ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla

On 25 June 1975, the President declared a National Emergency under Article 352 on the ground of internal disturbance. On 27 June 1975, a Presidential order under Article 359(1) suspended the right to approach the courts to enforce Article 14, Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and Article 22 (protection against arrest and detention).

Many people were then detained without trial under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (M.I.S.A.). Detenus like Shivkant Shukla went to the High Courts. They argued that their arrest was illegal, that even the procedure under M.I.S.A. had not been followed, and that they should be released. They asked for a writ of habeas corpus, which literally means 'produce the body'.

Several High Courts, including Allahabad, Delhi, Bombay, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh, held that even during the Emergency a court could step in if a detention was illegal, made in bad faith, or not in accordance with law. Some detenus got relief. The government then appealed to the Supreme Court.

1. During the Emergency, when the enforcement of Article 21 is suspended by a Presidential order under Article 359(1), can a person still file a habeas corpus petition in a High Court under Article 226?

2. Does a detenu have locus standi to challenge a detention as illegal, mala fide or contrary to the procedure in M.I.S.A. while the order is in force?

3. Is Section 16A(9) of M.I.S.A., which allowed the grounds of detention to be kept secret, constitutionally valid?

For the detenus: Suspending the enforcement of fundamental rights did not wipe out every right. Common law rights, statutory rights, natural justice and legal procedure still survived. The High Court's writ power under Article 226 still existed. The order under Article 359 only barred the enforcement of fundamental rights, so challenging an illegal detention should still be possible. If the procedure under M.I.S.A. itself was not followed, or if the detention was made in bad faith, it was illegal and the court could examine it.

For the State (A.D.M. Jabalpur): During an Emergency the country's interest comes first, and military, economic and security interests are most important. The Presidential order under Article 359(1) clearly said that rights like Article 21 could not be enforced. So a habeas corpus writ could not be filed either. Under Section 16A(9) of M.I.S.A. the grounds of detention could be kept secret and need not be shown to the court. During the Emergency the court had no jurisdiction and the detenu had no locus standi.

In a famous exchange, Justice H. R. Khanna asked Attorney General Niren De whether there would still be no remedy if an officer took away a person's life. The Attorney General answered that there would be no remedy in court as long as the Emergency lasted.

On 28 April 1976, the five-judge bench decided the case by a 4:1 majority and accepted the State's view.

Majority (Chief Justice A. N. Ray, Justice M. H. Beg, Justice Y. V. Chandrachud and Justice P. N. Bhagwati): After the Constitution came into force, Article 21 was the only source of the right to life and personal liberty. Once its enforcement was suspended, no separate right survived under common law or natural law, and the court could not restore it. During the Emergency, no person had locus standi to file a habeas corpus petition under Article 226, even if the detention broke the procedure established by law. Section 16A(9) of M.I.S.A. was held constitutionally valid. Chief Justice Ray treated it as a rule of evidence, so neither the detenu nor the court could demand the grounds of detention. The majority also felt that in an Emergency the executive judges the country's security and courts should not interfere.

Dissent (Justice H. R. Khanna): Even if the enforcement of Article 21 is suspended, the State cannot take away life and liberty without the authority of law. The right to life is not a gift of the Constitution, and Article 21 is not its only source. The right existed even before the Constitution. The Presidential order only barred the remedy of going to court. It did not end the rule of law, which means the government too is under the law. Arresting people without reason or procedure and also denying them access to courts would be dictatorship, not democracy. Habeas corpus is needed most in times like an Emergency.

As a result, many political prisoners stayed in jail without trial. Justice Khanna, who was next in line to be Chief Justice, was superseded in January 1977 when the junior Justice M. H. Beg was made Chief Justice of India, and Justice Khanna resigned.

Later developments: The Forty-fourth Amendment (1978) provided that the enforcement of Articles 20 and 21 cannot be suspended under Article 359 even during an Emergency. It also replaced 'internal disturbance' in Article 352 with 'armed rebellion'. Justice Bhagwati later publicly admitted that his decision had been wrong. In K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), a nine-judge bench expressly overruled A.D.M. Jabalpur, called it seriously flawed and held that Justice Khanna was right.

Constitution of India, Article 352 (National Emergency); Article 359(1) (suspension of enforcement of fundamental rights during Emergency); Article 14; Article 21; Article 22; Article 226 (writ jurisdiction of High Courts); Article 20 (protected from suspension by the Forty-fourth Amendment); Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (M.I.S.A.), Section 16A(9); Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment), 1978

The case is called the most controversial judgment in India's legal history and the darkest chapter, or low point, of the Indian judiciary. Justice Khanna's dissent is its moral high point.

It shows what happens to personal liberty when courts step back during a crisis. It directly led to the Forty-fourth Amendment, which protects Articles 20 and 21 from suspension and makes Emergencies harder to misuse.

It is a standard example of a dissent later becoming the law, since it was overruled in K. S. Puttaswamy (2017). For exams, students should explain both the majority's reasoning and the dissent. Exam keywords: Article 359, habeas corpus, Section 16A(9) of M.I.S.A., the 4:1 majority, the Khanna dissent, the Forty-fourth Amendment and the overruling in Puttaswamy.

Hypothetical: Suppose an Emergency is declared and Prince is detained by an officer, Farhan. Farhan gives no reason and does not follow the procedure in the detention law. Prince's sister Zoya files a habeas corpus petition in the High Court.

Under the 1976 majority view in A.D.M. Jabalpur, Zoya's petition would have been thrown out, because nobody would have locus standi while Article 21 was suspended.

Today, after the Forty-fourth Amendment, the enforcement of Article 21 cannot be suspended even during an Emergency. A.D.M. Jabalpur has also been overruled. So the High Court can ask Farhan to produce Prince and show the legal basis for the detention, and it can order Prince's release if the detention is illegal. This reflects Justice Khanna's dissent.