About this subject
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A judge must decide, months or years later, what happened in an incident the judge never saw. The only way is through evidence, the bridge between the past event and the present courtroom. The Law of Evidence decides which planks can build that bridge, and how strong it must be before the court walks across it.
The law now in force is the B.S.A., 2023, which replaced the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA). Most judgments were decided under the IEA, so both section numbers are given throughout.
Exam tip: write the B.S.A. section number first; the old IEA number is needed to understand the case law.
The five questions of every evidence problem
- Relevancy: is this fact connected to the case?
- Admissibility: even if connected, will the law allow it in?
- Proof: how is it proved: by a witness, a document or an electronic record?
- Burden of proof and presumptions: who must prove it, and can the court presume something?
- Witnesses and examination: who can give this evidence, and how is that person questioned?
The subject follows this path in six modules: the foundation; relevancy and admissibility (the largest); proof, including electronic evidence; the accomplice; burden of proof and presumptions; and witnesses.
Role of the Law of Evidence
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| Kind of law | What it does | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| Substantive | Tells you your rights and duties | B.N.S. (murder is an offence); Indian Contract Act (when a promise becomes enforceable) |
| Procedural | Tells you how a case moves through the system | B.N.S.S. (police investigation, criminal trial); Code of Civil Procedure (filing and trial of a civil suit) |
| Evidence | What material the court can look at, how it must be brought before the court, and when a fact is treated as proved | B.S.A. |
The law says murder is an offence; procedure says the trial will be held in a Sessions Court. How the court will know that this accused killed this person is the gap evidence law fills.
Substantive law says what must be proved. Procedural law says where and when. Evidence law says how.
Prince says Farhan took his motorcycle without permission. The B.N.S. makes theft an offence; the B.N.S.S. governs registration, investigation and the Magistrate's trial. The B.S.A. governs how Prince proves the theft: a neighbour who saw Farhan riding away, the registration papers, street CCTV footage. Each is an evidence question.
The B.S.A. helps the court find the truth, and find it fairly. It applies to civil and criminal cases, mainly at inquiry and trial; balances both sides; decides who must prove what; allows some presumptions; gives each side the right to cross-examine; keeps out some evidence, like confessions to the police; and protects certain communications, like those between client and advocate.
The B.S.A. is not a list of technical rules; it is a system for fair fact-finding.
History: From the IEA to the B.S.A.
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- Before 1872: no uniform law. The Presidency towns broadly followed English rules; elsewhere practice varied.
- 1872: Sir James Fitzjames Stephen drafted the Indian Evidence Act, in force from 1 September 1872; it worked for over 150 years.
- 2000: with the Information Technology Act, the IEA was amended for electronic records, adding Sections 65A and 65B.
- 2003: the Law Commission reviewed the whole Act in its 185th Report.
- 2013: amendments strengthened protection of victims of sexual offences.
- 2023: three criminal laws passed together: the B.N.S. replaced the Indian Penal Code, the B.N.S.S. the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the B.S.A. the IEA. Assent: 25 December 2023; in force: 1 July 2024.
The B.S.A. is not a completely new law. It keeps the structure and most of the language of the IEA; most provisions are renumbered, some merged, a few dropped and some important ones added. The biggest changes concern electronic and digital records, and colonial references are removed.
| Point | IEA | B.S.A. |
|---|---|---|
| Number of sections | 167 | 170 |
| Confessions to the police | Sections 25, 26, 27 | Combined in Section 23 |
Transition: Section 170
Section 170 repeals the IEA, but any trial, inquiry, investigation, proceeding or appeal pending when the B.S.A. came into force continues under the IEA as if the B.S.A. had not come into force. For some years, both laws will be applied.
Stephen gave us the IEA in 1872. The B.S.A. of 2023 keeps Stephen's skeleton, but gives it a digital body.
Constitutional and Jurisprudential Basis
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- Article 14: equality and protection against arbitrariness; rules of proof must apply equally to both sides.
- Article 21: no deprivation of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, read by the Supreme Court as a procedure that is fair, just and reasonable. A fair trial is part of Article 21 and impossible without fair rules of evidence; the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses is at its core.
- Article 20(3): no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. This right against self-incrimination shapes the whole law of confessions.
- Natural justice: no one should be condemned unheard; justice must be done and be seen to be done. The B.S.A. gives life to these principles through the right to cross-examine, the exclusion of forced confessions, and decisions based only on proved facts.
Adjective law: Jeremy Bentham called procedural law, including evidence, adjective law. As an adjective serves a noun, it serves substantive law, so that substantive rights can actually be enforced.
Illegally obtained evidence
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Is relevant evidence excluded if collected illegally, say in a search that broke the procedure? Some countries exclude it; Indian law generally has not. A good essay question.
Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection: evidence obtained through an illegal search. Held: it is not excluded merely because the search was illegal, so long as it is relevant, unless the Constitution or a law excludes it. Principle: illegal collection does not by itself shut out relevant evidence.
The Law Commission's 94th Report (1983) proposed a judicial discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence. It was never enacted, and the B.S.A. has not adopted such a rule. The issue links evidence law with privacy and fair investigation.
Evidence Law, Substantive Law and Procedural Law
The B.N.S. defines murder and tells you what the prosecution must establish (causing death with a certain intention or knowledge) but not how to prove intention. The B.S.A. does: Section 12 makes facts showing a state of mind relevant, and Section 6 makes motive and preparation relevant. On the procedural side, the B.N.S.S. governs how evidence in a criminal trial is recorded, and the Code of Civil Procedure how issues are framed in a civil suit. The three laws work like three gears in one machine.
The B.S.A. also borrows from the B.N.S.: its presumption on dowry death uses the B.N.S. meaning of dowry death, and its rule on proving General Exceptions, like private defence, refers to the B.N.S.
Not every evidence rule is purely procedural. Estoppel and conclusive proof are almost substantive in effect: a conclusive presumption of legitimacy can decide who a child's legal father is.
Applicability of the B.S.A.: Section 1
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Section 1: the B.S.A. applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any Court, including Courts-martial, but not to affidavits presented to any Court or officer, nor to proceedings before an arbitrator.
| Proceeding | Applies? | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| Courts, including Courts-martial (military courts) | Yes | Expressly covered |
| Affidavits | No | They have their own rules |
| Arbitration | No | Parties choose it for a quicker, less technical process |
Tribunals, commissions and departmental inquiries decide disputes but are not courts in the strict sense. The B.S.A. does not bind them in its full technical form unless some law says so, but they must still follow natural justice.
Case: Dhakeswari Cotton Mills v. Commissioner of Income Tax
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Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1955): the Income Tax Officer rejected a mill's return and simply guessed a higher profit, adding ₹36 lakh. The Appellate Tribunal reduced the addition but relied on other mills' profit figures, supplied by the department and never shown to the company, and refused to look at the company's books, so the company never got a fair chance to answer. Issue: is an income tax authority bound by the Evidence Act and, if not, can it decide against a person on material that person has never seen? Held: an income tax authority is not bound by the technical rules of the Evidence Act, but it cannot make a pure guess without any material, or use material against a person without disclosing it and giving a chance to explain. The order, in breach of these fundamental rules of natural justice, was set aside and the case sent back. Principle: even where the Evidence Act does not strictly apply, natural justice always applies.
No strict evidence rules does not mean no rules at all.
Case: R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court
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R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009): in the BMW hit-and-run trial in Delhi, a television sting's hidden-camera recordings appeared to show senior defence lawyer R.K. Anand trying to win over Sunil Kulkarni, a witness dropped by the prosecution but summoned by the trial court as a court witness. The Delhi High Court held him guilty of contempt. Issue: could the sting recordings be relied on, and was the procedure fair? Held: the Supreme Court upheld the finding. He never really disputed the recordings' genuineness and kept changing his stand, so no formal proof was needed. Contempt proceedings are sui generis (a class of their own), so the Evidence Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure do not strictly apply; but the standard of proof is as strict as in a criminal trial and natural justice applies with even greater force. Principle: undisputed recordings may be relied on, but the procedure must be fair and the proof strict.
R.K. Anand: Genuine recording. Fair procedure. High standard.
Fact, Fact in Issue and Relevant Fact
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These definitions are in Section 2 of the B.S.A. (formerly Section 3 of the IEA); every later topic depends on them.
Fact means and includes (i) anything, state of things, or relation of things, capable of being perceived by the senses; and (ii) any mental condition of which any person is conscious.
- Physical facts (seen, heard, touched, smelt, tasted): a man standing near a shop; blood on a knife; a person hearing a scream.
- Psychological facts (in the mind): an intention; good faith; an opinion; consciousness of a sensation, like pain. They matter because murder needs intention or knowledge and cheating needs dishonest intention.
The old Act also listed reputation as a fact; the B.S.A. has dropped that illustration.
Facts in issue
Facts from which, by themselves or with other facts, the existence, non-existence, nature or extent of any right, liability or disability, asserted or denied in the case, necessarily follows. Simply, the main fact in dispute on which the result depends: if proved, a right or liability follows; if not, it does not.
A is accused of murdering B. Facts in issue: that A caused B's death and intended to cause it. If A pleads grave and sudden provocation by B, or unsoundness of mind preventing him from knowing the nature of his act, those also become facts in issue.
In civil cases, facts in issue come from the pleadings (plaint and written statement); by the Explanation, whenever a court records an issue of fact under civil procedure law, the fact asserted or denied in answer to it is a fact in issue. In criminal cases, they come from the charge and the ingredients of the offence.
Relevant fact
One fact is relevant to another when connected with it in any of the ways referred to in the B.S.A.'s provisions on relevancy of facts.
A common mistake: "relevant" does not mean anything that seems useful. A fact is relevant only if it fits one of the Act's relevancy provisions.
| Fact in issue | Relevant fact |
|---|---|
| The main question; the result depends on it | Helps answer it; does not decide the case alone |
| Whether Farhan killed Prince | That Farhan threatened Prince the day before |
| The destination | The road that leads there |
Evidence: Oral, Documentary and Electronic
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Under Section 2, evidence means and includes:
- Oral evidence: all statements, including statements given electronically, which the court permits or requires witnesses to make before it in relation to matters of fact under inquiry.
- Documentary evidence: all documents, including electronic or digital records, produced for the inspection of the court.
So evidence by video conferencing is still oral evidence, and an email, chat or CCTV file is a document.
Document: any matter expressed, described or otherwise recorded upon any substance by letters, figures, marks or any other means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for recording that matter; expressly including electronic and digital records. A modern illustration: an electronic record on emails, server logs, documents on computers, laptops or smartphones, messages, websites, locational evidence and voice mail messages stored on digital devices are documents.
What a person says is oral evidence; what is recorded on paper or any substance is documentary evidence; what is recorded digitally is electronic evidence, a kind of document: Mouth, Marks and Machine.
Direct and circumstantial evidence
Not a statutory definition, but an essential classification.
| Direct evidence | Circumstantial evidence |
|---|---|
| Proves the fact in issue directly | Proves other facts from which the fact in issue is inferred |
| An eyewitness who saw the stabbing | The accused seen running from the house in a bloodstained shirt |
Both are valid. Many convictions rest entirely on circumstantial evidence, provided the chain is complete and points only towards guilt.
Proved, Disproved and Not Proved
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| Term (Section 2) | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Proved | After considering the matters before it, the court either believes the fact to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists |
| Disproved | The court either believes the fact does not exist, or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought to act upon the supposition that it does not exist |
| Not proved | Neither proved nor disproved |
The test is the prudent man, not mathematical certainty: would a sensible, careful person act on this belief in these circumstances?
Prince says he paid Farhan ₹50,000 and produces a bank transfer record the court believes: proved. Farhan shows Prince's account was empty that day and the court believes no payment was made: disproved. The evidence is evenly balanced and the court cannot say either way: not proved.
Not proved is not disproved. Not proved means the party who had to prove the fact has failed; it does not mean the opposite is established. A very important exam distinction.
Standard of proof
The definition is the same in civil and criminal cases; the degree of probability the prudent man demands differs.
| Civil cases | Criminal cases |
|---|---|
| Preponderance of probabilities (more likely than not) | Guilt beyond reasonable doubt, because life and liberty are at stake |
May Presume, Shall Presume and Conclusive Proof
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A presumption is a shortcut the law allows: when one fact is proved, the court takes another as proved, unless something stops it. There are three levels.
| Term | B.S.A. | Effect | Court's choice? | Disproof? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| May presume | Section 2(1)(h) | Court may regard the fact as proved unless and until disproved, or may call for proof of it | Yes | Yes |
| Shall presume | Section 2(1)(l) | Court must regard the fact as proved unless and until disproved | No | Yes |
| Conclusive proof | Section 2(1)(b) | On proof of one fact, court must regard the other as proved and shall not allow evidence to disprove it | No | No |
Under the IEA, all three were in Section 4.
May means maybe. Shall means must, until disproved. Conclusive means closed.
Foundation in brief: evidence law says how facts are proved. The B.S.A. replaced Stephen's IEA from 1 July 2024, with pending matters continuing under the IEA. It rests on Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 and on natural justice. Under Section 1 it applies to judicial proceedings in courts, including courts-martial, but not to affidavits or arbitration; tribunals must still follow natural justice (Dhakeswari Cotton Mills), and R.K. Anand shows recordings relied on in a special proceeding with fair process and strict proof. A fact may be physical or mental; a fact in issue is the main disputed fact, and a relevant fact is connected to it in a way the Act recognises. Evidence is oral or documentary, and documents include electronic records. Proved, disproved and not proved are judged by the prudent man; may presume, shall presume and conclusive proof are three levels of presumption.
Relevancy and Admissibility: General Principles
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Section 3 (Section 5 of the IEA): evidence may be given in any suit or proceeding of the existence or non-existence of every fact in issue, and of such other facts as are declared to be relevant, and of no others.
"And of no others" is the gatekeeper of the whole Act: evidence only of facts in issue and relevant facts; everything else stays outside the courtroom door.
Relevancy and admissibility distinguished
| Relevancy | Admissibility |
|---|---|
| Connection: is the fact connected to the case in a way the Act recognises? | Permission: even if relevant, does the law allow the court to receive it? |
| A matter of logic | A matter of law |
Farhan, arrested for murder, tells the Inspector at the police station, "I killed Prince." Nothing is more relevant, but Section 23 says a confession to a police officer shall not be proved against the accused. Relevant, but not admissible.
All admissible evidence is relevant, but all relevant evidence is not admissible. A very important exam distinction.
Logical relevance is the common-sense connection between two facts; legal relevance is narrower, a connection the law recognises and will act upon. A village rumour may be logically connected to a case, but the law will not act on it because it cannot be tested. Exam line: relevancy is a matter of logic; admissibility is a matter of law.
The judge as gatekeeper: Sections 141 and 168
Section 141 (Section 136 of the IEA): when a party proposes to give evidence of a fact, the judge may ask how the fact, if proved, would be relevant, and shall admit it only if the judge thinks it would be relevant.
Section 168 (Section 165 of the IEA): to discover or obtain proof of relevant facts, the judge may ask any question he considers necessary, in any form, at any time, of any witness or party, about any fact, and may order production of any document or thing. The parties cannot object.
| Old Section 165 (IEA) | Section 168 (B.S.A.) |
|---|---|
| Any question "he pleases", about any fact "relevant or irrelevant" | Any question "he considers necessary" |
Limits: the judgment must rest on facts declared relevant and duly proved, and a witness cannot be forced to answer a question he is legally entitled to refuse. The judge is not a silent umpire; finding the truth is the court's own duty.
The relevancy provisions begin with Sections 3 to 9 (Sections 5 to 11 of the IEA), often called logically relevant facts.
Res Gestae: Section 4
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Res gestae means "things done": facts so closely connected with a fact in issue that they form part of the same transaction are relevant.
Section 4 (Section 6 of the IEA): facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue or relevant fact as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.
Rationale: an event is a flow of things said and done just before, during and after it, not a frozen moment; cut those out and the court sees a broken picture. Words spoken in the heat of the moment are usually true, as there is no time to invent a lie.
As Farhan stabs Prince on a street, Prince shouts, "Farhan, don't kill me," and a shopkeeper shouts, "Stop him, he has a knife." These words are part of the incident and relevant under Section 4, though the witness in court repeats what someone else said. The Act's first illustration is similar: where A is accused of murdering B by beating him, whatever was said or done by A, B or bystanders at the beating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction, is relevant.
- Transaction: a group of facts so connected that they can be referred to by a single name, like a crime, a contract or a wrong. Test: closeness in time, unity of place, continuity of action and common purpose.
- Spontaneity is the key ingredient: the statement must be made during the event, or so soon after that there was no time to reflect or fabricate.
- Exception to hearsay: normally a witness speaks only of what he himself saw or heard, but he may repeat words spoken as part of the event, because they are themselves part of what happened.
A common mistake: if Prince survives, goes home, thinks for an hour and then tells his brother what happened, that is not res gestae, only a later account of a past event.
Case: Mukesh v. State for NCT of Delhi (Nirbhaya case)
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Mukesh and another v. State for NCT of Delhi (2017): in December 2012 a young woman was brutally gang-raped and assaulted on a moving bus in Delhi; her male friend was beaten and both were thrown out. She died about two weeks later. The accused were convicted and sentenced to death. Issue: did the evidence as a whole prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt? Held: convictions and death sentences upheld, on a wide range of evidence: (i) the victims' statements, on the way to hospital, to the head constable in the police control room van, treated by the Delhi High Court as spontaneous res gestae under Section 6 of the IEA, which the Supreme Court upheld; (ii) three dying declarations, one given mainly by gestures and writing as she could not speak; (iii) DNA and other scientific evidence; (iv) electronic evidence, including CCTV footage; (v) the accused's conduct after the crime, such as washing the bus and burning the victims' clothes. Principle: the court looks at the whole transaction and every connected fact the law makes relevant, not one piece in isolation.
Res gestae: same transaction, spontaneous, no time to invent.
Occasion, Cause or Effect: Section 5
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Section 5 (Section 7 of the IEA) makes relevant facts which are the occasion, cause or effect, immediate or otherwise, of relevant facts or facts in issue, or which constitute the state of things under which they happened, or which afforded an opportunity for their occurrence. Occasion and opportunity made the event possible; cause led to it; effect followed; the state of things is the background.
Write Section 5 (Section 7 of the IEA) for this topic, not Section 9, which is a different rule on facts not otherwise relevant.
- Occasion and opportunity: whether A robbed B: that shortly before, B went to a fair with money and showed or mentioned it to others.
- Effect: whether A murdered B: marks on the ground produced by a struggle at or near the place of murder.
- State of things and opportunity: whether A poisoned B: B's health before the symptoms, and B's habits, known to A, which gave A an opportunity to give the poison.
Before, during and after: occasion and opportunity come before, cause leads into it, effect comes after.
Case: R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra
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R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra (1973): after a patient died following an operation by Dr. Adatia, Malkani, the Coroner of Bombay, was accused of demanding a bribe from him through Dr. Motwani as go-between. With Dr. Motwani's consent, the anti-corruption police attached a tape recorder to his telephone and recorded his call with Malkani about the demand. Issue: was the secretly made recording admissible? Held: yes. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is itself a relevant fact; the Court called it res gestae, compared it to a photograph of a relevant incident, and held it relevant and admissible under Sections 7 and 8 of the IEA (now Sections 5 and 6 of the B.S.A.). Recording without Malkani's knowledge did not make it inadmissible. Conditions: (1) the conversation is relevant; (2) the speaker's voice is identified; (3) accuracy is proved by ruling out any possibility of erasing or tampering. Principle: a recorded conversation is admissible if relevant, voice-identified, and shown to be accurate and untouched.
A recording today is an electronic record, so the rules in Section 63 also apply.
Malkani: Relevant. Identified. Untampered.
Motive, Preparation and Conduct: Section 6
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- Section 6(1) (Section 8 of the IEA): any fact which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact is relevant.
- Section 6(2): the conduct of any party or party's agent, in reference to the proceeding or any fact in issue or relevant fact, and of the person against whom the offence was committed, is relevant if it influences or is influenced by a fact in issue or relevant fact, whether it came before or after.
Motive is why a person acts: money, revenge, jealousy, fear. It is not an ingredient of the offence but explains why it may have been committed.
With reliable direct evidence, like a trustworthy eyewitness, absence of motive matters little. In a circumstantial evidence case, motive is very important as one of the links in the chain.
Preparation is arranging the means: buying poison, sharpening a knife, studying the victim's routine, arranging an escape vehicle. Illustration: A, tried for poisoning B, had procured before B's death poison similar to that given to B: relevant.
Conduct is behaviour before or after the event which influences or is influenced by the fact in issue: running away, hiding the weapon, destroying evidence, threatening witnesses. Illustration: after a robbery, someone says in A's presence that the police are coming for the man who robbed B, and A immediately runs away: relevant conduct.
- Explanation 1: conduct excludes statements, unless they accompany and explain acts other than statements. If a person runs away shouting, "They will kill me", the words accompany and explain the running and form part of the conduct.
- Explanation 2: when a person's conduct is relevant, any statement made to him, or in his presence and hearing, which affects that conduct, is relevant.
- Complaints: where the question is whether a person was robbed or a woman raped, that the victim made a complaint soon after, with its circumstances and terms, is relevant as conduct. A mere statement "I was robbed", not a complaint, is not relevant as conduct, though it may be relevant otherwise, for example under Section 26 or Section 160.
Absconding is relevant conduct but a weak circumstance by itself, since an innocent person may also run out of fear. It can support other evidence but cannot alone prove guilt.
Farhan owes Prince ₹2 lakh and Prince presses hard for repayment: motive. Farhan buys a rope and a torch the evening before: preparation. After Prince is found dead, Farhan switches off his phone, leaves town and burns his clothes: conduct.
Of the cases read with this topic, the Nirbhaya case fits here for the accused's conduct after the crime; Badri Rai belongs under conspiracy and Jayantibhai under Section 9.
Motive is why. Preparation is getting ready. Conduct is behaviour, before and after.
Introductory, Explanatory and Identity Facts: Section 7
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Section 7 (Section 9 of the IEA), now very important in criminal law, makes relevant, in so far as they are necessary for the purpose, facts which:
- explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact;
- support or rebut an inference suggested by such a fact;
- establish the identity of any thing or person whose identity is relevant;
- fix the time or place at which a fact happened; or
- show the relation of the parties by whom the fact was transacted.
The limiting words let in only what is needed to explain, introduce or identify.
A, accused of a crime, suddenly left his house soon after it: conduct under Section 6. That he had sudden and urgent business where he went is relevant under Section 7, as it explains that conduct.
Today the key use of Section 7 is identity (who was the person, which the vehicle, whose the weapon), through five modern tools.
DNA tests
Every DNA profile is unique, except for identical twins, so a match between material from the scene and the accused is strong evidence of identity. It comes in through an expert, whose opinion is relevant under Section 39. It is only as good as the collection and preservation of samples: a broken chain of custody or possible contamination makes the court cautious. In the Nirbhaya case, DNA evidence was important in linking the accused to the crime.
Test Identification Parade
Where the witness did not know the accused before the crime, a Magistrate arranges a parade: the arrested suspect stands among several persons of similar appearance and the witness is asked to pick out the culprit.
Parade identification is not substantive evidence; the substantive evidence is the identification in court, on oath. The parade (1) assures the investigation it has the right person and (2) corroborates the later court identification. It is relevant under Section 7. Delay, or showing the suspect to the witness beforehand, weakens it; if the witness already knew the accused well, a parade is usually unnecessary.
Voice samples
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Can an accused be made to give a voice sample, for example to compare with a recorded ransom call?
Ritesh Sinha v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2019): the question was whether a person can be ordered to give a voice sample for investigation. Held: a Magistrate can so order, and this does not violate the right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court used its special power under Article 142 until Parliament made a law, following the reasoning in Kathi Kalu Oghad. Principle: a direction to give a voice sample does not offend Article 20(3).
Section 349 of the B.N.S.S. now expressly allows a Magistrate of the first class to direct any person, including an accused, to give specimen signatures, finger impressions, handwriting or a voice sample; an expert does the comparison.
Sniffer dogs
A trained dog picks up a scent at the scene and leads police to a house or person. Courts are very cautious: a dog cannot be cross-examined, and no one knows exactly why it went where it did. The handler's account may help the investigation, but the Supreme Court has said such evidence is not ordinarily of much weight and cannot alone establish guilt; at best it is a weak supporting circumstance.
Mobile phone location and GPS
Call detail records show who called whom and when; tower data shows roughly, and GPS more precisely, where a phone was, helping fix time and place under Section 7. But (1) as electronic evidence it must be proved under Sections 61 to 63, usually with a certificate; and (2) it shows where the phone was, not necessarily the person, so other evidence must link them.
Facts Not Otherwise Relevant: Section 9
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Section 9 (Section 11 of the IEA) is a safety net. Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant (1) if inconsistent with any fact in issue or relevant fact; or (2) if, alone or with other facts, they make the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable.
Inconsistency: whether A committed a crime in one city on a certain day: that A was in a far-away city that day is relevant, since no one can be in two places at once. This is the legal basis of the plea of alibi. High probability: if only one of four persons could have committed a crime, every fact showing that three of them could not have done it makes it highly probable the fourth did, and is relevant.
Courts apply Section 9 carefully: the fact must make the other highly probable or improbable, not just slightly more or less likely.
Case: Jayantibhai Bhenkarbhai v. State of Gujarat
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Jayantibhai Bhenkarbhai v. State of Gujarat (2002): Lalubhai was killed in an attack in village Singpur, Gujarat. The appellant, one of several accused, was convicted; his defence was that he was in Gandhinagar that day attending an official hearing. Issue: was the plea of alibi strong enough to create a reasonable doubt? Held: acquitted. Even the High Court accepted he was at Gandhinagar at about 11 a.m., and the Supreme Court found he was there until at least midday, about 300 km (eight to ten hours by bus) from the village. The alibi rested on documents of undoubted genuineness and witnesses with no reason to lie for him, and was raised consistently, so his return by the time of the attack (about 8 p.m.) was highly improbable. Weighed against the prosecution evidence, this created a reasonable doubt. Principle: a fact making the accused's presence at the crime highly improbable is relevant under Section 9, and a well-supported alibi can create a reasonable doubt.
Plea of Alibi under Section 9 (continued)
A good alibi rests on documents, independent witnesses and consistency from the very beginning.
Conspiracy (Section 8)
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Section 8 of the B.S.A. was Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act (IEA). It is examined very often.
A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do an illegal act, or a legal act by illegal means. The offence is defined in the B.N.S.; Section 8 answers the evidence question: how is a conspiracy proved, and how is it proved who was part of it? Conspirators do not sign agreements and meet in secret, so the law gives a special rule.
The rule
Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of them in reference to their common intention, after the intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact against each of them, both to prove the existence of the conspiracy and to show that any such person was a party to it.
Basis: agency. On joining a conspiracy, each member becomes the agent of the others for carrying out the common plan. What one says or does for the plan is treated as said or done by all.
Conditions: the three steps
- Prima facie evidence: there must first be reasonable ground to believe that a conspiracy existed.
- Common intention: the thing said, done or written must be in reference to the common intention.
- Timing: it must come after the intention was first formed and while the conspiracy is still alive.
Once the conspiracy ends (its object achieved or abandoned, or the conspirators arrested), the agency ends. What one conspirator says after that cannot be used against the others under Section 8.
Prince and Farhan plan to rob a bank. Before the robbery, Prince messages a third man to keep a van ready for the escape. The message refers to the common plan and was sent during the conspiracy, so it is relevant against Farhan too. After their arrest, Prince tells the police, "Farhan planned everything." That is a narrative of the past after the conspiracy ended; Section 8 does not make it relevant against Farhan.
Mirza Akbar v. Emperor (1940)
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Mirza Akbar v. Emperor (Privy Council, 1940): Mehr Taja, a married woman, and her lover Mirza Akbar were accused of conspiring to murder her husband and getting him killed by a hired man. Letters passed between them while the plan was being made. After the murder and her arrest, Mehr Taja made a statement before a Magistrate, which was used against Mirza Akbar. Held: It was not admissible against him under Section 10 of the IEA. Section 10 covers only what is said, done or written in reference to the common intention while the conspiracy is going on. A statement after the object is achieved and after arrest is only a narrative of past events. But its wrongful use did not by itself overturn the result, because other admissible evidence, including the letters written during the conspiracy, supported the case. Principle: Section 8 covers only what is said or done during the conspiracy and for its purpose; narratives after the conspiracy has ended are not covered.
No live conspiracy, no agency. No agency, no use against the others.
Badri Rai v. State of Bihar (1958)
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Badri Rai v. State of Bihar (1958): A police Inspector was investigating a case involving Ramji Sonar. Badri Rai and Ramji stopped him on the road, and Ramji asked him to hush up the case for a reward. About a week later, Badri went to the police station, handed the Inspector a packet of money and said Ramji had sent it, in pursuance of their earlier talk. Held: There was a conspiracy to bribe the Inspector, and anything said or done by either of them in reference to that common intention was admissible against both. Badri's statement was admissible against Ramji as well as Badri, because Badri was acting as Ramji's agent in carrying out the plan. Principle: what one conspirator says or does during the conspiracy, in furtherance of the common plan, is relevant against all.
Mohammed Khalid v. State of West Bengal (2002)
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Mohammed Khalid v. State of West Bengal (2002): On 16 March 1993, a massive explosion in a building in the Bow Bazar area of Calcutta killed 69 people. The prosecution alleged a conspiracy to make and store bombs to spread terror and wanted to use some accused's post-incident statements against the others. Held: The first condition of Section 10 of the IEA is reasonable ground to believe that the persons conspired together. It covers only statements in reference to the common intention while the conspiracy is alive; once it is over, for example after arrest, the agency ends. Conspiracies are usually proved by circumstantial evidence, as direct evidence is rarely available. Principle: Section 8 needs prima facie evidence of the conspiracy first, and covers only statements made during the conspiracy.
An accused's statement after arrest may be a confession, governed by the strict rules of Sections 22 to 24. Section 8 cannot be used as a back door to use one accused's post-arrest statement against another.
State of Mind and State of Body (Sections 12 and 13)
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Sections 12 and 13 of the B.S.A. were Sections 14 and 15 of the IEA. No one can look inside a person's head; the mind can only be inferred from outside facts.
Section 12
Facts showing any state of mind (intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will or good-will towards any particular person), or any state of body or bodily feeling, are relevant when that state is in issue or relevant.
- Explanation 1: the fact must show the state of mind in reference to the particular matter in question, not generally. It is not enough to prove that Farhan is generally dishonest; it must be shown that he knew these particular goods were stolen.
- Explanation 2: where a previous offence by the accused is relevant under this section, his previous conviction is also relevant.
Illustration: A is accused of receiving goods knowing them to be stolen, and is proved to have had a particular stolen article. That he had many other stolen articles at the same time is relevant, as it tends to show he knew all of them were stolen.
Section 13
This meets the defence "it was an accident". Where the question is whether an act was accidental or intentional, or done with a particular knowledge or intention, the fact that it formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in each of which the doer was concerned, is relevant.
Illustration: A is accused of burning his house for insurance money. That he lived in several houses one after another, insured each, a fire broke out in each, and he received insurance money each time, is relevant to show the fires were not accidents.
Once may be an accident. A pattern shows intention.
Admissions (Sections 15 to 21 and 25)
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Admissions, confessions and dying declarations are statements relevant because of who made them.
Definition (Section 15)
Section 15 of the B.S.A. (Section 17 of the IEA): an admission is a statement, oral or documentary or contained in electronic form, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, made by one of the persons, and in the circumstances, mentioned in the Act.
Simply put, it is a statement by a party, or someone closely connected with a party, about the facts of the case, usually against that party's own interest. The B.S.A. expressly adds the electronic form, so an email or a WhatsApp message can be an admission. It is relevant because people do not usually say things against their own interest unless they are true.
Farhan claims a plot of land, but earlier wrote in a letter that the plot belongs to Prince. The letter is powerful evidence against Farhan.
Who can make an admission (Sections 16 to 18)
- Section 16: a party; an agent authorised by the party; a person suing or sued in a representative character, while holding that character; a person with a proprietary or money interest in the subject matter; a person from whom a party got his interest.
- Section 17: persons whose position or liability must be proved against a party.
- Section 18: persons to whom a party has expressly referred for information.
Illustration: A sells a horse to B and says, "Go and ask C, C knows all about it." What C says is an admission against A.
Other rules on admissions
- Section 19 (against whom): admissions may be proved against the maker or his representative in interest, but generally not by or on behalf of the maker, since a person cannot create evidence in his own favour by his own words. There are three narrow exceptions, for example where the statement would be relevant as the statement of a dead person under Section 26.
- Section 20 (oral admissions about documents): oral admissions about the contents of a document are not relevant, unless the party is entitled to give secondary evidence of it, or its genuineness is in question. The document should speak for itself.
- Section 21 (civil cases): an admission is not relevant if made on an express condition that evidence of it would not be given, or in circumstances showing the parties agreed it would not be given. This protects "without prejudice" settlement talks so that parties can negotiate freely.
- Section 25 (Section 31 of the IEA): admissions are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted, but may operate as estoppels. So an admission can be explained: Farhan can show he wrote the letter by mistake or under pressure, and the court will weigh his explanation.
Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad (1974)
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Bishwanath Prasad v. Dwarka Prasad (1974): In a family property dispute, one side relied on statements the other side had made in earlier proceedings, contrary to its present claim. It was objected that these were never put to the first plaintiff when he gave evidence, and his father, who had also made them, never entered the witness box. Held: An admission by a party is substantive evidence by itself, though not conclusive. It can be used against the party whether or not he appears as a witness and whether or not it was put to him in cross-examination.
| Party's own earlier statement | Ordinary witness's earlier statement |
|---|---|
| An admission; substantive evidence against him | Used only to test his credibility |
A party's own words are evidence against him. A witness's earlier words only shake his credit.
Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.C. Shukla (1998)
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Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.C. Shukla (1998), the Jain Hawala diaries case: In May 1991, the CBI seized diaries, notebooks and files from the house of J.K. Jain, an employee of the Jain brothers, businessmen. The entries seemed to record large payments to politicians and public servants, and the CBI relied on them as account books kept in the course of business and as admissions. Held: Spiral notebooks and pads could count as books, but loose sheets could not. Even relevant entries in books of account (today Section 28 of the B.S.A.) are not alone sufficient to charge any person with liability; independent evidence is needed. Entries made by others were not admissions by the politicians: a stranger's statement is not an admission against a person.
Admission and confession distinguished
| Point | Admission | Confession |
|---|---|---|
| Proceedings | Civil or criminal | Only criminal |
| Nature | Any statement suggesting an inference against the maker | A statement by an accused admitting guilt |
| Maker | An agent's admission can bind the principal | Must be made by the accused himself |
| Value | Not conclusive | A voluntary and true confession can by itself support a conviction |
Every confession is an admission, but every admission is not a confession.
Confessions (Sections 22, 23 and 24)
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Meaning
The Act does not define "confession".
Pakala Narayana Swami v. Emperor (Privy Council, 1939): The classic explanation. A confession must admit in terms the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the offence. Principle: an admission of a gravely incriminating fact, even a conclusively incriminating fact, is not by itself a confession.
"I stabbed Prince because he insulted my mother," says Farhan: a confession. "I was with Prince at the time and my knife was with me": incriminating, but it does not admit the offence, so it is an admission, not a confession.
A confession can be the strongest and also the most dangerous evidence, since confessions have been extracted by torture, threats and false promises. So the law builds a wall of protection around the accused, brick by brick.
First brick: Section 22 (involuntary confessions)
Section 22 of the B.S.A. (Section 24 of the IEA): a confession by an accused is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding if the court thinks it was caused by any inducement, threat, coercion or promise which:
- has reference to the charge;
- comes from a person in authority, such as a police officer, a Magistrate or a public prosecutor; and
- is enough to give the accused reasonable grounds for supposing that by confessing he would gain an advantage or avoid an evil of a temporal (worldly) nature in reference to the proceedings against him.
A moral or religious appeal ("tell the truth, God is watching") is not a temporal inducement.
The IEA spoke of inducement, threat or promise. The B.S.A. adds a new word: coercion.
Provisos to Section 22
- If the impression caused by the inducement, threat, coercion or promise has been fully removed, a later confession is relevant (formerly Section 28 of the IEA).
- An otherwise relevant confession does not become irrelevant merely because it was made under a promise of secrecy, or because of a deception practised on the accused, or when he was drunk, or in answer to questions he need not have answered, or because he was not warned that he need not confess (formerly Section 29 of the IEA).
The test is voluntariness, not perfection of procedure.
Second brick: Section 23(1) (confession to a police officer)
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Section 23(1) of the B.S.A. (Section 25 of the IEA): no confession made to a police officer shall be proved against a person accused of any offence, whether or not he was in custody. The reason is fear of police pressure: the law does not want to encourage the police to take a shortcut through a forced confession instead of a proper investigation.
Third brick: Section 23(2) (confession in police custody)
Section 23(2) of the B.S.A. (Section 26 of the IEA): no confession made by any person while in the custody of a police officer shall be proved against him, unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. So a confession in police custody to a private person, a doctor or a fellow prisoner is out, unless a Magistrate is present.
Judicial, extra-judicial and retracted confessions
| Type | Meaning | Points to remember |
|---|---|---|
| Judicial | Recorded properly by a Magistrate | Procedure in Section 183 of the B.N.S.S. (Section 164 of the CrPC): the Magistrate must first explain that the accused is not bound to confess and that it may be used against him, and must be satisfied it is voluntary |
| Extra-judicial | Made to a private person outside court | Admissible if voluntary, but weak evidence, examined very carefully |
| Retracted | Later withdrawn | Courts may act on it if voluntary and true, but usually look for corroboration |
The one opening in the wall: discovery (Proviso to Section 23)
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Proviso to Section 23 (Section 27 of the IEA): when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from an accused in police custody, so much of the information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact discovered, may be proved.
The discovery itself confirms that part of the information was true: the recovered knife is independent proof that the accused knew where it was hidden.
Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor (1947)
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Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor (Privy Council, 1947): After a violent clash between two groups in a village, some persons were killed. The accused, in police custody, gave statements, and weapons were later produced from hidden places. Held (on Section 27 of the IEA): The fact discovered is not the object alone; it includes the place from which it is produced and the accused's knowledge of it. Only the information relating distinctly to that fact is admissible. "I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house" is admissible if the knife is found; the added words "with which I stabbed A" are not, being confession that did not lead to the discovery. Principle: only the words that lead to the discovery go in; the confession around them stays out.
Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar (1966)
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Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar (1966): Accused of killing four people, including his aunt, Aghnoo Nagesia went to the police station himself and told the officer everything. His statement was recorded as the FIR and bore his thumb impression. Held: The report, a confession to a police officer, was hit by Section 25 of the IEA. A confession cannot be broken into pieces, with parts not directly admitting the killings (his motive, where he hid the axe) admitted as mere admissions; each part disclosed an incriminating fact, so the taint attached to all of it. Only the parts admissible under the discovery rule, and the formal parts showing he came to the station and made the report, could be proved. The remaining evidence being insufficient, his conviction was set aside. Principle: an accused's own FIR does not escape the police rule; a confession cannot be cut into safe slices.
Veera Ibrahim v. State of Maharashtra (1976)
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Veera Ibrahim v. State of Maharashtra (1976): Veera Ibrahim was found dealing with smuggled goods, and customs officers recorded his statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act. He argued it violated his right against self-incrimination and was not voluntary. Held: When recorded, he was not a person accused of an offence, as no formal accusation had been made, so Article 20(3) did not apply. The customs officer was a person in authority, but a legal duty to tell the truth, with a warning about the penalty for lying, is not a threat making a statement involuntary. The statement was not even a confession, as he claimed not to know the goods were smuggled; it was admitted as an admission.
Two lessons from Veera Ibrahim: in customs and similar non-police proceedings, Article 20(3) begins only when a person is formally accused; and a legal duty to tell the truth is not a threat by a person in authority.
The separate rule that a customs officer is not a police officer for the police-confession rule was first laid down in Barkat Ram (1961) and confirmed in Romesh Chandra Mehta and Illias, both decided in 1968.
Confession of a co-accused (Section 24)
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Section 24 of the B.S.A. (Section 30 of the IEA): when more persons than one are tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession by one of them affecting himself and others is proved, the court may take it into consideration against those others as well as the maker.
It is not evidence in the ordinary sense: it is not on oath, not made in the presence of the other accused, and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a very weak type of evidence, usable only to lend assurance to other evidence, never as the foundation of a conviction (this is developed in the Bhuboni Sahu case, studied later in the course).
New Explanation in the B.S.A.: a trial held in the absence of an accused who has absconded or fails to comply with a proclamation under Section 84 of the B.N.S.S. is deemed a joint trial for this section. This links with trial in absentia under the B.N.S.S.
The Constitutional Shield: Article 20(3)
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Article 20(3): no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. It has three parts:
- the person must be accused of an offence; in customs and other non-police proceedings this means a formal accusation (Veera Ibrahim), but in a police investigation the protection also covers suspects and witnesses (Selvi);
- there must be compulsion;
- the compulsion must be to be a witness, that is, to give testimony.
Updated from the lecture: the lecture said Article 20(3) applies only after a formal accusation. The correct position is that a formal accusation is needed only in administrative and quasi-criminal proceedings (such as customs inquiries, as in Veera Ibrahim); in a criminal investigation the right protects persons formally accused, suspects, and witnesses who fear their answers could expose them to criminal charges. Source: Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010), Supreme Court of India, paras 109 and 111.
State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961)
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State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961, eleven-judge Bench): In appeals heard together, specimen handwriting and signatures, and palm and finger impressions, had been taken from accused persons, by the police or on a Magistrate's direction, for comparison with disputed material. Held: This is not being compelled to be a witness against oneself; all eleven judges agreed, though three gave slightly different reasons. Per the majority, to be a witness is to impart personal knowledge of relevant facts by oral or written statements. A specimen handwriting or thumb impression conveys no personal knowledge; it is only material for comparison, and does not change with the person's will. So it is not testimonial compulsion. Police custody alone does not prove compulsion. Principle: Article 20(3) protects the mind (testimony), not the body's physical identifying features.
Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010)
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Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010): Investigating agencies wanted to subject accused persons and suspects, without consent, to narco-analysis (a drug is injected so that the person talks), polygraph (lie detector) tests and brain mapping. Held: Involuntary administration violates Article 20(3), as the results are testimonial, extracting information from the mind, and Article 21, including mental privacy. Even with consent, the results cannot by themselves be admitted as evidence, but information later discovered with the help of a voluntarily taken test can be admitted under the discovery rule. Safeguards were required, such as the National Human Rights Commission guidelines for polygraph tests.
Testimonial compulsion and physical evidence
A key exam distinction:
| Category | Meaning | Position | Authority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Testimonial compulsion | Forcing a person to reveal what is in his mind | Prohibited | Article 20(3) |
| Physical evidence | Fingerprints, handwriting specimens, voice samples, blood or DNA samples; they do not reveal the mind | May be compelled | Kathi Kalu Oghad; Ritesh Sinha |
| Voluntary statement | Freely made, without threat, promise or coercion | Usable, subject to the rules on confessions to the police | Rules on confessions |
| Involuntary techniques | Narco-analysis, polygraph, brain mapping without consent; they force the mind open | Prohibited | Selvi |
| Evidentiary use | Even a voluntary test result is not itself evidence | A fact discovered because of it may be proved | Proviso to Section 23 |
The body can be compelled; the mind cannot. What the mind reveals freely can be used, but only through the law's gates.
Quick revision: Section 22 shuts out forced or induced confessions. Section 23 shuts out confessions to the police, and those in police custody unless made before a Magistrate, but lets in the words that led to a discovery. Section 24 treats a co-accused's confession as weak, supporting evidence. Article 20(3) protects testimony, not physical evidence.
Dying Declarations (Section 26(a))
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Section 26 of the B.S.A. (Section 32 of the IEA) covers statements of persons who cannot be called as witnesses because they are dead, cannot be found, have become incapable of giving evidence, or cannot be brought without unreasonable delay or expense.
Section 26(a) (Section 32(1) of the IEA): a statement by a person as to the cause of his death, or any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, is relevant in cases in which the cause of his death comes into question, whether or not he was then under expectation of death, and whatever the nature of the proceeding.
Why it is relevant
It is hearsay, and the maker cannot be cross-examined. It is admitted for two reasons:
- Necessity: the victim is often the only eyewitness to his own killing; excluding his words may let the killer go free.
- Truthfulness: a person facing death is unlikely to lie: nemo moriturus praesumitur mentiri (a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth).
Expectation of death
| English law | Indian law (Section 26(a)) |
|---|---|
| The declarant had to be under a settled, hopeless expectation of death | Not required; the statement is relevant whether or not the person expected to die |
So a statement made when the person thought he would recover becomes a dying declaration if he later dies and the cause of his death is in question. This is a common exam error.
Link with the cause of death
There must be a real and proximate link with the cause of death or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in it, though proximity is not read too rigidly. A general complaint about some old quarrel is not enough.
Sudhakar v. State of Maharashtra (2000)
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Sudhakar v. State of Maharashtra (2000): A young woman teacher was sexually assaulted and reported it to the police some days later. More than five months after the assault, she died by suicide by consuming poison. The prosecution sought to treat her statement about the assault as a dying declaration. Held: It was not one. It was made long before her death and was not shown to have a proximate connection with the death. The Court also stressed that a dying declaration must be proved by examining the person who recorded or heard it. Principle: no close link with the death, no dying declaration.
Who may record it, and in what form
- Anyone may record it: a doctor, a police officer, a Magistrate, a relative or a stranger. No rule requires a Magistrate, but a Magistrate's record carries greater assurance, as a neutral and responsible officer.
- A police-recorded declaration is not inadmissible; the confession rules do not apply, since the maker is the victim, not the accused. Courts examine it with extra care.
- It may be oral, written, or by signs and gestures, provided it is clear, voluntary and reliably recorded. A written one should ideally be in question and answer form and in the declarant's own words.
The Nirbhaya case: Unable to speak, the victim gave her third dying declaration to a Metropolitan Magistrate mainly through gestures and writing. Held: The Supreme Court accepted that a dying declaration can be made by gestures or nods.
Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (1958)
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Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay (1958): Baboolal was attacked with swords and spears in a narrow lane in Nagpur at about nine at night. Before dying, he made three dying declarations, to a doctor, a police officer and a Magistrate, each naming Khushal Rao among his attackers. Held: There is no absolute rule of law, or even of prudence, requiring corroboration. A dying declaration is not a weaker kind of evidence; each case turns on its facts, and the court must test it carefully because the accused could not cross-examine the maker. One recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner stands higher than one resting only on oral testimony. Once satisfied that it is true and voluntary, the court can convict on it alone.
Points to test:
- the declarant's opportunity to observe (for example, enough light);
- whether his capacity to remember and state the facts was unimpaired;
- consistency, where more than one statement was made;
- whether it was made at the earliest opportunity;
- freedom from tutoring by interested persons.
A true and voluntary dying declaration needs no corroboration.
Multiple declarations: consistency across them strengthens them (as in Khushal Rao). If they conflict on material points, the court must examine each and decide which, if any, is reliable; material inconsistency can make all unsafe, minor differences do not.
Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002)
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Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002, Constitution Bench of five judges): A woman made a dying declaration before a Magistrate, who was satisfied she was conscious and able to answer, but the doctor had not expressly certified her mental fitness. Laxman was convicted largely on it. Earlier decisions had suggested such a declaration was unsafe. Held: A doctor's certificate of mental fitness is not essential; insisting on it would be hyper-technical. What is essential is that the person recording it is satisfied the declarant was in a fit state of mind. Medical certification is only a rule of caution; if the evidence shows fitness, the declaration can be acted upon, provided the court finds it voluntary and truthful. Principle: fitness of mind is a question of fact, not of paperwork.
Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat (2001)
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Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat (2001): A woman was set on fire in broad daylight and died some weeks later. She named her attacker as Hiralal but at first gave his father's name wrongly; in a later statement to the investigating officer she explained the mistake and made clear she meant Hiralal Joitaram. Held: Her statements were reliable dying declarations; the slip, which she herself explained, did not destroy their value. The explanation, though given to the police, was also a dying declaration, being part of the story of how she was burnt. Conviction upheld. Principle: a small slip, honestly corrected, does not kill a truthful dying declaration.
If the maker survives
The statement is then not a dying declaration, but it can be used to corroborate his testimony under Section 160 or to contradict him under Section 148.
Aghnoo Nagesia, Pulukuri Kottaya, Veera Ibrahim, V.C. Shukla and Bodhraj v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (last seen theory) are often listed near dying declarations. Keep their principles separate: they concern the accused's statements, account books and circumstantial evidence, not the dying victim's words.
Memory line: cause of death, close link, clear mind, correct record. If all four are present, the court can convict on it alone.
Relevancy of Judgments (Sections 34 to 38)
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Sections 34 to 38 of the B.S.A. were Sections 40 to 44 of the IEA. Generally, a judgment is not evidence of the facts it decided in another case between different parties; otherwise one court's findings would bind strangers who never had a chance to be heard. The exceptions:
| Section | Rule |
|---|---|
| 34 | A previous judgment is relevant to bar a second suit or trial: the evidence side of res judicata (civil) and the rule against double jeopardy (criminal). |
| 35 | Judgments in rem in probate, matrimonial, admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction declare a legal status against the whole world. A divorce decree or grant of probate is conclusive proof of what it declares. |
| 36 | Judgments relating to matters of a public nature, such as a public right of way, are relevant but not conclusive. |
| 37 | All other judgments are irrelevant, unless the existence of the judgment is itself a fact in issue or relevant under another provision. |
| 38 | Any party may show that a relevant judgment was delivered without jurisdiction or obtained by fraud or collusion. |
Thirty-four bars, thirty-five binds the world, thirty-six helps on public matters, thirty-seven usually says no, and thirty-eight breaks a judgment tainted by fraud.
Opinion of Experts (Sections 39 and 40)
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A witness normally states facts, not opinions, but the judge sometimes needs knowledge the judge does not have.
Section 39(1) of the B.S.A. (Section 45 of the IEA): when the court has to form an opinion on foreign law, science or art, any other field, or the identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions of persons specially skilled in such matters (experts) are relevant facts. The words "or any other field" are new in the B.S.A. and widen the door to new areas like digital forensics.
Section 39(2) replaces Section 45A of the IEA: on information transmitted or stored in any computer resource or other electronic or digital form, the opinion of the Examiner of Electronic Evidence under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act is relevant, and the Examiner is treated as an expert.
Expert opinion is only advisory. The court is not bound by it and must test the expert's reasons; the doctor, the ballistic expert and the DNA analyst help, but the decision is the judge's. Section 40: facts supporting or contradicting an expert's opinion are also relevant.
Proof of Handwriting (Section 41)
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The writer, or someone who saw him write, can prove handwriting directly. Beyond that there are three doors:
| Door | Provision | How it works |
|---|---|---|
| Expert | Section 39 | Opinion of a handwriting expert |
| Person acquainted with the handwriting | Section 41 (Section 47 of the IEA) | One who has seen the person write, or received documents written by him in reply to his own letters, or habitually seen his writing in the ordinary course of business |
| Court's own comparison | Section 72 (Section 73 of the IEA) | The court compares the disputed writing with an admitted or proved one, and may direct a person present in court to write words for comparison |
Section 41 also covers electronic signatures: the opinion of the Certifying Authority that issued the Electronic Signature Certificate is relevant.
Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1973)
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Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1973): A five-year-old boy went missing and his father received ransom letters. Ram Narain was convicted mainly on a handwriting expert's opinion that the letters were in his hand. Held: Handwriting opinion, like any expert opinion, is fallible and must be received with great caution, but it is relevant and can be acted upon if internal or external evidence supports it. Here the courts had themselves compared the disputed and admitted writings and agreed with the expert, so the conviction was upheld. Principle: the expert advises; the judge verifies.
Santosh alias Bhure v. State, Government of NCT of Delhi (2023)
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Santosh alias Bhure v. State, Government of NCT of Delhi (2023): Santosh and Neeraj were tried on circumstantial evidence for a murder in Santosh's rented flat. A handwriting expert said Neeraj had written a fake suicide note found on the body; the landlord and a neighbour turned hostile. Held: Santosh was acquitted and Neeraj's acquittal upheld. Handwriting opinion must be relied on with caution and, as a rule of prudence, accepted when other evidence supports it. No reliable evidence placed Santosh in the flat at the time. A false explanation by the accused can be only an additional link after the prosecution has otherwise completed the chain of circumstances. Principle: weak links do not make a strong chain.
Custom, Usages, Tenets and Relationship (Sections 42 to 45)
- Section 42 (Section 48 of the IEA): on the existence of a general custom or right, the opinions of persons likely to know of it, if it existed, are relevant. It includes a custom or right common to a considerable class of persons, like villagers' right to use the water of a particular well.
- Section 43 (Section 49 of the IEA): on the usages and tenets of any body of men or family, the constitution and governance of a religious or charitable foundation, and the meaning of words used in particular districts or by particular classes, the opinions of persons with special means of knowledge are relevant.
- Section 44 (Section 50 of the IEA): on the relationship of one person to another, the opinion, expressed by conduct, of any person with special means of knowledge, as a family member or otherwise, is relevant.
- Section 45: the grounds on which an opinion is based are also relevant.
That A and B were usually received and treated by their friends as husband and wife is relevant to whether they were married.
Proviso to Section 44: such opinion is not sufficient to prove a marriage in proceedings under the Divorce Act or in certain prosecutions under the B.N.S., such as for bigamy, where stricter proof is needed.
"Expressed by conduct": the law looks not at what a relative says he thinks, but at how the family actually behaved over the years.
Character (Sections 46 to 50)
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Sections 46 to 50 of the B.S.A. were Sections 52 to 55 of the IEA. A person is tried for what he did, not for what kind of person he is, so character evidence is generally irrelevant, with controlled exceptions.
- Section 46 (civil cases): that a person's character makes some conduct probable or improbable is irrelevant, except so far as it appears from facts otherwise relevant.
- Section 47 (criminal cases): the accused's good character is relevant; the accused can help himself this way.
- Section 48 (protection of victims): in prosecutions for rape and certain other sexual offences under the B.N.S., where consent is in issue, evidence of the victim's character or her previous sexual experience with any person is not relevant on the issue of consent or the quality of consent.
Character Evidence: Sections 49 and 50 (continued)
Bad character of the accused: Section 49
In criminal proceedings, the accused's bad character is irrelevant, unless evidence has been given that he has a good character; then it becomes relevant.
- A previous conviction is relevant as evidence of bad character.
- The rule does not apply where bad character is itself a fact in issue.
The accused holds the key. If he opens the door to his good character, the prosecution may walk in with his bad character.
Character affecting damages: Section 50
In civil cases, character is relevant if it affects the amount of damages.
In a defamation case, a person with a poor reputation may receive less compensation.
Facts Which Need Not Be Proved: Sections 51 to 53
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The law of proof asks: which facts need no proof; which facts a party may not deny; which relevant facts cannot be proved; and how a fact is proved (by a witness, a document or an electronic record). Because proof costs time and money, two kinds of facts need no proof: facts judicially noticed and admitted facts.
1. Judicial notice: Sections 51 and 52
Section 51 (Section 56 of the IEA): no fact of which the court will take judicial notice need be proved.
Judicial notice: the court accepts a fact on its own knowledge, because it is so well known or so authoritative that proof would be a waste of time.
Section 52 (Section 57 of the IEA) lists facts of which the court shall take judicial notice, for example: all laws in force in India; the course of proceedings of Parliament and the State Legislatures; seals of courts; divisions of time and geographical divisions of the world; public festivals and holidays notified in the Official Gazette; the territory of India; and the rule of the road.
If a party asks the court to take judicial notice of a fact, even one on this list, the court may refuse until that party produces a suitable book or document of reference.
2. Admitted facts: Section 53
Section 53 (Section 58 of the IEA): no fact need be proved which the parties or their agents (a) agree to admit at the hearing, (b) agree in writing to admit before the hearing, or (c) are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings. The court still has a discretion to require such facts to be proved otherwise than by the admission.
Prince need not prove that 15 August is Independence Day. If Farhan admits in his written statement that he signed the agreement, Prince need not prove the signature. Known facts and agreed facts need no proof.
Estoppel: Sections 121 to 123
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Estoppel covers facts a party is not allowed to deny. Sections 121 to 123 of the B.S.A. were Sections 115 to 117 of the IEA. The word comes from an old word meaning to stop: if you make someone believe something and he acts on it, you cannot later deny it.
Section 121: the general rule
When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused or permitted another to believe a thing to be true and to act upon that belief, neither he nor his representative shall be allowed to deny its truth in any suit or proceeding between them or their representatives.
Essentials
- A representation by words, conduct or even silence.
- Made intentionally, or at least with the maker permitting the belief.
- The other person believed it and acted on it.
- The proceeding is between the same persons or their representatives.
The Act's illustration: A intentionally and falsely leads B to believe that certain land belongs to A, and so induces B to buy and pay for it. The land later becomes A's property, and A seeks to set aside the sale on the ground that he had no title at the time of sale. A will not be allowed to prove his lack of title.
Estoppel is a rule of fairness wearing the clothes of a rule of evidence.
Special estoppels: Sections 122 and 123
- Tenant: cannot, during the tenancy or at any time after it, deny that his landlord had title at the beginning of the tenancy. The words at any time after it are new in the B.S.A.
- Licensee: one who came on to property with the licence of the person in possession cannot deny that person's title to possession when the licence was given.
- Acceptor of a bill of exchange: cannot deny the drawer's authority to draw it.
- Bailee: cannot deny that the bailor had authority at the beginning of the bailment.
Promissory estoppel
The same idea applied to promises about the future. If a person makes a clear promise, intending the other to act on it, and the other does act on it, the promisor may be held to the promise even without a formal contract. Indian courts have applied it even against the Government, unless public interest or a statute stands in the way. It is an equitable doctrine developed by courts, not written in Section 121, but it grows from the same root.
Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University (1990)
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Sanatan Gauda v. Berhampur University (1990): Sanatan Gauda, holding a Master's degree, was admitted to an affiliated law college on his mark sheet, given admit cards and allowed to sit the examinations; only later did the University say his marks made him ineligible and withhold his results. Held: read correctly, the rules did not make him ineligible at all; and having admitted him and let him study and sit the examinations, the University was estopped from refusing to declare his results. Principle: if you let someone act on your stand, you cannot change your stand to his loss.
R.S. Maddanappa v. Chandramma
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R.S. Maddanappa v. Chandramma: Chandramma claimed her share in her mother's property. Her father and his second family argued that her earlier conduct (a letter to her stepmother disclaiming any interest, and attesting her father's will) estopped her. Held: no estoppel. Estoppel requires that the other person was misled and acted on the representation to his detriment; the father knew the true facts all along and had not changed his position because of her conduct. Principle: no one was fooled, so no one is estopped.
Privileges: Facts Which Cannot Be Proved (Sections 127 to 134)
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Some facts, though relevant, are protected from being forced out because another public interest matters more. Sections 127 to 134 of the B.S.A. were Sections 121 to 129 of the IEA.
Judges and Magistrates: Section 127
They cannot be compelled, except on the special order of a superior court, to answer questions about their own conduct in court, or about what came to their knowledge in court.
Communications during marriage: Section 128
A person who is or has been married shall not be compelled to disclose any communication made to him during the marriage by his spouse, nor permitted to disclose it, unless the spouse who made it, or that spouse's representative, consents.
Not applicable: (a) in suits between the married persons; (b) in proceedings where one spouse is prosecuted for a crime against the other. Reason: the law does not want the home to become a police station.
M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Ponnan (1970)
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M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Ponnan (1970): Ponnan's letters to his wife, Verghese's daughter, allegedly defamed Verghese, who filed a defamation complaint and wanted to use them. Issue: did marital privilege bar this? Held: the privilege bars disclosure of the communication by the spouse in evidence (the spouse cannot be compelled or permitted to disclose it), but it does not make other admissible evidence of the same fact inadmissible. Whether it applies depends on the relationship when the communication was made, so it survives the end of the marriage. Principle: the privilege stops the spouse disclosing the communication; it does not wipe out all other proof.
Affairs of State and official confidence: Sections 129 and 130
- Section 129: no one may give evidence derived from unpublished official records relating to affairs of State, except with the permission of the head of the department concerned.
- Section 130: a public officer shall not be compelled to disclose communications made to him in official confidence, when he considers that the public interest would suffer by disclosure.
State of U.P. v. Raj Narain (1975)
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State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain (1975): in his election case against Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1971 election), Raj Narain sought the Blue Book of rules on security arrangements for the Prime Minister's travel; the Government claimed privilege for it as an unpublished official record on affairs of State. Issue: is the claim final, or can the court examine it? Held: the privilege rests on public interest, but the court need not accept the claim blindly. It decides whether the document really relates to affairs of State, balancing the public interest in secrecy against that in the fair administration of justice, and may inspect the document itself. Principle: the Government may claim the privilege, but the court decides whether the claim is valid.
Information about offences: Section 131
No Magistrate or police officer shall be compelled to say when he got any information about an offence; the same applies to revenue officers for offences against the public revenue. The purpose is to protect informers.
The old Section 125 of the IEA said whence, meaning from where; some commentators see the change to when as a drafting slip.
Advocate and client: Sections 132 and 134
Section 132: no advocate shall, without the client's express consent, disclose any communication made to him in the course and for the purpose of his employment, the contents of documents he has seen in that course, or the advice he has given. The protection extends to interpreters and to clerks or employees of advocates.
Exceptions:
- A communication made in furtherance of an illegal purpose.
- Any fact the advocate observed in the course of employment showing that a crime or fraud has been committed since the employment began.
Prince tells his advocate, "I cheated my business partner last year, please defend me": privileged. "Help me forge a document to cheat him next week": not privileged, being in furtherance of an illegal purpose.
Section 134: no one shall be compelled to disclose a confidential communication with his legal adviser, unless he offers himself as a witness, and then only so far as needed to explain his evidence.
Preeti Jain v. Kunal Jain (2016)
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Preeti Jain v. Kunal Jain (2016, Rajasthan High Court): in a divorce case the husband produced video recordings from a pin-hole camera with hard disk memory, and electronic communications. The wife objected: no certificate, and spousal communications are privileged. Held: the recording on the device itself was primary evidence, so the certificate meant for secondary electronic evidence was not needed; and Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, which lets a Family Court receive any evidence that helps it deal effectively with the dispute, overrides the marital privilege in the Evidence Act. Principle: the original device is primary evidence, and Family Courts have wider freedom to receive evidence.
Oral Evidence and the Rule against Hearsay: Sections 54 and 55
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Section 54 (Section 59 of the IEA): all facts, except the contents of documents, may be proved by oral evidence.
Section 55 (Section 60 of the IEA): oral evidence must in all cases be direct, that is, the evidence of a witness who says:
- he saw it, for a fact which could be seen;
- he heard it, for a fact which could be heard;
- he perceived it by that sense, for a fact perceivable by any other sense;
- for an opinion, the evidence of the person who holds that opinion on those grounds.
Proviso: expert opinions in published treatises may be proved by producing the book if the author is dead, cannot be found, or cannot be called without unreasonable delay or expense.
The rule against hearsay
Aadil says, "I saw Farhan hit Prince": direct evidence. Another witness says, "Aadil told me that Farhan hit Prince": hearsay, since this witness saw nothing. Aadil himself must come to court and face cross-examination.
| Direct evidence | Hearsay |
|---|---|
| Witness personally saw, heard or perceived the fact | Witness repeats what someone else told him |
| Given on oath, before the court, open to cross-examination | Original speaker is not on oath, not before the court, cannot be cross-examined |
Exceptions to the hearsay rule: res gestae, admissions, confessions and dying declarations.
Number of witnesses: Section 139
Section 139 (Section 134 of the IEA): no particular number of witnesses is required in any case for the proof of any fact.
The law weighs evidence; it does not count it. Quality, not quantity.
Ajai alias Ajju v. State of U.P. (2023)
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Ajai alias Ajju v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023): the only eyewitness examined was Pinky, herself badly injured in a night attack in which her parents, brother and husband were killed, allegedly over a property dispute. The accused argued that she was a related witness with enmity towards them, that she had not named them at the very first instance, and that others present in the house were not examined. Held: the Supreme Court upheld the convictions; it is the quality, not the quantity, of witnesses that matters, and a single witness found reliable is enough.
The judgment says nothing about electronic records; it is known for its principle about witnesses. Beside electronic evidence, it shows that in an age of CCTV and phone records, the court still values one honest human witness.
Documentary Evidence: Sections 56 to 77
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The contents of a document must be proved by the document itself (primary evidence). A copy or an oral account of the contents is secondary evidence, allowed only in certain situations.
Section 56: contents of documents may be proved by primary or by secondary evidence.
Primary evidence: Section 57
Section 57 (Section 62 of the IEA): the document itself produced for the inspection of the court. A document executed in several parts: each part is primary evidence. New B.S.A. explanations for electronic records:
- a record stored in multiple files: each file is primary evidence;
- a record produced from proper custody is primary evidence unless disputed;
- a video stored and transmitted at the same time: each stored recording is primary evidence;
- each automated storage, even a temporary file, is primary evidence.
Secondary evidence: Section 58
Section 58 (Section 63 of the IEA): certified copies; copies made by mechanical processes ensuring accuracy; copies compared with the original; counterparts against parties who did not execute them; and oral accounts of the contents by someone who has seen the document. The B.S.A. adds three: oral admissions, written admissions, and the evidence of a skilled person who has examined a document consisting of numerous accounts or other documents that cannot conveniently be examined in court.
| Primary evidence | Secondary evidence |
|---|---|
| The document itself (Section 57) | Copies, counterparts, oral accounts, admissions (Section 58) |
| The rule (Section 59) | Only in the cases listed in Section 60 |
When secondary evidence is allowed: Sections 59 and 60
Section 59: documents must be proved by primary evidence, except in the cases in Section 60 (Section 65 of the IEA), for example when the other side holds the original and does not produce it after notice; the original is lost or destroyed; it cannot easily be moved, like writing on a wall; or it is a public document.
Public and private documents: Section 74
Public documents record the acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies, tribunals and public officers; all others are private documents. Public documents can be proved by certified copies.
Kumari Madhuri Patil v. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development (1994)
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Kumari Madhuri Patil v. Additional Commissioner, Tribal Development (decided 1994, reported 1995; sometimes spelt Madhuri Patel): two sisters got Scheduled Tribe certificates for admission to professional courses, but their father's school records, made decades earlier, described the family differently, and a scrutiny committee found the claim false. Held: cancellation upheld; great weight was given to the old school records, made long before any dispute, over later self-serving documents, and directions were laid down for verifying caste claims. Principle: records made long before a dispute usually deserve more trust than records made after it.
Updated from the lecture: the lecture said this case was reported in 1995, and the notes gave 1995 as its year. The correct position is that the Supreme Court delivered the judgment on 2 September 1994; 1995 is only the year of one of its reports, so cite it as a 1994 decision. Source: Kumari Madhuri Patil v. Addl. Commissioner, Supreme Court of India, 2 September 1994 (Indian Kanoon).
Exclusion of Oral by Documentary Evidence: Sections 94 and 95
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Sections 94 and 95 (Sections 91 and 92 of the IEA) protect written agreements.
- Section 94: when the terms of a contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be in writing, have been reduced to a document, those terms can be proved only by the document itself (secondary evidence only where the law permits).
- Section 95: once the terms are so proved, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement is admitted, between the parties or their representatives, to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from them.
Reason: when parties take the trouble to put their agreement in writing, the writing is the best evidence of what they agreed.
Prince and Farhan sign a written sale agreement for 10 lakh rupees. Farhan later says they had orally agreed on 8 lakh. Section 95 does not allow that oral evidence.
The six provisos to Section 95
These may still be proved:
- Any fact invalidating the document: fraud, intimidation, illegality, lack of due execution, lack of capacity, failure of consideration, or mistake.
- A separate oral agreement on a matter on which the document is silent, not inconsistent with it.
- A separate oral agreement constituting a condition precedent (the obligation does not arise until the condition is met).
- A distinct later oral agreement to rescind or modify the contract, except where the law requires the contract to be in writing or it has been registered.
- A usage or custom by which unmentioned terms are usually implied in such contracts, if it does not contradict the express terms.
- Any fact showing how the language of the document relates to existing facts.
Electronic Evidence: Sections 61, 62 and 63
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Meaning
Any information created, stored or sent in digital form, e.g. WhatsApp messages, emails, CCTV footage, call recordings, phone photos and videos, computer and cloud files, screenshots, social media posts, GPS data, call detail records and bank transaction logs. All are electronic records and, under the B.S.A., documents.
| Electronic record | Electronic evidence |
|---|---|
| The information itself, stored in digital form | That record when produced before the court to prove a fact |
| The WhatsApp chat on Prince's phone | The chat produced in court to prove that Farhan threatened him |
Special rules are needed because electronic material is easy to alter, easy to copy and hard to verify by looking at it (a screenshot can be edited in seconds; a video can be clipped). The law asks: is it authentic (what it claims to be)? Is it reliable (was the producing system working properly)? Has it been proved in the manner the law requires?
History under the IEA: Sections 65A and 65B
Added to the IEA in 2000. Section 65A: contents of electronic records may be proved according to Section 65B. Section 65B: a computer output (a printout, a copy on a CD) is deemed a document, admissible without producing the original if certain conditions are met. Section 65B(4): a certificate signed by a responsible person, identifying the record, describing how it was produced and dealing with those conditions.
Courts disagreed on whether the certificate was always required:
- Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014): a copy, like a CD, is not admissible without the certificate.
- Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018, two-judge Bench): the certificate is not always mandatory.
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020)
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Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020, three-judge Bench): an election petition (Maharashtra Assembly election) alleged the winner's nomination papers were filed late, relying on CD video recordings of the nomination process; the authorities holding them did not give the certificate. Issue: is the Section 65B(4) certificate mandatory, and what if it cannot be obtained? Held: it is a mandatory condition for secondary electronic evidence (Anvar P.V. approved; Shafhi Mohammad overruled on this point). No certificate is needed when the original is produced, e.g. the owner of a laptop or phone proves in the witness box that the device holding the original is his and in his control. The certificate should ordinarily accompany the evidence, though a court may allow it later in a proper case; if the person in control refuses, the court may be asked to direct its production. The High Court's "substantial compliance" view was wrong in law, but its decision stood: the petitioners had done everything possible to get the certificate (the law does not demand the impossible), and the High Court also relied on other evidence. Principle: for a copy of an electronic record, the certificate is a must; for the original device, proved by its owner, no certificate is needed. Copy needs a certificate; original speaks for itself.
The citation (2020) 3 SCC 216 is only the 2019 order which sent the question to the larger Bench. The final judgment is reported in (2020) 7 SCC 1.
The B.S.A. framework: Sections 61 to 63
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- Section 61 (new, parity clause): nothing in the Adhiniyam shall deny the admissibility of an electronic or digital record on the ground that it is electronic or digital; subject to Section 63, it has the same legal effect, validity and enforceability as other documents.
- Section 62 (old Section 65A): contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with Section 63.
- Section 63(1) (old Section 65B): information in an electronic record printed on paper, or stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory (pen drives, phone memory), produced by a computer or any communication device (smartphones), is deemed a document, admissible without further proof or production of the original if the conditions are met.
- Section 63(3): several computers or devices used together, standalone or networked, are treated as a single device.
Section 63(2): four conditions
- The device was regularly used during that period for the activity in question.
- Information of that kind was regularly fed into it in the ordinary course.
- The device was operating properly, or any defect did not affect the record.
- The information reproduces or is derived from what was fed in.
Section 63(4): the certificate
- Submitted with the electronic record at each instance it is submitted for admission.
- Identifies the record, describes how it was produced, gives particulars of the device, and deals with the conditions.
- Big change: signed by the person in charge of the computer or communication device (or the management of the relevant activities) and by an expert.
- In the Schedule form: Part A filled in by the party, Part B by the expert; the form requires the hash value of the record.
Hash value: a digital fingerprint of a file, a long code generated from its contents. If even one letter or pixel changes, the hash value changes, so comparing hash values shows whether the file in court is exactly the same as the original.
| IEA, Section 65B(4) | B.S.A., Section 63(4) |
|---|---|
| Signed by a responsible person | Signed by the person in charge (or management) and by an expert |
| Identifies the record, describes its production, deals with the conditions | Also gives device particulars; Schedule form (Part A and Part B) with hash value |
| Computer output such as a printout or CD | Adds semiconductor memory and communication devices |
Applying the framework
- WhatsApp: Prince's own phone, proved to be his, in his control and holding the original chat, is primary evidence (Arjun Panditrao; explanations to Section 57). Printouts or screenshots are copies needing the Section 63 certificate (his Part A, an expert's Part B). Either way he must show the messages came from Farhan's number and that Farhan was using it.
- Email, Section 90 (Section 88A of the IEA): the court may presume that a message forwarded by the originator through a mail server to the addressee corresponds with the message fed in for transmission, but shall not presume who sent it. Content may be presumed; the sender must be proved.
- CCTV: the original is on the shop's digital video recorder; a clip copied by the police to a pen drive is a copy, needing a certificate from the person in charge and an expert, with hash values, to show it was not edited.
- Call recording: Malkani's three conditions (relevance, voice identification, no tampering), plus the Section 63 certificate for a copy.
- Files, cloud records, social media posts: who controlled the system or account, was it working properly, is the copy identical to the stored record? The certificate answers these. A bare screenshot without a certificate is generally not admissible at all; even with one, its source must be proved.
- Location or GPS data: needs a Section 63 certificate from the provider's person in charge and an expert, and must be linked to the accused by other evidence: it tracks the device, not the person.
Related provisions: Section 39(2) treats the Examiner of Electronic Evidence as an expert. Under Section 93, for a five-year-old electronic record from proper custody, the court may presume that the electronic signature on it was put there by that person or by someone he authorised.
State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai (2003)
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State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai (2003): in a trial of a doctor for criminal negligence in treating a patient, a key prosecution witness, a doctor in the United States, would not come to India; the prosecution sought to record his evidence by video conferencing, and the accused objected that it must be recorded in his presence. Held: allowed. Evidence includes electronic records, and presence need not be physical: if the accused and his advocate can see and hear the witness and cross-examine him in real time, the evidence is recorded in his presence. The case anticipated Section 2 of the B.S.A., under which oral evidence includes statements given electronically.
Electronic records are documents; the original device can be primary evidence; copies need the Section 63 certificate (person in charge and expert, Schedule form, hash value); and authenticity, reliability and the author's identity must still be shown.
Quick revision: the law of proof
- Judicially noticed facts (Sections 51 and 52) and admitted facts (Section 53) need no proof.
- Estoppel stops a person denying what he made another believe and act upon (Sanatan Gauda), but not where no one was misled (Maddanappa).
- Privileges protect judges, spouses, affairs of State, informers and advocate-client communications (Sections 127 to 134).
- Oral evidence must be direct (Section 55), and quality beats quantity (Section 139).
- Documents are proved by primary evidence, and by secondary evidence only in the listed cases (Sections 59 and 60).
- Written terms cannot be varied orally (Sections 94 and 95), except through the provisos.
- Electronic evidence rests on Sections 61 to 63, Arjun Panditrao, and the Schedule certificate with its hash value.
Accomplice Evidence
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Accomplice and approver
An accomplice is a guilty associate in the crime: a person who took part in committing the offence, as a principal or as an abettor.
Under the criminal procedure law, the court sometimes pardons an accomplice on condition that he makes a full and true disclosure of the whole crime and gives evidence against the others. Such an accomplice is called an approver.
An accomplice is a partner in crime; an approver is a pardoned accomplice.
Why accomplice evidence is relevant, and why it is dangerous
Relevance: in many crimes, especially conspiracies, gang crimes, smuggling and corruption, only the people who did it really know what happened. Without an insider, the truth may never come out.
Danger: the accomplice is himself a criminal. He may want the pardon, want to shift the blame, or want to settle old scores, so he is a witness with every reason to lie.
The law handles this tension through Section 138 of the B.S.A., read with Section 119(1), Illustration (b). Under the IEA, these were Section 133, read with Section 114, Illustration (b).
Competency: Section 138
An accomplice can be a witness. Section 138 says that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person.
Conviction on accomplice testimony: the change in wording
The B.S.A. has changed the words of the second half of the provision.
| Point | IEA (Section 133) | B.S.A. (Section 138) |
|---|---|---|
| Second half of the section | A conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. | A conviction is not illegal if it proceeds upon the corroborated testimony of an accomplice. |
| Position on corroboration | Rule of law: a conviction on uncorroborated accomplice evidence was not illegal. Rule of prudence: courts almost always insisted on corroboration in material particulars. | Many commentators say the change of words turns corroboration from a rule of prudence into something close to a requirement of law. Others say it may be a drafting slip. The courts will settle the point over time. |
Alongside Section 138, Section 119(1), Illustration (b) says that the court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars. Under the IEA, the courts reconciled the two sections through the rule of law and rule of prudence approach.
Exam tip: explain both the old position and the new wording of Section 138. That shows real understanding.
Meaning of corroboration
Corroboration means independent evidence which supports the accomplice's story in material particulars, and which connects the accused with the crime. It has three parts:
- Independent: it must come from a source other than the accomplice himself.
- Material particulars: it must support the important parts of the story, not trivial details.
- Connects the accused with the crime: confirming merely that a crime happened is not enough.
Corroboration need not be direct evidence. It can be circumstantial, such as a recovery, a phone record, or the accused's own conduct.
Why courts seek corroboration
An accomplice can tell a story that is true in every detail about the crime, since he was there, and yet falsely substitute an innocent person for himself or for his friend. Corroboration on the identity of the accused guards against exactly that.
Prince, Farhan and Aadil rob a shop. Aadil becomes an approver and says Farhan planned the robbery. The court will not convict Farhan on Aadil's word alone. It will look for independent support, such as CCTV footage, recovery of the stolen goods from Farhan, or phone records showing Farhan's location.
Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (1949)
▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:21:28)
Bhuboni Sahu v. The King (1949), Privy Council: Bhuboni Sahu was convicted of murder mainly on the evidence of an approver. To support the approver, the prosecution relied on a co-accused's confession, recorded by a Magistrate and later retracted, and on the recovery of the dead man's loin cloth and a grass-cutting tool. Issue: can the confession of a co-accused supply the corroboration that an approver's evidence needs? Held: a co-accused's confession is evidence of a very weak type. It is not given on oath, not made in the presence of the accused, and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It can be used only in support of other evidence and cannot be the foundation of a conviction. Acting on an approver supported only by such a confession would not be illegal, but courts should be slow to do so, because prudence needs independent evidence implicating the particular accused. Here the approver and the co-accused had the chance to prepare their story together, and the recoveries did not connect the appellant with the crime, so the conviction was set aside. Principle: a weak confession cannot rescue a weak approver.
State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh (1958)
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State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh (1958), larger Bench of the Supreme Court: a police officer was accused of accepting a bribe. The Anti-Corruption Department laid a trap with marked currency notes, and witnesses watched the payment. Issue: were these trap witnesses accomplices whose evidence needed corroboration? Held: trap witnesses are not necessarily accomplices. They may be interested or partisan witnesses whose evidence must be examined with care, but there is no inflexible rule of law that it must be corroborated before it can be acted upon. Whether corroboration is needed depends on the facts, and where needed it can come from circumstances. Principle: a trap witness is usually an interested witness, not necessarily a partner in crime.
Haroon Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra (1968)
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Haroon Haji Abdulla v. State of Maharashtra (1968): several persons were charged with smuggling gold into India from the Persian Gulf. An accomplice, Kashinath, gave evidence against Haroon. To support him, the prosecution relied on Kashinath's own earlier statements and on statements of co-accused which they later retracted. Held: an accomplice cannot corroborate himself; his own earlier statements are not independent corroboration. But a retracted confession of a co-accused, if made independently and without a chance of collusion, can be used to lend assurance, though it is a weak link to be examined with great care. On the facts, the Supreme Court found the accomplice's evidence sufficiently supported. Principle: support must come from outside the accomplice.
Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana (1975)
▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:24:59)
Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana (1975): Ravinder Singh was accused of murdering his wife. A person involved in the crime became an approver and gave evidence against him. Held: the Supreme Court upheld the conviction. An approver must first be found to be a reliable witness, and then his evidence must ordinarily be corroborated in material particulars. In a rare case, a fully reliable approver may be acted upon even without corroboration. Principle: the double test, a phrase from the earlier case of Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, decided in 1957. First, is he reliable? Then, is he corroborated?
Burden of Proof: Meaning and General Rules
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Every case has gaps. The burden of proof decides who wins when the evidence is incomplete, by telling the court who suffers because of those gaps.
Burden of proof simply means the duty to prove a fact. The general rules are in Sections 104 to 107 of the B.S.A. (Sections 101 to 104 of the IEA).
Section 104: He who asserts must prove
Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, the burden of proof lies on that person.
The Act's illustration: A wants the court to punish B for a crime A says B committed. A must prove that B committed it.
Section 105: Who would fail if no evidence were given
A practical test: the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on the person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.
The Act's illustrations: (1) A sues B for land in B's possession, claiming it was left to him by will. If no evidence is given on either side, B keeps the land, so the burden is on A. (2) A sues B for money due on a bond. B admits signing the bond but says it was obtained by fraud. If no evidence is given, A would win because the bond is admitted, so the burden of proving fraud is on B.
Section 106: Burden as to a particular fact
The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on the person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless a law says otherwise.
The Act's illustration: A prosecutes B for theft and wants the court to believe that B admitted the theft to C. A must prove that admission. B wants the court to believe that, at the time in question, he was elsewhere. B must prove it.
This illustration to Section 106 is the statutory basis for the burden of proving an alibi.
Section 107: Fact necessary to make evidence admissible
The burden of proving any fact necessary to be proved in order to make evidence admissible is on the person who wants to give that evidence.
If A wants to prove B's dying declaration, A must first prove that B is dead.
Legal Burden and Evidentiary Burden
There are two kinds of burden, and the distinction confuses many students.
| Point | Legal burden | Evidentiary burden |
|---|---|---|
| Also called | Burden of proof on the pleadings | Burden of adducing evidence |
| Meaning | Duty to prove the whole case | Duty to produce evidence on a particular point at a particular stage |
| Shifting | Fixed by law and by the pleadings; never shifts | Can shift from one side to the other as the trial goes on |
In a criminal case, the prosecution carries the legal burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt from beginning to end.
Shifting works like a see-saw: the base (the legal burden) stays fixed, but the seat moves up and down. Prince proves that Farhan signed a promissory note for one lakh rupees. The evidentiary burden shifts to Farhan to show that he received nothing, or that he has repaid. If Farhan produces a receipt of repayment, the burden shifts back to Prince to show that the receipt is false.
At the end of the day, if the evidence is evenly balanced, the party with the legal burden loses.
Special Rules: Exceptions and Facts Especially Within Knowledge
These are Sections 108 and 109 of the B.S.A. (Sections 105 and 106 of the IEA).
Section 108: Burden of proving an exception
When a person is accused of an offence, the burden of proving that his case falls within any of the General Exceptions in the B.N.S., or within any special exception or proviso in the B.N.S. or in the law defining the offence, is upon him, and the court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. So if the accused pleads private defence, unsoundness of mind, or grave and sudden provocation, he must prove it.
Standard of proof on the accused
- The accused need not prove the exception beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough to show it on a preponderance of probabilities.
- Even if he fails to prove it fully, his evidence may still raise a reasonable doubt about an ingredient of the offence, such as intention, and he gets the benefit of that doubt.
Section 109: Facts especially within knowledge
When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.
The Act's illustrations: (1) A person who does an act with an intention different from what the character and circumstances of the act suggest must prove that intention. (2) When A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket, the burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.
The limit of Section 109, a common mistake: it does not relieve the prosecution of its duty. The prosecution must first prove the basic facts; only then does Section 109 ask the accused to explain facts that only he can know. Section 109 cannot fill the gaps in a weak prosecution case.
Reverse Onus
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Onus means burden. Normally the prosecution proves guilt and the accused is presumed innocent. A reverse onus clause turns this around on certain points: once the prosecution proves some basic facts, the law presumes a further fact against the accused, and the accused must disprove it.
Examples
- B.S.A.: Section 108 on exceptions, and the presumptions on dowry death and absence of consent (see Presumptions below).
- NDPS Act (Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act): presumes a culpable mental state, and presumes certain things from possession of illicit articles.
- POCSO Act: has similar presumptions.
- Section 20, Prevention of Corruption Act: presumes a corrupt motive once it is proved that a public servant accepted an undue advantage.
Justification and safeguards
Some crimes are very hard to prove, and the key facts are often within the accused's knowledge. But:
- the prosecution must first prove the foundational facts;
- the accused usually needs only to show that his version is probable; and
- the process must be fair.
Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) (2020)
▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:33:28)
Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) (2020), Constitution Bench: in a batch of NDPS cases, the police officer who was the complainant and lodged the case also investigated it. An earlier decision, Mohan Lal, had held that when the informant himself investigates, the trial is vitiated and the accused must be acquitted, especially because the NDPS Act puts a reverse burden on the accused. Issue: does the informant being the investigator automatically vitiate the trial? Held: no. The investigation is not automatically unfair merely because the informant investigated; bias or unfairness must be decided on the facts of each case. The blanket rule in Mohan Lal was not correct. Principle: the case links reverse onus with fair investigation. The Court rejected the argument that a reverse burden needs a separate investigator, pointing out that the presumption arises only after the prosecution proves the basic facts. Unfairness is tested case by case, not by a rigid rule.
Plea of Alibi
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Alibi is a Latin word meaning "elsewhere". The accused says: I was somewhere else when the crime happened, so I could not have done it.
A murder happens in Cuttack at nine at night. Farhan, the accused, says that at nine that night he was at a wedding in Bhubaneswar. He produces time-stamped photographs, the hall's booking register, and two independent guests who saw him there. If believed, he could not have been in Cuttack.
Essentials and legal basis
- Who raises it: the accused.
- What must be shown: that at the time of the crime he was at a place so far away that he could not have been present at the scene, or that his presence was highly improbable.
- Relevancy (Section 9): the fact is relevant because it is inconsistent with his presence at the crime.
- Burden (Section 106 and its illustration): the burden of proving that particular fact is on the accused, because he is the one asking the court to believe it.
Is alibi a complete defence?
If proved, yes, because a person cannot be in two places at once. But it is not an exception under Section 108; it is a denial of presence. So the prosecution must first prove that the accused was present and committed the act.
Alibi and the prosecution evidence
- Courts expect an alibi to be proved by strong and reliable evidence, and are suspicious of an alibi raised late, as an afterthought.
- A failed alibi does not by itself prove guilt; the prosecution must still prove its case. A false alibi may, at most, be an additional circumstance against the accused once the prosecution has otherwise proved its case.
- If the alibi evidence creates a reasonable doubt, the accused gets the benefit of it.
Jayantibhai Bhenkarbhai: documents and independent witnesses showed that the accused was in Gandhinagar. Held: the Supreme Court acquitted him. Principle: alibi evidence that creates a reasonable doubt gives the accused its benefit.
Say it early. Prove it firmly. And even if it fails, the prosecution must still prove its case.
Theory of Last Seen
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Last seen means that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the accused, and was then found dead.
Why it can be relevant
- If two people were together and soon after one of them is found dead, the other is the person most likely to know what happened. It is a circumstance pointing towards the accused.
- It also brings in Section 109, because what happened after they were last seen together is a fact especially within the accused's knowledge.
Prince leaves his house with Farhan at seven in the evening, and neighbours see them walk towards the river together. At eight, Prince's body is found by the river. That is a strong last seen circumstance, and Farhan is expected to explain what happened after they were seen together. Change one fact: Prince's body is found four days later, twenty kilometres away. The last seen fact becomes weak, because in four days anyone could have met Prince. This is the time-gap problem.
Bodhraj alias Bodha v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (2002)
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Bodhraj alias Bodha v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (2002): Swaran Singh, who ran a finance company, was murdered in 1994. Some of the accused owed him large sums of money. The prosecution relied on witnesses, on his being last seen with the accused, on recovery of weapons on the accused's information, and on motive. Held: the Supreme Court upheld the convictions. The last seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the point when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that the possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. The foundation of the discovery rule is confirmation by subsequent events. Principle: in a case of circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must form a complete chain.
Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana (2023)
▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:39:13)
Dinesh Kumar v. State of Haryana (2023): Gurmail Singh was last seen with the accused one evening; his body was found in a canal some days later. The police also relied on recoveries made on the appellant's information. Held: the Supreme Court acquitted the appellant. The last seen evidence lost its strength because of the long gap between the last sighting and the discovery of the body. The recoveries did not help much, because the relevant facts were already known to the police from another source before the appellant's statement. Principle: Section 106 of the IEA (Section 109 of the B.S.A.) cannot be used to fill the gaps in a prosecution case whose chain is incomplete.
Santosh alias Bhure (also discussed under handwriting evidence): a false explanation by the accused can only be an additional link, after the prosecution has otherwise completed the chain.
Why last seen cannot automatically mean guilt
Being with someone is not the same as killing him. Last seen is one circumstance only. It needs a short time gap, a complete chain of other circumstances, and no reasonable possibility of someone else.
Short gap, strong link. Long gap, weak link. And never the only link.
Particular Burdens: Sections 110 to 114
These are Sections 110 to 114 of the B.S.A. (Sections 107 to 111 of the IEA).
| Section | Subject | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| Section 110 | Proof of death | When the question is whether a man is alive or dead, and it is shown that he was alive within thirty years, the burden of proving that he is dead is on the person who says so. |
| Section 111 | Proof of living | When it is proved that a person has not been heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard of him if he had been alive, the burden of proving that he is alive shifts to the person who says so. |
| Section 112 | Relationships | When persons have been shown to be acting as partners, as landlord and tenant, or as principal and agent, the burden of proving that they do not stand, or have ceased to stand, in that relationship is on the person who affirms it. |
| Section 113 | Ownership | When a person is shown to be in possession of something, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who says so. Possession is treated as evidence of ownership. |
| Section 114 | Good faith | Where there is a question as to the good faith of a transaction between parties, one of whom stands in a position of active confidence towards the other, the burden of proving good faith is on the party in the position of active confidence. |
Thirty years, presume alive. Seven years' silence, presume dead. But the presumption is only that he is dead now; there is no presumption about when he died. Whoever relies on a particular date of death must prove it.
Section 114, the Act's illustrations: a sale by a client to his advocate, and a sale by a son just come of age to his father. In both, the advocate and the father must prove good faith.
Presumptions
▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:42:41)
May presume, shall presume and conclusive proof
These are defined in Section 2(1), clauses (h), (l) and (b) of the B.S.A. Under the IEA, they were all in Section 4.
| Term | B.S.A. definition | Effect | Nature |
|---|---|---|---|
| May presume | Section 2(1)(h) | The court has a choice. | Rebuttable |
| Shall presume | Section 2(1)(l) | The court must treat the fact as proved, but the other side may disprove it. | Rebuttable |
| Conclusive proof | Section 2(1)(b) | No disproof is allowed at all. | Irrebuttable |
Rebuttable means the presumption can be rebutted, that is, disproved.
Presumptions of fact and presumptions of law
| Point | Presumptions of fact | Presumptions of law |
|---|---|---|
| Nature | Inferences the court may draw from common experience | Inferences the law itself directs |
| Form | Always "may presume"; the main section is Section 119 | Usually "shall presume", or conclusive |
Presumptions as to documents: Sections 78 to 93
Sections 78 to 93 of the B.S.A. (Sections 79 to 90A of the IEA) contain presumptions about documents, such as certified copies, the Official Gazette, Government maps, powers of attorney, electronic agreements, electronic signatures and electronic messages. Two are famous:
- Section 92: for a document thirty years old produced from proper custody, the court may presume that the signature and handwriting are genuine and that it was duly executed.
- Section 93: for an electronic record five years old, the court may presume that the electronic signature on it was put there by that person or someone he authorised.
Some document presumptions are "shall presume" and some are "may presume", so always read the exact words.
Presumptions relating to gender violence: Sections 117, 118 and 120
▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:44:38)
Three presumptions protect women, and they are important for exams.
Section 117: Abetment of suicide by a married woman (Section 113A of the IEA)
When the question is whether a woman's suicide was abetted by her husband or his relative, and it is shown that she committed suicide within seven years of her marriage and that the husband or relative had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume that they abetted the suicide. But the court must have regard to all the other circumstances of the case.
Section 118: Dowry death (Section 113B of the IEA)
When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman, and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected by that person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person caused the dowry death.
- The meaning of dowry death comes from the B.N.S., which requires, among other things, that the death be unnatural and occur within seven years of marriage.
- Courts have explained that "soon before" does not mean "immediately before". There must be a proximate and live link between the cruelty and the death.
Section 120: Absence of consent (Section 114A of the IEA)
In certain prosecutions for rape under the B.N.S., where sexual intercourse by the accused is proved, and the question is whether it was without the woman's consent, and she states in her evidence before the court that she did not consent, the court shall presume that she did not consent.
| Section | Subject | Presumption |
|---|---|---|
| Section 117 | Abetment of suicide by a married woman | May presume |
| Section 118 | Dowry death | Shall presume |
| Section 120 | Absence of consent in certain rape prosecutions | Shall presume |
117, suicide, may. 118, dowry death, shall. 120, consent, shall.
Presumption of facts: Section 119
Section 119 of the B.S.A. (Section 114 of the IEA) is the common-sense section. The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, having regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private business.
Its illustrations are now in sub-section (1). The court may presume, for example:
- that a man in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession;
- that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless corroborated in material particulars;
- that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed;
- that the common course of business has been followed;
- that evidence which could be produced, but is not produced, would be unfavourable to the person who withholds it;
- that if a man refuses to answer a question which he is not compelled by law to answer, the answer would have been unfavourable to him.
Sub-section (2) reminds the court to consider the facts of the particular case before applying these maxims.
The presumption about stolen goods may not be fair against a shopkeeper who finds a stolen coin in his cash box, because he receives money from many customers every day.
Conclusive Proof of Legitimacy: Section 116
▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:48:16)
Section 116 of the B.S.A. (Section 112 of the IEA) is the strongest presumption. The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within 280 days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate child of that man.
Only exception: where it is shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.
Change in wording: The old Section 112 said legitimate son; the B.S.A. now says legitimate child.
Why the presumption is so strong
- To protect children from being branded illegitimate.
- To protect the mother's dignity.
- To keep family relationships stable.
The only escape is proof of non-access, meaning no opportunity for marital relations at the relevant time. On DNA and blood tests, two cases seem to pull in different directions but fit together.
Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal (1993)
▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:49:24)
Goutam Kundu v. State of West Bengal (1993): a wife claimed maintenance for herself and her child. The husband denied being the father and asked for a blood test of the child. Held: the Supreme Court refused. Courts in India cannot order a blood test as a matter of course, and such a prayer cannot be granted to enable a roving inquiry. There must be a strong prima facie case that the husband had no access, to dispel the presumption under Section 112 of the IEA. The court must consider the consequences for the child, because a test may brand the child illegitimate and the mother unchaste. No one can be compelled to give a blood sample. Principle: no roving inquiry.
Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy (2015)
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Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy (2015): a husband sought divorce on the ground of his wife's adultery, said the child was not his, and asked for a DNA test to prove the adultery. Held: the Supreme Court allowed the DNA test. Here the purpose was to establish the husband's allegation of infidelity, and a DNA test was the most legitimate and scientifically perfect means to establish it. If the wife refused to undergo the test, the court could draw an adverse presumption against her under Section 114 of the IEA (Section 119 of the B.S.A.). Principle: no blindness to science when the case is strong.
Reconciling the two cases
| Goutam Kundu (1993) | Dipanwita Roy (2015) |
|---|---|
| Blood test refused | DNA test allowed |
| Protects against casual fishing tests, especially where the child's legitimacy is attacked without a strong basis | Allows a DNA test where there is a specific and serious plea, like adultery, and the truth cannot otherwise be established |
No roving inquiry, but no blindness to science when the case is strong.
Who Can Be a Witness: Competency (Section 124)
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Witnesses are the people who bring evidence into the courtroom. Section 124 of the B.S.A. (Section 118 of the IEA) says that all persons shall be competent to testify, unless the court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them, or from giving rational answers, by:
- tender years;
- extreme old age;
- disease of body or mind; or
- any other cause of the same kind.
A person of unsound mind is not incompetent unless his unsoundness prevents him from understanding the questions and giving rational answers.
The test of competency is not age or status. The test is understanding, and the ability to give rational answers.
Competent and compellable
| Competent | Compellable |
|---|---|
| The person is allowed to give evidence. | The person can be forced to give evidence. |
Most competent witnesses are also compellable. But the accused cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself, because of Article 20(3). Section 126 makes husbands and wives competent witnesses for and against each other, subject to the marital privilege.
The child witness
The Act prescribes no minimum age. Even a young child is a competent witness if the child understands the questions and gives rational answers.
- Preliminary test: the judge first asks simple questions (What is your name? Which class do you study in? What happens if you tell a lie?). This is sometimes called the voir dire test. The judge then records whether the child understood and answered sensibly.
- Oath: under the Oaths Act, 1969, where a child under 12 years understands the duty of speaking the truth but not the nature of an oath, the oath may be dispensed with, and the child's evidence is still admissible.
- Caution: children can be tutored, and can mix imagination with memory. So courts examine a child's evidence carefully and often look for corroboration.
Looking for corroboration of a child witness is a rule of prudence, not of law. If the court finds the child truthful and reliable, a conviction can rest on the child's evidence alone.
Witness unable to communicate verbally (Section 125)
Section 125 of the B.S.A. (Section 119 of the IEA): a witness who is unable to speak may give evidence in any other manner in which he can make it intelligible, such as by writing or by signs.
- The writing must be written, and the signs made, in open court.
- Such evidence is deemed to be oral evidence.
- Proviso: if the witness is unable to communicate verbally, the court shall take the assistance of an interpreter or a special educator in recording the statement, and the statement shall be videographed.
Before 2013, Section 119 of the IEA spoke of "dumb witnesses". A 2013 amendment renamed it and added the proviso, and Section 125 of the B.S.A. keeps both. The idea is that a disability should never shut out a truthful witness.
Examination of Witnesses (Sections 142 to 149)
▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:56:02)
In a murder trial, the prosecution calls Prince, who says he saw the incident. Prince enters the witness box and takes the oath.
Examination-in-chief
Section 142 of the B.S.A. (Section 137 of the IEA): the examination of a witness by the party who calls him is his examination-in-chief. The public prosecutor asks Prince: Where were you on the night of the tenth? What did you see? Who was there? The purpose is to bring out the witness's story, in his own words, in favour of the party who called him.
Leading questions (Section 146)
The party calling a witness must not put words into his mouth. Section 146 combines the old Sections 141 to 143 of the IEA.
A leading question is any question suggesting the answer which the person putting it wishes or expects to receive.
- Leading questions must not, if the other side objects, be asked in examination-in-chief or re-examination, except with the court's permission.
- The court shall permit leading questions on matters which are introductory or undisputed, or which have already been sufficiently proved.
- Leading questions may be asked in cross-examination.
"You saw Farhan stab Aadil with a knife, didn't you?" is leading. "What did you see?" is not leading.
Cross-examination
Section 142: the examination of a witness by the adverse party is his cross-examination. The defence lawyer asks Prince: You were 200 metres away, weren't you? It was dark? You have a land dispute with the accused, don't you?
Its purposes are:
- to test the truth of the witness's story;
- to shake his credit; and
- to bring out facts that help the cross-examiner's side.
Leading questions are allowed here because the witness is not friendly to the cross-examiner. Under Section 143, cross-examination must relate to relevant facts, but need not be confined to what the witness said in chief.
Previous statements in writing (Section 148): a witness may be cross-examined about his previous statements in writing without being shown the writing first. But to contradict him by that writing, his attention must first be drawn to the parts to be used.
Questions lawful in cross-examination (Section 149): questions may be asked to test the witness's truthfulness, to show who he is and his position in life, or to shake his credit by injuring his character.
Proviso to Section 149: in a prosecution for rape or attempt to rape, where consent is in issue, no evidence can be given and no question can be put in cross-examination about the general immoral character or previous sexual experience of the victim, to prove consent or the quality of consent.
Re-examination
Section 142: the examination of a witness, after cross-examination, by the party who called him is his re-examination. The prosecutor clears up the confusion: You said it was dark. Was there any light at the spot? Prince answers: Yes, there was a street lamp right there.
Under Section 143, re-examination must be directed to explaining matters referred to in cross-examination. If a new matter is introduced with the court's permission, the other side may cross-examine again on that matter.
The judge's questions (Section 168)
Throughout, the judge can step in. Under Section 168, the judge can ask any question he considers necessary to discover the truth.
| Stage | By whom | Role | Leading questions |
|---|---|---|---|
| Examination-in-chief | Party calling the witness | Builds the story | Not if objected to, except with permission |
| Cross-examination | Adverse party | Tests the story | Allowed |
| Re-examination | Party calling the witness, after cross | Repairs the story | Not if objected to, except with permission |
Chief builds the story. Cross tests the story. Re-examination repairs the story. Build, break, repair.
Hostile Witness (Section 157)
▶ Watch this part of the lecture (3:00:05)
Prince, the prosecution's own witness, changes his story. In the police station, he said he saw Farhan stab Aadil. In court, he says, "I saw nothing."
Normally, a party cannot cross-examine its own witness. But Section 157 of the B.S.A. (Section 154 of the IEA) says the court may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. Nothing in the section disentitles the person so permitted from relying on any part of the evidence of that witness.
"Hostile" does not simply mean a bad person, and the word does not appear in the section. A hostile witness is one who, in the court's view, is not willing to tell the truth in favour of the party calling him, or shows hostility to that party. He may have been threatened, bribed or won over, or may simply have changed his mind. The law does not label him; it only allows cross-examination with the court's permission.
Timing of the request: State of Bihar v. Laloo Prasad
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State of Bihar v. Laloo Prasad (2002): in a CBI prosecution, a prosecution witness gave evidence helping the defence. The prosecution sought permission to cross-examine him not when his examination-in-chief ended, but only after the defence had finished its cross-examination. The trial judge refused; the High Court upheld the refusal. Held: the Supreme Court declined to interfere and disposed of the appeal. Permission under Section 154 of the IEA is a matter of the court's discretion. If the witness had gone back on his expected stand during examination-in-chief, permission should have been sought then; the trial judge could not be said to have erred in refusing the late request. The prosecution had other ways to deal with the evidence, such as arguing that it should not be relied upon. Principle: ask at the right time, and the court decides.
Evidence of a hostile witness: Khujji v. State of M.P.
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Khujji v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1991): on the value of a hostile witness's evidence. Held: the Supreme Court held that such evidence is not washed off the record, and can be accepted to the extent it is found dependable on careful scrutiny. Principle: the evidence of a hostile witness is not wiped out.
Section 158 of the B.S.A. (Section 155 of the IEA) also allows the credit of a witness to be impeached, for example by proof that he was bribed, or by proof of former statements inconsistent with his evidence.
Corroboration (Section 160)
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Corroboration means independent evidence that supports a witness's testimony. It arises with accomplices, children, co-accused confessions and dying declarations. Under Section 139, no particular number of witnesses is required to prove any fact; one reliable witness is enough.
Section 160 of the B.S.A. (Section 157 of the IEA): in order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by that witness relating to the same fact may be proved, if made:
- at or about the time when the fact took place; or
- before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact.
On the night of the incident, Prince tells his neighbour, "I just saw Farhan stab Aadil." An hour later, he lodges the first information report saying the same thing. Months later, he says the same in court. The statement to the neighbour, made at about the time, and the first information report can be proved to corroborate his court evidence. But a statement the police record from him later, during the investigation, cannot corroborate him, because Section 181 of the B.N.S.S. allows it to be used only to contradict him.
Section 160 only shows that the witness has been consistent. A person repeating his own story is not independent evidence against the accused. Consistency is not the same as truth.
Final Rapid Revision of the Whole Subject
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Definitions (all in Section 2)
- Fact: anything perceivable by the senses, or a mental condition.
- Fact in issue: the main disputed fact on which a right or liability depends.
- Relevant fact: one connected in a way the Act recognises.
- Evidence: oral, which now includes statements given electronically, or documentary, which includes electronic and digital records.
- Proved, disproved, not proved: judged by the prudent man.
- May presume gives the court a choice; shall presume obliges the court, until disproved; conclusive proof shuts out disproof.
The big distinctions
- Relevancy is logic, admissibility is law.
- All admissible evidence is relevant, but all relevant evidence is not admissible.
- A fact in issue is the destination, a relevant fact is the road.
- Not proved is not the same as disproved.
- Every confession is an admission, but not every admission is a confession.
- The legal burden never shifts, the evidentiary burden does.
- Competent means allowed to testify, compellable means can be forced.
- The body can be compelled, but the mind cannot.
Key sections in order
| Section | Subject |
|---|---|
| 1 | Applicability |
| 3 | Facts in issue and relevant facts only |
| 4 | Res gestae |
| 5 | Occasion, cause and effect |
| 6 | Motive, preparation and conduct |
| 7 | Identity |
| 8 | Conspiracy |
| 9 | Facts not otherwise relevant, the home of alibi |
| 12, 13 | State of mind |
| 15 to 21, 25 | Admissions |
| 22 to 24 | Confessions |
| 26(a) | Dying declarations |
| 34 to 50 | Judgments, opinions and character |
| 51 to 53 | Facts that need no proof |
| 54, 55 | Oral evidence |
| 56 to 60 | Primary and secondary evidence |
| 61 to 63 | Electronic evidence |
| 78 to 93 | Presumptions about documents |
| 94, 95 | Exclusion of oral by documentary evidence |
| 104 to 114 | Burden of proof |
| 116 to 120 | The key presumptions |
| 121 to 123 | Estoppel |
| 124, 125 | Competence |
| 127 to 134 | Privileges |
| 138 | Accomplice |
| 139 | Number of witnesses |
| 142 to 149 | Examination |
| 157 | Hostile witness |
| 160 | Corroboration |
| 168 | The judge's questions |
| 170 | Repeal and savings |
Major doctrines in one line each
- Res gestae: same transaction and spontaneous.
- Conspiracy: agency during the conspiracy only.
- Confession: voluntary, not to police, not in police custody without a Magistrate; but discovery lets in the words that led to it.
- Dying declaration: cause of death, close link, clear mind, correct record.
- Estoppel: you cannot deny what you made another believe and act upon.
- Documents: the writing speaks for itself.
- Burden: he who asserts must prove.
Presumptions
| Kind | Section | Subject |
|---|---|---|
| May presume | 117 | Abetment of suicide within 7 years of marriage, with cruelty |
| May presume | 119 | Presumption of facts, including stolen goods and the accomplice |
| Shall presume | 118 | Dowry death, where cruelty or harassment for dowry soon before death is shown |
| Shall presume | 120 | Absence of consent |
| Conclusive proof | 116 | Birth during a valid marriage, or within 280 days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, unless non-access is shown |
| Documents | 92 | Paper documents 30 years old |
| Documents | 93 | Electronic signatures on electronic records 5 years old |
Electronic evidence in five lines
- Electronic records are documents.
- Section 61 gives them equal legal effect.
- The original device, proved by its owner, is primary evidence, and the explanations to Section 57 treat many electronic records as primary.
- A copy needs the Section 63 certificate, signed by the person in charge and by an expert, in the Schedule form, with the hash value, at each instance it is submitted.
- Arjun Panditrao made the certificate mandatory for copies under the old law, and Praful Desai allowed evidence by video conferencing.
Cases in one line each
| Case | Principle |
|---|---|
| Dhakeswari Cotton Mills | No strict evidence rules still means natural justice. |
| R. K. Anand | Sting recordings accepted with a fair procedure. |
| Nirbhaya | The whole transaction; dying declarations by gestures; DNA and CCTV. |
| Malkani | A recording must be relevant, identified and untampered. |
| Jayantibhai | A well-proved alibi creates reasonable doubt. |
| Mirza Akbar | No use of a conspirator's statement after the conspiracy ends. |
| Badri Rai | What one conspirator does for the plan binds all. |
| Mohammed Khalid | Reasonable ground to believe first, and nothing after arrest. |
| Bishwanath Prasad | An admission is substantive but not conclusive. |
| V. C. Shukla | Account books alone cannot fix liability. |
| Pulukuri Kottaya | Only the words that led to the discovery. |
| Aghnoo Nagesia | The accused's own confessional FIR is still barred. |
| Veera Ibrahim | Article 20(3) starts with formal accusation. |
| Kathi Kalu Oghad | Specimens are not testimony. |
| Selvi | No forced narco-analysis, polygraph or brain mapping. |
| Khushal Rao | A true dying declaration needs no corroboration. |
| Laxman | No medical certificate is essential. |
| Sudhakar | No close link, no dying declaration. |
| Patel Hiralal Joitaram | A corrected slip does not destroy a dying declaration. |
| Ram Narain | The expert advises, the judge verifies. |
| Santosh alias Bhure | Handwriting opinion needs support, and a false explanation is only an extra link. |
| Sanatan Gauda | The University was estopped. |
| Maddanappa | No one misled, no estoppel. |
| Verghese | The marital privilege bars disclosure by the spouse, not all proof. |
| Raj Narain | The court decides the State's privilege claim. |
| Preeti Jain | The original device is primary evidence, and Family Courts are flexible. |
| Ajai alias Ajju | Quality, not quantity. |
| Madhuri Patil | Old records carry weight. |
| Arjun Panditrao | Certificate for copies. |
| Bhuboni Sahu | An approver needs independent support, and a co-accused's confession alone is not enough. |
| Basawan Singh | Trap witnesses are not necessarily accomplices. |
| Haroon Haji Abdulla | An accomplice cannot corroborate himself. |
| Ravinder Singh | Reliable first, corroborated next. |
| Mukesh Singh | Informant as investigator is not automatically unfair. |
| Bodhraj | Last seen needs a very small time gap. |
| Dinesh Kumar | A long gap weakens last seen, and Section 109 cannot fill gaps. |
| Goutam Kundu | No roving blood tests. |
| Dipanwita Roy | A DNA test where adultery is seriously alleged. |
| Laloo Prasad | Seek permission against a hostile witness at the right time. |
Constitutional connections
- Article 20(3) shapes confessions, specimens and scientific tests.
- Article 21 demands a fair trial, fair investigation and mental privacy.
- Article 14 demands equal and non-arbitrary rules.
- Natural justice applies even where the B.S.A. does not.
Key Changes from the IEA to the B.S.A.
▶ Watch this part of the lecture (3:11:07)
- The B.S.A. came into force on 1 July 2024, with pending matters continuing under the IEA.
- It has 170 sections instead of 167.
- Documents now expressly include electronic and digital records, and oral evidence includes statements given electronically.
- Section 61 gives electronic records equal legal effect.
- Section 57 treats many electronic records as primary evidence.
- Section 63 replaces the old Section 65B, adds semiconductor memory and communication devices, and requires a certificate signed by the person in charge and an expert, in the Schedule form, with the hash value.
- Section 58 widens secondary evidence to include oral and written admissions and the evidence of a skilled examiner of voluminous documents.
- Section 39 adds "any other field" to expert opinion, and carries over the old Section 45A on the Examiner of Electronic Evidence as its second sub-section.
- Section 22 adds coercion to inducement, threat and promise.
- Section 23 merges the old Sections 25, 26 and 27.
- Section 24 adds that a trial in the absence of an absconding accused is deemed a joint trial.
- Section 138 now speaks of corroborated, instead of uncorroborated, accomplice testimony.
- Smaller wording changes: Section 116 says legitimate child instead of legitimate son; Section 122 bars a tenant from denying the landlord's title even after the tenancy; Section 131 says "when" instead of "whence"; Section 168 lets the judge ask any question he considers necessary.
- Colonial references have been removed throughout.
The Five Questions for Any Evidence Problem
- Is it relevant?
- Is it admissible?
- How is it proved?
- Who must prove it, and is there a presumption?
- Who is the witness, and how is he examined?
Ask these five questions in this order, and no evidence problem will leave you lost. Before the exam, revise the cases once more and read the key sections in the bare Act.
Quick revision
- Everyone is competent under Section 124 unless unable to understand questions or answer rationally; a child can testify after a preliminary test.
- Under Section 125, a witness unable to speak testifies by writing or signs in open court, with an interpreter or special educator, on video.
- Witnesses are examined in chief, cross-examined and re-examined (build, break, repair), and Section 146 controls leading questions.
- A hostile witness can be cross-examined by his own side with the court's permission under Section 157, sought at the right time, as Laloo Prasad shows.
- The hostile witness's evidence is not wiped out, as Khujji holds.
- Section 160 lets former consistent statements corroborate a witness.