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Human Rights Law Complete notes

Human Rights Law: Complete Notes

About this subject ▶ Watch this part of the lecture (00:00) Human Rights Law runs, across six units, from what makes a right a human right to newer issues such as artificial intelligence, corruption, business power, and the rights of transgender persons and prisoners. Human rights are engaged whene…

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Human Rights Law Complete Course

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About this subject

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Human Rights Law runs, across six units, from what makes a right a human right to newer issues such as artificial intelligence, corruption, business power, and the rights of transgender persons and prisoners. Human rights are engaged whenever a person speaks out, visits a government hospital, stands in a ration queue or meets a police officer.

The subject moves between two worlds: the international world of treaties, United Nations bodies and regional courts, and the Indian world of the Constitution, statutes, commissions and courts.

Key point

Judgments of the Supreme Court of India, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of Human Rights, and the views of a United Nations committee, do not carry the same legal weight. Always note which body gave a decision.

What Makes a Right a Human Right

A tenant's or employee's rights depend on a role or a contract. A human right belongs to a person simply because he or she is a human being. It is not earned by citizenship, religion, caste, wealth or good behaviour; even a person accused of a serious crime keeps it.

The foundation of all human rights is human dignity: every person has an inner worth that the State cannot take away. Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (UDHR) opens: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." Dignity comes first; rights follow from it.

Characteristics

  • Universal: belong to every person everywhere.
  • Inherent: the State does not grant them; it only recognises and protects them.
  • Inalienable: cannot be sold, surrendered or simply taken away. Some may be lawfully limited: a convict may lose liberty after a fair trial but keeps dignity and the right not to be tortured, even in prison.
  • Indivisible and interdependent: the Vienna Declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights, 1993, says all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.
  • Equality and non-discrimination run through every right.

The individual is the right-holder; the State is mainly the duty-bearer, and must also protect people against private actors.

Human Rights and Fundamental Rights

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (03:28)

Human rightsFundamental rights (India)
Rights every human being holds, as recognised in international lawRights in Part III of the Constitution
Some, like the right to work, appear in India mainly as Directive Principles (Part IV), not directly enforceableDirectly enforceable in the Supreme Court (Article 32) and the High Courts (Article 226)
Belong to every human beingSome only for citizens (Article 19 freedoms); others for every person, including a foreigner (Article 14 equality before the law; Article 21 life and personal liberty)
Key point

Many fundamental rights are human rights in constitutional form, but the two circles are not identical.

Why human rights matter

  • They limit power: even a huge majority cannot vote away a minority's dignity.
  • They give a common standard for judging laws.
  • They give a voice to the weakest: prisoners, children, refugees, Dalit communities and women facing violence.
  • They drive constitutional litigation, public interest litigation and policy work, and are tested in judiciary examinations, UGC NET and CLAT PG.

Universality and cultural relativism

In the early 1990s some governments argued that human rights reflect Western values and must yield to local traditions (cultural relativism). The Vienna Declaration answered that national, regional, historical, cultural and religious differences must be borne in mind, but States, whatever their systems, must promote and protect all human rights.

Key point

Culture may shape how a right is realised but cannot excuse denying its core. Child marriage or untouchability cannot be defended as tradition.

The Global Story of Human Rights

  • Code of Hammurabi (Babylon): preventing the strong from oppressing the weak.
  • Greek and Roman Stoics: all humans share reason; this grew into natural law, a higher law binding even rulers.
  • Magna Carta, 1215: King John accepted that no free man could be imprisoned except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land. It protected mainly the barons but planted the idea that even the king is under the law. The Habeas Corpus Act, 1679 and Bill of Rights, 1689 followed.
  • John Locke: government exists to protect the natural rights of life, liberty and property.
  • American Declaration of Independence, 1776 and French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789: spoke of men and in practice excluded women, enslaved and colonised peoples. Olympe de Gouges replied with the Declaration of the Rights of Woman, 1791. Human rights history is also the history of excluded groups demanding inclusion.
  • League of Nations, 1920: no general list of rights in its Covenant, but it supervised minority-protection treaties and treated the well-being of peoples in certain former colonies as a sacred trust of civilisation. The International Labour Organization (ILO), founded in 1919, began setting labour standards. The League could neither stop aggression nor protect individuals against their own governments.

The Second World War and the Holocaust (about six million Jews and millions of others murdered) showed what happens when a State may treat its own people as it pleases. The UN Charter, signed on 26 June 1945, responded: its Preamble reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person; Article 1 makes respect for human rights, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, a UN purpose; under Articles 55 and 56 members pledge joint and separate action. The Charter did not list the rights; the UDHR (10 December 1948) filled that gap.

The Indian Story of Human Rights

Indian traditions spoke of dharma (righteous duty), rajdharma (the king's duty to rule justly) and Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (the world is one family). Buddhism and Jainism taught compassion and non-violence; Emperor Ashoka preached tolerance and humane treatment even of prisoners. Yet the same society practised rigid caste hierarchy, untouchability and subordination of women: ancient thought gave ideas of duty and compassion, not a full theory of equal rights. Kabir and Guru Nanak challenged caste pride; Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Jyotirao Phule and Savitribai Phule fought for widows, girls and oppressed castes.

Colonial rule brought the rule of law but also repression, so the freedom struggle became a struggle for rights:

  • Rowlatt Act, 1919: detention without trial; the Jallianwala Bagh massacre came the same year.
  • Nehru Report, 1928: demanded fundamental rights.
  • Karachi Resolution of the Congress, 1931: joined civil liberties with economic rights such as free primary education and protection of workers.
  • Dr Bhimrao Ambedkar led the fight against untouchability, including the Mahad Satyagraha, 1927, for access to a public water tank.

The Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950, soon after the UDHR. Civil and political rights became enforceable Fundamental Rights (Part III); economic and social rights became Directive Principles (Part IV), which under Article 37 are fundamental in governance but not enforceable by any court. The Preamble assures the dignity of the individual; Article 17 abolishes untouchability; Article 51 asks the State to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations.

How International Law Enters Indian Law

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A ratified treaty does not automatically become Indian law. India is dualist for treaties: a ratified treaty binds India internationally, but changing rights inside India needs legislation, and Article 253 empowers Parliament to implement treaties. Courts still use international human rights law to interpret the Constitution and statutes where there is no conflict with Indian law.

Case

Jolly George Varghese v. Bank of Cochin: a bank sought civil imprisonment of debtors for not paying a decree; Article 11 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights bars imprisonment merely for inability to fulfil a contractual obligation. Held (Supreme Court, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer): the Covenant cannot by itself override the Code of Civil Procedure, but the Code is read in the light of the Covenant and Article 21; a debtor may be detained only for bad faith, such as having the means and refusing to pay, not for mere inability. Principle: international law guides interpretation even where it cannot override a statute.

Case

Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997): no Indian law addressed sexual harassment at the workplace. Held: international conventions consistent with fundamental rights must be read into them where domestic law is silent; relying on the women's convention, the Supreme Court framed guidelines to be treated as law until Parliament acted. Parliament later enacted the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. Principle: international law fills the gap where domestic law is silent.

Note

Updated from the lecture: the lecture called the 2013 law the “Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2013”. The correct position is that its short title under section 1(1) is the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, often called the POSH Act; cite the full title in exams. Source: The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (Indian Kanoon).

Sources of Human Rights Law

Article 38 of the ICJ Statute lists: (1) treaties; (2) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) general principles of law; and (4) as subsidiary means, judicial decisions and the writings of the most highly qualified scholars.

Formal sourceMaterial source
Gives a rule binding force: State consent for a treaty; State practice with a belief that it is legally required for customSupplies content without binding anyone, e.g. the UDHR, a General Assembly resolution, an expert report

Human Rights Law strains this theory: it protects individuals against their own States and grows through declarations, resolutions and expert interpretations.

Key point

Always ask whether a text is binding law or soft law (influential guidance without binding force).

Treaties and custom

Under Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, every treaty in force binds its parties and must be performed in good faith: pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept). A treaty binds only its parties; for a non-party, the question is whether the rule exists in customary law, which binds all States. Custom needs (1) a general practice of States and (2) opinio juris, the belief that the practice is required by law.

Case

North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. the Netherlands) (1969): Denmark and the Netherlands relied on the equidistance principle of a 1958 treaty, which Germany never ratified. Held (ICJ, 20 February 1969): equidistance had not become custom binding Germany. Paragraph 77: the acts must amount to settled practice and show a belief that the practice is obligatory by a rule of law. Principle: frequent or habitual conduct is not enough; States do much out of courtesy, convenience or tradition.

Is Human Rights Law customary law?

Partly. The prohibitions of genocide, slavery, torture, systematic racial discrimination and prolonged arbitrary detention clearly are, and bind every State. Not every treaty Article has become custom, and proof is hard because many States break these rules while denying it.

Case

Nicaragua case (1986): Held (ICJ): a State acting against a rule but claiming an exception within it confirms the rule rather than weakening it. Principle: a government that tortures in secret and denies it in public still accepts the prohibition as law.

Case

Beg v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (2003): United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 22 December 2003. Beg, Pakistani-born and later a United States citizen, sued Pakistan in an American court over his land in Punjab province taken for military housing, relying on an exception permitting suits against a foreign State for property taken in violation of international law. Held: international law forbids uncompensated expropriation of foreigners' property, not of a State's own nationals; the land was taken from Beg as a Pakistani national, so the suit failed. Principle: though the UDHR speaks of a right to property, this customary rule protected only foreigners; not every human rights idea is enforceable custom.

Peremptory Norms: Torture as Jus Cogens

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Key point

Some customary rules rise higher and become peremptory norms. Jus cogens (Article 53, Vienna Convention): a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as one from which no derogation is permitted; a conflicting treaty is void. Obligation erga omnes: owed to the international community as a whole, so every State has an interest in its protection.

Case

Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (1998): Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 10 December 1998. Furundzija, a local commander of a Bosnian Croat special unit interrogated a woman while another soldier raped and sexually assaulted her; he was convicted of torture and of aiding and abetting outrages upon personal dignity including rape. Held (paragraphs 147 to 157): the torture prohibition is customary law, jus cogens and erga omnes. Consequences: no treaty or ordinary custom can override it; national laws or amnesties protecting torturers would not be recognised internationally; every State may investigate, prosecute and punish, or extradite, an accused torturer found in its territory.

Case

Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) (1999): General Augusto Pinochet (ruler of Chile 1973 to 1990, regime accused of widespread torture) was arrested in London in October 1998 on a Spanish extradition request and claimed former head-of-State immunity. Held (House of Lords, 24 March 1999, six to one): no immunity for torture and conspiracy to torture after 8 December 1988, by which date the United Kingdom, Spain and Chile had all joined the Convention against Torture; since the Convention defines torture as an act of a public official, immunity for such acts would defeat it. In March 2000 the Home Secretary let him return to Chile on medical grounds; he was never tried in Britain or Spain. Principle: a landmark in principle, not outcome.

Case

Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium (Arrest Warrant case) (2002): in April 2000 a Belgian judge issued an arrest warrant against the Congo's serving Foreign Minister for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Held (ICJ, 14 February 2002, thirteen to three): Belgium violated the immunity of a serving foreign minister under customary law, with no exception for such crimes. Principle: jus cogens does not sweep away every rule, but immunity is not impunity: the minister can be tried at home; his State can waive immunity; foreign courts can try him after he leaves office for acts before or after his term or private acts during it; certain international criminal courts can try him.

Case

Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom (2001): Mr Al-Adsani, a British and Kuwaiti national alleging torture in Kuwait sued in England, where Kuwait's State immunity was upheld. Held (Grand Chamber, European Court of Human Rights, 21 November 2001, nine to eight): no violation of the right of access to a court; the torture ban is jus cogens, but international law did not yet deny State immunity in civil claims for torture committed abroad. Principle: procedural immunity can block a remedy even for a jus cogens violation.

Key point

Learn Furundzija, Pinochet, Arrest Warrant and Al-Adsani as a group: the substantive ban on torture stands at the top, but procedural immunity rules may still block a particular remedy.

Case

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004): ICJ advisory opinion, 9 July 2004. (An advisory opinion answers a UN organ's legal question; not a binding judgment between parties, but of great authority.) Held: the wall Israel was building in occupied territory was contrary to international law; the obligations violated included obligations erga omnes, namely respect for the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and certain obligations of humanitarian law. Principle: all States must not recognise the illegal situation nor assist in maintaining it.

Reservations to Human Rights Treaties

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Key point

Reservation (Article 2, Vienna Convention): a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, by which a State joining a treaty seeks to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions for itself. Because of "however phrased or named", calling a reservation a declaration does not escape the rules.

Ordinary treatiesHuman rights treaties
Exchange benefits between StatesCreate duties owed to individuals
Reservations work on reciprocity: if one State limits its obligation, others may limit theirs towards itReciprocity fails: if one State refuses to protect free speech, no other State will silence its own citizens in response

Reservations encourage wider participation; the question is how far they are acceptable.

Case

Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951): ICJ advisory opinion, 28 May 1951, seven to five. Held: a State whose reservation is objected to by some parties but not others can still be a party if the reservation is compatible with the Convention's object and purpose; otherwise it cannot. Contracting States in such a convention have no interests of their own, only a common interest in its high purposes. Principle: the object and purpose test, now in Article 19 of the Vienna Convention.

Who decides compatibility?

ApproachPosition
StatesEach State decides by objecting, but States seldom object, so human rights bodies stepped in
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24 (1994)No reservation of the right to torture, enslave, arbitrarily kill or detain, or deny minorities their culture. An invalid reservation is normally severable: the State stays bound without its benefit. The United States, United Kingdom and France objected.
International Law Commission, Guide to Practice on Reservations (2011)Middle path: the author of an invalid reservation is presumed to remain a party without its benefit, unless it has shown a contrary intention
Case

Belilos v. Switzerland (1988): Mrs Belilos was fined by a Lausanne municipal police board for joining an unauthorised demonstration, with no full court review of the facts. Switzerland had ratified the European Convention with an interpretative declaration narrowing Article 6 (fair trial). Held (29 April 1988): the declaration was in substance a reservation, invalid as general in character and lacking the required statement of the law concerned; Switzerland was bound by Article 6 without it, and there was a violation. Principle: substance, not label, decides what is a reservation, and the State stays bound without an invalid one.

Case

Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections) (1995): Turkey accepted the European Court's jurisdiction with territorial restrictions effectively excluding northern Cyprus. Held (23 March 1995): the restrictions were struck out as invalid while Turkey's acceptance stood; the Convention is a constitutional instrument of European public order. Principle: a State cannot choose where it accepts supervision.

Key point

Reservations are acceptable only if compatible with the treaty's object and purpose, and human rights bodies increasingly decide this themselves and sever invalid ones.

The Common Law of Human Rights

Human Rights Law also grows through interpretation: courts, treaty bodies and expert committees borrow each other's reasoning, building a common law of human rights or jus commune (a law common to many systems). The European Court drives it by treating its Convention as a living instrument read in present-day conditions and insisting that rights be practical and effective, not theoretical or illusory, balanced by a margin of appreciation leaving States some room to strike the balance locally.

Case

Golder v. United Kingdom (1975): Mr Golder, a prisoner accused by a prison officer of involvement in a prison disturbance was refused permission by the Home Secretary to consult a solicitor to sue the officer for libel. The Convention does not expressly mention a right of access to a court. Held (21 February 1975): the right is inherent in Article 6, since fair trial guarantees are worthless if a person cannot start a case; the Court applied the Vienna Convention's interpretation rules as generally accepted principles of international law. Principle: implied rights can be read in to make a treaty effective, and a prisoner keeps them.

Case

Demir and Baykara v. Turkey (2008): Turkish courts annulled a municipal civil servants' union's collective agreement with a municipality, holding the union lacked capacity; the applicants were a member and the president of the union. Held (Grand Chamber, 12 November 2008, unanimously): violations of Article 11 (freedom of association); collective bargaining is now an essential element of the right to form and join trade unions. Principle: the Court defines Convention rights in light of other international instruments and their interpretation by competent bodies showing common ground in modern societies, even if the respondent State has not ratified them all.

Case

National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. United Kingdom (2014): British law bans secondary strikes (in support of workers at another employer), a ban criticised by ILO experts and the European Committee of Social Rights. Held (8 April 2014): secondary action falls within Article 11, but the ban was justified given the wide margin of appreciation in social and economic policy. Principle: expert criticism is relevant but not decisive; borrowing has limits.

Key point

Learn Demir and Baykara and the RMT case as a pair: the first shows the reach of borrowing, the second its limits.

Case

Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (2005): Turkey extradited two Uzbek nationals to Uzbekistan despite the European Court's interim measure asking it not to until the Court examined their case. Held (Grand Chamber, 4 February 2005): interim measures are binding; Turkey violated Article 34, the right of individual application. The Court relied partly on the practice of the ICJ, the Inter-American Court, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture. Principle: cross-fertilisation in its clearest form.

Case

Pretty v. United Kingdom (2002): Mrs Pretty, paralysed by motor neurone disease, was refused a promise that her husband would not be prosecuted for helping her die. Held (29 April 2002): the right to life in Article 2 cannot be read as a right to die, but her end-of-life choice fell within private life under Article 8, which rests on personal autonomy; the ban on assisted suicide was justified to protect vulnerable people. Principle: autonomy falls within private life but may be limited to protect the vulnerable.

Case

Common Cause v. Union of India (2018): the Supreme Court of India, on 9 March 2018, discussed Pretty. Held: passive euthanasia and advance directives (living wills) are part of the right to die with dignity under Article 21. Principle: an idea like autonomy travels from one court to another.

Case

Cadder v. Her Majesty's Advocate (2010): Scottish suspects detained by police had no right to a lawyer before or during questioning; Peter Cadder was convicted on admissions made in such an interview. In Salduz v. Turkey (2008) the European Court had held that access to a lawyer should normally be given from the first police interrogation. Held (Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, 26 October 2010, unanimously): relying on such admissions violated Article 6. Within three days the Scottish Parliament passed emergency legislation giving suspects a right to legal advice. Principle: a Strasbourg decision about Turkey changed Scottish criminal procedure.

Case

Defence for Children International v. Belgium (2012): decision of an expert body, the European Committee of Social Rights, which supervises the European Social Charter. Foreign children in Belgium, many unlawfully present, were left homeless and without food, schooling or medical care as the reception system was full. The Charter's Appendix limits protection to foreigners lawfully resident. Held (merits, 23 October 2012): violations of the children's rights to social, legal and economic protection, to special protection against physical and moral dangers, and to health; these are indispensable for children's life, integrity and dignity, so the Appendix cannot be used to deny them. Principle: expert bodies also develop the law by reading texts in the light of dignity.

UN treaty bodies issue General Comments explaining their treaties: not binding like judgments, but treated as authoritative guidance.

Case

Diallo case (2010): Held: the ICJ said it should give great weight to the Human Rights Committee's interpretation. Principle: treaty-body interpretation carries authority even before the ICJ.

Key point

Criticism: should judges and experts expand obligations States never expressly accepted? A good answer mentions both sides.

The Generations of Human Rights

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (33:09)

In the late 1970s the jurist Karel Vasak proposed three generations of rights, matching the French revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity.

GenerationRightsExamplesLabel
First (liberty)Civil and politicalLife, freedom from torture, liberty, fair trial, privacy, religion, expression, the vote"Negative": mainly ask the State not to interfere
Second (equality)Economic, social and culturalWork, fair wages, social security, food, housing, health, education"Positive": need State action and resources
Third (fraternity)Collective or solidaritySelf-determination, development, peace, a healthy environmentSolidarity rights

The two Covenants of 1966 contain the first two generations. The General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development in 1986 and in 2022 recognised the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. Some now speak of a fourth generation of digital rights.

Key point

A favourite of examiners: the generations idea is only an analytical tool for understanding history, not a ranking; later generations do not replace earlier ones.

  • History is not neat: the ILO protected labour rights (second generation) from 1919, long before most civil rights were protected internationally.
  • Politics: the two separate 1966 Covenants reflected the Cold War; Western States stressed civil rights, socialist States social rights.
  • Labels are too simple: a fair trial needs courts, judges and legal aid; the right to health also requires the State not to interfere.
Case

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation: Held: the Supreme Court read the right to livelihood into the right to life. Principle: Indian law shows the interdependence of rights.

Likewise, education became a fundamental right in Article 21A through an amendment of 2002 that took effect only in 2010.

Example

Prince, a daily wage labourer, can vote, but if he cannot read and his family is hungry, his vote gives him little real power; he also needs education and food. If a project floods his village without consultation, he needs the rights to development and a healthy environment. Farhan wants to protest peacefully because the ration shop cheats the villagers; he needs freedom of speech and assembly to secure the right to food.

Key point

Dignity is the root, the generations are the branches, and the tree is one.

Unit Two: Jurisdiction and State Responsibility

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Unit Two deals with the application and restriction of human rights law. It asks two practical questions: when is a State responsible for a violation, and when may a State lawfully restrict a right?

The notion of jurisdiction

  • Article 2, ICCPR — each State undertakes to respect and ensure the Covenant rights to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.
  • Article 1, European Convention on Human Rights — States must secure the Convention rights to everyone within their jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is the gateway: if a person is not within a State's jurisdiction, that State's treaty duties towards the person do not arise.

Key point

Here jurisdiction does not mean the power to make laws or the power of a court. It means a relationship of power and control between the State and a person or a place.

When is a State responsible?

Under the International Law Commission's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001), a State commits a wrongful act when conduct attributable to it breaches an international obligation.

  • Conduct of any State organ (police, army, court) is attributable to the State, even when the officer exceeds authority.
  • Private conduct is attributable when done on the State's instructions or under its direction or control.
Example

A constable tortures a suspect against the orders of his superiors. The State is still responsible.

Territorial and extraterritorial jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is primarily territorial; a State is presumed to have jurisdiction over its whole territory. It can also exist abroad in two main situations:

Spatial modelPersonal model
Effective control over an areaAuthority and control of State agents over a person
e.g. a State's army occupies part of another countrye.g. officials arrest someone abroad
Example

If a State's police torture Prince inside that State, the case is territorial. If that State's agents kidnap Farhan from a neighbouring country and beat him in their vehicle, the State is still responsible, because its agents held him in their power.

Case

Assanidze v. Georgia (2004) — territorial presumption. Mr Assanidze, a former mayor in the Ajarian Autonomous Republic (a region of Georgia), pardoned by the President for one offence and acquitted of another by the Supreme Court of Georgia, was kept in custody by the local Ajarian authorities; Georgia said it could not control the region. Held (Grand Chamber, 8 April 2004): Georgia was responsible — a State is presumed to have jurisdiction over all its territory, and difficulty in controlling a local authority does not remove responsibility. Liberty and fair trial violated; for the first time the Court ordered a specific measure — release at the earliest possible date.

Case

Loizidou v. Turkey (merits, 1996) — spatial model. Mrs Loizidou, a Greek Cypriot, owned land in Kyrenia, northern Cyprus, and could not reach it after the Turkish military intervention of 1974; Turkey argued the area was administered by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, not by Turkey. Held (18 December 1996): given the large number of Turkish troops on active duty, the Turkish army exercised effective overall control over northern Cyprus, so Turkey was responsible without proof that it controlled every policy of the local administration. The continuing denial of access violated Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (peaceful enjoyment of possessions). Principle: effective overall control of an area brings it within the State's jurisdiction.

Case

Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay (1981) — personal model, before the Human Rights Committee (independent experts, not a court; it adopts views, not judgments). Mr Lopez Burgos, a Uruguayan trade unionist living in Argentina was abducted in Buenos Aires in 1976 by Uruguayan security forces, ill-treated and secretly taken back to Uruguay, which argued the Covenant covers only its territory. Held (views of 29 July 1981): it would be unconscionable to read the Covenant as permitting a State to commit violations on another State's territory that it could not commit on its own. Principle: a State answers for what its agents do abroad.

Case

The Wall Advisory Opinion (ICJ, 9 July 2004). Relying on the Human Rights Committee's practice, the ICJ held that the ICCPR applies to acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory, and that the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Rights of the Child applied in the territory Israel occupied. Principle: human rights treaties follow a State's power beyond its borders.

Case

Ocalan v. Turkey (2005). Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), was handed over by Kenyan officials to Turkish officials inside an aircraft at Nairobi airport in 1999, flown to Turkey and sentenced to death. Held (Grand Chamber, 12 May 2005): from the moment of handover he was under Turkish authority and so within Turkey's jurisdiction, though abroad. His trial was unfair, and imposing a death sentence after an unfair trial was inhuman treatment under Article 3. By then Turkey had abolished the death penalty in peacetime and his sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment.

Case

Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom (2011) — the leading modern case. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United Kingdom took charge of security in south-east Iraq, around Basra. Six Iraqi civilians died — five in British security operations, and Baha Mousa after a beating in British custody; British courts accepted jurisdiction only over the death in custody. Held (Grand Chamber, 7 July 2011): having assumed public powers normally exercised by a sovereign government, in particular security, the United Kingdom's soldiers exercised authority and control over all six, who were within its jurisdiction. The procedural duty under Article 2 was violated in five cases, as investigations were not independent and effective. Principle: Convention rights can be divided and tailored abroad, not all or nothing.

Case

Jaloud v. Netherlands (2014). In April 2004, at a checkpoint in Iraq commanded by a Dutch officer (Dutch troops serving in a multinational force under British command), shots killed a car passenger, Azhar Sabah Jaloud. Held (Grand Chamber, 20 November 2014): the Netherlands kept full command over its troops and exercised authority and control over persons passing the checkpoint, so the death was within its jurisdiction; the defective investigation violated Article 2's procedural duty. Principle: acting within a coalition does not avoid jurisdiction.

Economic, social and cultural rights abroad: the Maastricht Principles

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has no jurisdiction clause; its Article 2 asks States to act individually and through international assistance and co-operation. In September 2011, experts meeting in Maastricht adopted the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (food, water, health, housing). A State must respect, protect and fulfil these rights:

  1. where it exercises authority or effective control;
  2. where its acts or omissions have foreseeable effects on these rights, inside or outside its territory;
  3. where it can exercise decisive influence.

They are not a treaty but an expert restatement — persuasive soft law.

Example

A rich country allows the export of a pesticide banned at home, and it poisons farmers abroad.

Key point

Jurisdiction in one line: a State is responsible for everyone on its territory, and outside it for areas it effectively controls and for persons its agents hold in their power.

The Obligations to Respect, Protect and Fulfil

The Norwegian expert Asbjorn Eide developed this three-layer typology in his United Nations work on the right to food in the 1980s. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted it in General Comment No. 12 on the right to food (1999).

DutyMeaning
RespectThe State itself must not interfere — the police must not torture; the State must not bulldoze homes arbitrarily.
ProtectThe State must prevent third parties (employers, companies, landlords, violent family members) from violating rights — make laws, investigate, punish, provide remedies.
FulfilThe State must take positive steps so people can actually enjoy the right: it facilitates (land reform, irrigation) and provides directly when people cannot help themselves (rations during a famine).
Example

Right to housing. The municipality demolishes Prince's hut at night without notice — failure to respect. A builder's hired men threaten Farhan to leave his rented room and the police refuse to register his complaint — failure to protect. Floods destroy a village and the State has no shelter plan at all — failure to fulfil.

The pattern applies to civil rights too: the right to life requires the police not to kill unlawfully, the State to protect people from killers, and the State to train the police and run working courts. The Indian Constitution reflects it: Part III mostly stops the State from interfering, the Directive Principles push it to provide, and the Supreme Court has read positive duties into Article 21.

Emergencies and Derogation

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (48:25)

Key point

Derogation: during a serious public emergency, a State may temporarily depart from some of its human rights obligations, but only under strict legal conditions.

Conditions under Article 4, ICCPR

  1. A public emergency which threatens the life of the nation,
  2. officially proclaimed;
  3. measures only as far as strictly required by the exigencies of the situation;
  4. no conflict with the State's other obligations under international law;
  5. no discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin;
  6. the State must immediately inform the other parties, through the UN Secretary-General, of the provisions suspended and the reasons.

Non-derogable rights

Article 4 lists rights that can never be suspended: the right to life; freedom from torture and ill-treatment; freedom from slavery; freedom from imprisonment for inability to fulfil a contract; freedom from retroactive criminal law; recognition as a person before the law; and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

General Comment No. 29 (2001) of the Human Rights Committee added guarantees that cannot be set aside in practice — e.g. humane treatment of detainees, the ban on hostage-taking and unacknowledged detention, and the right to challenge detention before a court.

Article 15, European Convention allows derogation in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation, but never from the right to life (except deaths from lawful acts of war), or from the bans on torture, slavery and retroactive punishment.

Derogation, restriction and absolute rights

DerogationRestriction (limitation)Absolute right
Exceptional, temporary suspension of obligations during a proclaimed emergencyOrdinary part of a qualified right, allowed even in peaceful times — e.g. limiting speech to protect someone's reputationCannot be restricted or suspended at all — the ban on torture is the clearest example
Key point

Examiners often test the difference between derogation, restriction and an absolute right. Remember also that non-derogable does not always mean absolute. Freedom of religion is non-derogable under the ICCPR, yet the manifestation of religion can be limited in ordinary times under Article 18(3).

Case

Piskin v. Turkey (2020) — derogation is not a blank cheque. After the July 2016 coup attempt, Turkey declared an emergency and derogated under Article 15. Mr Piskin, an expert at a public development agency in Ankara, was dismissed by emergency decree for alleged terrorist links, without individual reasons or a real chance to reply, though prosecutors had decided not to prosecute him. Held (15 December 2020): the emergency was genuine, but the measure was not strictly required — no adversarial procedure, no real judicial scrutiny; fair hearing and private life violated. Principle: even under a valid derogation, each measure must be necessary, and basic procedural safeguards survive.

India's experience

During the Emergency of June 1975, thousands were detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), and a Presidential order suspended the right to move courts to enforce Articles 14, 21 and 22.

Case

Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976). Held (April 1976, 4:1): detenus could not seek habeas corpus while the order lasted. Justice H.R. Khanna dissented: even without Article 21, the State cannot deprive a person of life or liberty without the authority of law. In 2017 the leading opinion in the Puttaswamy privacy judgment declared the majority overruled.

The Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 responded. Under Article 359, enforcement of Articles 20 and 21 cannot now be suspended in any emergency. An internal emergency can now be proclaimed only for armed rebellion.

The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Non-Refoulement

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (53:29)

Article 7, ICCPR and Article 3, European Convention prohibit torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Article 2, Convention against Torture: no exceptional circumstances whatsoever — war, threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency — may justify torture; nor may an order from a superior officer.

TortureInhuman treatmentDegrading treatment
Deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering, usually for a purpose such as extracting a confessionCauses intense physical or mental sufferingHumiliates or debases a person

All three are prohibited absolutely.

Non-refoulement

Key point

Non-refoulement (no forced return): a State must not send a person to a country where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person faces a real risk of torture or ill-treatment.

Case

Soering v. United Kingdom (1989). Extradition to face death row in the United States. The European Court first applied the non-refoulement idea here.

Case

Chahal v. United Kingdom (1996) — Indian connection. Karamjit Singh Chahal, an Indian citizen and Sikh separatist activist living in Britain since the early 1970s, was the subject of a 1990 decision of the British Government to deport him to India on national security grounds; he argued he would face torture by the police in Punjab. Britain obtained assurances from the Government of India. Held (Grand Chamber, 15 November 1996, 12 to 7): deportation would violate Article 3. The prohibition being absolute, the person's activities, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be weighed against the risk; the assurances were insufficient given evidence of serious abuses by security forces in Punjab then. He also could not effectively challenge his long detention and deportation before an independent court — Britain then created the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. Principle: national security never justifies sending a person to face torture.

Case

Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom (2012) — assurances can suffice. A Jordanian cleric convicted in his absence in Jordan of terrorist offences; the United Kingdom signed a memorandum of understanding with Jordan containing detailed assurances monitored by an independent body. Held (17 January 2012): the assurances were specific and reliable enough — no Article 3 violation. But, for the first time in an expulsion case, deportation would violate Article 6 owing to a real risk of a flagrant denial of justice: evidence obtained by torturing others could be used at his retrial. He was deported in July 2013, after a new treaty between the two countries dealt with this, and later acquitted in Jordan.

Key point

Learn Chahal and Othman as a pair: assurances are judged on their quality and on the record of the receiving State.

Expulsion of Aliens

An alien is a foreign national. Under Article 13, ICCPR, an alien lawfully in a State's territory may be expelled only by a decision reached in accordance with law. Unless compelling reasons of national security require otherwise, the alien must be allowed to submit reasons against expulsion, to have the case reviewed by a competent authority, and to be represented. The European system also bans collective expulsion of aliens.

Above these procedural guarantees stands the stronger rule of non-refoulement:

Refugee Convention, 1951Ban on return to torture
Protects refugees from return to persecutionProtects any person facing a real risk of torture
Exceptions: a refugee who is a danger to national security, or who has been convicted of a particularly serious crime and is a danger to the communityNo exception

India's position

  • Not a party to the Refugee Convention.
  • On joining the ICCPR, India declared that it reserves the right to apply its own law relating to foreigners in respect of Article 13. That law is now mainly the Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025, in force from 1 September 2025, which replaced the Foreigners Act, 1946 and three older laws.
  • Foreigners enjoy Article 14 (equality) and Article 21 (life and personal liberty), but not the right to reside and settle under Article 19, which belongs only to citizens.
Case

Mohammad Salimullah v. Union of India (2021). Rohingya refugees detained in Jammu. Held (April 2021): the Supreme Court declined to stop their deportation but directed that they should not be deported unless the procedure prescribed for deportation was followed.

Limitations on Rights: Legality, Legitimacy and Necessity

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:00:29)

Most rights are qualified rights that the State may limit in ordinary times — privacy, manifestation of religion, expression, peaceful assembly, association, movement. Every limitation must pass a three-part test:

  1. Legality — provided by law; the law must be accessible and precise enough for a person to foresee its consequences. A vague law, or one giving officials unlimited discretion, fails.
  2. Legitimacy — a legitimate aim listed in the treaty: national security, public order, public health or morals, or the rights and reputations of others.
  3. Necessity — necessary in a democratic society: meets a pressing social need and is proportionate, i.e. the least restrictive measure that works, striking a fair balance between the individual and the community.
Key point

The burden of justifying a restriction always lies on the State.

General Comment No. 34 (2011), Human Rights Committee

Explains Article 19, ICCPR (freedom of opinion and expression):

  • Freedom of opinion permits no restriction at all.
  • Expression may be restricted only if the three conditions are met; restrictions must never put the right itself in jeopardy. The relation between right and restriction, norm and exception, must not be reversed.
  • Laws must be precise and must not confer unfettered discretion.
  • Imprisonment is never an appropriate penalty for defamation; blasphemy laws are generally incompatible with the Covenant.
  • Unlike the European Court, the Committee uses no margin of appreciation; it makes its own assessment of necessity.

Indian law

Article 19(2) allows only reasonable restrictions on speech on listed grounds.

Case

Puttaswamy (privacy judgment, 2017). Held: any intrusion into privacy must satisfy legality, a legitimate aim and proportionality. Principle: Indian law speaks a language similar to the international three-part test.

Case

Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020). Internet shutdowns in Jammu and Kashmir. Held (January 2020): applying proportionality, such orders must be published, must not be indefinite, and must be open to review.

Case

S.A.S. v. France (2014). A young French Muslim woman who wore the burqa and niqab by choice challenged France's 2010 ban on concealing the face in public places. Held (Grand Chamber, 1 July 2014, 15 to 2): public safety failed, as a blanket ban was not necessary; gender equality and dignity could not justify banning a practice women themselves defend. But respect for the minimum requirements of life in society — "living together" — was accepted as protecting the rights and freedoms of others, and with a wide margin of appreciation there was no violation of private life or religion. The two dissenters found "living together" far too vague.

Case

Human Rights Committee views on the French face-covering ban (2018). On complaints by two French women fined under the same law, views adopted in July 2018 found violations of freedom of religion and equality under the ICCPR. The Committee was not persuaded by security or living together, and noted that the ban hit Muslim women disproportionately.

European Court (S.A.S., 2014)Human Rights Committee (2018)
No violationViolation of religion and equality
Accepted "living together"; wide margin of appreciationRejected security and living together; noted disproportionate impact
Binding judgmentViews not formally binding
Key point

A court and a treaty body reached opposite results on the same law: the necessity test is not mechanical.

Case

Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom (2003). Residents near Heathrow said night flights under a 1993 government scheme disturbed their sleep, violating private life and home (Article 8); a Chamber agreed in 2001. Held (Grand Chamber, 8 July 2003): no Article 8 violation (12 to 5) — the Government had studied the problem, consulted the public and weighed the economic importance of night flights; social and economic policy attracts a wide margin of appreciation. But Article 13 was violated (16 to 1), as English courts then could not examine whether the scheme was a justified restriction. Principle: necessity also means fair balance and fair procedure.

Checklist for problem questions

  1. Was the person within the State's jurisdiction?
  2. Which duty — respect, protect or fulfil?
  3. Is the right absolute (like the ban on torture), so no justification is possible?
  4. Has the State validly derogated during a real emergency?
  5. If the right is qualified: is the restriction provided by law, aimed at a legitimate aim, and necessary and proportionate?
Example

The police ban every protest by Farhan and his neighbours against a new factory, citing public order. Ask whether a law authorises the ban and whether public order is really at risk; then whether a smaller step, such as fixing the route or timing of the march, would have been enough.

Unit Three: The United Nations and Human Rights

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:05:43)

Unit Three covers the international human rights framework and implementation mechanisms: who watches over human rights at the international level, and how. Rights written on paper need machinery to make them real.

  • The UN Charter placed human rights among the purposes of the Organization.
  • Article 13 — the General Assembly may make recommendations on human rights.
  • Articles 55 and 56 — members pledge joint and separate action.
  • Article 68 — the Economic and Social Council was to set up a human rights commission.
  • Article 2(7) — the UN may not intervene in matters essentially within a State's domestic jurisdiction. Governments long used it as a shield; today serious violations are accepted as a matter of international concern.

The General Assembly adopts declarations and treaties; the Security Council can act when violations threaten peace (as when it created the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda); the ICJ decides disputes between States.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Drafting and adoption

In 1946 the Economic and Social Council created the Commission on Human Rights, chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt (United States). In the drafting group, John Humphrey (Canada), head of the UN human rights division, prepared the first draft; René Cassin (France) gave it its structure; Peng Chun Chang (China) and Charles Malik (Lebanon) shaped its philosophy. India's delegate Hansa Mehta replaced "all men are born free and equal" with "all human beings", so that women would not be left out.

Adopted by the General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 by 48 votes to none, with 8 abstentions (the Soviet Union and five other socialist States, Saudi Arabia and South Africa) — hence Human Rights Day on 10 December. Its purpose: to give meaning to the Charter's promise by setting a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.

Structure

A Preamble followed by 30 Articles:

ArticlesContent
1–2Foundations: equal dignity; all rights without distinction of any kind
3–21Civil and political: life, liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, equality before law, fair hearing, privacy, movement, asylum, nationality, marriage, property, religion, expression, assembly, participation in government
22–27Economic, social and cultural: social security, work, rest, adequate standard of living, education, cultural life
28–30A just social and international order; duties of every person to the community; limits on rights

Article 29 allows only limitations determined by law, for respecting the rights of others and meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

  • A General Assembly resolution, not a treaty — not binding when adopted. Eleanor Roosevelt told the Assembly it was not a treaty or a statement of legal obligation, but might become an international Magna Carta for all people everywhere.
  • States treat it as the authoritative interpretation of the Charter's human rights provisions.
  • The Proclamation of Teheran (1968) declared that it constitutes an obligation for the members of the international community.
  • Many provisions — bans on torture, slavery and arbitrary detention — now reflect customary international law.
Case

Tehran Hostages case (ICJ, 1980). Wrongfully depriving human beings of their freedom in conditions of hardship is manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter and the fundamental principles of the Universal Declaration.

With the two Covenants of 1966 and their protocols, the UDHR forms the International Bill of Human Rights. It inspired regional treaties and many national constitutions, and Indian courts use it.

Case

Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das (2000). Railway employees gang-raped a Bangladeshi woman in a railway building at Howrah station. Held (January 2000): compensation of 10 lakh rupees upheld; Article 21 protects every person, including a foreign national; the Court relied on the principles of the Universal Declaration.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

  • Recommended by the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna (1993); post created by the General Assembly on 20 December 1993.
  • Appointed by the Secretary-General with General Assembly approval, for four years, renewable once.
  • First: José Ayala Lasso (Ecuador), from 1994. Present: Volker Türk (Austria), in office since October 2022; in July 2026 the General Assembly approved his reappointment for a second term.

The OHCHR, part of the UN Secretariat in Geneva, is the main UN human rights office. It serves the Human Rights Council, the treaty bodies and the Special Procedures; runs field offices; helps governments (drafting laws, training police); supports national human rights institutions; and the High Commissioner speaks publicly about violations anywhere.

Key point

Limits: the High Commissioner cannot bind any State or punish anyone. The Office persuades, reports and assists, and depends heavily on voluntary funding.

From the Commission on Human Rights to the Human Rights Council

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:12:45)

The Commission on Human Rights (1946–2006)

  • A body of the Economic and Social Council, with 53 member States by the end; drafted the UDHR and the two Covenants.
  • At first declared it had no power to act on complaints. ECOSOC Resolution 1235 (1967) allowed public debate on gross violations; Resolution 1503 (1970) created a confidential complaint procedure. It also created the first Special Procedures.
  • Criticised for politicisation and selectivity, and because States with poor records joined it to shield themselves. Last session: March 2006.

The Human Rights Council

  • Created by General Assembly resolution of 15 March 2006 (170 to 4, 3 abstentions); a subsidiary body of the General Assembly, based in Geneva.
  • 47 members, elected directly and individually by secret ballot by a majority of all GA members. Seats: Africa 13, Asia-Pacific 13, Eastern Europe 6, Latin America and Caribbean 8, Western Europe and others 7.
  • Three-year terms; no immediate re-election after two consecutive terms.
  • The GA, by two-thirds majority, may suspend a member committing gross and systematic violations — Libya (2011), Russia (2022).
  • At least three sessions a year, no less than ten weeks; special sessions on urgent situations.
  • Politics persists: the United States announced its withdrawal in February 2025.

Main tools: the Universal Periodic Review; the Special Procedures; an Advisory Committee of experts; a confidential complaint procedure for consistent patterns of gross violations; and commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions (e.g. Syria, Myanmar).

Human Rights CouncilHuman Rights Committee
Political body of 47 governmentsBody of 18 independent experts
Created by the General AssemblyCreated by the ICCPR to supervise that treaty
Think: governments and politicsThink: experts and a treaty
Key point

Confusing the Council with the Committee costs marks: they are completely different bodies.

The Universal Periodic Review

The UPR is the Council's most original invention: every UN member State, big or small, has its whole human rights record reviewed by other States once every cycle of about four to five years — like a class where every student's report card is discussed openly by classmates. Standards: the Charter, the UDHR, treaties ratified, voluntary pledges and applicable humanitarian law.

Procedure

  1. Three documents: a national report; a compilation of UN information by the OHCHR; a summary of stakeholder information (NGOs, national human rights institutions).
  2. Review in a Working Group of the 47 Council members; any UN member may speak.
  3. Three States chosen by lot — the troika — act as rapporteurs.
  4. After an interactive dialogue, States make recommendations; the State under review supports or notes each.
  5. The Council adopts the outcome in plenary; the next cycle focuses on what the State actually did.

India has been reviewed four times — 2008, 2012, 2017 and 10 November 2022; its next review falls in the fifth cycle.

StrengthsWeaknesses
Universality, equal treatment, peer pressureRecommendations not binding; friendly States praise each other; many recommendations vague

It is best seen as a regular public conversation that builds pressure over time.

The Special Procedures

Independent human rights experts appointed by the Council to examine a theme or a country: Special Rapporteurs, Independent Experts, and Working Groups of five (one from each region). In 2026 there were more than fifty mandates, mostly thematic (torture, freedom of expression, arbitrary detention, adequate housing, privacy), some on particular countries. Mandate holders serve in a personal capacity, are unpaid, and serve a maximum of six years.

  1. Country visits, only with the State's consent. India extended a standing invitation to the thematic Special Procedures in 2011.
  2. Communications to governments on individual cases or laws, including urgent appeals where a person faces imminent harm.
  3. Thematic studies and annual reports to the Council.

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention even gives opinions on whether a particular detention is arbitrary. Findings are not binding but bring facts into the open.

The Treaty Bodies and State Reporting

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:18:59)

Each core treaty has a treaty body of independent experts elected by the States parties, serving in a personal capacity, not as government representatives. There are ten: the Human Rights Committee; the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture; and the committees on economic, social and cultural rights; racial discrimination; discrimination against women; torture; rights of the child; migrant workers; persons with disabilities; and enforced disappearances.

Task 1: State reporting

  1. Initial report soon after joining, then periodic reports on how the State gives effect to the treaty.
  2. Often a list of issues in advance.
  3. NGOs and national human rights institutions send shadow reports.
  4. Public constructive dialogue with a government delegation in Geneva.
  5. Concluding observations — positive steps, concerns, recommendations; some followed up after a year or two.

Problems: overdue reports, heavy backlog, weak follow-up — but it gives civil society a powerful platform.

Task 2: Interpretation

General Comments (called General Recommendations by the committees on women and racial discrimination) explain treaty provisions — e.g. the Human Rights Committee's General Comment on the right to life; the women's committee's General Recommendation that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination.

Individual Communications

Task 3 is deciding individual complaints (communications) — possible only if the State has accepted the procedure, by ratifying an Optional Protocol (e.g. the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR) or by a declaration (e.g. Article 22, Convention against Torture).

Admissibility: domestic remedies exhausted; complaint not anonymous; same matter not under examination in another international procedure. The procedure is written; the committee may request interim measures (e.g. no deportation while pending); finally it adopts views on violation and may recommend a remedy.

Are views binding? Not like a court judgment. But General Comment No. 33 (2008) says they show important characteristics of a judicial decision — reached in a judicial spirit by independent members, an authoritative determination by the body the Covenant established — so States must consider them in good faith.

Key point

India has not accepted any individual complaint procedure, so a person in India cannot complain against India before these committees.

Two other procedures: some treaties allow a committee to inquire on its own into grave or systematic violations; some allow inter-State complaints, which States rarely use.

International Human Rights Courts and Their Effectiveness

There is no world court of human rights. Globally only the ICJ decides legal disputes, only between States, and hears human rights disputes when a treaty gives it jurisdiction.

Case

Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (ICJ, 2007). Held: Serbia violated its duties to prevent and punish genocide at Srebrenica.

Case

Belgium v. Senegal (ICJ, 20 July 2012). Senegal was ordered to prosecute former Chadian president Hissène Habré under the Convention against Torture, or else extradite him. Senegal set up special chambers with the African Union, which convicted Habré in 2016.

Case

The Gambia v. Myanmar (ICJ), concerning the Rohingya: provisional measures ordered in 2020; merits heard in January 2026.

The International Criminal Court tries individuals for crimes such as genocide; it is not a human rights court.

Real human rights courts are regional: the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. Their effectiveness depends on:

FactorPosition
Binding forceJudgments legally binding, unlike treaty-body views
ComplianceSupervised by a political body in Europe; by the Court itself in the Americas
RemediesEurope: usually compensation. Americas: wide reparations — public apologies, memorials, changes in law
AccessEurope: individuals go directly. Americas: first to the Inter-American Commission
Workload and resistanceTens of thousands of pending cases in Europe; some judgments unimplemented for years; some States have left the system

Yet these courts have changed laws on torture, detention, privacy, amnesty and discrimination across two continents.

The European System

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:24:46)

  • Council of Europe: founded 1949, separate from the European Union, 46 member States.
  • European Convention on Human Rights: signed in Rome, 4 November 1950; in force 1953. Originally a European Commission of Human Rights filtered complaints, and individual petition and the Court's jurisdiction were optional.
  • Protocol No. 11 (in force 1998): a single full-time Court with compulsory jurisdiction, to which individuals apply directly.

The Strasbourg Court

  • One judge per member State, elected by the Parliamentary Assembly for a single nine-year term.
  • Formations: single judge (rejects clearly inadmissible cases); Committees of three (routine cases); Chambers of seven (most others); Grand Chamber of seventeen (most serious).
  • Admissibility: application within four months of the final domestic decision (reduced from six by Protocol No. 15, applied since February 2022); domestic remedies exhausted; significant disadvantage.
  • Article 41: just satisfaction. Article 46: States must abide by final judgments; the Committee of Ministers supervises execution.
  • Pilot judgments for systemic problems, requiring general reforms.
  • Protocol No. 16 (in force 2018): highest national courts may request advisory opinions, which are not binding.

Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe in March 2022 and ceased to be a party to the Convention in September 2022. The European Social Charter is supervised by the European Committee of Social Rights — an expert body, not a court — which examines State reports and, under a 1995 protocol, collective complaints from trade unions and NGOs.

Key point

Do not confuse the Strasbourg Court with the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg, which interprets European Union law.

The Inter-American System

  • The Organization of American States adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man in May 1948, some months before the UDHR.
  • Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: created 1959, based in Washington, seven members; receives individual petitions against all OAS member States, makes country visits, publishes reports.
  • American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José): signed 1969, in force 1978; created the Inter-American Court in San José, Costa Rica, with seven judges.
  • Contentious jurisdiction only over States that accept it; only States parties and the Commission can bring cases — individuals cannot go directly.
  • The United States and Canada are not parties to the Convention.
Case

Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras (1988) — the Court's foundational judgment (29 July 1988). Manfredo Velásquez, a university student, was abducted in Honduras in 1981 by armed men connected with the armed forces and never seen again. Held: Honduras was responsible for his enforced disappearance (life, humane treatment, personal liberty). Principle: the duty to ensure requires the State to prevent, investigate and punish violations and provide reparation; even an act of an unidentified private person engages the State if it fails to act with due diligence to prevent or respond — the duty to protect in its clearest form.

Case

Barrios Altos v. Peru (2001). Held: amnesty laws blocking investigation of serious violations have no legal effect.

Case

Almonacid Arellano v. Chile (2006). Developed conventionality control: national judges must set aside domestic laws that conflict with the Convention as interpreted by the Court.

Advisory opinions include those of 2017 on the environment and human rights and on gender identity and same-sex couples, and one made public in July 2025 on the climate emergency and human rights.

The African System

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981, in force 1986) protects individual rights and also peoples' rights, such as the right to development, and lists the duties of individuals. It is supervised by the African Commission and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (protocol in force 2004). Asia, including South Asia, has no regional human rights court.

Key point

Declarations set standards; councils and reviews create political pressure; treaty bodies interpret and assess; courts decide with binding force. A strong human rights system uses all four together.

The Core International Human Rights Treaties

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:31:19)

Beyond the machinery of supervision lie the main treaties themselves, and discrimination, the violation that cuts across all of them.

The United Nations recognises nine core human rights treaties, each supervised by its own committee. Five are studied closely here:

  • the two Covenants of 1966 (ICCPR and ICESCR);
  • the convention on women (CEDAW);
  • the convention on the child (CRC);
  • the convention against torture (CAT).

Two more are added later: the convention on racial discrimination (ICERD), and the Genocide Convention, which is not one of the nine and has no committee of its own.

Key point

For every treaty, ask four questions: (1) What does it deal with? (2) What rights does it protect? (3) What must States do? (4) Who monitors it?

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)

  • Adopted: by the General Assembly on 16 December 1966.
  • In force: 23 March 1976.
  • Rights protected: the classic civil and political rights, such as life, freedom from torture and slavery, liberty and fair trial; also privacy, religion, expression, assembly, association, family life, political participation, equality before the law, and the rights of minorities.
  • State obligations (Article 2): each State must respect and ensure these rights without discrimination, adopt the necessary laws, and provide an effective remedy. These obligations are immediate, not progressive.
  • Monitoring: the Human Rights Committee of 18 independent experts.
  • First Optional Protocol (adopted with the Covenant): allows individual communications.
  • Second Optional Protocol (1989): aims at abolishing the death penalty.

India and the ICCPR

India acceded to the ICCPR on 10 April 1979, with some declarations. One of them, which works in effect as a reservation, said that the Indian legal system recognises no enforceable right to compensation for unlawful arrest or detention, which Article 9(5) requires. India has not joined either Optional Protocol.

Case

D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (December 1996): on India's reservation to Article 9(5) of the ICCPR, the Supreme Court observed that the reservation had lost its relevance, because Indian courts themselves award compensation for violations of the right to life. Principle: compensation for violation of the right to life is available in Indian law, despite the reservation.

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)

  • Adopted: on the same day as the ICCPR (16 December 1966).
  • In force: 3 January 1976.
  • Rights protected: work, just conditions of work, forming trade unions, social security; protection of the family; an adequate standard of living including food, clothing and housing; health; education; and taking part in cultural life.
  • Key obligation (Article 2(1)): each State must take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of these rights.

Does progressive realisation allow the State to wait forever?

No. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in General Comment No. 3 (1990), explained that some duties are immediate:

  • the duty not to discriminate is immediate;
  • the duty to take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps is immediate;
  • every State has a minimum core obligation to ensure at least minimum essential levels of each right, such as essential food, primary health care, basic shelter and the most basic education;
  • deliberately backward (retrogressive) steps need the fullest justification.
Key point

Peculiarity of the ICESCR: its Committee of 18 experts was not created by the Covenant itself but by the Economic and Social Council in 1985. An Optional Protocol of 2008, in force since 2013, allows individual communications.

India acceded to this Covenant also in April 1979. Many of its rights appear in the Directive Principles or have been read into Article 21.

PointICCPRICESCR
Adopted16 December 1966Same day
In force23 March 19763 January 1976
Nature of obligationImmediate (Article 2)Progressive realisation to the maximum of available resources (Article 2(1)), with certain immediate duties
Monitoring bodyHuman Rights Committee (18 experts), created by the CovenantCommittee on ESCR (18 experts), created by ECOSOC in 1985
Individual communicationsFirst Optional Protocol (adopted with the Covenant)Optional Protocol of 2008, in force 2013
IndiaAcceded 10 April 1979; not joined either Optional ProtocolAcceded April 1979

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)

Adopted in 1979 and in force from 1981, CEDAW is often called an international bill of rights for women.

Key point

Article 1 – discrimination against women: any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.

Three features of this definition:

  1. The words effect or purpose cover indirect discrimination.
  2. The words any other field reach into private and family life.
  3. The goal is real equality, not only equal laws.

Main obligations

  • Article 2: States must embody equality in their laws and eliminate discrimination by any person, organisation or enterprise.
  • Article 4: allows temporary special measures to speed up real equality.
  • Article 5: requires States to change social and cultural patterns based on stereotyped roles for men and women.
  • Other Articles cover political life, education, employment, health, rural women, equality before the law and, in Article 16, marriage and family.

Monitoring

  • The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has 23 experts.
  • General Recommendation No. 19 (1992) declared that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination; General Recommendation No. 35 (2017) updated it.
  • An Optional Protocol of 1999 allows individual communications and inquiries.

India and CEDAW

India ratified CEDAW on 9 July 1993, with these declarations and reservation:

  • it would apply Article 5(a) and Article 16(1) in conformity with its policy of non-interference in the personal affairs of any community without its initiative and consent;
  • compulsory registration of marriages, though desirable in principle, was not practical in a vast country like India;
  • a reservation to the clause that sends disputes to the ICJ.

India has not joined the Optional Protocol. Yet the Convention has shaped Indian law, most famously in the Vishaka case.

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)

  • Adopted: 20 November 1989; in force: 1990.
  • It is the most widely ratified human rights treaty. The United States is the only member of the United Nations that has not ratified it.
  • Child: every human being below 18 years, unless majority is attained earlier under national law.
  • It protects children against abuse and exploitation, and forbids the death penalty and life imprisonment without possibility of release for offences committed below 18.
  • Its Committee has 18 experts.
  • Two Optional Protocols of 2000 deal with (i) children in armed conflict and (ii) the sale and sexual exploitation of children; a third, of 2011, creates a communications procedure.
Key point

The four general principles of the CRC: (1) non-discrimination; (2) the best interests of the child as a primary consideration; (3) the right to life, survival and development; (4) respect for the views of the child.

India: acceded to the CRC in 1992 and ratified the first two Protocols in 2005. The Juvenile Justice Act of 2015, the POCSO Act and the right to education in Article 21A reflect these commitments.

Convention against Torture (CAT)

The fifth core treaty is the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), adopted in 1984 and in force from 1987. Its definition and duties are discussed below with the Genocide Convention. Three facts to remember:

  • the Committee against Torture of 10 experts monitors it;
  • its Optional Protocol of 2002 created a system of preventive visits to places of detention;
  • India signed the Convention on 14 October 1997, but has still not ratified it.

The Prohibition of Discrimination

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:40:20)

Equality and non-discrimination are not just one right among many; they run through every human rights treaty.

Meaning of discrimination

Key point

Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18 (1989): discrimination means any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the enjoyment by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.

The Committee added an important qualification: not every difference in treatment is discrimination. A difference is lawful if the criteria are reasonable and objective, and if the aim is legitimate under the Covenant.

Example

A pension given only to people above sixty treats people differently by age, but reasonably and objectively, so it is not discrimination.

Where the prohibition is found

InstrumentProvision and scope
UN CharterArticles 1 and 55: human rights for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
UDHRArticle 2: rights for everyone without distinction of any kind; Article 7: equality before the law.
ICCPRArticle 2: forbids discrimination in the enjoyment of the Covenant's own rights; Article 26 goes further.
American Convention on Human RightsArticle 24: equality before the law and equal protection of the law without discrimination.
European ConventionArticle 14: protects against discrimination only in the enjoyment of Convention rights. The complaint must fall within the ambit of another right, although that right need not itself be violated. Protocol No. 12 adds a free-standing ban, but fewer States have ratified it.
CEDAWGives the fullest definition of discrimination for women.

Article 26 of the ICCPR: four distinct duties

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground.

  1. Equality before the law: officials and courts must apply the law equally to everyone.
  2. Equal protection of the law: the content of the law itself must not be discriminatory; this binds the legislature.
  3. Duty to prohibit any discrimination: the State must enact laws forbidding discrimination, including by private actors.
  4. Duty to guarantee equal and effective protection: the State must provide real remedies and enforcement, and sometimes positive measures.

Article 14 of the Indian Constitution uses the same two phrases: equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws.

Case

Broeks v. the Netherlands (views of 9 April 1987) – the leading case on the scope of Article 26. Mrs Broeks, a nurse, lost her job and received unemployment benefits. Under Dutch law, a married woman could keep receiving a certain benefit only if she proved she was the breadwinner of the family; a married man faced no such condition. The Netherlands argued that social security belongs to the other Covenant (ICESCR), not the ICCPR. Held: the Human Rights Committee rejected this argument. Article 26 is an autonomous right. It does not require a State to adopt social security laws, but when a State does adopt them, they must not discriminate. The condition, based on sex and marital status, was not reasonable, so there was a violation. Principle: Article 26 applies to every field regulated by public authorities, not only to the rights listed in the Covenant.

Case

Sprenger v. the Netherlands (views of 31 March 1992). The author lived with an unmarried partner and was refused co-insurance under the partner's health insurance, which the law allowed only for married spouses. Held: no violation. A difference between married and unmarried couples can rest on reasonable and objective criteria, because marriage brings a distinct set of legal rights and duties that the couple chose not to accept. Separate opinion (three members): in the field of social security, Article 26 does not demand absolute equality at every moment; it requires States to review their laws regularly and remove unjustified differences over time.

Key point

Learn Broeks and Sprenger as a pair: not every difference is discrimination, but an unreasonable one always is.

Case

Guido Jacobs v. Belgium (views of 7 July 2004) – positive measures. A Belgian law of 1998 created a High Council of Justice and required that, among the eleven non-judicial members of each of its two colleges, there be at least four members of each sex. The author, a legal officer at the Belgian Council of State, applied for such a seat, was not appointed, and complained that the rule was discriminatory. Held: no violation of Articles 25 and 26. The gender requirement was not a disproportionate restriction on access to public office, and merit still mattered, because every candidate needed long professional experience. Principle: a proportionate measure to ensure a balance of women and men in a public body is compatible with equality.

Formal and Substantive Equality

Formal equalitySubstantive equality
Treating like cases alike and applying the same rule to everyone.Looks at the real situation and the result.
Necessary, but it can hide injustice.Recognises that people start from different positions and that historical disadvantage continues.
Same rule for all, whatever the effect.Sometimes requires different treatment, reasonable accommodation, or special measures.
Example

A college demands the same fee from a rich student and a poor one. The rule is formally equal, yet it may keep the poor student out.

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in General Comment No. 20 (2009), explained that States must eliminate two kinds of discrimination:

  • Formal discrimination – found in laws and policies.
  • Substantive discrimination – exists in practice, especially against groups that suffer historical or persistent prejudice.
Case

Thlimmenos v. Greece (Grand Chamber, 6 April 2000) – this case turned substantive equality into a rule of the European Convention. Mr Thlimmenos, a Jehovah's Witness, refused to wear a military uniform because of his religious beliefs and was convicted of a serious offence. Years later he passed the examination to become a chartered accountant but was refused appointment, because the rules excluded anyone convicted of a serious crime. Held: unanimously, a violation of Article 14 read with the freedom of religion in Article 9. The right not to be discriminated against is also violated when States, without an objective and reasonable justification, fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different. A conviction for refusing a uniform on religious grounds did not show the dishonesty that the rule was meant to exclude. Principle: treating unlike cases alike can itself be discrimination.

Direct and Indirect Discrimination

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:48:29)

Direct discriminationIndirect discrimination
A person is treated less favourably than another in a similar situation because of a prohibited ground.A law, policy or practice looks neutral but has a disproportionate effect on people with a protected characteristic, without objective justification.
Example: a notice saying that a flat will not be rented to a particular religious community.Example (General Comment No. 20): requiring a birth registration certificate for school enrolment may discriminate against ethnic minorities or non-nationals who do not have such certificates.
Example

The company where Farhan works requires every employee to work on one fixed day of the week, and that day is the sacred day of rest in his religion. The rule applies to everyone, but it hits Farhan much harder. That may be indirect discrimination, unless the company can justify the rule or accommodate him.

Case

Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport, ex parte European Roma Rights Centre (House of Lords, 9 December 2004) – a classic on direct discrimination. To stop asylum seekers before they reached Britain, British immigration officers screened passengers at Prague Airport before they boarded flights to the United Kingdom. Most asylum seekers from the Czech Republic were Roma. The evidence showed that Roma passengers were questioned longer and more intrusively, and refused far more often, than others. Held: (i) the scheme itself did not breach the Refugee Convention, because the passengers were still in their own country; (ii) treating Roma passengers with greater suspicion because they were Roma was direct discrimination on racial grounds, contrary to British race relations law. Principle (Baroness Hale): it does not matter if a stereotype is statistically true of a group; treating an individual worse because of the group is still discrimination, because the law requires each person to be treated as an individual.

Case

Central Okanagan School District No. 23 v. Renaud (Supreme Court of Canada, 24 September 1992) – a leading case on indirect discrimination and the duty to accommodate. Larry Renaud, a school custodian, was a Seventh-day Adventist, whose Sabbath runs from sunset on Friday to sunset on Saturday. His shift included Friday evenings. The school board was willing to create a special shift, but the union refused an exception to the collective agreement, and Renaud was dismissed. Held: both the employer and the union were liable. A neutral rule that burdens a religious group requires reasonable accommodation up to the point of undue hardship, and more than minor inconvenience must be shown. A union that blocks a reasonable accommodation shares the blame, and the employee must also co-operate in finding a solution. Note: this is a national court, not an international body, but its reasoning is widely followed.

Case

Rosalind Williams Lecraft v. Spain (views of 27 July 2009) – racial profiling. In 1992, at the railway station in Valladolid, a police officer asked Ms Williams Lecraft, a black Spanish citizen, to show her identity document. Her husband and son, and other passengers, were not asked. When she asked why, the officer said he had to check people like her because many of them were illegal immigrants. Held: identity checks for public security or immigration control are legitimate, but physical or ethnic characteristics cannot by themselves be treated as a sign of unlawful presence. The Human Rights Committee found a violation of Article 26 read with the right to an effective remedy, and asked Spain to apologise and to prevent such checks.

Case

Timishev v. Russia (European Court, 13 December 2005). Mr Timishev, a lawyer of Chechen origin living in another Russian region, was refused passage at a police checkpoint because officers had been told not to admit persons of Chechen ethnicity. His children were also refused admission to school. Held: violations of freedom of movement read with Article 14, and of the right to education. Principle: no difference in treatment based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person's ethnic origin is capable of being objectively justified in a contemporary democratic society built on pluralism and respect for different cultures.

Case

Konstantin Markin v. Russia (Grand Chamber, 22 March 2012). Mr Markin, a serviceman in the Russian army, was divorced and raising his three children. He asked for three years of parental leave, which Russian law gave to servicewomen but not to servicemen. Held: violation of Article 14 read with the right to family life. The advancement of gender equality is a major goal, so very weighty reasons are needed to justify a difference based on sex. The traditional idea that women are the primary carers of children is a gender stereotype and cannot justify the difference. Principle: stereotypes about men can also produce discrimination.

Discrimination in the Private Sphere and the Duties of the State

Human rights law can reach discrimination by private persons, such as a landlord, an employer or a restaurant owner, through the State's duty to protect:

  • Article 26 of the ICCPR requires the law to prohibit any discrimination.
  • CEDAW reaches any person, organisation or enterprise.
  • General Comment No. 20 asks States to act against discrimination in housing, employment and other private spheres.

General Comment No. 20 also:

  • recognises systemic discrimination, rooted in social behaviour and organisation;
  • reads other status to include grounds such as disability, age, nationality, sexual orientation, gender identity, health status, place of residence, and economic and social situation.

Indian constitutional tools

  • Article 15(2): forbids discrimination in access to shops, public restaurants, hotels, wells and public places, even by private persons.
  • Article 17: abolishes untouchability altogether.
  • Articles 15 and 16: allow special measures for women, children and disadvantaged classes.
Case

Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India (decided 25 March 2021): concerned the Army's evaluation criteria for granting permanent commission to women officers. Held: the Supreme Court expressly recognised indirect and systemic discrimination; the criteria, though neutral on their face, disadvantaged women officers. Principle: the ideas of substantive and indirect discrimination are now part of Indian constitutional law.

Racial Discrimination

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD)

  • Adopted on 21 December 1965; in force in 1969.
  • It was the first of the core United Nations human rights treaties. India ratified it in 1968.
Key point

Article 1 – racial discrimination: any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin, which has the purpose or effect of impairing the equal enjoyment of human rights in any field of public life. Temporary special measures for disadvantaged groups are not discrimination.

State obligations

  • End racial discrimination in their own practice.
  • Review discriminatory laws.
  • Prohibit racial discrimination by private persons and groups.
  • Article 4: punish the spreading of ideas of racial superiority and incitement to racial discrimination, with due regard to freedom of expression.
  • Article 5: lists rights to be enjoyed without racial discrimination, including access to any place or service intended for the public.

Monitoring

The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has 18 experts. It examines reports, issues General Recommendations, runs an early warning procedure, and hears individual complaints against States that accept its competence.

Does ICERD cover caste?

This question matters greatly for India. The Convention covers discrimination based on descent.

CERD Committee's viewGovernment of India's view
In its concluding observations on India in 1996, the Committee said that the term descent does not refer solely to race, and affirmed that the situation of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes falls within the scope of the Convention.India has consistently disagreed. It argues that caste is not race and so falls outside Article 1.
General Recommendation No. 29 (2002) confirmed that descent includes discrimination based on caste and similar systems of inherited status.India stresses its own protections, such as Article 17 and the Atrocities Act.
Key point

Remember both positions: the Committee's view that caste is covered, and India's view that it is not.

UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice

Adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO on 27 November 1978.

  • Article 1: all human beings belong to a single species and are descended from a common stock, and are born equal in dignity and rights. All individuals and groups have the right to be different, but difference can never be a pretext for racial prejudice.
  • Article 2: any theory claiming that racial or ethnic groups are inherently superior or inferior has no scientific foundation and is contrary to the moral and ethical principles of humanity.
Key point

This is a declaration, not a treaty, so it is not binding. Its value is that it removed any scientific pretence from racism.

Freedom from Torture and the Crime of Genocide

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:59:38)

The Genocide Convention of 1948 and the Convention against Torture of 1984 both deal with the gravest attacks on human dignity, and both prohibitions have the rank of jus cogens. But they are different legal concepts and must never be treated as the same.

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide

  • Adopted on 9 December 1948, one day before the UDHR; in force in 1951.
  • Article 1: the parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.
Key point

Article 2 – genocide: any of five acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.

The five acts:

  1. killing members of the group;
  2. causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
  3. deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction;
  4. imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
  5. forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
  • Conspiracy, direct and public incitement, attempt and complicity are also punishable, whether committed by rulers, officials or private individuals.
  • What is left out: political and social groups are not protected by this definition.
  • Article 9: disputes about the Convention, including the responsibility of a State for genocide, go to the ICJ.
  • India ratified the Convention in 1959 but has not enacted a separate law making genocide a specific crime.

Convention against Torture: definition and duties

Key point

Article 1 – torture: any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for purposes such as obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation or coercion, or for any reason based on discrimination, when inflicted by, or at the instigation or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official or a person acting in an official capacity. Pain arising only from lawful sanctions is excluded.

Four elements of torture:

  1. severe pain or suffering;
  2. intention;
  3. a purpose;
  4. official involvement.

Duties of States

  • No exceptional circumstance can justify torture, and superior orders are no defence.
  • No person may be sent to a State where there are substantial grounds for believing they would face torture.
  • Torture must be made a crime; a State that finds a suspected torturer in its territory must prosecute or extradite.
  • Complaints must be investigated promptly and impartially, and victims must receive redress.
  • Statements made under torture cannot be used as evidence, except against the torturer.
  • The State must also prevent other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.

Monitoring

  • The Committee against Torture examines reports, conducts confidential inquiries, and hears individual complaints against States that accept them.
  • The Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture, working with national preventive mechanisms, visits places of detention.

Genocide and torture compared

PointGenocideTorture
Who is protectedGroups (national, ethnical, racial or religious)Every individual
Mental elementSpecial intent to destroy a protected group as suchIntentional infliction of severe suffering for a purpose
Official involvementNot required; rulers, officials or private individuals can commit itRequired (public official or person acting in an official capacity)
Nature of the instrumentMainly an instrument of international criminal law and State responsibilityA core human rights treaty with its own monitoring committee
Year19481984

Genocide can be committed without any torture, for example by forcibly transferring children, and most torture has nothing to do with genocide. But the two can overlap: torturing members of a group with intent to destroy the group can be genocide, through causing serious bodily or mental harm.

India and torture

  • India signed the Convention against Torture in 1997 but has not ratified it.
  • The Prevention of Torture Bill, passed by the Lok Sabha in 2010, lapsed.
  • The Law Commission of India, 273rd Report (October 2017), recommended that India ratify the Convention and enact a separate law against torture. It proposed compensation for victims and a presumption against the police when a person is injured in custody.
  • Until then, protection comes mainly from Article 21, the ban on compelled self-incrimination in Article 20(3), the custody safeguards laid down in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, and the criminal law.
Key point

In one line: treaties set the standards, equality runs through all of them, and discrimination can be direct or indirect, formal or substantive, public or private.

Protection of Human Rights in India: The Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:05:18)

India protects human rights inside its own borders through four layers:

  1. the Constitution and the courts;
  2. special statutes;
  3. the human rights commissions; and
  4. other national commissions for particular groups.

Background and commencement

By the early 1990s there was concern, at home and abroad, about custodial deaths, disappearances and abuses in areas of conflict. The United Nations was also encouraging every country to create an independent national human rights institution. India responded with the Protection of Human Rights Act, which is deemed to have come into force on 28 September 1993. It was amended in 2006 and in 2019, and is studied here as it stands today.

  • Section 2(d), human rights: the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the International Covenants and enforceable by courts in India.
  • Section 2(f), International Covenants: the ICCPR and the ICESCR, and any other Covenant or Convention adopted by the General Assembly that the Central Government notifies.
Key point

Note the closing words of Section 2(d): "enforceable by courts in India". A right found only in a treaty, which Indian courts do not enforce, falls outside the statutory definition of human rights.

The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)

Composition (Section 3, as amended in 2019)

The NHRC has its headquarters in Delhi.

  • Chairperson: must have been a Chief Justice of India or a Judge of the Supreme Court.
  • One Member who is or has been a Judge of the Supreme Court.
  • One Member who is or has been a Chief Justice of a High Court.
  • Three Members with knowledge of, or practical experience in, human rights, of whom at least one must be a woman.
  • Deemed members: the Chairpersons of seven bodies are deemed members for most functions, but not for inquiring into complaints. They are the national commissions for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Women, Minorities, Backward Classes and the Protection of Child Rights, and the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities.
  • Secretary-General: the chief executive officer.

Appointment (Section 4)

The President appoints the Chairperson and Members on the recommendation of a committee chaired by the Prime Minister. The other members of the committee are:

  • the Speaker of the Lok Sabha;
  • the Union Home Minister;
  • the Leaders of the Opposition in both Houses; and
  • the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.

Removal (Section 5)

  • The President can remove a Chairperson or Member for proved misbehaviour or incapacity, but only after the Supreme Court, on a reference from the President, has inquired and reported in favour of removal.
  • The President may also remove them directly on specific grounds, such as insolvency, outside paid employment, unsoundness of mind, or conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude.

Term (Section 6)

Three years, or until the age of seventy, and they are eligible for reappointment.

Functions (Section 12)

  • Inquiring into complaints of violation of human rights, or of negligence by a public servant in preventing such a violation. It may act on its own motion, on a petition by a victim or someone on the victim's behalf, or on a court's direction.
  • Intervening in court proceedings, with the court's approval.
  • Visiting jails and other institutions where people are detained.
  • Reviewing legal safeguards.
  • Studying factors, such as terrorism, that inhibit the enjoyment of human rights.
  • Studying international treaties and recommending their implementation.
  • Promoting research, human rights literacy and the work of non-governmental organisations.

Powers

  • Section 13: while inquiring, the Commission has the powers of a civil court, such as summoning witnesses and requiring documents, and its proceedings are treated as judicial proceedings. It can transfer a complaint to the State Commission concerned.
  • Section 14: it can use the investigating agencies of governments.
  • Section 17: it can call for government reports.
  • Section 18 (the key provision): if the inquiry discloses a violation, the Commission may recommend compensation, prosecution of the persons concerned, or other action. It may approach the Supreme Court or the High Court for directions, and at any stage it may recommend immediate interim relief. The government must send its comments and the action taken within one month, and the Commission publishes its report with those comments.

Limitations

  1. Armed forces (Section 19): for complaints against the armed forces, the Commission cannot inquire itself. It can only seek a report from the Central Government and make recommendations.
  2. Section 36: it cannot take up a matter pending before a State Commission or another commission. No commission can inquire into a matter after one year from the date of the alleged violation.
  3. Recommendatory outcome: its final outcome is a recommendation.
Case

N.C. Dhoundiyal v. Union of India (December 2003): concerned the one-year limit on inquiries. Held: the one-year limit goes to jurisdiction. Principle: the Commission is a creature of statute, so it cannot escape the limit by calling a wrong "continuing".

Are the Commission's recommendations binding?

Indian courts are divided.

Case

Abdul Sathar v. Principal Secretary to Government (February 2021): a Full Bench of the Madras High Court. Held: a State Commission's recommendation under Section 18 binds the government.

By contrast, the Patna High Court, in decisions of 2024 and 2025, has stressed that a State Commission only recommends and cannot issue directions, and that the government must consider its recommendations; it has not expressly held that the government may refuse to follow them.

Key point

Whether recommendations under Section 18 are binding is not yet settled: the Madras High Court (Full Bench, 2021) says binding; the Patna High Court (2024, 2025) stresses that the Commission only recommends and cannot direct, without expressly deciding whether the government may refuse to follow a recommendation.

Note

Updated from the lecture: the lecture said the Patna High Court treats State Commission recommendations as views the government must consider but need not obey. The correct position is that the Patna High Court (2024) called the Commission a recommendatory body whose recommendations the government is obliged to consider, and (2025) held that the Commission cannot issue directions, while expressly stating it had no quarrel with the Madras High Court view that recommendations are binding and enforceable; neither decision expressly held that the government may disregard a recommendation. Source: Patna High Court judgment of 28 July 2025 (Indian Kanoon).

The State Human Rights Commissions

  • Constitution (Section 21): a State Government may constitute a State Human Rights Commission.
  • Chairperson: must have been a Chief Justice or a Judge of a High Court.
  • Members: one Member who is or has been a High Court Judge, or a District Judge with at least seven years' experience as District Judge; and one Member with knowledge or experience of human rights.
  • Jurisdiction: it can inquire only into matters in the State List and the Concurrent List.
  • Appointment: the Governor appoints the Chairperson and Members on the recommendation of a committee chaired by the Chief Minister. The other members are the Speaker, the State Home Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, and, where there is a Legislative Council, its Chairman and its Leader of the Opposition.
  • Removal: only by the President, and only after a Supreme Court inquiry, just as for the national body.
  • Term: three years or until seventy; eligible for reappointment.
  • Union Territories: since 2019, the Central Government may give the human rights functions of a Union Territory to a State Commission, while those of Delhi stay with the NHRC.
Key point

Exam trap: although the Governor appoints the Chairperson and Members of a State Human Rights Commission, only the President can remove them, and only after a Supreme Court inquiry.

Human Rights Courts (Section 30)

A State Government, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, may specify a Court of Session in each district as a Human Rights Court, for the speedy trial of offences arising out of human rights violations. In practice, this provision has remained weak.

The Paris Principles and National Human Rights Institutions

The credibility of a national human rights institution is measured by the Paris Principles. They were drafted at an international workshop in Paris in October 1991, and the General Assembly endorsed them on 20 December 1993. They require:

  1. A broad mandate based on universal human rights standards, set out in the constitution or a statute.
  2. Independence from the government, guaranteed by law, including a stable term for members.
  3. Pluralism: the membership should reflect the diversity of society.
  4. Adequate resources, so that the institution cannot be controlled through its budget.
  5. Adequate powers to investigate, to advise the government and to engage with the United Nations system.

Accreditation and the NHRC's status

Compliance is assessed by a Sub-Committee on Accreditation of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions. A status means full compliance and allows the institution to take part in the work of the Human Rights Council.

  • The NHRC of India first received A status in 1999 and kept it after later reviews.
  • Since 2023 its review has been deferred repeatedly, and in 2025 the Sub-Committee recommended downgrading it to B status.
  • The concerns included heavy reliance on police officers for investigations, a lack of diversity among members and staff, a non-transparent appointment process, and a weak response to serious violations.
  • The Commission challenged the recommendation, and a final decision was expected in November 2026.
  • The 2019 amendments, which widened eligibility and added a woman member, were made partly to answer such concerns.

Domestic Courts and Quasi-Judicial Institutions

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:15:25)

The constitutional courts

The strongest protectors of human rights in India are the constitutional courts.

  • Article 32 makes the right to move the Supreme Court for enforcing fundamental rights itself a fundamental right.
  • Article 226 gives the High Courts even wider writ powers.
  • Public interest litigation: the courts relaxed the rules of standing, so that a public-spirited person can approach them on behalf of people who cannot, and they even treated letters as petitions.
  • Compensation as a public law remedy for violation of fundamental rights, as in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983) and Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993).
  • Detailed guidelines, such as the custody safeguards in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal.

Commissions as quasi-judicial institutions

Commissions such as the NHRC have some powers of a civil court and follow a fair procedure, but they are not courts, and their final outcome is a recommendation, not a decree.

Commissions (quasi-judicial)
StrengthsAccessibility, low cost, expertise, power to act on their own motion
WeaknessesDependence on the government for staff and money; lack of direct enforcement

The two systems, courts and commissions, work best together.

Case

National Human Rights Commission v. State of Arunachal Pradesh (January 1996): the Commission itself filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court on behalf of about 65,000 Chakma refugees threatened with forcible eviction by local groups. Held: Article 21 protects every person, citizen or not. The State was directed to protect them and to forward their citizenship applications. Principle: courts and commissions can act together, and Article 21 extends to non-citizens.

Five decisions showing the courts at work

Case

Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (series of orders from 1979): newspaper reports in the Indian Express showed that undertrial prisoners in Bihar had spent years in jail awaiting trial, many for longer than any sentence they could have received. Held (judgment of 12 February 1979, Justice P.N. Bhagwati): a speedy trial is an essential part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21; a procedure that keeps people behind bars for years without trial cannot be reasonable, fair and just. The Court criticised a bail system that kept the poor in jail only because they could not offer money or sureties, and directed release of undertrials on personal bonds. In a further order of 9 March 1979, reading Article 21 with Article 39A, it held that free legal services for an accused who cannot afford a lawyer are an essential part of a fair procedure. Principle: the series gave India both the right to a speedy trial and the right to free legal aid.

Case

Khatri v. State of Bihar (order of 19 December 1980, Justice P.N. Bhagwati): arose from the Bhagalpur blindings, in which undertrial prisoners in custody had been blinded. Held: the State's duty to provide free legal aid arises not only at the trial but from the moment the accused is first produced before a magistrate, and at every remand. The magistrate must inform a poor accused of the right to free legal aid, because the right would be illusory if an illiterate prisoner had to ask for it. The State cannot avoid this duty by pleading financial or administrative difficulty.

Case

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (Constitution Bench, 10 July 1985, Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud): in 1981 the State of Maharashtra and the municipal corporation decided to evict pavement and slum dwellers from Bombay; journalists, including Olga Tellis, and the dwellers challenged the decision. Held:

  • the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood, since otherwise the easiest way to deprive a person of life would be to take away the means of living;
  • there is no estoppel against the Constitution, so an earlier concession by the dwellers that they would not claim protection did not bind them;
  • there is no right to occupy public pavements;
  • the law allowing removal of encroachments without notice was upheld, read as a discretion to be used fairly and only in exceptional cases;
  • evictions were postponed until after the monsoon, with alternative sites for dwellers counted in an earlier census.

Principle: the State may regulate public spaces, but it must treat livelihood as part of life. This is the landmark on livelihood.

Case

Kishen Pattnayak v. State of Orissa (judgment of 9 January 1989): from Kalahandi, a drought-hit district, a letter described starvation deaths, distress sales of paddy and labour, and poor families selling their children. The Supreme Court treated the letter as a writ petition and called for a report from the District Judge. Held: noting the relief and development measures already taken by the State, the Court did not find starvation deaths proved, but said one or two such deaths could not be ruled out. It directed that representatives of voluntary organisations be added to the existing Natural Calamities Committees of the affected districts, which were to meet regularly to monitor the situation. Principle: the Court recognised hunger as a constitutional concern, while relying largely on the executive.

Later developments on the right to food:

  • In the right to food case, People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, begun in 2001, the Supreme Court issued continuing orders on food schemes.
  • Parliament enacted the National Food Security Act, 2013.
  • Internationally, the Council of the Food and Agriculture Organization adopted non-binding Voluntary Guidelines on the right to adequate food in November 2004.
Case

People's Union for Civil Liberties v. State of Maharashtra (23 September 2014, Chief Justice R.M. Lodha): the PUCL challenged the genuineness of about 99 encounters by the Mumbai police in the 1990s, in which about 135 people died. Held: for every case of death or grievous injury in a police encounter:

  • any intelligence tip-off must first be recorded;
  • an FIR must be registered and sent to the court without delay;
  • the investigation must be done by the CID or by a police team of another police station, under a senior officer;
  • a magisterial inquiry must be held in every case of death;
  • information must be sent without delay to the National or State Human Rights Commission;
  • the officers involved must surrender their weapons for forensic examination;
  • the family must be informed, and compensation must be considered;
  • no out-of-turn promotion or gallantry award may be given immediately after the incident.

The Court declared these requirements to be law under Article 141. Principle: courts and commissions work together to enforce the right to life.

Special Statutes Protecting Vulnerable Groups

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:23:34)

Three statutes protect particular groups. Each gives effect to the State's duty to protect people against private violence and discrimination.

The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

Article 17 abolished untouchability, and the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 punished its practice. But violence and humiliation against Dalit and Adivasi communities continued, so Parliament enacted this Act, often called the Atrocities Act.

  • Atrocities: the Act defines a long list of specific offences committed against members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by persons outside those communities. Examples: parading a person naked, forced labour, denying access to public places or water sources, and intentionally insulting a person to humiliate them in public view.
  • Amendment in force from 26 January 2016: added many new offences, such as imposing a social or economic boycott; created Exclusive Special Courts; and added a chapter on the rights of victims and witnesses.
  • Section 18: excludes anticipatory bail.

The anticipatory bail controversy

Case

Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra (March 2018): Held: the Supreme Court required a preliminary inquiry and approval before arrest, to prevent misuse of the Act.

  • After nationwide protests, Parliament inserted Section 18A in August 2018, removing any need for a preliminary inquiry or approval, and again excluding anticipatory bail.
  • The Court recalled its directions on review in October 2019.
Case

Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India (February 2020): Held: Section 18A is valid. A court may still grant anticipatory bail where the complaint does not disclose even a prima facie case under the Act.

The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act)

  • In force from 14 November 2012; gives effect to India's duties under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
  • Gender-neutral; protects every person below eighteen years.
  • Offences: penetrative sexual assault, sexual assault, sexual harassment and the use of a child for pornographic purposes.
  • Aggravated forms carry higher punishment, for example when the offender is a police officer, a teacher or a relative.
  • An amendment of 2019 increased punishments, including the death penalty for aggravated penetrative sexual assault.
  • Reporting of offences is mandatory.
  • Child-friendly procedure: the child's statement is recorded at the child's home or chosen place, preferably by a woman police officer not in uniform; the child's identity must not be disclosed; the trial is held in camera before a Special Court.
  • Presumption: a person charged with the main offences is presumed to have committed them, unless the contrary is proved.
Case

Attorney General for India v. Satish (November 2021): Held: sexual assault does not require skin-to-skin contact. Principle: the key element is sexual intent.

Case

Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish (September 2024): Held: even possessing or viewing child sexual abuse material can be an offence. The Court also suggested calling it "child sexual exploitative and abuse material".

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

In force from 26 October 2006, the Act reflects the view that domestic violence is a human rights issue. Its Statement of Objects and Reasons invokes the CEDAW Committee's recommendation to protect women against violence within the family. It mainly provides civil remedies.

  • Domestic violence (Section 3) is defined widely, to include physical, sexual, verbal and emotional, and economic abuse, and harassment for dowry.
  • Aggrieved person: a woman who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent, covering relationships by blood, marriage, adoption, and relationships in the nature of marriage.
  • Reliefs by a magistrate: protection orders, residence orders, monetary relief, custody orders and compensation.
  • Protection Officers help women to use the law.
  • Section 17: every woman in a domestic relationship has the right to reside in the shared household.
  • Section 31: breach of a protection order is a criminal offence.

Three Supreme Court decisions that widened the Act

Case

Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016): Held: the words "adult male" in the definition of respondent were struck down, so complaints can also be made against women relatives.

Case

Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2020): Held: a shared household can include the house of the in-laws where the woman lived, even if the husband has no share in it.

Case

Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi (2022): Held: a woman need not have actually lived with the respondent to claim the right to reside.

The NCW, the NCM, the NCSC and the NCST

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:30:39)

Besides the NHRC, India has national commissions for particular groups.

National Commission for Women (NCW)

  • Constituted in January 1992 under the National Commission for Women Act, 1990.
  • Composition: a Chairperson committed to the cause of women; five Members, including at least one from the Scheduled Castes and one from the Scheduled Tribes; and a Member-Secretary.
  • Functions: examines the legal safeguards for women; reviews laws and suggests amendments; looks into complaints; takes notice on its own of the deprivation of women's rights; can inspect jails and other places where women are held.
  • Powers: while investigating certain matters, it has the powers of a civil court.

National Commission for Minorities (NCM)

  • Works under the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992.
  • Composition: a Chairperson, a Vice-Chairperson and five Members; at least five of them, including the Chairperson, must come from minority communities.
  • Notified minorities (six): Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Parsis (1993), and Jains (2014).
  • Functions: monitors the working of safeguards for minorities, looks into specific complaints, and makes recommendations.

National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) and National Commission for Scheduled Tribes (NCST)

  • Constitutional bodies, created by Articles 338 and 338A.
  • Originally there was one joint commission; the Constitution (Eighty-ninth Amendment) Act, 2003 split it into two, and the separate commissions began work in 2004.
  • Composition: each has a Chairperson, a Vice-Chairperson and three other Members, appointed by the President.
  • Functions: investigate and monitor the safeguards for these communities, inquire into specific complaints, advise on their socio-economic development, and report to the President. Their reports are laid before Parliament with a memorandum of action taken.
  • Powers: while investigating or inquiring into a complaint, each has all the powers of a civil court.
  • Consultation: the Union and State governments must consult them on all major policy matters affecting these communities.

Comparison of the commissions

CommissionCoverageNatureSource
NHRCHuman rights of everyoneStatutoryProtection of Human Rights Act, 1993
NCWWomenStatutoryNational Commission for Women Act, 1990
NCMMinoritiesStatutoryNational Commission for Minorities Act, 1992
NCSCScheduled CastesConstitutionalArticle 338
NCSTScheduled TribesConstitutionalArticle 338A
Key point

The NHRC, NCW and NCM are statutory bodies; the NCSC and NCST are constitutional bodies. All share one weakness: they investigate and recommend, but cannot enforce like a court. They are therefore used together with the constitutional courts, not in place of them.

Example

Prince, a Dalit agricultural worker, is beaten in police custody, and the police refuse to register his complaint. His family can approach the High Court under Article 226 for an independent investigation and compensation; complain to the State Human Rights Commission within one year; and ask the NCSC to intervene. The officers may also face prosecution under the criminal law, and under the Atrocities Act where it applies. The Indian system offers many doors, and a good lawyer knows which door to open first.

Emerging Areas of Human Rights

Human Rights Law is not frozen. New technologies, new forms of power, and old injustices seen in a new light keep testing it. Five such areas are studied: artificial intelligence, corruption, business, the rights of transgender persons, and the rights of prisoners.

Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights

Key point

Artificial intelligence (AI) means computer systems that perform tasks which normally need human judgment, such as recognising faces, predicting behaviour, sorting job applications or producing text.

Governments and companies increasingly use AI to decide who gets a loan, a job, a welfare benefit or police attention. The question is not whether AI is good or bad, but how existing human rights apply when machines make or shape decisions.

Rights affected

  1. Privacy: AI runs on huge amounts of personal data, often collected without real consent. Privacy is protected by Article 17 of the ICCPR and, in India, by Article 21 after the Puttaswamy judgment.
  2. Equality: an algorithm learns from past data, and past data often carries past discrimination. This algorithmic bias is often indirect discrimination.
  3. Surveillance: facial recognition in public places can track everyone and chill free expression and peaceful assembly.
  4. Due process: many systems are a "black box", so a person refused a benefit cannot understand or challenge the decision.
  5. Dignity: a person must not be reduced to a data profile, and a human being must remain responsible for decisions that seriously affect a person's life.
Example

A hiring system trained on the records of a company that mostly hired men may learn to rank women lower. A lending system that uses a person's area of residence may exclude a community concentrated there. Both are forms of algorithmic bias.

Case

Glukhin v. Russia (European Court of Human Rights, 4 July 2023): the European Court's first judgment on facial recognition technology. Mr Glukhin travelled on the Moscow metro with a life-size cardboard figure of a well-known protester, as a peaceful one-person protest. The police used surveillance cameras and facial recognition technology to identify and arrest him, and he was punished for not notifying the authorities of his solo demonstration. Held (unanimously): violations of the right to private life and of freedom of expression. Principle: using facial recognition to identify a peaceful protester is highly intrusive and needs detailed rules and strong safeguards against abuse, which Russian law lacked.

How AI is governed

Binding law

  • Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (adopted May 2024): the first binding international treaty on AI, but by September 2026 it had not yet entered into force.
  • European Union AI Act, 2024: a risk-based approach. It bans certain practices, such as social scoring, and imposes duties of risk management, data quality, transparency and human oversight on high-risk systems in areas like employment, education, credit, policing and migration. Amendments of 2026 postponed most of these duties to 2027 and 2028.

Soft law

  • The UNESCO Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, 2021.
  • General Assembly resolutions of 2024 and 2025; the second created a scientific panel and a global dialogue on AI governance.

India

  • India has no specific statute on AI yet.
  • The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 is coming into force in phases, under rules notified in November 2025, with the main duties applying from May 2027.
  • When the State itself uses AI, for example for police facial recognition, the Puttaswamy tests of legality, legitimate aim and proportionality apply.
Example

A welfare department uses an algorithm that flags Farhan as a likely fraud and stops his pension without telling him why. Human Rights Law asks: Is there a law authorising this? Was the data accurate and lawfully collected? Does the system disproportionately flag poor or minority applicants? Can Farhan get an explanation and a human review? If the answers are no, his rights to privacy, equality and a fair procedure may all be violated.

Human Rights and Corruption

Corruption is not only a crime; it is increasingly seen as a serious obstacle to human rights, in four ways:

  1. It blocks access to public services. When a poor woman must pay a bribe to get her child admitted to a government hospital, or to receive her ration, her rights to health and food depend on money.
  2. It drains resources. Under the ICESCR, a State must use the maximum of its available resources for economic and social rights; stolen public money is money not spent on schools, clinics and water.
  3. Corruption in the police and the courts destroys equality before the law and the right to a fair trial.
  4. It creates impunity for violators, and danger for journalists, whistleblowers and human rights defenders who expose it.

International law

  • United Nations Convention against Corruption: adopted in 2003, in force since 2005; India ratified it in 2011. It is an anti-corruption treaty, not a human rights treaty. It requires States to prevent and criminalise bribery and embezzlement, to co-operate internationally, and to recover stolen assets.
  • Human Rights Council: has repeatedly addressed the negative impact of corruption on the enjoyment of human rights.
  • Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: adopted a resolution on corruption and human rights in March 2018, stressing the rights of victims and the duty of States to investigate.
Key point

A human rights approach to corruption puts the victims of corruption at the centre, and treats transparency, participation and accountability as rights, not favours.

India

  • The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which since 2018 also punishes the giving of bribes.
  • The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013.
  • The Right to Information Act, 2005, which lets citizens demand records of how public money is spent.
  • In the right to food case, the Supreme Court set up a vigilance committee to examine leakages and corruption in the public distribution system.

Transparency laws are therefore also human rights laws.

Business and Human Rights

Some companies today are richer than many States, and their factories, mines, supply chains and digital platforms affect millions of lives. But international human rights treaties bind States, not companies. The question is how Human Rights Law reaches business.

Case

Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (the Bhopal case): on the night of 2–3 December 1984, methyl isocyanate leaked from a pesticide plant in Bhopal owned by Union Carbide India Limited, a subsidiary of the American company Union Carbide Corporation. Thousands died and hundreds of thousands were injured, many with lifelong illness.

  • Parliament passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, allowing the Union of India to represent all the victims.
  • A suit filed in the United States was dismissed there, on the ground that Indian courts were the more suitable forum.
  • On 14 and 15 February 1989 the Supreme Court recorded a settlement: Union Carbide paid 470 million United States dollars in full settlement of all claims, and the criminal proceedings were quashed. The victims had not been heard before this settlement.
  • Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India (December 1989): the Court upheld the 1985 Act.
  • On review (3 October 1991), the Court upheld the civil settlement but restored the criminal prosecutions.
  • In March 2023, a Constitution Bench dismissed the Government's curative petition seeking more compensation from the company.

Lessons: a parent company can shelter behind its subsidiary, victims wait for decades, and a lump-sum settlement rarely matches the harm.

Case

M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (oleum gas leak case, 20 December 1986, Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati): only two years after Bhopal, a gas leak from a factory in Delhi led to a new rule. Held: the rule of absolute liability. An enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community. If harm results, it is liable without any of the exceptions allowed under the old rule of strict liability, and the larger the enterprise, the greater the compensation it must pay. Principle: the Indian courts' own answer to corporate harm.

The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

The key international text was prepared by Professor John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, building on his "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework of 2008. The Human Rights Council endorsed the Guiding Principles on 16 June 2011. They rest on three pillars:

PillarContent
1. State duty to protectStates must protect people against human rights abuse by business, through laws, regulation, policies and adjudication. This is the State's general duty to protect.
2. Corporate responsibility to respectEvery business, whatever its size, should avoid infringing human rights and should address the harm it causes or contributes to, through a policy commitment, human rights due diligence (identifying, preventing, mitigating and accounting for its impacts), and processes to remedy harm.
3. Access to remedyVictims must have effective remedies, through courts, non-judicial bodies, and grievance mechanisms run by the companies themselves.
Key point

The Guiding Principles are not a treaty. They create no new binding obligations, and the corporate responsibility to respect is a global standard of expected conduct, not a legal duty in itself. It binds only when States turn it into law.

Turning the responsibility into law

  • The European Union adopted a Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive in 2024, requiring large companies to carry out human rights and environmental due diligence; amendments of 2026 postponed its application to 2029.
  • At the United Nations, a working group has negotiated a binding business and human rights treaty since 2014, but none has been agreed.
  • India adopted National Guidelines on Responsible Business Conduct in 2019, and the securities regulator requires the largest listed companies to report on their human rights and sustainability performance.
Key point

Do not confuse business and human rights duties with corporate social responsibility spending under the Companies Act, 2013. Charity does not excuse a company that harms the people affected by its business.

Example

A garment company where Aadil is an executive buys shirts from a supplier whose workers are locked in, underpaid and denied leave. Under the Guiding Principles, the company cannot say that the supplier is someone else's problem. It should identify the risk, use its influence to stop the abuse, and help provide a remedy to the workers.

The Rights of Transgender Persons

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:46:21)

Three concepts to keep apart

ConceptMeaning
Sex assigned at birthWhat is recorded when a child is born
Gender identityA person's deeply felt internal sense of being a man, a woman, both, neither, or another gender
Sexual orientationWhom a person is attracted to
Key point

A transgender person is someone whose gender identity does not match the sex assigned at birth.

Internationally, the Yogyakarta Principles of 2006, prepared by experts, explain how existing human rights law applies to sexual orientation and gender identity. They are soft law, but courts, including the Supreme Court of India, have relied on them.

Case

National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (15 April 2014, Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan and Justice A.K. Sikri): the foundation of transgender rights in India. NALSA asked the Court to protect transgender persons, including the Hijra community, who faced exclusion from education, jobs, health care and public life. Held:

  • transgender persons have the right to decide their own gender identity, and the State must legally recognise them as male, female or third gender according to their self-identification;
  • insisting on sex reassignment surgery as a condition for recognition is illegal;
  • "sex" in Articles 15 and 16 includes gender identity;
  • expressing one's gender is part of freedom of expression, and gender identity is part of dignity and personal autonomy under Article 21;
  • governments must treat transgender persons as socially and educationally backward classes for reservations, and provide health care, separate toilets and welfare schemes;
  • the Court relied on the Yogyakarta Principles and international human rights law, as they were consistent with fundamental rights.

Sexual orientation and Section 377: four decisions

Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code punished carnal intercourse against the order of nature, and it was used to harass gay men and transgender persons.

Case

Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi (Delhi High Court, 2 July 2009, Chief Justice A.P. Shah and Justice S. Muralidhar): Held: Section 377 violated Articles 14, 15 and 21 insofar as it criminalised consensual sexual acts of adults in private. Principle: constitutional morality prevails over popular morality.

Case

Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (11 December 2013, two-judge bench of the Supreme Court): Held: the Delhi High Court decision was reversed. The Court described the affected people as a "minuscule fraction" of the population and left the matter to Parliament.

Case

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (24 August 2017, nine-judge bench, unanimous): Held: the right to privacy is a fundamental right, protected mainly by Article 21 and by the freedoms in Part III. Privacy includes bodily autonomy, informational privacy, and freedom of choice in intimate matters. The leading opinion said that sexual orientation is an essential attribute of privacy and criticised the Koushal decision, explaining that the rights of a minority do not depend on how small it is. Principle: any intrusion into privacy must satisfy legality, a legitimate aim and proportionality. This judgment is also the base of Indian data protection law.

Case

Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (6 September 2018, five-judge Constitution Bench, unanimous): Held: Section 377 is unconstitutional insofar as it criminalised consensual sexual conduct between adults; Koushal was overruled. Sexual orientation is a natural and intrinsic part of identity, and constitutional morality must prevail over social morality. Some opinions held that "sex" in Article 15 also covers sexual orientation. The Section continued to apply to non-consensual acts, acts involving minors, and bestiality.

The Indian Penal Code has since been replaced by the B.N.S., which has no provision corresponding to Section 377.

DecisionCourt and dateOutcome on Section 377
Naz FoundationDelhi High Court, 2 July 2009Violated Articles 14, 15 and 21 for consensual adult acts in private
Suresh Kumar KoushalSupreme Court (two judges), 11 December 2013Reversed Naz; left the matter to Parliament
K.S. PuttaswamySupreme Court (nine judges), 24 August 2017Privacy a fundamental right; sexual orientation an essential attribute of privacy; Koushal criticised
Navtej Singh JoharSupreme Court (five judges), 6 September 2018Unconstitutional for consensual adult conduct; Koushal overruled
Case

Arunkumar v. Inspector General of Registration (Madras High Court, April 2019, Justice G.R. Swaminathan): Arunkumar, a man, married Sreeja, a transwoman, in a temple, but the registration authorities refused to register the marriage. Held: the word "bride" in the Hindu Marriage Act includes a transwoman, and the marriage must be registered. The Court also directed the State Government to ban sex reassignment surgeries on intersex infants and children, who cannot give consent; the State later issued an order to that effect.

The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019

  • In force from January 2020.
  • Wide definition of transgender person: trans men, trans women, persons with intersex variations, genderqueer persons, and socio-cultural identities such as Kinnar and Hijra.
  • Prohibits discrimination in education, employment, health care, housing and public facilities.
  • Self-perceived gender identity, certified by the District Magistrate, although recognition as male or female required proof of surgery.
Case

Jane Kaushik v. Union of India (October 2025): Held: governments had been grossly apathetic in implementing the 2019 Act. The Court awarded compensation to a transwoman teacher dismissed by private schools, and set up an expert committee to frame equal opportunity policies.

The 2026 amendment

In March 2026, Parliament passed an amendment that changes direction sharply:

  • it removes trans men, trans women and genderqueer persons from the listed categories;
  • it makes the District Magistrate's certificate depend on a medical board's recommendation;
  • it adds severe punishments for forcing a person to assume a transgender identity.

Critics argue that this conflicts with the self-identification principle of the NALSA judgment, so the issue is likely to return to the courts.

Case

Supriyo Chakraborty v. Union of India (October 2023): Held: the Supreme Court refused to recognise a fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples, but held that transgender persons in heterosexual relationships can marry under the existing laws.

The Rights of Prisoners

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:53:42)

Key point

Imprisonment lawfully takes away liberty; it does not take away humanity. Convicts are not, by mere reason of their conviction, stripped of all their fundamental rights.

  • Article 10 of the ICCPR: all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person; the prison system must aim at reformation and social rehabilitation.
  • United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, revised in 2015 and called the Nelson Mandela Rules: detailed standards on dignity, health care, family contact and the limits of solitary confinement. They are not a treaty, but Indian courts rely on them.

Solitary confinement, fetters and prison grievances

Case

Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (Constitution Bench, 30 August 1978): two challenges by prisoners in Delhi. Sunil Batra, sentenced to death by a Sessions Court, had been locked alone in a cell while his appeal was pending; another petition challenged the power to put prisoners in bar fetters. Held: Section 30 of the Prisons Act, 1894 was read down:

  • a prisoner is "under sentence of death" only when the sentence has become final, after the appeals and the mercy petition;
  • even then, the law allows only separate confinement, not the solitary confinement that only a criminal court can impose;
  • irons may be used only for safe custody, based on the prisoner's own dangerous conduct, with reasons recorded and regular review.

Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, concurring, said that the fundamental rights in Part III do not part company with the prisoner at the gates.

Case

Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (second case, 20 December 1979): Sunil Batra wrote to a judge that a warder had tortured a fellow prisoner to extort money from his relatives. The Court treated the letter as a habeas corpus petition. Held: it directed grievance boxes in prisons, regular visits by judges and magistrates, and prior judicial approval before punishments such as solitary confinement. Principle: the courts do not stop at the prison gate.

Death row and delay in execution

Case

T.V. Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu (16 February 1983, two-judge bench, Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy): Held: a delay of more than two years in carrying out a death sentence entitles the prisoner to commutation, because prolonged waiting under a death sentence is itself dehumanising.

Case

Sher Singh v. State of Punjab (24 March 1983, three-judge bench): Held: no fixed period applies; delay is a relevant factor, not an automatic ground for commutation.

Case

Triveniben v. State of Gujarat (Constitution Bench, 1988 and 1989): agreed with Sher Singh. Held: only delay after the final judicial verdict counts, mainly unexplained delay by the executive in deciding mercy petitions, and not delay caused by the prisoner's own petitions.

Case

Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (21 January 2014, three-judge bench): several death sentences were commuted because of long, unexplained delay in deciding mercy petitions. Held: deciding mercy petitions is a constitutional duty; solitary confinement before a mercy petition is finally rejected was condemned; safeguards were laid down, such as legal aid and at least fourteen days' notice before execution.

Key point

Current law on delay: unexplained executive delay after the final verdict can justify commutation, judged case by case, but there is no two-year rule (the Vatheeswaran rule did not survive Sher Singh and Triveniben).

CaseBenchPosition on delay
T.V. Vatheeswaran (16 February 1983)Two judgesDelay over two years entitles commutation
Sher Singh (24 March 1983)Three judgesNo fixed period; delay a relevant factor only
Triveniben (1988, 1989)Constitution BenchOnly delay after final verdict counts, mainly unexplained executive delay on mercy petitions; not delay caused by the prisoner
Shatrughan Chauhan (21 January 2014)Three judgesCommuted sentences for unexplained mercy-petition delay; safeguards laid down

Custodial violence

Case

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyamsunder Trivedi (9 May 1995, Justice A.S. Anand): in October 1981, Nathu Banjara was taken to a police station in Madhya Pradesh for questioning about a murder, beaten by a sub-inspector and constables, and died in custody that night; the police tried to dispose of his body as unclaimed. The trial court acquitted the officers, and the High Court acquitted them of the killing. Held: the Supreme Court reversed the acquittals and convicted the sub-inspector and three constables of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Custodial death is one of the worst crimes in a civilised society. Direct evidence is rare, because police officers stay silent to protect their colleagues, so courts must not take a narrow, technical view of the evidence. The Court regretted that a Law Commission recommendation had not been acted upon: to presume that a police officer caused the injuries of a person injured in custody, unless the officer proves otherwise.

Case

State of Andhra Pradesh v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy (26 April 2000, Justice S. Saghir Ahmad): in May 1977, a father and son, both undertrial prisoners, were attacked with bombs inside their cell in a sub-jail in Andhra Pradesh. They had warned the police of the danger, but too few guards were on duty, and a police officer was himself part of the conspiracy. The father died, and the family sued the State for damages. Held: the award of compensation was upheld. A prisoner, whether a convict or an undertrial, does not cease to be a human being and keeps the right to life under Article 21; the State cannot escape liability for such a violation by pleading sovereign immunity. Principle: the State that locks a person up must also keep that person safe.

Everyday dignity inside prison: decisions of 2019

Three decisions of 2019 show courts protecting everyday dignity inside prison. The first is on parole.

Case

Kantilal Nandlal Jaiswal v. Divisional Commissioner, Nagpur (13 September 2019, Full Bench of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur): a life convict was refused parole under a rule that barred a second parole within one year of the previous one, except on the death of a near relative. Held: parole is not a mere concession but a limited legal right, subject to the conditions in the rules. The rule was struck down as arbitrary and contrary to Articles 14 and 21.

Prisoners' Rights and Custodial Safeguards (continued)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:53:42)

Prisoner's choice of prison and proximity to family

Case

V. Radhakrishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu: a prisoner serving life imprisonment had spent about 25 years in prison. His elderly mother wanted him held in a prison near her home in Madurai. Decided on 19 July 2019 by the Madras High Court, through Justice G.R. Swaminathan. Held: applying the principle of proportionality and the Nelson Mandela Rules (which encourage placing prisoners close to their families), the authorities must respect a prisoner's choice of prison, subject to security, discipline and the public interest. The prisoner was allowed to remain in Madurai. Principle: proportionality and family proximity guide decisions on where a prisoner is held.

Contact with a spouse: a right, not a privilege

Case

Rahmath Nisha v. Additional Director General of Prisons: a remand prisoner's wife was critically ill in hospital, and his sister asked the court to let him visit her. Decided on 28 May 2019 by the Madras High Court, again through Justice G.R. Swaminathan. Held: an escorted visit was allowed. The court relied on the rights to dignity and privacy recognised in the Puttaswamy and Navtej judgments. The prison rule requiring officers to be present during interviews should not apply to meetings between spouses. Principle: such contact is a right of the prisoner's wife, not a privilege of the prisoner.

Caste discrimination in prison manuals

Case

Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India (decided 3 October 2024): State prison manuals segregated prisoners by caste and assigned work, such as cleaning and sweeping, on the basis of caste. Held: the Supreme Court struck down these provisions as violating equality, the abolition of untouchability, the ban on forced labour and the right to dignity, and directed the States to revise their manuals. Principle: the old wrongs of caste and untouchability can survive even inside prison walls, and Human Rights Law must follow them there.

Undertrials: Section 479 of the B.N.S.S.

The concern of the Hussainara Khatoon case, undertrials waiting endlessly in jail, has returned in a new form.

  • Section 479 of the B.N.S.S. (in force since July 2024): a first-time offender who has spent one third of the maximum sentence in custody as an undertrial must be released on bond by the court. This does not apply to offences punishable with death or life imprisonment, or where investigation, inquiry or trial is pending in more than one offence or case.
  • In August 2024, the Supreme Court directed jail superintendents across India to apply this rule even to cases registered before the new law began, as the Union Government had accepted.
Note

Updated from the lecture: the lecture said a first-time offender who has spent one third of the maximum sentence in custody as an undertrial must be released on bond, without stating any limits. The correct position is that the court releases such a person on bond (the jail superintendent must apply to the court), but Section 479(1) of the B.N.S.S. excludes offences punishable with death or life imprisonment, and Section 479(2) bars release where investigation, inquiry or trial in more than one offence or in multiple cases is pending. Source: The B.N.S.S. (Gazette of India text), Section 479.

Key point

Section 479 of the B.N.S.S.: first-time offender + one third of the maximum sentence spent as an undertrial = release on bond by the court (not for offences punishable with death or life imprisonment, and not where more than one case is pending). By the Supreme Court's August 2024 direction, it applies even to cases registered before the B.N.S.S. came into force.

Connecting the themes: an example

Example

Aadil, a transgender prisoner, is kept alone in a cell for months, is marked as a troublemaker by a faulty facial recognition system, and is denied medical care because staff demand a bribe. Every theme meets in this one story: dignity in prison, the right to be recognised as who one is, the risks of A.I., and the human cost of corruption. Human Rights Law gives a lawyer the tools to challenge each of these wrongs.

Course Conclusion and Exam Strategy

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (3:03:54)

Human Rights Law runs from the idea of human dignity all the way to artificial intelligence and the rights of prisoners. For the examination, three habits matter.

  1. Frame every problem with three questions: which State had jurisdiction, which duty was breached, and whether any restriction was lawful, legitimate and necessary.
  2. Cite precisely: always name the treaty or the Article, support it with the leading case, and say which body decided it, a court or a committee.
  3. Distinguish similar concepts: whenever two concepts look similar, such as derogation and restriction, or direct and indirect discrimination, write their differences clearly, with an example.

Quick revision

  • V. Radhakrishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu (Madras High Court, 19 July 2019): applying proportionality and the Nelson Mandela Rules, the authorities must respect a prisoner's choice of prison, subject to security, discipline and the public interest.
  • Rahmath Nisha v. Additional Director General of Prisons (Madras High Court, 28 May 2019): escorted visit to a critically ill wife allowed; officers need not be present at meetings between spouses; such contact is the wife's right, not the prisoner's privilege.
  • Sukanya Shantha v. Union of India (Supreme Court, 3 October 2024): caste-based segregation and caste-based allotment of work in State prison manuals struck down; States directed to revise their manuals.
  • Section 479 of the B.N.S.S.: a first-time offender who has spent one third of the maximum sentence in custody as an undertrial must be released on bond by the court (not for offences punishable with death or life imprisonment, or where more than one case is pending); by the Supreme Court's August 2024 direction, this applies even to cases registered before the new law began.
  • The course runs from the idea of human dignity to artificial intelligence and the rights of prisoners.
  • In every problem ask: which State had jurisdiction, which duty was breached, and whether any restriction was lawful, legitimate and necessary.
  • Always name the treaty or Article, support it with the leading case, and state the deciding body (a court or a committee).
  • Write the differences between similar concepts (derogation and restriction; direct and indirect discrimination) clearly, with an example.

Practise Human Rights Law MCQs

24 questions. Every answer comes with an explanation and the legal provision behind it.

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