About this topic
These notes work through the CLAT PG 2018 question paper, solved question by question. The full paper has 150 numbered questions, and the notes cover every one of them, including the questions that were officially omitted from scoring. For each question you get the options, the answer given in the supplied question paper, the legal principle behind it, and the method for approaching similar questions in the examination. This part covers the first block of the paper, Constitutional Law (Questions 1 to 18).
Constitutional Law
Question 1
The question is about a judgment, so the task is to identify the legal principle the Court actually decided.
Which of the following judgments was not over-ruled by the judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1?
- M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954) SCR 1077
- Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964) 1 SCR 332
- ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521
- Govind v. State of M.P. (1975) 2 SCC 148
Answer: (D) Govind v. State of M.P. (1975) 2 SCC 148
The principle. The privacy judgment recognised privacy as a fundamental right under Article 21, connected with liberty and dignity.
- It rejected the contrary privacy positions in M.P. Sharma and the majority reasoning in Kharak Singh.
- It also rejected the Emergency-era position in ADM Jabalpur.
- Govind had already recognised privacy interests, although with limits.
Privacy is not only about keeping secrets. It is also linked to personal choice, dignity, bodily autonomy and freedom from unjustified intrusion. In the privacy judgment the Supreme Court did not reject every earlier judgment that mentioned privacy. It rejected certain older reasons for denying privacy constitutional protection. That is why the word NOT in this question matters so much.
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017): Held: privacy is a fundamental right under Article 21, connected with liberty and dignity. The Court rejected the contrary positions in M.P. Sharma, the majority reasoning in Kharak Singh and the Emergency-era position in ADM Jabalpur. Principle: privacy covers personal choice, dignity, bodily autonomy and freedom from unjustified intrusion.
| Option | Effect of the privacy judgment |
|---|---|
| (A) M.P. Sharma | It had denied a constitutional right to privacy, and that reasoning was later rejected. |
| (B) Kharak Singh | The majority position denying privacy protection was disapproved. |
| (C) ADM Jabalpur | The privacy bench expressly rejected the Emergency-era conclusion. |
| (D) Govind | It had already recognised privacy interests (with limits), so it was not overruled. This is the correct answer. |
A later court may disagree with part of an earlier judgment without overruling every principle in that case.
Question 2
Rights over resources within the territorial waters, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, vest in the Union of India, under which provision of the Constitution of India?
- Article 297
- Article 51
- Article 253
- Article 260
Answer: (A) Article 297
The principle. Article 297 vests in the Union the lands, minerals and other things of value lying under the ocean within India's territorial waters, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone. The question is about who owns maritime resources. It is not about foreign affairs or the implementation of treaties.
The territorial waters, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone are three different maritime areas. "Vest in the Union" means that the Constitution itself gives the Union the specified rights in the underlying lands, minerals and other valuable things. Do not confuse this with Parliament's power to make laws about international treaties.
A company discovers minerals under the sea within an area covered by Article 297. Who owns those minerals is a constitutional question. It is a different question from a treaty issue about how States cooperate at sea.
| Provision | Subject |
|---|---|
| Article 297 | Union rights in the resources of the territorial waters, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (correct answer) |
| Article 51 | A Directive Principle on international peace, not ownership of sea resources |
| Article 253 | Legislation to implement international agreements |
| Article 260 | Jurisdiction outside India by agreement |
Remember Article 297 for Union rights in maritime resources. Article 253 deals with something else.
Question 3
The question is worded in the negative, so pick the option that does not fit the rule.
Which of the following is not a special procedure or feature in respect of a Money Bill?
- It shall not be introduced in the Council of States.
- The House of the People may not accept any recommendations of the Council of States and shall return the Money Bill to the Council of States requesting that the Council of States reconsider its recommendations.
- A Bill only imposing pecuniary penalties shall not be deemed to be a Money Bill.
- The House of the People may not accept any recommendations of the Council of States and the Money Bill shall be deemed to have been passed by both Houses.
Answer: (B) The House of the People may not accept any recommendations of the Council of States and shall return the Money Bill to the Council of States requesting that the Council of States reconsider its recommendations.
The principle (Articles 109 and 110).
- A Money Bill can be introduced only in the Lok Sabha.
- Under Article 109 the Rajya Sabha has only a recommending role. It must return the Bill within 14 days and may recommend changes, but it cannot force reconsideration.
- The Lok Sabha may accept or reject the recommendations. It does not send the Bill back for another round, and the Constitution provides no second cycle in which the Rajya Sabha reconsiders its own recommendations.
- Article 110 defines a Money Bill. A Bill solely about fines or fees is not automatically a Money Bill, and a Bill imposing fines alone is expressly excluded from the definition.
The Rajya Sabha recommends a change to a tax provision in a Money Bill. The Lok Sabha can disagree, and it does not have to send the recommendation back for a second vote.
| Option | Assessment |
|---|---|
| (A) | A genuine feature, because a Money Bill cannot originate in the Rajya Sabha. |
| (B) | Not a feature. No constitutional procedure returns the Bill so that the Rajya Sabha can reconsider its recommendations. This is the correct answer. |
| (C) | A genuine feature, because Article 110 excludes from the definition a Bill that only imposes monetary penalties. |
| (D) | A genuine feature. It describes what happens when the Lok Sabha does not adopt the Rajya Sabha's recommendations. |
Keep a recommendation and a binding veto apart. The Rajya Sabha only recommends on a Money Bill.
Question 4
The question is worded in the negative, so pick the option that does not fit the rule.
Which of the following shall not be eligible for further office under the Government of India or Government of any State?
- Speaker of the House of the People
- Comptroller and Auditor-General of India
- Attorney General for India
- Member of a Public Service Commission
Answer: (B) Comptroller and Auditor-General of India
The principle. Article 148(4) bars a person who has been Comptroller and Auditor-General from holding any further office under the Union or a State after leaving office. The other office-holders named in the options do not face this general constitutional bar in the same way.
The bar protects the independence of the CAG. It reduces pressure on the CAG and the expectation of a future appointment. Other constitutional offices have different rules. The words "further office" are the heart of the question.
An auditor knows that a powerful department could reward him with another government post. Disqualification from further office helps prevent such expectations from undermining independent auditing.
| Option | Assessment |
|---|---|
| (A) Speaker | Not subject to this general bar on later government office. |
| (B) CAG | Barred from further office by Article 148(4). This is the correct answer. |
| (C) Attorney-General | Appointed under Article 76, which contains no similar general prohibition. |
| (D) Member of a Public Service Commission | Subject to special rules on further employment, but not to the exact, absolute CAG rule this question tests. |
Always link a constitutional disqualification to its exact office and its exact provision.
Question 5
Part IX of the Constitution of India providing for constitution of Panchayats was introduced to give effect to which provision of the Constitution?
- Article 40
- Article 21A
- Article 23
- Article 48
Answer: (A) Article 40
The principle. Article 40 directs the State to organise village panchayats as units of self-government. Part IX was inserted by the Seventy-third Amendment and gives the panchayat system constitutional status.
A Directive Principle is a constitutional direction to governments, although it is not ordinarily directly enforceable in the way a Fundamental Right is. Article 40 asks the State to organise village panchayats. The Seventy-third Amendment later built a much more detailed constitutional system of rural local self-government in Part IX.
A village elects representatives to decide its priorities for water and roads. The constitutional panchayat system provides the framework for that local decision-making.
| Provision | Subject |
|---|---|
| Article 40 | Organisation of village panchayats (correct answer) |
| Article 21A | Education for children aged 6 to 14 |
| Article 23 | Prohibition of trafficking and forced labour |
| Article 48 | Agriculture, animal husbandry and cow protection |
Directive Principles can guide later constitutional reforms. Part IX gave effect to Article 40.
Question 6
Which Constitution (Amendment) Act brought about modifications to Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles of State Policy as well as Fundamental Duties?
- The Constitution (Eightieth Amendment) Act, 1999
- The Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002
- The Constitution (One Hundredth Amendment) Act, 2015
- The Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 2005
Answer: (B) The Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002
The principle. The Eighty-sixth Amendment changed all three Parts:
| Part affected | Change made |
|---|---|
| Fundamental Rights | Inserted Article 21A, a right to education for children aged 6 to 14. |
| Directive Principles | Revised Article 45, now about early childhood care. |
| Fundamental Duties | Inserted Article 51A(k), a duty on parents and guardians to provide educational opportunities to children aged 6 to 14. |
None of the other options (the Eightieth, One Hundredth and Ninety-third Amendments) matches this three-part change. Do not choose an option just because it contains familiar legal words.
A single amendment can change Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles and Fundamental Duties together. The Eighty-sixth Amendment, 2002 is the standard example.
Question 7
On which of the following matter in List II to Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India is the Legislative Assembly for the National Capital Territory of Delhi empowered to make laws?
- Banking
- Police
- Rights in land
- Officers and servants of the High Court
Answer: (D) Officers and servants of the High Court
The principle. Delhi is a Union Territory with a specially elected Legislative Assembly. Article 239AA gives that Assembly important but limited powers over State List and Concurrent List matters, so it is not the same as a full State legislature.
- Three subjects are excluded from its powers: public order, police and land.
- Banking is a Union List matter.
- Officers and servants of the High Court fall under a State List entry that is not one of the three excluded subjects.
Do not mix up "rights in land", which is excluded, with officers and servants of the High Court.
A proposed law on police powers within Delhi falls in a field the Constitution excludes. For a proposed law on a permitted State List subject, the result can be different.
| Option | Assessment |
|---|---|
| (A) Banking | A Union List subject, not a State List subject as the question requires. |
| (B) Police | Expressly excluded from the Delhi Assembly's power by Article 239AA. |
| (C) Rights in land | Expressly excluded by Article 239AA. |
| (D) Officers and servants of the High Court | A State List subject that is not excluded. This is the correct answer. |
Delhi is not the same as a full State. Always check the Article 239AA exclusions: public order, police and land.
Question 8
The question is about a judgment, so the task is to identify the legal principle the Court actually decided.
In which of the following judgments was it held that the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Article 226 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution of India?
- Common Cause v. Union of India (1999) 6 SCC 667
- L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261
- In re Special Courts Bill (1979) 1 SCC 380
- S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1
Answer: (B) L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261
The principle. Judicial review means that courts examine whether government action and legislation are lawful. The judicial review exercised by the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227, and by the Supreme Court under Article 32, is part of the basic structure. Tribunals can supplement this constitutional judicial review but cannot replace it.
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997): Held: the High Courts' power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 and the Supreme Court's power under Article 32 form part of the basic structure. Tribunal decisions remain open to review by the constitutional courts. Principle: tribunals can supplement constitutional judicial review, but an ordinary tribunal cannot completely replace the High Court and the Supreme Court in that function.
| Option | Assessment |
|---|---|
| (A) Common Cause | Not the ruling on tribunals and the basic structure that the question describes. |
| (B) L. Chandra Kumar | The ruling on tribunals and the basic structure. This is the correct answer. |
| (C) In re Special Courts Bill | A different constitutional case, decided on a reference. |
| (D) S.R. Bommai | Known chiefly for federalism, secularism and Article 356. |
The basic structure protects the judiciary's power to test whether action is constitutionally valid.
Question 9
The National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 was declared as unconstitutional and void in:
- Youth Bar Association of India v. Union of India (2016) 9 SCC 473
- Common Cause v. Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 332
- Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1571
- Supreme Court Advocate-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1
Answer: (D) Supreme Court Advocate-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1
The principle. The National Judicial Appointments Commission would have changed the system of appointing judges. The Supreme Court struck down both the Ninety-ninth Constitutional Amendment and the related Commission Act. Judicial independence was central to the decision.
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (decided 2015, reported 2016): a challenge to the Ninety-ninth Amendment and the National Judicial Appointments Commission framework. Held: both the Amendment and the Commission Act were struck down on the ground of judicial independence. Principle: judicial independence is an important feature of the basic structure.
| Option | Assessment |
|---|---|
| (A) Youth Bar Association | About a different issue: access to information on criminal cases. |
| (B) Common Cause | Not the judgment that invalidated the Commission. |
| (C) Madras Bar Association | About tribunals and institutional independence, not the Commission. |
| (D) Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association | Struck down the Ninety-ninth Amendment and the Commission Act. This is the correct answer. |
The decision was delivered in 2015, but the cited law report is from 2016. Do not confuse this case with the tribunal cases or other public interest cases.
Question 10
The question is about a judgment, so the task is to identify the legal principle the Court actually decided.
Which of the following is the correct position in law regarding administration of narco-analysis techniques, in the light of the judgment in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263?
- Compulsory administration constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in the context of Article 21.
- Compulsory administration violates the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3).
- Compulsory administration may, however, be justifiable in compelling public interest in combatting terrorist activities.
- Information subsequently discovered with the help of voluntarily administered narco-analysis results may be admitted in evidence.
Select the correct answer from the following:
- Statement 2 and Statement 4 only
- Statement 1 and Statement 2 only
- Statement 1, Statement 2 and Statement 4 only
- Statement 3 and Statement 4 only
Answer: (C) Statement 1, Statement 2 and Statement 4 only
The principle. Self-incrimination means being compelled to provide testimonial material against yourself. Narco-analysis is a drug-assisted process of questioning.
- Compulsory narco-analysis, polygraph and brain-mapping tests violate constitutional protections, including the rights under Articles 20(3) and 21. Statements 1 and 2 are therefore correct.
- The Court treated involuntary testimonial statements differently from evidence discovered after a voluntary procedure. Such later discoveries can be admitted, subject to the limits of evidence law. Statement 4 is therefore correct.
- A voluntary test still does not make every answer given during it admissible evidence.
- The Court did not lay down any general terrorism exception allowing forced tests. A public-interest argument does not automatically permit compulsion, so Statement 3 is wrong.
Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010): concerned compulsory narco-analysis, polygraph and brain-mapping tests. Held: compulsory administration of these techniques violates Articles 20(3) and 21. Information discovered later with the help of a voluntarily administered test is a separate evidentiary matter and may be admitted, subject to evidence-law limits. There is no terrorism or public-interest exception permitting compulsion. Principle: consent and constitutional protection are central to these tests.
Police force Aadil to undergo drug-assisted questioning. The compulsion itself engages his constitutional rights. If he had cooperated voluntarily, any physical evidence discovered later would raise a separate legal question.
| Option | Assessment |
|---|---|
| (A) Statements 2 and 4 | Leaves out Statement 1, which is correct. |
| (B) Statements 1 and 2 | Leaves out Statement 4, which is correct. |
| (C) Statements 1, 2 and 4 | Includes every correct statement and nothing else. This is the correct answer. |
| (D) Statements 3 and 4 | Leaves out Statements 1 and 2, and includes Statement 3, which is wrong. |
Consent and constitutional protection are the core of Selvi. Material discovered afterwards is a separate question of evidence.
Question 11
The Constitution (One Hundred and First) Amendment Act, 2016 was required to be ratified by the Legislature of not less than one half of the State Legislatures because it sought to make changes in:
- Chapter I of Part XI of the Constitution dealing with legislative relations between the Union and the States.
- Lists I and II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
- The Sixth Schedule to the Constitution.
- Part XIII of the Constitution dealing with trade, commerce and intercourse within India.
Select the correct answer from the following:
- All the four reasons.
- It was not required to be ratified by the State Legislatures before being presented to the President for assent.
- Statement 2 only.
- Statement 1 and Statement 2 only.
Answer: (D) Statement 1 and Statement 2 only
The principle. Ratification by the States is not needed for every constitutional amendment. Under the proviso to Article 368(2), ratification by at least half the States is needed only for amendments that affect certain listed federal matters.
The Goods and Services Tax (GST) amendment changed federal legislative arrangements. It affected Union–State legislative relations and the distribution of subjects among the entries of the Seventh Schedule. Those changes triggered the ratification requirement. The mere fact that an amendment mentions other Parts or Schedules of the Constitution does not trigger it.
| Option | Assessment |
|---|---|
| (A) All four | Includes Statements 3 and 4, which are not grounds for ratification. |
| (B) No ratification needed | Wrong, because Statements 1 and 2 did require ratification. |
| (C) Statement 2 only | Leaves out Statement 1. |
| (D) Statements 1 and 2 | Includes every correct statement and nothing else. This is the correct answer. |
Learn exactly which matters are listed in the proviso to Article 368(2). Only those require ratification by the States.
Question 12
Question 12 was omitted from valuation in the supplied CLAT PG 2018 question paper and was not counted for scoring. It is listed here only to keep the numbering in sequence.
Question 13
A majority of not less than two-third of the membership of the House concerned is not necessary for removal of which of the following authority?
- A Judge of the High Court
- The President of India
- The Chief Election Commissioner
- The Speaker of the House of the People
Answer: (D) The Speaker of the House of the People
The principle. Article 94 governs the removal of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha. It requires a majority of all the then members of the House, not a two-thirds majority of the total membership. The President and judges are removed by different procedures that require special majorities.
The other options (a High Court Judge, the President and the Chief Election Commissioner) do not fit the rule explained above. Do not choose an option just because it contains familiar legal words.
Learn the difference between a majority of the total membership and a majority of the members present and voting.
Question 14
Which of the following Commission(s) has/have a constitutional status, as of April, 2017?
- National Commission for Scheduled Castes
- National Commission for Backward Classes
- National Commission for Scheduled Tribes
- National Human Rights Commission
- Statement 1, Statement 2 and Statement 3 only
- Statement 1 and Statement 3 only
- Statement 1, Statement 2, Statement 3 and Statement 4
- Statement 1 only
Answer: (B) Statement 1 and Statement 3 only
The principle. A constitutional commission gets its status from the text of the Constitution. A statutory commission is created by an ordinary Act of Parliament.
| Commission | Status as of April 2017 |
|---|---|
| National Commission for Scheduled Castes | Constitutional, with an express constitutional basis |
| National Commission for Backward Classes | Not yet constitutional. It gained constitutional status only through the One Hundred and Second Amendment in 2018. |
| National Commission for Scheduled Tribes | Constitutional, with an express constitutional basis |
| National Human Rights Commission | Statutory |
Option (A) wrongly includes Statement 2. Option (C) wrongly includes Statements 2 and 4. Option (D) leaves out Statement 3.
Always respect the date built into a constitutional law question. Never answer a question about the law at a past date by applying a later amendment.
Question 15
Which of the following reason(s) was/were considered necessary for the Constitution (Seventy-Seventh) Amendment Act, 1995 inserting Article 16(4A)?
- Inadequacy of representation of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in services in the States.
- Reservation in promotion was held constitutionally impermissible in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477.
- To prevent qualitative exclusion of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in services in the States.
- To achieve inter-locking in horizontal and vertical reservation among the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in services in the States.
Select the correct answer from the following:
- Statement 1 only
- Statement 1 and Statement 2 only
- Statement 1, Statement 2 and Statement 4 only
- Statement 1, Statement 2, Statement 3 and Statement 4
Answer: (B) Statement 1 and Statement 2 only
The principle. After the ruling in Indra Sawhney, the Seventy-seventh Amendment inserted Article 16(4A) to enable reservation in promotion for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The relevant reasons were the inadequate representation of these groups and the Indra Sawhney ruling on promotions. The other suggested reasons (qualitative exclusion, and interlocking horizontal and vertical reservation) are not the basis tested here.
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1993): Held: reservation in promotion is constitutionally impermissible. Principle: this ruling, together with the inadequate representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in State services, led to the Seventy-seventh Amendment inserting Article 16(4A).
| Option | Assessment |
|---|---|
| (A) Statement 1 | Leaves out Statement 2. |
| (B) Statements 1 and 2 | Includes every correct statement and nothing else. This is the correct answer. |
| (C) Statements 1, 2 and 4 | Wrongly includes Statement 4. |
| (D) All four | Wrongly includes Statements 3 and 4. |
An enabling provision for reservation does not mean reservation is automatic in every case.
Question 16
Which of the following provision(s) applicable to the Supreme Court is/are also applicable to the High Courts?
- Article 124(4)
- Article 124(5)
- Article 129
- Article 144
Select the correct answer from the following:
- Statement 1 and Statement 2 only
- Statement 1, Statement 2 and Statement 4 only
- Statement 3 and Statement 4 only
- Statement 3 only
Answer: (A) Statement 1 and Statement 2 only
The principle.
- Proviso (b) to Article 217(1) applies the removal method of Article 124(4) to High Court judges.
- Article 218 applies clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 to the High Courts.
- Article 129 declares the Supreme Court a court of record. Article 215 deals separately with the High Courts, so Article 129 itself does not apply to them.
| Option | Assessment |
|---|---|
| (A) Statements 1 and 2 | Includes every correct statement and nothing else. This is the correct answer. |
| (B) Statements 1, 2 and 4 | Wrongly includes Statement 4. |
| (C) Statements 3 and 4 | Leaves out Statements 1 and 2, and wrongly includes Statements 3 and 4. |
| (D) Statement 3 | Leaves out Statements 1 and 2, and wrongly includes Statement 3. |
Article 218 is the link that applies the Supreme Court's removal provisions (Article 124(4) and (5)) to High Court judges.
Question 17
Which of the following statement(s) is/are correct, regarding the duties and rights of the Attorney-General for India in performance of his duties?
- The Attorney-General for India shall give advice to the Government of India upon legal matters.
- The Attorney-General for India shall have a right to audience in all Courts in India.
- The Attorney-General for India shall have the right to speak in the proceedings of either House.
- The Attorney-General for India shall not be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said by him in Parliament or any committee thereof.
- Statement 1 and Statement 2 only
- Statement 1, Statement 2 and Statement 3 only
- All of these statements are correct.
- Statement 1 only
Answer: (C) All of these statements are correct.
The principle. These rules come from different provisions, so Article 76 should be learnt together with Articles 88 and 105.
| Provision | Right or duty of the Attorney-General |
|---|---|
| Article 76 | Duty to advise the Union Government on legal matters, and a right of audience in all courts in India (Statements 1 and 2) |
| Article 88 | Right to speak in, and take part in, the proceedings of either House, but no right to vote by virtue of the office (Statement 3) |
| Article 105 | Parliamentary immunity for speech in the relevant House proceedings, within its scope (Statement 4) |
Option (A) leaves out Statements 3 and 4. Option (B) leaves out Statement 4. Option (D) leaves out Statements 2, 3 and 4.
The right to speak in Parliament does not make the Attorney-General a voting member.
Question 18
Which of the following Fundamental Rights is enforceable against private individuals?
- Article 17
- Article 23
- Article 24
- Article 21
Choose the correct answer from the following:
- Fundamental Rights are not enforceable against private individuals.
- All are enforceable against private individuals.
- Statement 1, Statement 2 and Statement 3 only.
- Statement 2 and Statement 3 only.
Answer: (C) Statement 1, Statement 2 and Statement 3 only
The principle. A Fundamental Right operates horizontally when it can be invoked against certain conduct of private persons, not only against government officials.
- Article 17: untouchability can be practised by private persons.
- Article 23: trafficking and forced labour can be committed by non-state actors.
- Article 24: prohibits child labour in specified occupations.
- Article 21: framed mainly as protection against deprivation by the State, although the State may have positive duties to protect people from private harm.
A private contractor forces workers to work against their will. The constitutional concern under Article 23 remains even though the contractor is not the government.
| Option | Assessment |
|---|---|
| (A) None enforceable | Leaves out Statements 1, 2 and 3. |
| (B) All enforceable | Wrongly includes Statement 4 (Article 21). |
| (C) Statements 1, 2 and 3 | Includes every correct statement and nothing else. This is the correct answer. |
| (D) Statements 2 and 3 | Leaves out Statement 1 (Article 17). |
Some Fundamental Rights operate horizontally, meaning they apply against private actors as well. Articles 17, 23 and 24 are the standard examples.
Constitutional Law (continued)
Question 19
Which of the following procedure was adopted to give effect to the land boundary agreement between India and Bangladesh in 2015?
- A law made by Parliament under Article 3 of the Constitution of India.
- The Constitution (100th Amendment) Act.
- The Constitution (98th Amendment) Act.
- By an executive action.
Answer: (B) The Constitution (100th Amendment) Act.
The India-Bangladesh land boundary arrangements involved territorial exchange. They were implemented through the 100th Constitutional Amendment.
- Article 3 alone is not enough for ceding Indian territory to another country.
- Options (A), (C) and (D) do not state the rule that governs a transfer of territory to a foreign country.
Distinguish ordinary internal State boundary changes (Article 3 law) from a territorial transfer to a foreign country (constitutional amendment).
Question 20
Which of the following statements is incorrect in view of the judgment in Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014) 8 SCC 1?
- Article 15(5) does not violate the freedom of private unaided educational institutions under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.
- Articles 15(5) and 21A do not alter the basic structure of the Constitution and are constitutionally valid.
- A law made under Article 15(5) of the Constitution shall not be open to challenge under Article 14, if it treats private aided and unaided educational institutions alike.
- Article 15(5), insofar as it is applicable to minority educational institutions referred to in Article 30(1) of the Constitution, is ultra vires the Constitution.
Answer: (C) A law made under Article 15(5) of the Constitution shall not be open to challenge under Article 14, if it treats private aided and unaided educational institutions alike.
Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014): concerned the right to education and the educational rights of minorities under Article 30. Held: Article 15(5) expressly excludes Article 30 minority institutions from its application; the Court also protected minority educational institutions from the application of the RTE Act in the manner considered there. Principle: a constitutional provision being valid does not mean every law made in its name becomes immune from an equality challenge.
- Article 30 gives minorities educational rights.
- Article 15(5) contains an exception for educational institutions covered by Article 30(1).
- The claim in option (C), that such laws cannot face Article 14 review merely because aided and unaided schools are treated alike, is too broad. It is therefore the incorrect statement.
A valid enabling constitutional provision does not automatically immunise every law made under it from equality review under Article 14.
Question 21
From where did the Drafting Committee borrow the expression "except according to procedure established by law" for Article 21 of the Indian Constitution?
- Irish Constitution.
- Swedish Constitution.
- Australian Constitution.
- Japanese Constitution.
Answer: (D) Japanese Constitution.
The phrase "procedure established by law" in Article 21 was influenced by Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan. In Maneka Gandhi, the Supreme Court interpreted that procedure to require fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness.
| Option | Why it is not the source of the phrase |
|---|---|
| (A) Irish Constitution | Famous as one influence on the Directive Principles. |
| (B) Swedish Constitution | Swedish law is not the textual source identified for Article 21. |
| (C) Australian Constitution | Supplied other constitutional influences, not this phrase. |
Compare the textual borrowing (Japan) with the later interpretation of Article 21 (Maneka Gandhi: the procedure must be fair, reasonable and non-arbitrary).
Question 22
In which of the following decisions the Supreme Court framed guidelines for safeguarding the interest of the death row convicts?
- Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 1.
- Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P. (2006) 8 SCC 161.
- People's Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 10 SCC 635.
- Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494.
Answer: (A) Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 1.
Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014): dealt with the treatment of death row prisoners. Held: the Court considered the effect of unreasonable delay, mental illness and procedural safeguards on execution, and framed guidelines safeguarding death row convicts. Principle: a death sentence does not remove basic constitutional protections.
The other cited cases concern clemency review, police encounters or prison conditions, not guidelines for death row convicts.
A death sentence does not remove basic constitutional protections.
Question 23
Which of the following does not follow from the law declared in National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014) 5 SCC 438, in respect of rights of the members of the transgender community?
- Recognition to gender identity as male, female or as third gender.
- Steps to treat the third gender as a socially and economically backward class.
- Extending special provisions relating to certain classes as contained in Article 330 of the Constitution.
- Extending reservation in cases of admission in educational institutions and public appointments.
Answer: (C) Extending special provisions relating to certain classes as contained in Article 330 of the Constitution.
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014): concerned the rights of the transgender community. Held: the judgment recognised the gender identity of transgender persons and called for their appropriate treatment as socially and educationally backward groups, with reservation measures in admissions and public appointments. Principle: the directions relate to educational and employment measures, not reservation of legislative seats.
Article 330 concerns reserved seats in the Lok Sabha for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. That was not one of the directions in NALSA, so option (C) does not follow from the judgment.
Do not confuse educational and employment measures (reservation in admissions and public appointments) with legislative seat reservation (Article 330).
Question 24
Which of the following were relevant considerations for prohibition on sale of liquor along national and state highways in State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Balu (2017) 2 SCC 281?
- There is no fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) to trade in liquor.
- Under Article 47, the State is under a duty to raise the level of nutrition, standard of living and improve public health.
- An exception to permit the sale of liquor along a stretch of the highway which passes through the limits of city is arbitrary and violative of Article 14.
- Right to life under Article 21 signifies a right to live with human dignity, free of noxious substances and intoxicants.
Choose the correct answer from the following:
- All the four statements are correct.
- Statement 1 and statement 3 only.
- Statement 1, statement 2 and statement 3 only.
- Statement 1, statement 2 and statement 4 only.
Answer: (C) Statement 1, statement 2 and statement 3 only.
State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Balu (2017): concerned the prohibition on sale of liquor along national and state highways. Held: the Court linked highway liquor restrictions with public health, road safety and Article 47, dealing with the risk of road accidents caused by alcohol. Trade in liquor is not protected like ordinary trade under Article 19(1)(g). Principle: commercial activity involving liquor receives different constitutional treatment from ordinary trade.
- Article 47 encourages improved public health.
- The narrow issue involving highway stretches within municipalities needs attention to the actual judgment, rather than a broad statement that every liquor restriction is always constitutional.
- The exact numbered combination should be checked against the judgment, because the Article 21 phrasing in statement 4 is broad.
| Option | Assessment |
|---|---|
| (A) All four | Statement 4 uses a broad Article 21 formulation which does not represent the relevant grounds in the same way as the other three. |
| (B) 1 and 3 only | Omits the relevant Article 47 public-health principle in statement 2. |
| (C) 1, 2 and 3 only | The combination selected in the question paper: regulation of liquor trade, public health and unequal highway exceptions. |
| (D) 1, 2 and 4 only | Includes the broad statement 4 while leaving out the relevant Article 14 objection in statement 3. |
Separate the Court's actual reasons from general statements about health and dignity.
Question 25
Which of the following reasons led to the setting aside of the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat', triple talaq in Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1?
- Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 was a pre-constitutional legislation within the meaning of Article 13(1) and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the ground of arbitrariness.
- Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 was a pre-constitutional legislation within the meaning of Article 13(1) and violative of Article 15 of the Constitution of India, being discriminatory.
- Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 is not a law regulating triple talaq but the practice of triple talaq was against the basic tenets of the Holy Quran and no practice against the tenets of Quran was permissible.
- 'Talaq-e-biddat' is integral to the religious denomination but the Supreme Court may injunct this practice as a means for severing matrimonial relationship.
- Statement 1 and statement 2 only.
- Statement 1, statement 2 and statement 3 only.
- Statement 1 and statement 4 only.
- Statement 1 and statement 3 only.
Answer: (D) Statement 1 and statement 3 only.
Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017): challenge to instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat). Held: instant triple talaq was invalidated by a 3:2 majority, but the majority judges relied on different reasons. Principle: a fractured judgment can produce one outcome through different lines of reasoning.
| Judges in the majority | Line of reasoning |
|---|---|
| Justices Nariman and Lalit | Applied the arbitrariness analysis (Article 14) to the 1937 Act (statement 1). |
| Justice Kurian Joseph | A practice contrary to the Quran could not be treated as valid under the relevant Muslim law (statement 3). |
- Statement 2 does not belong: do not say that the whole majority adopted a single Article 15 theory, or that all judges found a violation of Article 15.
- Statement 4 does not belong in the group of reasons.
- Option (A) leaves out statement 3 and includes statement 2; option (B) includes statement 2; option (C) leaves out statement 3 and includes statement 4.
Shayara Bano is an important example of a divided majority: three judges set aside instant triple talaq, but not all three used the same constitutional reasoning.
Question 26
Which is the correct position in law on an Ordinance promulgated under Article 123 of the Constitution of India, following the judgment in Krishna Kumar v. State of Bihar (2017) 3 SCC 1?
- Power conferred upon the President under Article 123 is legislative in character and the satisfaction of the President is immune from judicial review.
- An Ordinance promulgated under Article 123 must be laid before the Parliament, which is a mandatory constitutional obligation cast upon the government.
- An Ordinance promulgated in exercise of powers under Article 213 cannot create enduring rights in favour of individuals.
- Re-promulgation of an Ordinance is a fraud on the Constitution.
Choose the correct answer from the following:
- All the four statements are correct.
- Statement 2, statement 3 and statement 4 only.
- Statement 2 and statement 4 only.
- Statement 1 only.
Answer: (B) Statement 2, statement 3 and statement 4 only.
An Ordinance is a temporary lawmaking measure issued when the legislature is not in session, under specified constitutional conditions.
Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017): concerned the repeated re-promulgation of Ordinances. Held: laying an Ordinance before the legislature is mandatory; routinely re-promulgating Ordinances can amount to a fraud on the Constitution; Presidential or gubernatorial satisfaction is reviewable on limited grounds and does not escape every form of judicial review; expired Ordinances do not automatically create permanent rights, and rights that have arisen under an expired Ordinance require a careful factual and legal assessment. Principle: Ordinance power is temporary legislative power, not an unlimited substitute for Parliament.
An executive repeatedly issues the same temporary Ordinance merely to avoid a legislative debate. The constitutional difficulty is not solved by giving the Ordinance a new date.
| Option | Assessment |
|---|---|
| (A) All four | Includes statement 1 (satisfaction immune from review), which does not belong. |
| (B) 2, 3 and 4 only | Includes the required statements and leaves out the others. |
| (C) 2 and 4 only | Leaves out statement 3, which belongs. |
| (D) 1 only | Leaves out statements 2, 3 and 4 and includes statement 1. |
Ordinance power is temporary legislative power, not an unlimited substitute for Parliament.
Question 27
Article 29 of the Constitution protects the rights of:
- Minorities based on religion or language.
- Citizens with distinct script or culture.
- Religious denominations.
- Socially and educationally backward class of citizens.
Answer: (B) Citizens with distinct script or culture.
Article 29(1) safeguards any section of Indian citizens with a distinct language, script or culture. The provision is not confined to religious minorities. Article 30 more specifically addresses minority educational institutions.
| Option | Why it is not correct |
|---|---|
| (A) Minorities based on religion or language | Article 29 is not restricted to religious or linguistic minorities alone. |
| (C) Religious denominations | Religious denominations have distinct protections, notably Article 26. |
| (D) Socially and educationally backward classes | Special provisions for backward classes arise under other constitutional provisions. |
Differentiate cultural protection in Article 29 from education rights in Article 30.
Question 28
In which case, the Supreme Court struck down that part of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 by which Article 31C was amended?
- Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.
- L.C. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.
- Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789.
- S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, 1987 SCR (3) 233.
Answer: (C) Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789.
Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1980): challenge to the Forty-second Amendment's change to Article 31C. Held: the Court struck down the Forty-second Amendment's attempted expansion of Article 31C to all Directive Principles. Principle: the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is part of the basic structure; no constitutional amendment may destroy the basic structure.
| Case | What it concerned |
|---|---|
| Kesavananda Bharati | Articulated the basic-structure doctrine, but did not decide the later Forty-second Amendment challenge. |
| Golak Nath | Parliament and the amendment of Fundamental Rights, before the Forty-second Amendment. |
| Minerva Mills | Struck down the Forty-second Amendment's expansion of Article 31C. |
| S.P. Sampath Kumar | The tribunal framework. |
No constitutional amendment may destroy the Constitution's basic structure.
Question 29
In which among the following cases did the Supreme Court hold that the petitioners have no fundamental right within the meaning of Article 25 or 26 to perform 'Tandava dance' in public streets and public places?
- Commr. HRE v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282.
- Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638.
- N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devasom Board, (2002) 8 SCC 106.
- Commr. of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770.
Answer: (D) Commr. of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770.
Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta (2004): the Anand Margis claimed a right to perform the Tandava dance in public. Held: the Supreme Court did not accept it as an essential religious practice requiring protection in the claimed form; there is no fundamental right under Article 25 or 26 to perform the Tandava dance in public streets and public places. Principle: essential religious practice questions turn on the practice and the judgment's specific findings.
Essential religious practice questions turn on the particular practice and the judgment's specific findings.
Question 30
Omitted. This question was omitted from valuation in the CLAT PG 2018 question paper and was not counted for scoring. It is listed here only to preserve the sequence.
Question 31
The idea of single citizenship in India was taken from the
- British Constitution.
- US Constitution.
- Australian Constitution.
- Weimar Constitution.
Answer: (A) British Constitution.
India adopted the idea of a single national citizenship from the British constitutional tradition. This differs from federal arrangements that separately recognise State citizenship alongside national citizenship.
Single citizenship means there is Indian citizenship rather than separate citizenship of each State.
A person may live in Goa or Odisha, but that person is not required to hold two different kinds of citizenship. He or she is simply an Indian citizen.
| Option | Why it is not correct |
|---|---|
| (B) US Constitution | The United States recognises federal and State citizenship ideas, unlike the model tested here. |
| (C) Australian Constitution | Australia supplied other institutional influences, but not single citizenship. |
| (D) Weimar Constitution | Not the usual historical source of this feature. |
Citizenship and the distribution of legislative powers are two different questions. Single citizenship is normally compared with federal systems that discuss national and subnational citizenship.
Question 32
With which amendment was clause (4) to Article 13, Constitution of India, inserted?
- The Constitution (Twenty-second Amendment) Act, 1969.
- The Constitution (Twenty-third Amendment) Act, 1969.
- The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971.
- The Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971.
Answer: (C) The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971.
- The Twenty-fourth Amendment inserted Article 13(4).
- Article 13(4) excludes constitutional amendments made under Article 368 from the definition of "law" for the purposes of Article 13.
- Kesavananda Bharati subsequently imposed the basic-structure limitation on the amendment power.
Article 13(4) does not allow destruction of the basic structure.
Question 33
Which Constitution Amendment Act brought into force the goods and services tax?
- 98th.
- 99th.
- 100th.
- 101st.
Answer: (D) 101st.
The 101st Constitutional Amendment of 2016 introduced the modern Goods and Services Tax framework, including Article 246A and the GST Council under Article 279A.
| Amendment | Subject |
|---|---|
| 98th | Did not create GST. |
| 99th | Judicial appointments. |
| 100th | Implemented the India-Bangladesh land boundary arrangement. |
| 101st | Goods and Services Tax (Article 246A; GST Council under Article 279A). |
The GST constitutional amendment number is 101.
Question 34
Which one of the following statements is not correct?
- The Jammu and Kashmir Code of Criminal Procedure has no provision for transfer of a case from a Court in Jammu and Kashmir to any Court outside that State and, therefore, no criminal case can be transferred from the State of Jammu and Kashmir to any other Court outside that State.
- Article 370 of the Constitution of India confers merely a "Temporary" status on the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
- Article 371-D and Presidential Orders issued thereunder override any other provision of the Constitution of India.
- The citizens of India have a fundamental right to reside and settle in any part of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
Answer: (A) The Jammu and Kashmir Code of Criminal Procedure has no provision for transfer of a case from a Court in Jammu and Kashmir to any Court outside that State and, therefore, no criminal case can be transferred from the State of Jammu and Kashmir to any other Court outside that State.
The question concerns the 2018 Jammu and Kashmir constitutional and procedural setting and must be read as a question about the law in 2018. The statement in option (A), claiming an absolute inability to transfer a criminal case outside the former State, is wrong because the Supreme Court's constitutional powers are separate from the State Code.
Anita Kushwaha v. Pushap Sudan: concerned transfer of proceedings between Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India, even though ordinary procedural statutes did not contain a straightforward transfer route. Held: the Supreme Court relied upon its constitutional powers and the importance of access to justice. Principle: the claim that transfer is categorically impossible is wrong.
- Option (A) is the answer indicated by the paper and supported by the reported authority, but the stated qualification and the exact question wording must be kept in mind.
- Major constitutional changes in August 2019 make this question time-sensitive.
- Changes after 2019 should not be used to answer this historical question.
Historical Jammu and Kashmir questions must be studied with their examination date clearly in mind. The paper is from 2018: keep historical examination law separate from later legal developments.
Question 35
Which of the following questions is not relevant in determining the existence of a constitutional convention?
- What are precedents?
- Did the actors in the precedent believe that they were bound by a rule?
- Are they justified in terms of morality?
- Is there any reason for the rule?
Answer: (C) Are they justified in terms of morality?
Constitutional convention means a political practice treated as binding by constitutional actors despite lacking ordinary legal enforcement.
The standard inquiry into whether a convention exists considers:
- the precedents;
- whether the participants in the precedents felt bound by a rule; and
- the reason for the rule.
A separate moral approval test is not part of that classic formulation. Hence option (C) is the irrelevant question.
A convention differs from enforceable written law.
Question 36
In which of the following cases, the Supreme Court issued detailed directions for the protection of Good Samaritans?
- Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, AIR 2016 SC 1617.
- Sabu Mathew George v. Union of India (2017) 2 SCC 514.
- Voluntary Health Association of Punjab v. Union of India, AIR 2016 SC 5122.
- Devika Biswas v. Union of India, AIR 2016 SC 4405.
Answer: (A) Savelife Foundation v. Union of India, AIR 2016 SC 1617.
SaveLIFE Foundation v. Union of India (2016): concerned protections for Good Samaritans, meaning people who help road-accident victims. Held: the Court issued directions reinforcing protections for such helpers against unnecessary harassment. Principle: a helper should not be discouraged from providing emergency assistance.
Good Samaritan = a person who helps a road-accident victim. A helper should not be discouraged from providing emergency assistance.
Question 37
In which of the following cases, the Supreme Court refused to give any relief to the petitioner(s) under Article 32?
- Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India, AIR 2016 SC 2929
- Bachpan Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, 2016 (12) SCALE 751
- Supreme Court Women Lawyers Association v. Union of India, AIR 2016 SC 358
- Suresh Chand Gautam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2016 SC 1321
Answer: (D) Suresh Chand Gautam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2016 SC 1321.
Suresh Chand Gautam v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2016): the petitioners sought directions requiring the collection of data supporting reservation in promotions. Held: the Court declined to issue the requested directions under Article 32. Principle: a court may recognise a constitutional concern and yet refuse the particular remedy requested.
The other three matters (Swaraj Abhiyan, Bachpan Bachao Andolan and Supreme Court Women Lawyers Association) involved different kinds of public law relief. None of them states the rule asked for; do not choose an option merely because it contains familiar legal words.
Exam tip: recognising a constitutional concern is not the same as granting the relief asked for. The Court may refuse the specific direction sought under Article 32.
Question 38
Right to life includes right to reputation was recognised in:
- Archbishop Raphael Cheenath S.V.D. v. State of Orissa, AIR 2016 SC 3639
- Shyam Narayan Chouksey v. Union of India (2017) 1 SCC 421
- Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, AIR 2016 SC 2728
- Karma Dorji v. Union of India, AIR 2017 SC 113
Answer: (C) Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, AIR 2016 SC 2728.
Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016): challenge to the constitutional validity of criminal defamation. Held: criminal defamation is constitutionally valid; reputation is acknowledged as an aspect of dignity under Article 21. Principle: the right to life includes the right to reputation. This does not make every statement criticising a person criminally defamatory.
Options A, B and D do not state this rule.
Reputation (Article 21) must be balanced against the freedom of speech under Article 19.
Question 39
Preventive Detention under Article 22 of the Constitution can be enforced:
- Only during the time of communal violence.
- Only when a proclamation of national emergency is made.
- Only when a proclamation of internal emergency is made.
- At any time during peace or war.
Answer: (D) At any time during peace or war.
Meaning of preventive detention
Preventive detention is detention intended to prevent anticipated harmful activity, rather than punishment for an offence already proved after conviction.
- Article 22 places constitutional safeguards on this power and also contains exceptions.
- A declared national emergency is not a general condition for the power to exist. It is inaccurate to say that all preventive detention requires a declared emergency.
- The law can permit preventive detention during peace or war, but statutory and constitutional requirements still apply.
Authorities lawfully detain a person under a valid statute to prevent a specified threatened activity. The detention is preventive, but the statute and the constitutional safeguards still matter.
Why the other options are wrong
- (A) Preventive detention is not limited to communal violence.
- (B) A declaration of national emergency is not a general precondition.
- (C) The older label "internal emergency" is also not a condition of ordinary preventive detention powers.
Preventive detention powers exist in peacetime too, subject to law and safeguards.
Question 40
Article 233A was introduced into the Constitution of India to validate the appointments of, and judgments, etc. delivered by certain District Judges. In which among the following cases were those appointments invalidated in a writ of Quo-warranto?
- Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1987
- Chandramouleshwar Prasad v. Patna High Court, AIR 1970 SC 370
- G.D. Karkare v. T.L. Shevde, AIR 1952 Nag 330
- Anand Bihari Mishra v. Ram Sahay, AIR 1952 MB 31
Answer: (A) Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1987.
Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1966): concerned the appointment of District Judges contrary to the requirements of Article 233. Held: those appointments were invalid. Article 233A was later inserted to address the validity of certain such appointments and the judgments delivered by those judges.
Options B, C and D do not state this rule.
The rules for appointment of District Judges are constitutionally specified (Article 233); Article 233A is the validating provision.
Question 41
Which one of the following statements is correct?
- The Court has no jurisdiction to see whether the procedure established by law in Parliament is reasonable or not.
- The procedure which is arbitrary or oppressive is not a valid procedure.
- The requirement of compliance with the principles of natural justice is not implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution.
- The Doctrine of 'Due Process' is not implied in Article 21.
Answer: (B) The procedure which is arbitrary or oppressive is not a valid procedure.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India: transformed the meaning of "procedure established by law" under Article 21. Held: a procedure depriving a person of life or personal liberty cannot be arbitrary, unfair or oppressive. Principle: an enacted procedure is not automatically sufficient merely because the legislature has called it law; Articles 14, 19 and 21 must be read together in light of their constitutional relationship.
Why the other options are wrong
- (A) does not state the rule; after Maneka Gandhi the Court does examine whether the procedure is fair and reasonable.
- (C) and (D) are restrictive or negative statements that do not accurately capture the governing rule.
Article 21 requires a fair, just and reasonable procedure.
Question 42
In which case was it held that the authority which "embarks upon a post-decisional hearing will naturally proceed with a closed mind and there is hardly any chance of getting a proper consideration of the representation at such a post-decisional opportunity"?
- Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248
- Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1271
- Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1480
- H.L. Trehan v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 568
Answer: (D) H.L. Trehan v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 568.
H.L. Trehan v. Union of India (1989): a hearing was given to employees only after a decision adversely affecting them had been taken. Held: the Court criticised the practical weakness of a post-decisional hearing, since the authority has already made up its mind. Principle: a post-decisional hearing is unlikely to give the representation proper consideration.
Options A, B and C do not state this rule.
Natural justice generally favours a fair hearing before adverse action, subject to recognised exceptions.
Question 43
Which one of the following statements is incorrect?
- Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to goods and services tax where the supply of goods, or of services, or both takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.
- The tax collected by the Union under Clause (1) of Article 246A shall not be distributed between the Union and the States.
- The Goods and Services Tax Council has power to establish a mechanism to adjudicate any dispute between the Government of India and one or more States.
- Article 279A is an entrenched provision under Article 368 of the Constitution of India.
Answer: (B) The tax collected by the Union under Clause (1) of Article 246A shall not be distributed between the Union and the States.
This is a negatively worded question: the option that does not fit the governing rule must be identified.
| Provision | Subject |
|---|---|
| Article 246A | Authorises GST lawmaking |
| Article 269A | Inter-State supply |
| Article 279A | Establishes the GST Council |
| Article 368 | Article 279A is listed among the matters requiring State ratification for certain amendments (entrenched provision) |
Options A, C and D are correct statements. The false proposition is the absolute claim in option B that GST collected by the Union is not distributed at all.
Do not mix up legislative power (Article 246A), tax distribution and amendment entrenchment (Article 368).
Question 44
In which of the following cases the reservation for Jats was struck down?
- Ram Singh v. Union of India, 2015 (3) SCALE 570
- U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Rajesh Kumar, AIR 2012 SC 2728
- Prem Kumar Singh v. State of U.P., 2011 (3) ALJ 343
- Dr. Gulshan Prakash v. State of Haryana (2009) 14 SCALE 290
Answer: (A) Ram Singh v. Union of India, 2015 (3) SCALE 570.
Ram Singh v. Union of India (2015): concerned the inclusion of Jats in the central list of backward classes. Held: the particular inclusion was invalidated. Principle: inclusion requires adequate contemporary evidence of backwardness.
Options B, C and D do not state this rule.
A claim to reservation must meet constitutional standards and be backed by evidence.
Question 45
Is a writ petition for mandamus maintainable in any of the following cases?
- Against a citizen for performance of his fundamental duties.
- Against a private University established by an Act of State Legislature.
- Against a private trust running coaching classes.
- Against a lawyer restraining him from filing public interest litigations.
Answer: (B) Against a private University established by an Act of State Legislature.
Mandamus is a command to perform a public or statutory duty.
- A private university created by State legislation may perform public or statutory duties and can therefore sometimes face mandamus.
- A purely private, personal dispute is different; options A, C and D do not involve such a public duty.
For mandamus, focus on the public nature of the duty, not only on the private label of the body.
Question 46
For prevention of corruption, provisions have been made under which of the legislations?
- The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
- The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013
- The Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003
Choose the correct answer from the following:
- 1 only
- 1 and 3 only
- 3 only
- 1, 2 and 3
Answer: (D) 1, 2 and 3.
All three named laws contain anti-corruption arrangements:
| Legislation | Role |
|---|---|
| Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 | Addresses corruption offences (criminal enforcement) |
| Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 | Creates anti-corruption oversight |
| Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003 | Gives statutory structure to vigilance oversight |
Options A, B and C are restrictive and leave out laws that contain anti-corruption provisions.
Learn the separate roles of criminal enforcement, the Lokpal and vigilance institutions.
Question 47
The Supreme Court may review the award given by the Inter-State Water Dispute Tribunal by invoking
- Article 142
- Article 131
- Article 262
- Article 136
Answer: (D) Article 136.
- Article 136 provides the Supreme Court with special leave appellate jurisdiction in suitable cases.
- In the Cauvery proceedings, the Court clarified that an appeal against a water-dispute tribunal decision can lie under Article 136, notwithstanding the special statutory scheme, in the circumstances considered.
- Article 262 permits Parliament to exclude the ordinary jurisdiction of courts in certain water disputes. Its relationship with Article 136 and the statutory restrictions on inter-State water disputes requires care.
- The broad assertion that the Court may "review" a tribunal award cannot ignore these jurisdictional limits. Option D is the answer indicated by the paper, but this qualification and the wording of the question must be kept in mind.
Options A (Article 142), B (Article 131) and C (Article 262) do not state the rule.
Distinguish the tribunal's original dispute-resolution function from appellate scrutiny by the Supreme Court under Article 136. Do not confuse Article 136 with Article 262.
Question 48
For approval or extension of emergency under Article 352 it is required that there should be
- Resolution by both Houses of Parliament by a majority of total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of members present and voting.
- Resolution by both Houses of Parliament by a simple majority of members present and voting.
- Resolution by both Houses of Parliament by a majority of total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of members present and voting and ratification by not less than one-half of the States.
- Resolution by both Houses of Parliament by a majority of total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than three-fourth of members present and voting.
Answer: (A) Resolution by both Houses of Parliament by a majority of total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of members present and voting.
Article 352 requires approval of a national emergency by each House with a special majority:
- more than half of the total membership of that House; and
- at least two-thirds of the members present and voting.
- (B) An ordinary simple majority is insufficient.
- (C) State ratification is not an added requirement here.
- (D) The requirement is two-thirds, not three-fourths, of members present and voting.
There are two separate numerical tests in the emergency approval majority: majority of total membership and two-thirds of members present and voting.
Question 49
Double Jeopardy means:
- No person shall be prosecuted and compelled to be a witness in the same case simultaneously.
- No person shall be sued for a civil wrong and prosecuted for an offence simultaneously.
- No person shall be prosecuted for two offences simultaneously.
- No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.
Answer: (D) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.
Article 20(2) prohibits a person being prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. This is the Indian constitutional protection against double jeopardy. It is not a general rule against civil and criminal cases arising from similar facts.
| Article 20(2) | Article 20(3) |
|---|---|
| Double jeopardy | Self-incrimination |
| No prosecution and punishment more than once for the same offence | Protection against self-incrimination, such as being compelled to testify |
Why the other options are wrong
- (A) Being compelled to testify falls under the self-incrimination doctrine in Article 20(3), not the clause (2) rule.
- (B) Civil litigation and criminal prosecution do not necessarily engage double jeopardy for the same offence.
- (C) Two separate alleged offences are not automatically barred merely because proceedings run together.
Double jeopardy concerns repeat prosecution and punishment for the same offence.
Question 50
This question was omitted from valuation in the CLAT PG 2018 question paper and was not counted for scoring. Its place in the sequence is preserved.
Jurisprudence
Question 51
Eight Principles of Internal Morality of Law were propounded by
- Hart
- Hobbes
- Kelsen
- Lon L Fuller
Answer: (D) Lon L Fuller.
Lon Fuller described eight ways in which a legal system can fail to guide human conduct, such as secret rules, retroactive rules, contradictions, impossibility, constant changes and gaps between official conduct and the stated law. He called these concerns the internal morality of law. Put positively, laws should be:
- general;
- publicly known;
- prospectively applied in ordinary situations;
- understandable;
- consistent;
- possible to follow;
- reasonably stable; and
- administered in a manner consistent with their announced terms.
A law secretly changes every day, punishes conduct before the rule existed and gives officials unlimited power to disregard the published rule. Fuller would say such a system fails the basic principles of legality.
| Thinker | Better known for |
|---|---|
| Hart | Primary and secondary rules |
| Hobbes | Sovereignty and the social contract |
| Kelsen | Hierarchy of norms and the basic norm |
| Lon L Fuller | Eight principles of the internal morality of law |
Remember Fuller's eight principles of legality; do not confuse them with Kelsen's basic norm.
Question 52
Who stated: "The life of law has not been logic; it has been experience"
- Oliver Holmes
- Dworkin
- Hart
- Roscoe Pound
Answer: (A) Oliver Holmes.
Oliver Wendell Holmes Junior wrote that the life of the law has been experience rather than logic. He challenged the idea that legal results are reached by pure logic alone, and stressed that legal decisions develop from social needs, judicial experience and historical conditions.
- This view is associated with American legal realism.
- Realism studies what courts and legal institutions actually do, not merely how legal rules look on paper.
Two legal rules may seem logically identical on paper, but courts sometimes interpret them differently because of social history and experience. Holmes wanted this practical life of the law to be examined.
| Thinker | Better known for |
|---|---|
| Dworkin | Legal principles and interpretive rights |
| Hart | Primary and secondary rules |
| Roscoe Pound | Social engineering and balancing of interests |
Holmes is associated with practical experience and American legal realism.
Question 53
Roberto Mangabeira Unger was the main propounder of
- Feminist Theory
- Legal Textualism
- Legal Realism
- Critical Legal Studies
Answer: (D) Critical Legal Studies.
Roberto Mangabeira Unger was a major scholar associated with Critical Legal Studies, which questions whether law is neutral and inevitable.
| School | Focus |
|---|---|
| Feminist legal theory | Examines gender |
| Legal textualism | Concentrates on the legal text |
| Legal realism | Studies what courts actually do |
| Critical Legal Studies | Challenges the assumptions of established legal systems; questions the neutrality and inevitability of law |
Critical Legal Studies challenges the assumptions of established legal systems.
Question 54
The Preamble to the UN Charter uses the expression
- We the People
- We the Nations
- We the Peoples
- We the Founding Nations
Answer: (C) We the Peoples.
The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations begins with "We the Peoples of the United Nations". The plural word "peoples" differs from the Preamble of the Constitution of India, which starts "We, the People of India".
- (A) "We the People" is familiar from the Indian and United States constitutions, but it is not the UN Charter wording.
- (B) The Charter opens with "peoples", not "nations".
- (D) "Founding Nations" is not the phrase used in the Charter.
Learn the exact opening expression of important foundational documents.
Question 55
Jus Cogens means:
- Peremptory norm of International Law.
- Judgments of the ICJ.
- Just Resolution of Disputes.
- Justice for all.
Answer: (A) Peremptory norm of International Law.
Jus cogens is a Latin legal expression. It refers to a peremptory norm of general international law, a rule accepted as one from which no derogation is permitted.
- States cannot make an ordinary treaty to escape such a fundamental international rule.
- Examples generally include the prohibitions on genocide, slavery and torture.
- It is not the name of an international court's judgment and does not mean a judgment of the International Court of Justice.
An ordinary agreement between two States cannot make torture lawful where an applicable peremptory norm prohibits it.
Why the other options are wrong:
- (B) The ICJ delivers judgments; those are different from peremptory norms.
- (C) Words about resolving disputes do not define jus cogens.
- (D) "Justice for all" is an aspiration, not this international-law category.
A peremptory norm has special priority under international law.
Question 56
The first Jurist to use the word Sociology was
- Austin.
- Roscoe Pound.
- Duguit.
- Auguste Comte.
Answer: (D) Auguste Comte.
Auguste Comte is generally credited with introducing the term sociology, although describing him as a jurist is historically imprecise.
| Thinker | Associated with |
|---|---|
| Auguste Comte | Introduced the term sociology |
| Roscoe Pound | Later developed sociological jurisprudence; social engineering and balancing of interests |
| Austin | Analytical positivism and command theory |
| Duguit | Social solidarity account |
Distinguish the origin of sociology (Comte) from the later school of sociological jurisprudence (Pound).
Question 57
The concept of Dialectical Materialism is a concept commonly associated with which of the following Schools of Thought?
- Marxism.
- Liberal Theory.
- Post Modernism.
- Utilitarianism.
Answer: (A) Marxism.
Dialectical materialism is commonly associated with Marxism. It interprets change through material conditions and contradictions, not principally through abstract ideas alone.
Liberalism, postmodernism and utilitarianism describe different intellectual traditions.
Marxist analysis often studies class, economic structures and material change.
Question 58
Who authored, "The Indian School of Synthetic Jurisprudence: An Idea Relating to Its Purposes"?
- Kautilya.
- Manu.
- M. J. Sethna.
- Upendra Baxi.
Answer: (C) M. J. Sethna. This is the answer indicated by the paper, but the stated qualification and the question wording must be kept in mind.
The title The Indian School of Synthetic Jurisprudence: An Idea Relating to Its Purposes is associated in this paper with M. J. Sethna. Synthetic jurisprudence seeks to bring different approaches together.
This bibliographic attribution is taken from the marked answer and should be checked against the original publication.
Jurisprudence is the study of what law is, how law works and why legal rules have authority.
Do not invent biographical details when the specific book attribution has not been independently located.
Question 59
Bridges versus Hawkesworth is a popular case on
- Ownership.
- Possession.
- Transfer of ownership.
- Atonement.
Answer: (B) Possession.
Bridges v. Hawkesworth: banknotes were found on the floor of a shop, and a dispute arose over possessory claims, namely the relative right of the finder against someone who controls the premises but did not previously possess the thing. Principle: the case is commonly used to explain relative possession and the finder of lost goods. Possession can confer rights even when the possessor is not the ultimate owner.
The distinction tested is not simply who legally owns the whole building; it is how possession of a found object is analysed.
A finder may have a better claim than some persons, but not necessarily than the true owner.
Question 60
Hedonistic calculus as a measure of pain and pleasure was hypothesized by
- Austin.
- Bentham.
- Salmond.
- Holland.
Answer: (B) Bentham.
Jeremy Bentham proposed a felicific or hedonistic calculus to assess pleasure and pain when considering consequences.
Why the other options are wrong:
- (A) Austin is known for command theory and legal positivism.
- (C) Salmond wrote extensively on jurisprudence and legal rights.
- (D) Holland is associated with analytical legal definitions, not the pleasure-pain calculus.
Bentham is central to classical utilitarianism, which evaluates consequences for happiness.
Question 61
Jurisprudence should be ideally divided into censorial and expository jurisprudence. This view was given by
- Auguste Comte.
- Bentham.
- Emile Durkheim.
- Holland.
Answer: (B) Bentham.
Bentham distinguished expository jurisprudence from censorial jurisprudence. This separation shows the difference between description and reform.
| Expository jurisprudence | Censorial jurisprudence |
|---|---|
| Describes law as it is | Assesses law as it ought to be |
| Description | Reform |
Why the other options are wrong:
- (A) Comte introduced sociology, not Bentham's expository-censorial distinction.
- (C) Durkheim developed sociological theory.
- (D) Holland is associated with analytical jurisprudence.
Memory aid: "is" for expository, "ought" for censorial.
Question 62
Law is a combination of Primary and Secondary rules. This principle was propounded by
- Kelsen.
- Ronald Dworkin.
- Hart.
- Fuller.
Answer: (C) Hart.
H. L. A. Hart explained law through primary rules governing conduct and secondary rules about identifying, changing and applying primary rules. This pairing is central to his account of a legal system.
| Primary rules | Secondary rules |
|---|---|
| Govern conduct: tell people what conduct is required or prohibited | Rules about primary rules: explain how rules are identified/recognised, changed and applied |
| Example: a rule prohibiting theft | Example: a rule telling which body can enact or change that rule |
A college rule requiring students to carry identification is a primary rule. A rule saying who can make, revise or cancel college rules resembles a secondary rule.
Why the other options are wrong:
- (A) Kelsen analysed legal norms through a hierarchy and the basic norm (Grundnorm).
- (B) Dworkin highlighted principles as well as rules in adjudication.
- (D) Fuller wrote about principles of legality and the internal morality of law.
Hart's rule of recognition is a key example of a secondary rule.
Question 63
As per the Anthropological approach towards the study of Jurisprudence, the Twelve Tables of Rome may be considered an example of
- Religious law.
- Divine law.
- Published law.
- Personal command.
Answer: (C) Published law.
The Roman Twelve Tables publicly set out laws that had previously been harder to know. They are an early example of published or publicly available law, not simply a divine command or a personal order.
Publication helps legal rules become knowable to ordinary people.
Question 64
Who made the statement, "Law is uncertain and certainty of law is a legal myth"?
- Fuller.
- Jerome Frank.
- Llewellyn.
- Holmes.
Answer: (B) Jerome Frank.
Jerome Frank is associated with legal realism and the criticism that complete certainty in law is a myth. Judicial fact-finding and human decision-making introduce uncertainty.
- (A) Fuller is better known for internal morality and principles of legality.
- (C), (D) Other realists, such as Llewellyn and Holmes, also studied law in practice but are not the attribution marked here. Holmes is better known for "experience" and American realism.
Legal realism focuses on how legal outcomes are actually reached.
Question 65
As per Kelsen, if a norm remains permanently inefficacious, then it is deprived of its validity. This is known as
- Nomodynamics.
- Condition per quam.
- Desuetudo.
- Effective Repeal.
Answer: (C) Desuetudo.
Desuetude means that a rule has fallen into disuse. In discussions of Kelsen's theory, a norm's lasting lack of effectiveness may be relevant to its validity, although isolated disobedience is not the same as legal loss of validity.
Why the other options are wrong:
- (A) Nomodynamics concerns the dynamic creation of norms in Kelsenian analysis.
- (B) Condition per quam is not the term used for a legal rule lost through prolonged disuse.
- (D) Effective repeal is different from the specific concept of desuetude.
Do not confuse occasional non-compliance with permanent ineffectiveness.
Question 66
The theory "justice as fairness" was propounded by
- Robert Nozick.
- Ronald Dworkin.
- F. Engels.
- John Rawls.
Answer: (D) John Rawls.
John Rawls developed justice as fairness, including the original position and the veil of ignorance, as ways of thinking about fair social arrangements.
Imagine that people must choose the rules of a society without knowing whether they will be rich or poor, powerful or weak. This thought experiment is the original position behind the veil of ignorance. It helps explain why fair institutional rules matter.
Imagine making rules for university scholarships before knowing whether you will be rich, poor, disabled or from a privileged group. This illustrates the veil of ignorance.
Why the other options are wrong:
- (A) Nozick took a different approach to rights and holdings; he is known for entitlement theory, not justice as fairness.
- (B) Dworkin focused on legal rights and interpretation, and developed equality and rights-based interpretive theories.
- (C) Engels is linked to Marxist analysis rather than Rawlsian fairness.
Rawls asks what principles people would choose without knowing their social position.
Question 67
The term 'transcendental idealism' is applied to the epistemology of
- Hegel.
- Stammler.
- Immanuel Kant.
- Karl Marx.
Answer: (C) Immanuel Kant.
Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism concerns the conditions under which human beings can have knowledge and experience. Hegel, Marx and Stammler developed different philosophical positions; Marx is better known for materialist and class analysis.
Transcendental idealism is a key Kantian phrase.
Question 68
The famous essay Vom Bneruf was written by Savigny as a reaction to
- Thibaut's proposal for a Code on the lines of the Napoleonic Code.
- The King's proposal for introducing British common law in Germany.
- The Parliament's proposal to introduce Roman law in Germany.
- The revival of Justinian's Code.
Answer: (A) Thibaut's proposal for a Code on the lines of the Napoleonic Code.
Savigny's essay Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft responded to Thibaut's demand for a German civil code along French lines.
Savigny argued that law grows historically through the life of a people rather than being made instantly by abstract drafting.
Savigny represents the historical school of jurisprudence.
Question 69
Who among the following is called as "Darwinian before Darwin", because of his contribution to apply the evolutionary principle to the development of the legal system?
- Gluckman.
- Malinowski.
- Savigny.
- Puchta.
Answer: (C) Savigny.
Savigny applied an evolutionary understanding to law before Darwin's famous biological work. He treated law as developing organically through a people's historical experience and customs. This is why the historical school is linked with the wording of the question.
Volksgeist means the shared spirit or character of a people in Savigny's theory.
Question 70
In his endeavour to discover a pattern of legal development, Maine was led to distinguish between societies as
- Static and progressive societies.
- Dependent and independent societies.
- Subjective and objective societies.
- Customary and statutory societies.
Answer: (A) Static and progressive societies.
Henry Maine distinguished stationary (static) societies from progressive societies when comparing patterns of legal change.
His famous movement from status to contract is associated with legal development in progressive societies.
Maine linked the development of law to changing social relationships.
Question 71
Pound's theory of Social Engineering mainly talks about
- General consciousness being the primary source of law.
- Legislative power.
- Balancing of competing interests in society.
- Difference between law creation and law application.
Answer: (C) Balancing of competing interests in society.
Roscoe Pound used social engineering as a metaphor for the work of law in balancing competing social interests.
- It does not mean mechanically building society; it means adjusting interests to reduce friction and conflict.
- For example, businesses may want freedom to operate, while neighbours seek quiet and safety; legal rules attempt to manage those interests in a workable way.
- Social engineering is not the same as political propaganda or merely engineering a physical structure.
A factory wishes to operate at night, while nearby residents want to sleep. The law may try to balance both needs by setting reasonable conditions.
Pound emphasised balancing individual, public and social interests.
Question 72
Which theory of punishment implies "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" approach?
- Expiatory.
- Preventive.
- Deterrent.
- Retributive.
Answer: (D) Retributive.
Retributive punishment focuses on giving the offender the punishment considered deserved for the wrong. It looks backwards to the wrong that was committed.
| Theory | Aim |
|---|---|
| Retributive | Deserved punishment for the wrong; looks backwards to the wrong committed ("an eye for an eye") |
| Deterrent | Discourages crime / prevents future wrongdoing through fear of consequences (prospect of punishment) |
| Preventive | Stops future offending / further wrongdoing |
| Reformative | Improves the offender's behaviour |
| Expiatory | Making amends or atoning for wrongdoing |
"An eye for an eye" reflects retribution, not deterrence, though modern law also applies proportionality.
Question 73
As per the rule of English law, a custom to be recognized as law, must be proved to be in existence since times immemorial. However, for customs that are old and whose time of origin cannot be ascertained, which year has been fixed as the date before which it must have started?
- 1169 AD.
- 1189 AD.
- 1369 AD.
- 1389 AD.
Answer: (B) 1189 AD.
A custom is an established practice that may receive legal recognition if the applicable conditions are met.
Under traditional English common-law doctrine, legal custom was conventionally traced to a legal memory date of 1189. This is a historical evidentiary fiction, not a rule that all Indian customs must date from that year.
Remember the English legal-memory date: 1189.
Question 74
Which of the following is an accessory right?
- Easementary rights.
- Ownership rights.
- Right to reputation.
- Right to personal security.
Answer: (A) Easementary rights.
An easement is an accessory right enjoyed for the benefit of another piece of land.
A right of way across neighbouring land is an easement.
Ownership is a more general proprietary right; reputation and personal security concern the person.
Why the other options are wrong:
- (B) Ownership is a more general, main proprietary right, not accessory to another land interest.
- (C) Reputation is a personal interest.
- (D) Personal security protects the individual rather than serving a dominant parcel of land.
Accessory rights support the enjoyment of another principal right or property.
Question 75
Ownership of goodwill of a business is
- Corporeal ownership.
- Incorporeal ownership.
- Business ownership.
- Beneficial ownership.
Answer: (B) Incorporeal ownership.
Ownership means the legally recognised collection of powers over property, subject to lawful limits.
Goodwill is a valuable business advantage arising from reputation and customer connections, but it is not a tangible physical object. That is why ownership of goodwill is incorporeal ownership.
Why the other options are wrong:
- (A) Corporeal assets have a physical existence, unlike goodwill.
- (C) Business ownership is too general and does not answer the physical-versus-intangible classification.
- (D) Beneficial ownership concerns who enjoys the benefits, not whether the subject matter is intangible.
Corporeal means physical; incorporeal means without a physical form.
Question 76
The law applying to controversies involving non-citizens of Rome was known as
- Jus civilie.
- Jus gentium.
- Nicomachean ethics.
- Corpus civilie.
Answer: (B) Jus gentium.
| Jus civile | Jus gentium |
|---|---|
| Rome's civil law for citizens (the distinct Roman citizen-law classification) | Roman law associated with dealings involving foreigners as well as Roman citizens |
The other expressions concern different bodies of writing or philosophy.
- (C) Nicomachean Ethics is Aristotle's ethical work.
- (D) Corpus juris civilis is a later compilation of Roman law, not the specific law of peoples.
Jus gentium is often described as the law of peoples.
Question 77
Which one of the following philosophers conceived justice as 'some sort of equality' and divided the concept of justice as 'corrective justice' and 'distributive justice'?
- Aristotle.
- Rawls.
- Robert Nozick.
- Ronald Dworkin.
Answer: (A) Aristotle.
| Distributive justice | Corrective justice |
|---|---|
| Fair allocation of benefits and burdens | Correcting wrongs in dealings between people |
Why the other options are wrong:
- (B) Rawls developed justice as fairness centuries after Aristotle.
- (C) Nozick proposed an entitlement-based theory of justice.
- (D) Dworkin worked on equality, rights and legal interpretation.
Rawls and Nozick are later writers on distributive questions.
Distributive means allocation; corrective means repairing an imbalance.
Question 78
"Sociology of law must begin with the ascertainment of the living law, the concrete which can be observed and not the abstract". Who said so?
- Duguit.
- Ihering.
- Ehrlich.
- Durkheim.
Answer: (C) Ehrlich.
Eugen Ehrlich argued that sociology of law should study living law: the rules people actually follow in daily social relations.
| Thinker | Associated with |
|---|---|
| Ehrlich | Living law |
| Duguit | Solidarity |
| Durkheim | Analysis of society; social theory of solidarity |
| Ihering | Connected law with social purposes |
Living law may be observed in practice, not only in statute books.
Jurisprudence (continued)
Question 79
Who said that, "The law of nature or natural law is the general will of the people who come together to form an association called State"?
- Hobbes
- Locke
- Rousseau
- Kant
Answer: (C) Rousseau
Jean-Jacques Rousseau linked legitimate political authority to the general will arising from citizens' association. Hobbes, Locke and Kant offer different accounts of political authority and freedom.
- Hobbes: better known for sovereignty and the social contract.
- Locke: better known for natural rights and consent.
- Kant: better known for transcendental idealism and moral philosophy.
The general will is central to Rousseau's social-contract thought.
Question 80
Which one of the following conceived 'integrative jurisprudence' as combined jurisprudence of positivist, naturalist and sociological descriptions and an understanding of the value components of legal ordering?
- Jerome Hall
- John Finnis
- Clarence Morris
- Leon Duguit
Answer: (A) Jerome Hall
Jerome Hall advocated integrative jurisprudence, which combines the analytical, sociological and ethical aspects of law. An integrative approach resists understanding law through only commands, only social facts or only morality.
Jurisprudence is the study of what law is, how law works and why legal rules have authority. "Integrative" means bringing different approaches into one account.
John Finnis, Clarence Morris and Leon Duguit are not associated with this idea; do not choose an option merely because it contains a familiar name.
Question 81
De Jure Belli ac Pacis is the celebrated work of:
- Hugo Grotius
- Niccolo Machiavelli
- Samuel Pufendorf
- Jean Jacques Burlamaqui
Answer: (A) Hugo Grotius
Hugo Grotius wrote De Jure Belli ac Pacis, meaning On the Law of War and Peace. It is a foundational work in the history of international law.
- Machiavelli: wrote political works such as The Prince.
- Pufendorf: another natural-law writer, but not the author of this title.
- Burlamaqui: wrote on the principles of natural and political law.
Associate Grotius with the law of war and peace.
Question 82
Which one of the following drafted the hypothetical Case of the Speluncean Explorers?
- Lon L Fuller
- Rudolph Stammler
- John Rawls
- Clarence Morris
Answer: (A) Lon L Fuller
Lon Fuller wrote the imaginary Case of the Speluncean Explorers, in which judges give different legal reasons for deciding an extreme survival situation. It is not an actual criminal judgment. The hypothetical teaches competing methods of judicial interpretation.
- Stammler: wrote on legal philosophy, not this hypothetical.
- Rawls: proposed justice as fairness and the original position.
- Clarence Morris: a legal scholar, but not its author.
The Speluncean Explorers case is a teaching fiction designed to compare philosophies of adjudication.
Question 83
Which of the following is not absolute duty according to John Austin?
- Duties towards lower animals
- Duties towards community
- Self-regarding duties
- Duties towards sovereign
Answer: no clearly correct option. All four alternatives fall within Austin's categories of absolute duty; this is a flawed "NOT" question.
Austin called a duty absolute where there is no corresponding legal right in one determinate individual. His categories of absolute duty were:
- duties towards lower animals;
- duties towards persons indefinitely, including the community;
- self-regarding duties;
- duties owed towards the sovereign.
Options A, B, C and D all match these categories. The question asks which is not an absolute duty, but no single option accurately answers it.
Learn the correct principle (all four are Austin's absolute duties) rather than memorising the marking in the paper.
Question 84
Who said, "A precedent, therefore, is a judicial decision which contains in itself a principle. The underlying principle which thus forms its authoritative element is often termed the ratio decidendi."?
- Salmond
- Keeton
- Rupert Cross
- Osborn
Answer: (A) Salmond
Salmond described precedent as a judicial decision containing an authoritative legal principle, its ratio decidendi. Keeton, Rupert Cross and Osborn are not the source of this definition.
Ratio decidendi means the reason essential to the decision, not every sentence a judge writes. A binding precedent depends on its decisive legal reason.
Question 85
Which of the following statements does not suit the Hohfeldian analysis of right?
- Power in 'X' means presence of liability upon 'Y'.
- Immunity in 'X' means absence of liability in 'X'.
- Right in 'X' means presence of 'No-right' in 'Y'.
- Liberty in 'X' means absence of duty in 'X'.
Answer: (C) Right in 'X' means presence of 'No-right' in 'Y'.
Hohfeld's basic legal relationships are four correlative pairs:
| In one person (X) | Correlative in another person (Y) |
|---|---|
| Claim-right | Duty |
| Privilege (liberty) | No-right |
| Power | Liability |
| Immunity | Disability |
So a claim-right in one person corresponds to a duty in another, not to that person's no-right. Option C is therefore the incorrect statement.
- Option A: correct; power in one person correlates with liability in another.
- Option B: correct; immunity means another person lacks the power to alter the immune person's legal position.
- Option D: correct; liberty means the holder has no duty not to act.
Learn Hohfeld's four correlatives as pairs: right–duty, privilege–no-right, power–liability, immunity–disability.
Question 86
Which of the following is not a circumstance of strengthening the authority of a precedent?
- Approval of the decision in later cases and by the profession at large.
- Closely divided opinion of the Court.
- Evidence in the report that the issue was fully argued by counsel and the Court took time to deliberate.
- The decision has stood the test of time.
Answer: (B) Closely divided opinion of the Court.
A decision made by a closely divided court may appear less persuasive than an established and repeatedly accepted ruling. Circumstances that strengthen the authority of a precedent include:
- later approval of the decision (in later cases and by the profession);
- full argument by counsel and time taken by the court to deliberate;
- long acceptance, i.e. the decision has stood the test of time.
The binding force of a precedent and its persuasive strength are different ideas.
Question 87
A rule which says, "the literal sense of words should be adhered to, unless this would lead to absurdity, in which case the literal meaning may be modified", can be called:
- Mischief rule
- Literal rule
- Golden rule
- Compromise approach
Answer: (C) Golden rule
The golden rule begins with ordinary literal interpretation but permits a modification to avoid absurdity.
| Rule | Approach |
|---|---|
| Mischief rule | Looks to the legal problem the law intended to cure; asks what social defect the legislature intended to remedy. |
| Literal rule | Places more weight on the ordinary words; a strict literal rule has no defined escape from absurdity. |
| Golden rule | Literal meaning is followed unless it leads to absurdity, in which case it may be modified. |
"Compromise approach" is not the established name of an interpretive rule.
Golden rule = literal wording, unless it produces an absurd result.
Question 88
Who defined ownership as 'a right – indefinite in point of user – unrestricted in point of disposition – and unlimited in point of duration'?
- Salmond
- Austin
- Marx
- Glaniville Williams
Answer: (B) Austin
John Austin defined ownership in broad terms concerning use, disposition and duration. This is a theoretical description, not a claim that every property owner's powers are truly unlimited under modern legislation.
- Salmond: better known for his work on legal rights, ownership and precedent, but this definition is not his.
- Marx: better known for materialist and class analysis.
- Glaniville Williams: not the source of this definition.
Ownership means the legally recognised collection of powers over property, subject to lawful limits. Legal ownership can be subject to lawful restrictions.
Question 89
Which of the following is not correct in the context of valid usage?
- Usage must be so well established as notorious.
- In case of conflict between usage and law, law prevails.
- In case of conflict between express provision of a contract and usage, contract prevails.
- Usage shall be a reasonable one.
Answer marked in the paper: (C) In case of conflict between express provision of a contract and usage, contract prevails. This marking is highly questionable: all four statements are broadly defensible, and the paper may have no clearly incorrect option. Treat this as a disputed question.
A usage is a recognised practice that may help interpret dealings in a particular trade or community. For a usage to have legal effect, courts normally examine:
- its certainty;
- its reasonableness;
- its established (well-known) character;
- its consistency with law.
A clear express contract is generally not displaced by a conflicting trade usage; an express contractual term ordinarily overrides an inconsistent usage. Hence Option C states a sound proposition.
- Option A: long-established and sufficiently well-known usage can meet the notoriety requirement.
- Option B: a valid law prevails over a conflicting usage.
- Option C: an express contract term ordinarily prevails over an inconsistent trade usage.
- Option D: an unreasonable practice would not normally qualify as a legally recognised usage.
A market practice about delivery dates is widely followed. If the written contract clearly states a different date, the express term ordinarily has priority over the inconsistent usage.
The marking of Option C should not be taught as an unquestionable legal proposition. Learn the correct principle rather than memorising the marked answer.
Question 90
"A dictate of right reason, which points out that an act, according as it is or is not in conformity with rational nature, has in it a quality of moral baseness or moral necessity." Who made this observation?
- Cicero
- Aristotle
- Plato
- Grotius
Answer: (D) Grotius
Grotius explained natural law by reference to right reason, moral necessity and the rational nature of human beings. Cicero, Plato and Aristotle also wrote about morality and justice, but this wording is conventionally attributed to Grotius.
- Cicero: wrote about natural law, but the exact right-reason wording is attributed to Grotius.
- Aristotle: divided justice into distributive and corrective categories.
- Plato: wrote about justice in the Republic.
Grotius is an important bridge between natural law and international law.
Question 91
"Private property is robbery, and a state based on private property is a state of robbers who are fighting for a share of the spoils." Who made this observation?
- Lenin
- Marx
- Renner
- Pashukanis
Answer: (A) Lenin (as indicated by the paper, subject to the qualification below).
The paper associates this quotation about private property and robbers with Lenin. However, the famous short statement "property is theft" is associated with Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and the attribution of the quotation should be verified before it is taught as an established literal statement by Lenin.
- Marx: better known for materialist and class analysis.
- Renner and Pashukanis: not identified with this quotation.
Distinguish the wording of a historical quotation from later slogans about property.
Question 92
In response to a petition, the Supreme Court transferred a case on constitutionality of a Central Act to the High Court of Bombay. The Bombay High Court upheld it. In a constitutional challenge of the same Act, pending before the High Court of Madras, what the latter High Court cannot do with regard to the Bombay High Court judgment is:
- Abstaining from applying it.
- Applying it.
- Overruling it.
- Distinguishing it.
Answer: (C) Overruling it.
A High Court's judgment is generally persuasive, not binding, on another High Court. The Madras High Court may:
- follow and apply it (Option B);
- decline to follow a merely persuasive decision (Option A);
- distinguish the earlier case on its facts or legal setting (Option D).
But it cannot formally overrule the Bombay High Court's judgment. Overruling is done by an appropriately superior or larger court within the judicial hierarchy.
Distinguish disagreeing with (not following) a precedent from formally overruling it.
Question 93
Which of the following characteristics of trust is considered as a problematic factor in a legal system?
- Group property can be applied for the desired purpose.
- Pooling up of economic power to neutralise competition.
- Enables endowments and gifts by vesting rights in trustees.
- Helps in settling family property in favour of the vulnerable.
Answer: (B) Pooling up of economic power to neutralise competition.
Pooling economic power through trusts may be problematic if it weakens competition or concentrates control. By contrast, trusts serve useful purposes: applying group property to a desired purpose, safeguarding family property for the vulnerable, and supporting gifts, endowments and charitable arrangements.
Trust law permits useful property management, but concentration of economic power is a possible concern.
Question 94
Which of the following is a right in re aliena?
- Literary copyright
- Moveable property
- Servitude
- Land
Answer: (C) Servitude
A right in re aliena is a right over property belonging to another person. A servitude, such as an easement burdening another's land, fits that idea.
- Literary copyright: a right over intellectual work, not the classic servitude over another's parcel.
- Moveable property: owning it does not itself describe an interest in another's property.
- Land: ownership of one's own land is not, by itself, a right in another person's property.
Re aliena means "another person's thing".
Question 95
Which of the following is not correct about the will theory of contract?
- It believes in the dictum of status to contract.
- It puts emphasis on expectations reasonably aroused by conduct rather than state of mind.
- It relies on person's mind which can be proved only from his own evidence or by inferences from his conduct.
- It leads to such a subjective view of mistake that the security of transactions is thereby imperilled.
Answer: (B) It puts emphasis on expectations reasonably aroused by conduct rather than state of mind.
The will theory emphasises the parties' intentions and assent (a subjective approach). An option placing primary stress on reasonable expectations raised in others fits an objective theory rather than the subjective will theory. Expressed conduct can still be evidence of intention.
Option C is a restrictive or negative statement that does not accurately capture the qualification in the governing rule; the option that is not correct is B.
A contract is an agreement enforceable by law, subject to the requirements of the governing statute. Do not confuse the subjective will theory with an objective reliance or expectation theory.
Question 96
"The suppression of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression of subversive activities." Who made this observation?
- H L A Hart
- J S Mill
- Lord Devlin
- James Stephens
Answer: (C) Lord Devlin
Lord Devlin argued that law may sometimes support a society's shared morality, including the suppression of vice. H L A Hart argued against using criminal law merely to enforce morality without further justification. The Devlin–Hart debate is central to the topic of law and morality.
| Thinker | Position on law and morality |
|---|---|
| Lord Devlin | Law may support a society's shared morality, including suppression of vice. |
| H L A Hart | Argued against using criminal law merely to enforce morality without further justification; criticised broad criminal enforcement of private morality. |
| J S Mill | Famous for the harm principle limiting coercion. |
| James Fitzjames Stephen | Discussed morality and criminal law, but is not the author of this observation. |
Devlin and Hart disagreed over the proper limits of legal enforcement of morality.
Question 97
Which of the following is not correct about the Critical Legal School?
- It strongly believes in the inescapable power of the intellectual climate's search for value neutrality.
- It shows the way in which the legal system works at many different levels to shape popular consciousness towards accepting the legitimacy of the status quo.
- It rejects formalism.
- Its central thrust of attack is on legal liberalism.
Answer: (A) It strongly believes in the inescapable power of the intellectual climate's search for value neutrality.
Critical Legal Studies rejects the assumption that legal rules and legal reasoning are always neutral, objective and independent of social power. An uncritical faith in value neutrality therefore does not fit this school. Options B, C and D correctly describe it.
Critical Legal Studies questions formalism and legal liberalism.
Question 98
Which of the following propositions do not suit the approaches of American Realism?
- It is a combination of the analytical positivist and sociological approaches.
- It lays emphasis on empirical study of the behaviour of judges.
- It distrusts the sufficiency of legal rules and concepts as descriptive of what Courts do.
- It combines the 'is' and 'ought' aspects in the study of law and how it works.
Answer: (D) It combines the 'is' and 'ought' aspects in the study of law and how it works.
American legal realists studied judges' actual behaviour, the uncertainty of rules and the social settings of decisions. The idea of combining what law is with what it ought to be is not the central, empirically oriented realist proposition posed by this question.
American realism is especially concerned with law in action rather than law only in books.
Question 99
Who stated that, "Law is the sum of the conditions of social life in the widest sense of the term, as secured by the power of the State through the means of external compulsion."
- Roscoe Pound
- Jeremy Bentham
- Ehrlich
- Ihering
Answer: (D) Ihering
Rudolf von Ihering linked law to securing the conditions of social life through organised State coercion.
- Roscoe Pound: studied social interests; associated with social engineering and balancing interests.
- Bentham: associated with utility and legal reform.
- Ehrlich: described the living law in social practice.
Ihering emphasised the social purpose of law and its organised enforcement.
Question 100
Which of the following is not emphasised by Katherine Bartlette as a part of feminist legal research?
- Asking the woman question
- Consciousness-raising
- Difference theory
- Positionality
Answer: (C) Difference theory
Katharine Bartlett described feminist legal methods including:
- asking the woman question;
- feminist practical reasoning;
- consciousness-raising;
- positionality (also addressed in later discussions).
Difference theory is a broader school of feminist theory rather than one of her named research techniques in this list.
Learn named feminist legal methods separately from broader feminist legal theories.
General Law
Question 101
In which case was it observed that "The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated"?
- Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248
- State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269
- A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150
- Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818
Answer: (C) A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150
Updated from the lecture: the option and answer cited A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India as AIR 1970 SC 170. The correct position is that the judgment is reported at AIR 1970 SC 150, and it contains the observation that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. Source: A. K. Kraipak & Ors. Etc vs Union Of India & Ors (29 April 1969), Indian Kanoon.
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1970): the dispute concerned a selection process in which a participant had a conflicting role. Held: the dividing line between administrative and quasi-judicial functions had become very thin. Principle: even an administrative selection decision affecting rights may require fairness and absence of bias.
Quasi-judicial describes an authority that must use fair hearing and decision-making procedures even though it is not an ordinary court. Natural justice applies beyond the narrow category of traditional court proceedings.
Questions 102 to 120
Question 102
In which of the following cases did the Supreme Court hold that the Wednesbury rule was applicable in administrative actions?
- Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579
- Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P., AIR 1991 SC 537
- State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna, AIR 2001 SC 343
- A.N. Parasuraman v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1990 SC 40
Answer: (A) Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, (2003) 4 SCC 579.
Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar (2003): discusses the Wednesbury approach to unreasonable administrative decisions. Principle: the test asks whether an official decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have reached it, not whether judges would prefer a different policy.
Why the other options are wrong:
- Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P.: concerned arbitrariness and fairness in State dealings; it is not the cited Wednesbury ruling.
- State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna: raised issues of mala fides in administrative conduct.
- A.N. Parasuraman v. State of Tamil Nadu: raised questions concerning excessive delegated discretion.
Exam tip: Wednesbury unreasonableness is a demanding standard of review.
Question 103
Which one of the following statements with regard to the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 is not correct?
- It makes certain amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- It contains detailed provisions for the appointment of Lokayuktas in States.
- It confers supervisory jurisdiction on Delhi Special Police Establishment.
- It extends to the whole of India.
Answer: (B) It contains detailed provisions for the appointment of Lokayuktas in States.
The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 establishes the central Lokpal and requires States to establish Lokayuktas, but it does not prescribe every detail of their appointment procedure in the States. Statement (B) is therefore the incorrect one.
Options (A), (C) and (D) do not state the incorrect claim the question looks for; an option should not be chosen merely because it contains familiar legal words.
Distinction: creating a general requirement for States (to set up Lokayuktas) is different from writing a detailed, uniform State code. The question asks for the incorrect claim about how the statute operates.
Question 104
Which one of the following has powers similar to those of a Court having power to issue a writ of certiorari under the express statutory provisions?
- Administrative tribunals established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985
- Industrial Tribunals established under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
- Income Tax Appellate Tribunal established under the Income Tax Act, 1961
- State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission established under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986
Answer: (D) State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission established under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 gave the State Consumer Commissions powers of revision, including correcting jurisdictional errors of District Forums. This is comparable in limited respects to certiorari.
- This is not the same as granting the State Commission the constitutional writ jurisdiction of a High Court.
- The 1986 legislation was later replaced.
Options (A), (B) and (C) do not match this express statutory revisional power.
Distinguish a statutory supervisory remedy (revision) from a constitutional writ.
Question 105
Which one of the following statements with regard to a Commission of Inquiry is incorrect?
- A Commission of Inquiry can be headed only by a sitting or retired judge.
- A Commission of Inquiry cannot compel a person to disclose any secret process of manufacture of any goods unless the subject matter of inquiry relates to that process.
- The report of the Commission of Inquiry is not binding on the Government.
- The Central Government is not always restrained from appointing a Commission of Inquiry when on the same subject a Commission appointed by a State Government is already working.
Answer: (A) A Commission of Inquiry can be headed only by a sitting or retired judge.
- The Commissions of Inquiry Act permits the appointment of appropriately qualified persons; an inquiry commission need not always be headed by a sitting or retired judge. Statement (A) is therefore incorrect.
- The findings of a Commission are generally recommendatory, not automatically binding legal judgments.
- Statements (B), (C) and (D) are not the incorrect statement the question seeks.
A commission collects information and makes recommendations; it does not necessarily act as a court.
Question 106
Which one of the following statements with regard to the Right to Information Act, 2005 is not correct?
- No reasons are required to be given for seeking information.
- Private Universities are bound to give information.
- No fee is to be paid if information is supplied after five weeks from the date of application.
- Intelligence Bureau is not bound to give any information.
Answer: (D) Intelligence Bureau is not bound to give any information, as marked in the paper. The question is ambiguous, because Option (B) also fails as a general statement.
The relevant provisions of the RTI Act:
- Section 6, clause (2): an applicant ordinarily need not give reasons for seeking information.
- Section 7, clause (6): information must be given free of charge when the public authority misses the applicable statutory deadline for response.
- Section 24: generally excludes specified intelligence and security bodies, but preserves information relating to allegations of corruption and human-rights violations.
- Private universities: they are not automatically public authorities merely because they are private universities; coverage depends on whether they are public authorities under the Act.
An RTI request concerns an allegation of corruption involving an intelligence organisation. Section 24 does not permit an automatic rejection based solely on the organisation's name.
Analysis of the options:
- (A): correct as a general statutory rule; Section 6(2) does not require an applicant to give reasons.
- (B): overbroad; private university status alone does not establish that an institution is a public authority under the Act.
- (C): reflects the free-of-charge principle when the statutory time limit expires, though the applicable deadline depends on the request and the statutory rules.
- (D): wrong as an absolute statement, because Section 24 contains exceptions for corruption and human-rights allegations.
The paper marks Option (D), which is indeed too absolute. Option (B) also fails as a general statement, so this question has more than one materially overbroad answer and is ambiguous.
Avoid absolute answers when the Act contains express exceptions.
Question 107
Which among the following was the first case before the Supreme Court of India where the constitutionality of death penalty was challenged?
- Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P.
- Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.
- Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab
- Machhi Singh and Others v. State of Punjab
Answer: (B) Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P.
Jagmohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh: the early Supreme Court decision directly examining the constitutionality of capital punishment. Principle: it is the first case in which the constitutionality of the death penalty was tested.
The later cases:
- Rajendra Prasad v. State of U.P.: came after Jagmohan and dealt with later capital sentencing issues.
- Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab: later formulated the rarest-of-rare sentencing approach.
- Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab: subsequently elaborated the death-sentence approach.
A case can be the first to test constitutionality without being the final word on sentencing safeguards.
Question 108
Which among the following is/are not true with respect to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (AIR 1996 SC 2715)?
- This was a PIL against the pollution caused by discharge of untreated effluent from tanneries and other industries.
- The Court refused to recognise that a balance must be struck between the economy and the environment.
- The Court accepted the traditional concept that development and ecology are opposed to each other.
- The Court reviewed the development of the concept of sustainable development in the international sphere.
- The Supreme Court held that the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle are part of International environmental law and not of municipal law.
- Only i, iii and v
- Only ii, iii and v
- Only iii, iv and v
- Only iv and v
Answer: (B) Only ii, iii and v (the answer supported by the reported authority).
Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India (1996): a PIL on industrial pollution caused by tanneries. Held: the Court recognised sustainable development, the precautionary principle and the polluter-pays principle as part of Indian environmental law. It did not hold that economic development and ecology must always remain opposed, or that these principles have no domestic status. Principle: sustainable development, not an automatic choice between the economy and the environment.
Concepts recognised:
- Sustainable development: pursuing development while protecting environmental needs for the future.
- Precautionary principle: protective action is required before serious environmental harm becomes irreversible.
- Polluter-pays principle: the polluter is responsible for the consequences of pollution.
A tannery discharges polluted water into a village stream. Sustainable development does not mean ignoring the factory's economic role, but neither does it excuse destruction of the environment.
Analysis of the options:
- (A): statement i describes the actual pollution case and is true, so this option wrongly includes a true statement.
- (B): statements ii, iii and v misstate the Court's position; the Court accepted sustainable development and incorporated the environmental principles into domestic law.
- (C): statement iv is true, because the Court discussed developments in international environmental law; this combination wrongly includes it.
- (D): statement iv is true, while the answer requires the false statements ii, iii and v.
Sustainable development seeks to balance development and environmental protection.
Question 109
Identify the correct statement with respect to the Law of Partnership.
- Though registration of the Partnership is not mandatory, the registration of the Partnership deed is essential.
- The Limited Liability Partnership is part of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.
- The existence of a partnership can only be determined by the partnership deed.
- Unless there is a contract to the contrary, death of a partner will automatically lead to the dissolution of the partnership.
Answer: (D) Unless there is a contract to the contrary, death of a partner will automatically lead to the dissolution of the partnership.
- Section 42, clause (c) of the Indian Partnership Act generally provides that a firm is dissolved on the death of a partner, subject to contract between the partners.
- Registration is not always compulsory, so Option (A) does not accurately state the rule.
- The existence of a partnership depends on the real relationship between the parties, not on the document alone, so Option (C) is wrong.
- Option (B) does not state the governing rule.
Read the "subject to contract to the contrary" qualification carefully.
Question 110
In which among the following cases did the Supreme Court observe: "We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for that matter, in any other foreign country. We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order."
- Sri Ram Food Fertilizers Case (AIR 1987 SC 965)
- M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (AIR 1987 SC 1086)
- Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 273)
- M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumar (AIR 2002 SC 551)
Answer: (B) M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (AIR 1987 SC 1086).
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987): the Oleum gas leak decision, associated with the Shriram hazardous-industry litigation. Held: the Supreme Court developed the distinctive Indian rule of absolute liability for hazardous industries in the Indian constitutional setting, rather than simply adopting older English strict-liability limits. Principle: Indian legal problems may call for principles developed for Indian circumstances rather than uncritical dependence on English legal rules; the observation about not needing the crutches of a foreign legal order reflects this independent development.
- Absolute liability is stricter than the earlier English rule associated with Rylands v. Fletcher.
- Options (A), (C) and (D) are not the case in which this observation was made.
Strict liability and the Indian rule of absolute liability are not identical. The paper is from 2018; keep historical examination law separate from later legal developments.
Question 111
Which among the following authorities is vested with the power to investigate on matters of professional misconduct committed by a Chartered Accountant or a Chartered Accountant's Firm under Section 132 of the Companies Act, 2013?
- National Advisory Committee on Accounting Standards
- Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
- The Serious Fraud Investigation Office
- National Financial Reporting Authority
Answer: (D) National Financial Reporting Authority.
Section 132 of the Companies Act, 2013 gives the National Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA) powers concerning accounting and auditing standards and investigations of specified professional misconduct.
- (A): the older advisory committee was not the Section 132 investigating authority.
- (B): professional institutes have their own disciplinary functions, but the statute assigns the Section 132 power to NFRA.
- (C): the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO) investigates serious corporate fraud under different provisions.
NFRA and SFIO have different statutory functions.
Question 112
Which among the following is not true with respect to negotiable instruments?
- There must be an unconditional order or promise for payment.
- A cheque cannot be considered as a bill of exchange.
- If the time of payment is linked to the death of a person, it is nevertheless a negotiable instrument.
- It is freely transferable and delivery of the instrument is essential.
Answer: (B) A cheque cannot be considered as a bill of exchange.
- Section 6 of the Negotiable Instruments Act defines a cheque as a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and payable on demand. The statement denying that a cheque is a bill of exchange is therefore incorrect.
- A negotiable instrument generally involves an unconditional order or promise, and transferability, subject to statutory rules.
- Options (A), (C) and (D) are not the untrue statement the question seeks.
Every cheque is a specialised bill of exchange; not every bill of exchange is a cheque.
Question 113
In which case did the Supreme Court place the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa before the Chief Justice of India for reconsideration by a larger bench?
- State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 1
- Coir Board v. Indira Devi, (2000) 1 SCC 224
- Aeltemesh Rein v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 54
- A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271
Answer: (A) State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 1.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jai Bir Singh (2005): referred questions about the scope of "industry" and the Bangalore Water Supply decision for reconsideration by a larger bench. Principle: a referral does not by itself overrule the earlier binding decision.
Options (B), (C) and (D) are not the referring decision.
Referral for reconsideration is not the same as overruling.
Question 114
The legal phrase "pari passu" means:
- On equal footing
- Like angels do
- Repay without delay
- Return promptly
Answer: (A) On equal footing.
Pari passu means on an equal footing, or proportionally and without preference among members of the same class. In insolvency, it may describe equal ranking among certain creditors.
- The phrase does not mean behaving like angels (B), repaying without delay (C) or returning promptly (D).
Pari passu is a ranking principle, not a direction to repay immediately.
Question 115
When a person dies intestate:
- He dies in his home in his estate.
- He dies without leaving any property.
- He dies without leaving a will.
- He dies by committing suicide.
Answer: (C) He dies without leaving a will.
Intestate means that a person dies without leaving a legally effective will governing the relevant property. It has nothing to do with dying inside an estate, poverty or suicide.
- (A): the place of death is irrelevant to intestacy.
- (B): a person can leave considerable property while dying intestate.
- (D): intestacy has no connection with the cause of death.
Intestacy determines which legal succession rules distribute the property.
Question 116
A foreigner can acquire Indian citizenship through:
- Registration
- Naturalisation
- Birth
- Descent
Answer: (B) Naturalisation, as expected by the paper. The question is imprecise, because eligible foreigners may also become citizens by registration; Option (B) is not uniquely correct without extra facts.
- Naturalisation: a recognised route by which a foreign national may acquire Indian citizenship under the Citizenship Act, after meeting legal conditions such as residence and other statutory requirements.
- Registration: a separate route under the Citizenship Act for particular eligible categories of persons. A foreigner may fall within a registration category, so the stem does not give an exclusive and universally correct route if it expects only naturalisation.
- Birth and descent have separate eligibility rules and should not be confused with naturalisation.
A foreign national has lived in India for the required period; naturalisation might be available if the statutory conditions are satisfied. A different foreign national might qualify for registration under a different section.
Analysis of the options:
- (A): registration can give citizenship to particular eligible foreign applicants, so it cannot be dismissed in every case.
- (B): naturalisation is a recognised statutory means by which an eligible foreigner may become an Indian citizen.
- (C): birth is a separate legal category with conditions about date and parentage; it is not the usual answer to a foreign applicant's question.
- (D): descent involves statutory rules about birth outside India and Indian parentage; it is not a universal route for any foreigner.
Registration and naturalisation are separate citizenship routes; the options in this question are not perfectly exclusive.
Question 117
Which of the following writs can be used against a person believed to be holding a public office he is not entitled to hold?
- Writ of mandamus
- Writ of certiorari
- Writ of prohibition
- Writ of quo warranto
Answer: (D) Writ of quo warranto.
| Writ | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Quo warranto | Asks by what authority a person holds a public office. |
| Mandamus | Directs a person or body to perform a public duty. |
| Certiorari | Sets aside or corrects certain unlawful decisions of lower courts or tribunals. |
| Prohibition | Restrains a court or tribunal from proceeding without jurisdiction. |
Match each writ with its own purpose.
Question 118
The principles of natural justice are applicable:
- only to judicial and quasi judicial proceedings and not to administrative proceedings.
- only to judicial, quasi judicial and administrative proceedings but not to the law making procedure.
- only to judicial proceedings.
- to all judicial, quasi judicial, administrative and law making procedures.
Answer: (B) only to judicial, quasi judicial and administrative proceedings but not to the law making procedure.
- Natural justice requires a fair procedure, particularly a meaningful hearing and an impartial decision-maker.
- It applies to judicial and quasi-judicial functions and often to administrative decisions affecting persons.
- Purely legislative acts generally do not attract the same individual hearing requirement, unless the law provides otherwise.
- Options (A) and (C) are too restrictive; Option (D) wrongly extends natural justice to law-making.
The scope of natural justice depends on the nature of the function.
Question 119
What is the minimum number of judges required to constitute a Constitution Bench in the Supreme Court of India?
- Five
- Three
- Seven
- Nine
Answer: (A) Five.
Article 145, clause (3) provides that at least five Supreme Court judges must sit to decide a case involving a substantial question of constitutional interpretation, or to hear an Article 143 reference. A Constitution Bench may contain more than five judges.
- (B): three judges is below the required minimum for these matters.
- (C) and (D): seven or nine judges may constitute a bench, but neither is the minimum.
Five is the minimum, not the only possible size of a Constitution Bench.
Question 120
According to the Hindu Marriage Act, a marriage is:
- An agreement
- A contract
- A sacrament
- A pious obligation
Answer: (C) A sacrament (the answer indicated by the paper, subject to the qualification below).
- Hindu marriage is traditionally described as a sacrament, meaning a solemn religious and social union.
- The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 also sets enforceable legal conditions, provides divorce remedies and gives marriage specific civil legal consequences. Calling it only a sacrament can hide these modern statutory aspects; modern marriage rights cannot be explained by calling it only a ritual.
- For this question, "sacrament" is the traditional classification being tested, not the complete modern account of marital law.
- Options (A), (B) and (D) do not reflect the classification tested.
Use the traditional classification carefully alongside the statutory law. The paper is from 2018; keep historical examination law separate from later legal developments.
Law of Contract: Consideration, Minors, Acceptance and Restraint of Trade
Question 121
Which one of the legal propositions is correct?
- It is necessary for a contract to be valid that the consideration should be adequate.
- Inadequacy of consideration does not affect the validity of the agreement.
- Inadequacy of consideration renders the contract void ab initio.
- An agreement made on account of natural love and affection, without consideration is void.
Answer: (B) Inadequacy of consideration does not affect the validity of the agreement.
Rule: Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act provides that inadequacy of consideration alone does not make an otherwise valid agreement void. Inadequacy can, however, help the court assess whether consent was freely given.
An agreement made without consideration may sometimes fall within a statutory exception under Section 25, including qualifying agreements made on account of natural love and affection.
Why the other options fail:
- Option A: the law does not demand that consideration always be economically adequate.
- Option C: inadequacy alone does not make a contract void from the start.
- Option D: Section 25 provides qualified exceptions involving natural love and affection, so such an agreement is not simply void.
Inadequate consideration and absence of consideration are different problems. Inadequacy alone does not invalidate the agreement; an agreement without consideration may be saved only if it falls within a statutory exception under Section 25.
Question 122
A supplied to B, a minor, provisions such as wheat flour, rice and other food stuffs.
- Since a minor's contract is void, A cannot recover the price of the provisions from B.
- A can recover the price from B as there is an agreement between A and B.
- A is not entitled to recover the money as he voluntarily supplied the provisions knowing that B was a minor.
- Since the provisions supplied constituted necessaries, A can recover the money.
Answer: (D) Since the provisions supplied constituted necessaries, A can recover the money.
Rule: Section 68 of the Indian Contract Act deals with necessaries supplied to a person incapable of contracting. The supplier is entitled to reimbursement from the property of that person when the goods are suitable to the person's condition in life and actual requirements.
- Section 68 does not make the minor personally liable as though an ordinary contract were binding.
- The provision protects suppliers while still respecting the minor's contractual incapacity.
A shop supplies suitable food to a minor who truly needs it. The shop may claim reimbursement from the minor's property under the statutory rule; it cannot automatically enforce a personal debt against the minor.
Why the other options fail:
- Option A: it ignores reimbursement under Section 68 from the incapable person's property.
- Option B: a minor is not personally bound by an ordinary contractual promise.
- Option C: knowledge of minority does not automatically defeat the statutory remedy for necessaries.
Necessaries may be reimbursed from the minor's property, not through ordinary personal contractual liability.
Question 123
A, from Kerala, writes a letter to B who lives in Delhi requesting the supply of certain goods at a certain price. While accepting the offer by writing a letter on his printed letterhead B writes at the top of the letterhead, "Subject to the jurisdiction of Delhi Courts." Later a dispute arises and A files an action in Kerala.
- A cannot file legal proceedings in Kerala since B has clearly indicated that the jurisdiction is restricted to Delhi courts.
- The agreement is void as it tends to defeat the legal process.
- Since B has written the words at the top of his letterhead, they do not become part of the contract and hence A is free to file the action in any court which has jurisdiction.
- Since the letterhead is part of the agreement of acceptance, the agreement is enforceable.
Answer: (C) Since B has written the words at the top of his letterhead, they do not become part of the contract and hence A is free to file the action in any court which has jurisdiction.
Rule: A printed jurisdiction note does not automatically become a binding term of the bargain merely because one party puts it on stationery, such as an acceptance letterhead.
- Parties may choose between courts that already have jurisdiction, when they clearly agree to do so.
- Even a valid exclusive-jurisdiction clause can normally choose only among courts that already have jurisdiction; parties cannot create jurisdiction for a court that has none under law.
- The problem tests agreement and the incorporation of contract terms, not simply the location of the printing.
- The question gives insufficient facts to determine every territorial connection with certainty. Option C is the answer indicated in the question paper, but this qualification and the exact wording of the question must be kept in mind.
Why the other options fail:
- Option A: a restrictive statement that does not capture the qualification in the governing rule.
- Option B: it does not identify any rule or legal condition that would make the agreement void.
- Option D: it does not identify the rule established by the explanation; the letterhead note is not automatically part of the acceptance.
Both consent (agreement to the clause) and a court's existing legal jurisdiction matter in jurisdiction-clause questions.
Question 124
A, a cultivator of green tea, agrees with B that he would not grow tea for a period of five years in consideration of which B agrees to pay him Rs. 25,000.
- The agreement is valid.
- The agreement is valid as the consideration is adequate.
- The agreement is void as it is in restraint of trade.
- The agreement is voidable at the option of A.
Answer: (C) The agreement is void as it is in restraint of trade.
Rule: Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act generally makes agreements restraining a lawful trade void to that extent, subject to recognised exceptions. A payment does not automatically validate a promise to stop growing tea for five years.
Why the other options fail:
- Option A: the general rule against restraint of trade prevents calling the agreement simply valid.
- Option B: a sufficient payment does not, by itself, legalise a restraint.
- Option D: an unlawful restraint is generally void to that extent, not merely voidable at one party's choice.
Reasonable consideration alone does not cure an unlawful restraint of trade.
Law of Torts: Vicarious and Strict Liability
Question 125
A entrusted his car to B for plying it as a taxi. B employed C as a cleaner. B gave the taxi to C for taking a driving test and to obtain a driving licence. C while giving the driving test seriously injured D. D filed a case against A, the owner of the vehicle.
- A is not liable as he had neither permitted nor authorised C to drive the car.
- A is liable because B was acting as his agent in giving the vehicle to C for taking it for driving test.
- A is liable because the accident happened during the course of employment.
- A is liable because C was giving the driving test for the licence of A.
Answer: (A) A is not liable as he had neither permitted nor authorised C to drive the car.
Rule: Vicarious liability means holding one person responsible for another person's wrongful conduct because of an employment or agency relationship.
- An owner or employer is not automatically responsible for every unauthorised use of a car by another person. It is not enough that the car belongs to someone.
- Liability depends on agency, the course of employment and the connection with authorised work.
- On the facts given in the paper, the cleaner was allowed to take the driving test without the owner giving the required authority or permission.
- Responsibility depends on the scope of authorised work and the actual relationship, not ownership alone.
- Option A is the answer indicated in the question paper, but the stated qualification and the wording of the question must be kept in mind.
A taxi owner authorises a driver to carry passengers, but a cleaner takes the taxi for a personal test. Whether the owner is responsible requires analysis of authority and employment, not merely the registration certificate.
Why the other options fail: Options B, C and D each assert liability (through agency, course of employment, or a test for A's own licence) without identifying a rule or legal condition supported by the facts. Do not choose an option merely because it contains familiar legal words.
Focus on whether the wrongful driving occurred within authorised work or agency. Ownership of the vehicle alone does not create vicarious liability.
Question 126
A transport company issued a circular to all its drivers that they should not compete or obstruct other buses plying in the route. Driver A, in contravention of the express prohibition, obstructed another bus and while doing so met with an accident in which B was injured.
- The company is not liable as it had expressly prohibited the drivers from competing and obstructing other buses.
- The company is liable as the accident happened in the course of employment.
- The company is not liable because the driver had disobeyed the company's instructions and thereby acted outside the course of employment.
- The company is not liable because the driver had not acted for the benefit of the employer, the company.
Answer: (B) The company is liable as the accident happened in the course of employment.
Rule: An employer may be vicariously liable for an employee's negligent driving committed in the course of employment even when the employee violates an instruction about how to do the job.
- An employer cannot escape vicarious liability in every case merely by saying that the employee broke an instruction.
- If the employee is still doing the employer's work, but doing it negligently or in a prohibited manner, responsibility may remain.
- If the employee leaves the employment tasks altogether on a personal venture (a complete departure from employment), the outcome can differ.
| Unauthorised manner of doing authorised work | Entirely unauthorised personal act |
|---|---|
| Employee is still doing the employer's work, but in a wrongful or prohibited way (e.g., obstructing another bus while driving it) | Employee abandons the employment tasks and goes on a personal venture |
| Within the course of employment; employer may be liable | Outside the course of employment; the result may differ |
Why the other options fail: Options A, C and D are restrictive or negative statements that do not capture the qualification in the governing rule; an express prohibition, or disobedience of it, does not by itself take the act outside the course of employment.
Disobeying an instruction does not always put conduct outside employment. Distinguish the unauthorised manner of doing work from an entirely unauthorised personal act.
Question 127
A was riding his bicycle on a rainy day on a road which had no street lights. He came in contact with a live wire lying on the road which was inundated with water and got electrocuted. A's wife brought an action against the Electricity Board for negligence.
- The Board is not liable as the accident happened because of the negligence of the cyclist.
- The Board is not liable as the accident happened because of the negligence of a third party, as the Board argued that a third party tried to siphon off the electricity illegally, and negligently left the wire on the road.
- The Board is not liable because of the rain and storm, and as such, it was an Act of God.
- The Board is liable as supplying electricity is an inherently dangerous act, and as such, the Board is absolutely liable.
Answer: (D) The Board is liable as supplying electricity is an inherently dangerous act, and as such, the Board is absolutely liable.
Rule: Electricity distribution creates serious danger if live wires are exposed in a public place. The responsibility of the Electricity Board for death from a live wire left on a road is governed by a strict responsibility approach to this hazardous activity.
M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari: death caused by a live electricity wire lying on a road. Held: the Electricity Board was responsible, applying strict responsibility for the inherently dangerous activity of electricity distribution, including where a third party contributed to the wire's presence. Principle: the electricity authority cannot simply say a third person caused the problem and automatically escape responsibility to an injured person; the facts still matter when applying the principle.
Why the other options fail: Options A, B and C (negligence of the cyclist, act of a third party, Act of God) are restrictive or negative statements that do not capture the rule; in a hazardous activity the Board cannot simply blame the victim, an outsider or the weather to escape responsibility.
In dangerous utility activities, the Board cannot always escape responsibility by blaming outsiders.
Consumer Protection: Medical Services
Question 128
The Supreme Court in Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha, (1995) 6 SCC 651, has held that:
- a hospital rendering free service to some patients and paid services to others is not covered under the definition of service under the Consumer Protection Act, as gratuitous services is excluded from the definition of service under the Act.
- a hospital which renders service to the patients is covered under the Consumer Protection Act whether they are rendering a contract of service or contract for service.
- a hospital which is run by the government is not covered under the Consumer Protection Act and the patient who suffers due to the negligence of a doctor working in the hospital will have to file the case in a civil court under the law of tort.
- a hospital which renders free service to some patients and paid service to some others is covered under the definition of service, as the patients who receive free service are the beneficiaries of the service hired by the patients who pay for the service.
Answer: (D) a hospital which renders free service to some patients and paid service to some others is covered under the definition of service, as the patients who receive free service are the beneficiaries of the service hired by the patients who pay for the service.
Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha (1995): the Court examined when medical treatment is a "service" under consumer-protection law. Held: paid medical services can fall under consumer-protection law; where a hospital charges some patients while treating others free, the free patients may still fall within the service framework, as beneficiaries of the paid-service arrangement. Principle: a facility that gives services free to every patient requires separate analysis; the distinction depends on the structure of the service, not just the label "hospital".
| Hospital charging some patients, treating others free | Hospital treating every patient free |
|---|---|
| Free patients may still be covered as beneficiaries of the service hired by paying patients | Analysed differently; requires separate analysis |
Why the other options fail:
- Options A and C: restrictive or negative statements that do not capture the qualification in the governing rule.
- Option B: it does not identify the rule actually laid down in the judgment.
Do not treat a partly free hospital exactly like a wholly free service.
Administrative Law
Question 129
Delegated Legislation is:
- the law made by the Parliament or the State Legislature under delegated authority from the Constitution.
- the rule, regulations byelaws, etc., made by subordinate authorities under delegated authority from the Parliament or State Legislature.
- the Ordinance promulgated by the President or the Governor under delegated authority from the Constitution.
- the law declared by the judiciary while deciding cases brought before it.
Answer: (B) the rule, regulations byelaws, etc., made by subordinate authorities under delegated authority from the Parliament or State Legislature.
Delegated legislation means rules, regulations, orders or bye-laws made by an authority under power delegated by a primary legislature; in other words, detailed rules made under authority given by a parent law.
| Instrument | Nature |
|---|---|
| Statute enacted directly by Parliament or State Legislature | Primary legislation |
| Rules, regulations, bye-laws made by subordinate authorities under a parent Act | Delegated legislation |
| Ordinance by the President or Governor | A distinct constitutional legislative instrument |
| Law declared by courts while deciding cases | Case law, not delegated legislation |
Delegated rules must stay within their parent Act and constitutional limits.
Question 130
The doctrine of 'Acting under Dictation' is applied in the case of:
- Abuse of discretion.
- Failure to exercise discretion.
- Unreasonable exercise of discretion.
- Arbitrary exercise of discretion.
Answer: (B) Failure to exercise discretion.
Rule: Acting under dictation means that an official who is legally required to decide independently follows another person's command instead. This is a failure to exercise the discretion given by law.
Why the other options fail:
- Option A: abuse of discretion is a wider label and does not identify failure through dictation as precisely.
- Option C: unreasonableness examines a decision's rationality rather than who actually decided it.
- Option D: arbitrariness is another ground, but dictation particularly involves failure to decide independently.
The lawful decision-maker must apply their own independent judgment.
Question 131
Judicial Review deals with:
- the supervision and monitoring of the activities of the officials of various government departments.
- the review by the judiciary of its own decisions.
- the review by the judiciary of the administrative and legislative acts.
- the review by the judiciary of the case laws with a view to apply in the case at hand.
Answer: (C) the review by the judiciary of the administrative and legislative acts.
Judicial review is the judicial examination of the legality and constitutionality of legislative and executive action; it checks whether a government act or law is constitutionally and legally valid.
Judicial review differs from a department supervising its employees, an appeal on facts, or a court reviewing its own order.
Why the other options fail:
- Option A: departmental supervision is administrative oversight.
- Option B: a court reviewing its own judgment is a different procedural power.
- Option D: reviewing precedents to select a rule is ordinary adjudicative analysis, not constitutional judicial review of State action.
Judicial review asks whether public power has been exercised lawfully.
Constitutional Law: Free Legal Aid
Question 132
Directions: The question below consists of two statements, one labelled as 'Assertion' (A) and another as 'Reason' (R). Examine these two statements carefully and select the answers to these items from the codes given below.
Assertion (A): It is the legal and constitutional duty of the State to provide legal aid to poor.
Reason (R): No one should be denied justice by reason of his poverty.
Codes:
- Both A and R are individually true and R is the correct explanation of A.
- Both A and R are individually true but R is not the correct explanation of A.
- A is true but R is false.
- A is false but R is true.
Answer: (A) Both A and R are individually true and R is the correct explanation of A.
Rule: Article 39A directs the State to provide equal justice and free legal aid. Articles 14 and 21 also support meaningful access to justice.
Both the Assertion and the Reason are true, and the Reason explains the Assertion: the State must provide legal aid precisely because poverty should not prevent a person from obtaining justice.
Why the other options fail: Option B wrongly denies the explanatory link; Options C and D wrongly treat one of two true statements as false.
Access to justice must not depend entirely on ability to pay.
Law of Contract: Refusal to Perform
Question 133
A, a singer, enters into a contract with B, the manager of a theatre, to sing at his theatre two nights every week during the following two months, and B agrees to pay Rs. 100 for each night's performance. On the sixth night A wilfully absents herself from the theatre.
- B is at liberty to put an end to the contract.
- B has to give notice to end the contract.
- B cannot breach the contract.
- It is A's freedom to take leave, so B has to retain A.
Answer: (A) B is at liberty to put an end to the contract.
Rule: Section 39 of the Indian Contract Act permits a promisee to put an end to a contract when the promisor refuses to perform, or disables herself from performing, her promise in its entirety, unless the promisee indicates acceptance of continued performance.
This problem is an actual illustration to Section 39. The singer promises repeated performances but wilfully does not attend on the sixth night, so the theatre manager is at liberty to end the contract.
The theatre manager pays for regular performances. When the singer deliberately misses the promised sixth performance, the manager may choose to end the arrangement under the statutory illustration.
| Singer wilfully absent on the sixth night | Manager accepts her back and she sings on the seventh night |
|---|---|
| Manager is at liberty to put an end to the contract | Manager's conduct can show acceptance of continued performance; the remedy may then differ, including compensation for the earlier breach |
Why the other options fail:
- Option B: it does not identify any rule requiring notice; the illustration leaves B at liberty to end the contract.
- Option C: a restrictive statement that does not capture the governing rule.
- Option D: there is no rule obliging B to retain A after a wilful refusal to perform.
A serious refusal to perform can give the innocent party an option to terminate.
Company Law
Question 134
Under which provision of the Companies Act, 2013, will members be liable for a reduction of the statutory minimum number of members, in the Company?
- Sec. 3A.
- Sec. 7.
- Sec. 3.
- Sec. 4.
Answer: (A) Sec. 3A.
Rule: Section 3A of the Companies Act, 2013, inserted by the 2017 Amendment, addresses personal liability of members when:
- the company's membership falls below the statutory minimum;
- the company carries on business for more than six months after that; and
- the member knows of the position.
Why the other options fail: Options B, C and D (Sections 7, 3 and 4) do not identify the provision that imposes this liability.
Liability under Section 3A depends on the six-month period and the knowledge requirement.
Law of Contract: Liability of Surety
Question 135
Farhan lends Rs. 1,00,000 to Aadil where Armaan was the surety. The contract in this transaction provided that the liability of Armaan is limited to Rs. 50,000. The contract is:
- void.
- irregular.
- voidable.
- valid.
Answer: (D) valid.
- A surety promises to answer for another person's debt or default.
- The principal debtor is the person who originally owes the obligation.
Rule: Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act makes the surety's liability coextensive with that of the principal debtor, unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. Therefore, the parties may validly agree on a lower maximum amount for the surety, below the whole loan amount. The existence of a large loan does not by itself mean that the surety must pay the whole loan.
Why the other options fail:
- Option A: the guarantee is not void simply because it sets a maximum below the loan.
- Option B: it is not legally irregular merely because liability is capped.
- Option C: no ground making the arrangement voidable is given.
A surety's liability can be capped by agreement.
Constitutional Law: Right to Counsel
Question 136
The right of an accused to be defended by a legal practitioner of his/her choice commences when:
- the charge sheet is issued.
- the accused pleads not guilty.
- the accused is remanded.
- the accused is arrested.
Answer: (D) the accused is arrested.
Rule: Article 22(1) protects a person who is arrested, including the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his or her choice. The protection does not begin only at the filing of the charge sheet or at trial.
Why the other options fail: issue of the charge sheet (A), a plea of not guilty (B) and remand (C) do not mark the start of the right; the protection is available to a person on arrest.
Access to legal assistance begins at the arrest stage.
Transfer of Property: Spes Successionis
Question 137
The transfer of 'spes successionis' under the Transfer of Property Act is
- void ab initio.
- voidable.
- perfectly valid.
- valid only if approved by the court.
Answer: (A) void ab initio.
Spes successionis is a Latin term meaning a mere chance of succeeding to property, that is, a mere chance of inheritance.
Rule: Section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act excludes spes successionis from transferable property. A possible future heir cannot convey a present transferable interest that has not yet vested.
- A person whose parent is alive may expect to inherit one day, but that expectation can disappear if circumstances change.
- Section 6(a) prevents the transfer of this bare expectation.
- Compare an existing vested property right, which can often be transferred subject to the applicable law.
Zoya, an adult, expects to inherit a house from a living relative. That expectation alone is not an existing ownership right, and she cannot sell it.
Why the other options fail:
- Option B: the mere expectancy is not a present right that can be transferred and later avoided.
- Option C: the statute expressly prevents transfer of this mere chance.
- Option D: court approval alone does not turn a bare expectancy into transferable property under this provision.
An expectation of inheritance is not the same as owning an existing right.
Property Law: Transfer of Property Act
Question 138
A mortgage by deposit of title deeds for which a loan of Rs 3 crores is raised:
- can be effected only with the help of a written deed.
- only with the help of a written and attested deed.
- can be effected only with the help of a written, attested and registered document.
- can be effected without an attested or registered document.
Answer: (D) can be effected without an attested or registered document.
The rule
Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act recognises a mortgage by deposit of title deeds in specified places. A genuine deposit made with intent to secure a debt need not always be created through a separate registered and attested mortgage deed.
A mortgage by deposit of title deeds is sometimes called an equitable mortgage. Its key features are:
- deposit of the property documents (title deeds);
- with the necessary intention to create security for a debt;
- in a place where the provision applies.
Simply recording an already completed deposit is different from executing a written instrument that itself creates the mortgage. A memorandum that itself creates rights may raise registration issues; registration consequences change depending on what the document actually does.
Why the other options fail
- (A) A written deed is not always an essential feature of a mortgage by title-deed deposit.
- (B) Attestation is not automatically required for a deposit satisfying Section 58(f).
- (C) The full formality of a registered, attested deed is not always necessary for this kind of mortgage.
- (D) Correct: matches the rule.
Exam tip: distinguish delivery of title deeds (no attested or registered document needed) from a written instrument that itself creates the mortgage (which may need registration).
Question 139
The rule of Daniels v. Davison (1809) 16 Ves 249, has been given a statutory shape in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, under which of the following titles?
- Registration as constructive notice.
- Actual possession as constructive notice.
- Doctrine of animo attestendi.
- Doctrine of election.
Answer: (B) Actual possession as constructive notice. The question paper's key marks Option (A), which is inconsistent with the reported rule in Daniels v. Davison; Option (B) is the supported answer.
The rule
Notice in property law includes actual knowledge and, in defined situations, knowledge that a reasonable enquiry would reveal. When someone other than the seller openly occupies the property, a buyer should ask whether that person has a lease or another legal interest.
Daniels v. Davison (1809): Principle: actual possession by someone other than the seller can put a purchaser on inquiry notice of that occupier's rights. The case is associated with the duty to enquire about the occupier's rights. It supports actual possession as constructive notice, not registration as constructive notice.
Neha buys a house while a tenant lives there. Asking the seller alone may be insufficient. A reasonable enquiry of the tenant may reveal a right that affects the property.
Why the other options fail
- (A) Registration can sometimes operate as constructive notice under property law, but it is not the rule associated with Daniels v. Davison.
- (B) Correct: actual possession can alert a buyer that the occupier may have enforceable rights. This fits the reported case.
- (C) Animo attestendi concerns an intention to attest a legal instrument, not an occupier giving notice of rights.
- (D) The doctrine of election concerns a person choosing between inconsistent benefits or rights, not possession as notice.
Question 139 has a marked-answer error: choose Option (B) on the reported rule.
Family Law
Question 140
Under which of the following laws is the remedy of restitution of conjugal rights not available?
- Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
- Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872.
- Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936.
- Special Marriage Act, 1954.
Answer: (B) Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872.
The rule
Restitution of conjugal rights is a legal remedy seeking restoration of marital cohabitation under certain matrimonial statutes. It is provided in the Hindu Marriage Act, the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act and the Special Marriage Act.
For Christians, the remedy is found in the Divorce Act of 1869, not in the Indian Christian Marriage Act of 1872 named in Option (B).
Why the other options fail
- (A) The Hindu Marriage Act expressly provides for restitution in Section 9.
- (B) The answer indicated by the paper, keeping in mind the qualification above and the wording of the question.
- (C) The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act contains a restitution remedy.
- (D) The Special Marriage Act contains a restitution remedy in Section 22.
| Statute | Restitution of conjugal rights |
|---|---|
| Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 | Available (Section 9) |
| Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936 | Available |
| Special Marriage Act, 1954 | Available (Section 22) |
| Divorce Act, 1869 (Christians) | Available |
| Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 | Not provided |
Exam trap: the Indian Christian Marriage Act and the Divorce Act are different statutes. A statute's title is not enough; check the remedy provision. Check the correct statute, not merely the religious community covered.
Question 141
H and W, both professing Muslim faith marry under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. In course of time they are blessed with two sons and two daughters. The eldest child, S1 was very successful and made a lot of money while the rest of the family members were in dire financial circumstances. He maintained a separate habitation, refused to share his money and executed a Will of his total property in favour of a trust before his death at the age of 44 excluding completely his younger siblings and old parents. The Will would be:
- valid only to the extent of one-third of his total property.
- void as two-thirds of his property must go by intestate succession.
- valid as he can make a Will of his total property.
- valid as he died a bachelor.
Answer: (C) valid as he can make a Will of his total property.
The rule
Section 21 of the Special Marriage Act directs that succession to the property of persons married under that Act, and of the issue of their marriage, is generally governed by the Indian Succession Act, subject to specific rules and exceptions.
The question describes a child born to two Muslims married under this Act. Applying the ordinary Muslim one-third testamentary limitation automatically would therefore be mistaken. The problem concerns the son's own testamentary capacity and the succession rules that govern him.
- Testamentary succession: property passes by a valid will.
- Intestate succession: property passes where there is no will.
The expected answer is Option (C); the legal interaction is more subtle than saying every Muslim always has the same testamentary restriction.
A son's parents chose a civil marriage under the Special Marriage Act. Before deciding the effect of his will, examine the special succession rule instead of assuming that only the family's religion determines it.
Why the other options fail
- (A) The one-third limit cannot simply be assumed when the succession scheme under Section 21 of the Special Marriage Act governs the issue of the marriage.
- (B) For the same reason, the suggested automatic two-thirds intestate distribution is not the legal conclusion supported by these facts.
- (C) Correct: the expected result once the special statutory succession framework is considered, subject to the usual validity requirements for a will.
- (D) Being a bachelor does not by itself make a will valid or determine the full extent of testamentary powers.
Marriage under the Special Marriage Act can alter the applicable succession framework. The paper is from 2018: keep historical examination law separate from later legal developments.
Question 142
A 35 years old Hindu bachelor (single man) adopts a 14 years old girl under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Such adoption under the law is:
- valid.
- void.
- voidable.
- irregular.
Answer: (A) valid.
The rule
- Under Section 11 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, a man adopting a girl must be at least 21 years older than the child.
- Under Section 10, the child must ordinarily be below the age of 15 years.
Here the adopter is 35 and the girl is 14: the difference is exactly 21 years, and the child is below the 15-year ceiling. The question assumes the other statutory conditions are met. Other required conditions must still be satisfied, so the problem cannot be used to say that age difference is the only requirement for a valid adoption.
35 minus 14 = 21. The age difference is exactly 21 years, which meets that part of the legal test.
Why the other options fail
- (A) Correct: the male adopter is exactly 21 years older than the girl, satisfying the cross-gender age requirement.
- (B) A void adoption would require a legal defect; these ages do not breach the required 21-year difference.
- (C) The question shows no defect that makes this adoption merely voidable based on the ages.
- (D) "Irregular" does not follow merely because the adopter is unmarried or because of this valid age difference.
For a man adopting a girl, calculate the age difference exactly: at least 21 years is required.
Intellectual Property Law
Question 143
An "International Application" under the Patent Co-operation Treaty:
- is examined by a patent examiner at a designated office.
- is searched against by a single search conducted at a designated office.
- results in a single patent covering all the States for which protection is sought.
- is forwarded to the patent offices of all the States for which protection is sought for search and examination.
Answer: defective question. The question paper's key marks Option (D), but no single option accurately states the PCT procedure. Learn the correct principle rather than memorising the marked option.
The rule: PCT procedure
PCT means Patent Cooperation Treaty. It provides a coordinated international filing route, not a single patent valid throughout the world.
- A receiving Office accepts the application and checks formalities.
- A competent International Searching Authority searches relevant published material and issues its report and opinion.
- If the applicant elects to proceed, the application continues before national or regional offices (the national phase), which decide whether to grant patents.
An applicant wants patent protection in several countries. A PCT filing simplifies the early process, but each national or regional office can still decide whether a patent should be granted.
Why each option fails
- (A) A designated office may examine the application in the later national phase, but that is not how the PCT international search is described.
- (B) The international search is conducted by an International Searching Authority, not by the designated national office as this option says.
- (C) The PCT does not grant one worldwide patent; separate national or regional grants remain necessary.
- (D) A loose description of later national processing. It wrongly suggests that every designated office performs the initial search and examination; national processing comes later only if the applicant proceeds.
This question is poorly framed: none of its options accurately describes the full PCT procedure.
Environmental Law
Question 144
The first of the major laws for the protection of environment, to be promulgated in India was the:
- Water Act.
- Air Act.
- Environmental Act.
- Noise Pollution Rule.
Answer: (A) Water Act.
The rule
The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act of 1974 was an early major Indian environmental statute, preceding the Air Act and the Environment Protection Act. Option (A) is therefore the answer; the Air Act (Option B) came later, in 1981, and the Environment Protection Act (Option C) in 1986.
| Law | Year / nature |
|---|---|
| Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act | 1974 |
| Air Act | 1981 |
| Environment Protection Act | 1986 |
| Noise Pollution Rules | Later subordinate legislation (regulations), not the first major statute |
Learn the order: Water Act, Air Act, Environment Protection Act.
Legal Research
Question 145
What does the term ISSN displayed on Journals stand for?
- International Sequence of Standard Numbers.
- International Standard Serial Number.
- Index of Standard Serial Numbers.
- Indexed Standard and Sequential Numbers.
Answer: (B) International Standard Serial Number.
The rule
An ISSN is a standard identifier for a continuing serial publication, such as a journal or magazine. "Serial" refers to a publication that comes out over successive issues. An ISBN, by contrast, identifies a book or similar edition-level publication.
| ISSN | ISBN |
|---|---|
| International Standard Serial Number | Serves a different bibliographic purpose |
| Journals, magazines and other continuing serial publications | Chiefly books and similar edition-level publications |
Options (A), (C) and (D) are not the correct expansion of ISSN.
ISSN is for serials; ISBN is chiefly for books.
International Law
Question 146
The fundamental principle of non-refoulement in International Law is applied in relation to:
- Terrorists.
- Drug traffickers.
- Smugglers.
- Refugees.
Answer: (D) Refugees.
The rule
Non-refoulement generally means that a State must not send a refugee back to a place where the person faces specified serious threats or persecution. The principle is associated with refugee protection and also interacts with non-return duties under human-rights law.
- (A) The term comes from refugee law, not a special protection based merely on terrorism.
- (B) Being a drug trafficker alone is not the refugee category asked about.
- (C) Being a smuggler alone is also not the category defining this principle.
Refoulement means forced return to danger in the relevant legal sense.
Criminal Law: Legal History
Question 147
The last trial by jury held in a criminal case in India was that of:
- Rustom v. State of Gujarat.
- Ascentia Dawes v. Crown.
- Lily v. State of Bombay.
- K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra.
Answer: (D) K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (the expected examination answer, with the historical qualification below).
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra: a landmark murder case with a famous jury verdict, conventionally associated with the ending of prominent criminal jury trials in India and the decline of the jury system.
The Nanavati case is frequently presented in textbooks as the last jury trial in India, but that simplified historical claim is disputed; historical scholarship describes later jury trials. "Last trial by jury" should not be asserted as an exhaustive finding about every Indian court and year.
- (A), (B), (C) None of these is the landmark Indian jury trial conventionally expected by the examiner.
- (D) The examination answer and the best-known Indian criminal jury-trial case, but not by itself sound evidence that no jury trial ever happened later.
For the MCQ, choose Nanavati: it is the landmark jury-trial case commonly expected in exam preparation. For history, describe it as a landmark jury trial associated with the decline of the system, not as a proven nationwide last trial. The paper is from 2018: keep historical examination law separate from later legal developments.
Constitutional Law
Question 148
The Right to Education Act 2009 (RTE) provides for free and compulsory education to:
- All illiterate children of India.
- All citizens of India.
- Children aged between 6 and 14 years.
- All children up to the age of 10 years.
Answer: (C) Children aged between 6 and 14 years.
The rule
Article 21A and the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act address the age group 6 to 14 years. Early-childhood policy and education beyond 14 are separate matters.
- (A) The Act is not restricted to children who are already illiterate.
- (B) The right applies to the specified child age group, not every citizen regardless of age.
- (D) Limiting eligibility to age 10 ignores children aged 11 to 14.
The RTE statutory age band is 6 through 14.
International Law and the Constitution: Treaties
Question 149
An International treaty becomes binding on India, when:
- The Prime Minister of India signs the treaty.
- The President of India signs the treaty.
- The Parliament of India makes special legislation for accepting the treaty.
- When the Indian delegation signs the treaty.
Answer: defective question. The question paper's key marks Option (C), but none of the four options correctly states the full rule. Do not learn Option (C) as a universal legal rule.
The rule: two separate questions
| Issue | Position |
|---|---|
| When is India bound internationally by a treaty? | Depends on the treaty and the method by which consent to be bound is expressed, such as ratification or other agreed means. India can undertake binding treaty obligations through the Union executive; a parliamentary statute is not always necessary. |
| When are treaty rules enforceable in Indian domestic courts? | Domestic legislation is required when implementation changes domestic law or restricts rights. |
Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel: Held: the executive may create international obligations, but legislation is needed where implementation of a treaty changes domestic law or affects private rights. Principle: international binding force and domestic implementation are separate issues.
India makes a treaty promising cooperation that does not change anyone's rights. Parliament may not need a new law merely to sign that treaty. If compliance requires changing citizens' legal rights, domestic legislation may be necessary.
Why each option fails
- (A) A Prime Minister's signature may be significant, but it is not the universal rule for when every treaty becomes binding.
- (B) The President's signature is not a universal mandatory step for every treaty.
- (C) Legislation can be required for domestic implementation, but it is not the universal step creating the international obligation.
- (D) A delegation's signature may or may not express binding consent under the treaty's actual terms; the answer cannot be universal.
The options collapse two separate issues (international binding force and domestic enforceability), making Question 149 flawed. A signature by a named official does not always make a treaty binding, and parliamentary legislation is not always necessary.
Constitutional Law: Transgender Rights
Question 150
The Supreme Court of India recognised 'transgenders' as 'third gender with all rights' in the case of:
- Bar Council of India v. A.K. Balaji, AIR 2018 SC 1382.
- National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, AIR 2014 SC 1863.
- Suresh Kumar Koushal v. NAZ Foundation, AIR 2014 SC 563.
- State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh, AIR 2016 SC 5176.
Answer: (B) National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, AIR 2014 SC 1863.
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014): Held: transgender persons have the right to their gender identity and constitutional protection, including recognition as third gender. Principle: dignity, equality and non-discrimination.
The other listed cases concern different topics, including representation in courts and equal pay. Options (A), (C) and (D) do not identify the rule asked for; do not choose an option merely because it contains familiar legal words. Later cases may develop these rights further, but they are not what the CLAT PG 2018 question asked about.
NALSA is the important case for constitutional recognition of transgender rights.