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B.N.S. Complete notes

B.N.S.: Complete Notes

Criminal Law explains why the law punishes one person and lets another go free, even when both have done something that looks the same from the outside.

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Criminal Law explains why the law punishes one person and lets another go free, even when both have done something that looks the same from the outside.

Example

One person pushes a stranger off a crowded platform because he wants the stranger to die. Another slips on a wet floor, falls against a stranger, and the stranger also falls and dies. Each has caused the death of a human being, yet the first is a murderer and the second has suffered a terrible accident.

Criminal Law is therefore not merely a list of prohibited acts and punishments. Criminal liability depends on what the person did, what was going on in the person's mind, the surrounding circumstances, the defences the law allows, the part played by other people, and the precise ingredients of the particular offence.

The course covers, in order: what a crime is and the building blocks of criminal liability; crimes that are not yet complete (inchoate offences); situations in which the law excuses or justifies conduct that would otherwise be an offence; and the application of these principles to offences against the human body and offences against property. The subject is substantive Criminal Law: what an offence is and when a person is liable for it. Procedure and evidence are referred to only where they help in understanding an offence.

B.N.S. and the IPC

The change of codes

For more than 160 years, the substantive criminal law of India was contained in the Indian Penal Code of 1860 (IPC). On 1 July 2024 the codes were replaced:

Old lawReplaced by
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)B.N.S., 2023
Code of Criminal ProcedureB.N.S.S., 2023
Indian Evidence ActB.S.A., 2023

What has been carried over

B.N.S. did not throw away the structure of the IPC. Most basic definitions (culpable homicide, murder, theft, extortion, robbery, cheating, abetment and the general exceptions) have been carried into B.N.S. with the same or almost the same words. What has changed in many places is the section number, and in some places the law itself: the general exceptions now begin at Section 14, murder is in Section 101, and theft is in Section 303.

New ideas in B.N.S.

  • Murder by a group of five or more persons on grounds like race, caste, community, language or personal belief.
  • The offence of snatching.
  • Community service as a punishment for some minor offences.
  • A separate offence of sexual intercourse obtained by deceitful means.
Key point

Because the words are largely the same, the great judgments decided under the IPC continue to guide: where the Supreme Court explained a word in the IPC and the same word appears in B.N.S., that explanation remains valuable. But wherever B.N.S. has changed the rule, the present rule applies, and the old judgment is used only for the principle that still survives.

How to Read a Section of B.N.S.

Most offences are built in the same way:

  1. Definition: states the ingredients of the offence.
  2. Explanations: clarify the meaning of particular words.
  3. Illustrations: short examples written into the statute itself, using persons called A, Z and so on. They cannot override the words of the section, but courts treat them as valuable guides to its meaning.
  4. Exceptions and provisos: cut down the reach of the definition.
  5. Punishment: often in a separate subsection.
Key point

Break every offence into its ingredients and, for each ingredient, ask what exactly the prosecution must prove. Simple examples with persons such as A, B and C are not decorations: each is designed to show one legal ingredient being present or absent. Understanding why a person is liable in one example and not liable in the next is understanding the law.

Meaning of Crime

No jurist has produced a definition of crime that fits every case. Crime is not a natural object like a stone or a tree. An act becomes a crime because the community, through its law, decides that the act is so harmful to society that the State itself must respond with punishment. Murder, theft and cheating are crimes in almost every society, but some acts have been crimes in one period and not in another.

Key point

Crime: a wrong that the law treats as a wrong against the whole community, and for which the law provides punishment through proceedings brought in the name of the State.

Crime and civil wrong

Example

Prince borrows money from Farhan and refuses to repay it: a civil wrong. Farhan must go to a civil court, and the State does not prosecute Prince. If instead Prince takes Farhan's money from his pocket with a dishonest intention, the State steps in. If Prince deceives Farhan and takes his money, the act is both: Farhan may sue for the money, and the State may prosecute Prince for cheating.

PointCivil wrongCrime
Who proceedsThe person wronged, in a civil courtThe State: police investigate and the prosecution is conducted in its name
AimTo put the victim back in the position he should have been in, usually by paymentTo punish the offender
FocusThe loss of the victimThe guilt of the offender and the harm to society

Crime and offence

Crime is the broader idea: a wrong which society condemns and the law punishes. Offence is the precise legal word. Under Section 2(24) of B.N.S., offence means a thing made punishable by B.N.S.; in certain chapters and sections it also covers things punishable under special or local laws.

Key point

A court does not ask whether something is morally a crime. It asks whether a law in force makes it a punishable offence, and whether every ingredient of that offence is proved.

No crime and no punishment without law

The maxim nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege means that a person can be punished only for an act that the law already declared to be an offence, and only with the punishment that the law already provided. Criminal Law in India works inside a constitutional frame:

  • Article 20(1): no conviction except for violating a law in force at the time of the act, and no penalty greater than the one in force at that time.
  • Article 20 also protects a person from being prosecuted and punished twice for the same offence, and from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
  • Article 21: no deprivation of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, which must be fair, just and reasonable.

Elements of Criminal Liability

Traditionally, four elements are identified:

  1. a human being who does the act;
  2. a guilty mind (mens rea);
  3. a guilty act or omission (actus reus); and
  4. an injury, meaning harm caused to a person, to society or to property.

The two elements studied most closely are the guilty act (actus reus) and the guilty mind (mens rea).

Actus reus

Actus reus is the external, physical side of the offence: the conduct of the accused, the circumstances in which it takes place and, very often, the consequence that follows. If any one external part is missing, the actus reus of that offence is missing.

Example

In theft, the conduct is moving the property; the circumstances are that the property is movable, is in someone else's possession, and the person in possession has not consented. In murder, the consequence is the death of a human being.

The act must be voluntary

Example

Farhan grabs Prince's hand and forces it to strike Aadil. The movement of Prince's hand is not Prince's act but Farhan's; Prince has done nothing for which the law can blame him. Likewise, a movement made in a genuine fit or seizure is not a willed act.

Omissions

  • Section 3(4) of B.N.S.: words referring to acts also extend to illegal omissions.
  • Section 2(15) of B.N.S.: a person is legally bound to do whatever it is illegal in him to omit.
Key point

An omission becomes criminal when the law imposes a duty to act. A mother who deliberately refuses to feed her infant, a jailor who deliberately refuses food to a prisoner in his charge, or a railway gatekeeper who deliberately keeps the gate open when a train is coming can be liable for the result. A stranger who walks past a drowning person is generally not liable, however morally wrong his conduct, because the law imposes no general duty on everyone to rescue everyone.

Example

Section 3(7), statutory illustration: A intentionally causes Z's death partly by illegally omitting to give Z food and partly by beating Z. A has committed murder. An act and an omission can together make up one offence.

Mens Rea: The Guilty Mind

Mens rea is the guilty mental element required for an offence. In simple terms, Criminal Law often asks not only what the accused did, but also what was happening in the accused's mind when the act was done. The classic maxim is actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea: an act does not make a person guilty unless the mind is also guilty.

Example

Prince drives carefully, at a proper speed, on the correct side of the road. A child suddenly runs out from behind a parked bus and, before anyone could react, is hit and dies. Prince did not intend harm, did not know harm was likely and was not careless, so he should not be punished. But if Prince sees his enemy Farhan crossing the road and deliberately drives into him and kills him, the physical act is almost the same, yet there is a guilty mind and Prince is a murderer.

Different mental states

Mens rea is not a single mental state. The law uses different mental states for different offences, from the highest to the lowest:

Mental stateMeaning
Intention (the highest)Acting in order to bring about a particular result
KnowledgeAwareness that a particular consequence is certain or likely
RashnessRunning a risk with awareness of it
NegligenceFailing to take the care that a reasonable person would take

B.N.S. builds these mental states into the definitions of offences through words like intentionally, knowingly, voluntarily, dishonestly, fraudulently and reason to believe. Several are defined in Section 2; for example, a person acts dishonestly when he intends to cause wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another.

Key point

B.N.S. does not state mens rea in one general section. Most offences specify which mental state is required.

Intention and motive

IntentionMotive
The immediate aim of the actThe deeper reason behind it
A guilty intention is enough for liabilityA good motive does not erase a guilty intention, though it may matter in sentencing; a bad motive cannot create an offence where the required intention is absent
Example

Prince steals medicine from a shop because his child is dying and he has no money. His motive is good, but his intention is to take the medicine dishonestly, and that is enough for theft.

Concurrence of Act and Mind

A requirement students often forget: the guilty act and the guilty mind must exist together. The mental element must accompany the act that causes the prohibited result; a guilty mind at one time and the act at another is not enough.

Example

Prince plans on Monday to kill Farhan but on Tuesday changes his mind completely. On Wednesday, driving with full care, Prince accidentally hits Farhan, who dies. Prince had a guilty mind on Monday and there was a death on Wednesday, but when the fatal act happened there was no guilty mind, so Prince is not guilty of murder.

Case

Palani Goundan v. Emperor (1919, Full Bench of the Madras High Court): the accused struck his wife on the head with a ploughshare and she fell senseless. Believing her dead, and wanting it to look like suicide, he hanged her from a beam. Medical evidence showed she died of the hanging, not the blow. Held: not murder. The blow was intended only to cause grievous hurt and did not cause death; the hanging caused death, but he believed he was handling a corpse, and such a person does not have the intention required for culpable homicide. He was convicted only of causing grievous hurt. Principle: the guilty mind must accompany the act that causes the prohibited result.

The decision has been much debated. Courts have since taken a different view where the accused intended to kill from the very beginning, treating the attack and the disposal of the supposed body as one continuous transaction.

Strict Liability: When Mens Rea Is Not Required

In offences of strict liability the law does not ask about the mind at all, or asks only partly. They are usually created by special public-welfare statutes on food adulteration, weights and measures, pollution, customs, foreign exchange and traffic rules. The reason is practical: these laws protect the public at large, the harm can be widespread, and requiring proof of a guilty mind in every case could make the law almost impossible to enforce.

Key point

Courts do not lightly assume that the legislature wanted to punish people who had no guilty mind. They start from a presumption that mens rea is required. It is displaced only if the statute excludes mens rea expressly, or by necessary implication from its words, its subject matter and its object.

Case

State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George (1964, Supreme Court): a German national flying from Zurich to Manila stayed on board as a transit passenger at Bombay airport, where customs found 34 bars of gold in a specially made jacket. Gold could not be brought into India without the permission of the Reserve Bank of India. A general permission for gold in transit had been withdrawn a few days before his journey unless the gold was declared in the aircraft's manifest; the notification was published in the Official Gazette, but he did not know of it. Held (2 to 1): conviction restored. Mens rea is ordinarily presumed even in statutory offences and absolute liability is not lightly presumed, but the language of the Act and its object of protecting foreign exchange and preventing smuggling excluded it; the conscious act of bringing the gold into India was enough. Justice Subba Rao dissented: the presumption had not been displaced, and no one should be punished for breaking a rule he had no means of knowing. Principle: mens rea is presumed, but can be excluded by the words and object of a statute.

The majority drew a second lesson: ignorantia juris non excusat, ignorance of the law does not excuse. A person cannot escape liability by saying that he did not know the law, because the law, once validly made and published, is taken to be known to everyone. The principle returns under mistake of law in the general exceptions.

Joint Liability: Co-perpetration and Constructive Liability

When several persons plan a robbery, one may break the door, another keep watch and a third take the money. If each were punished only for what his own hands did, the watcher would escape, although the robbery could not have happened without him. The law answers this through co-perpetration and constructive liability.

Co-perpetration

Two or more persons are together the principal offenders because each takes part in committing the offence. Under Section 3(8), when an offence is committed by several acts, whoever intentionally cooperates in its commission by doing any one of those acts commits that offence.

Example

Section 3(8), statutory illustration: A and B agree to kill Z by giving him small doses of poison at different times. Z dies from the combined effect. Both are guilty of murder, although neither alone gave a fatal dose.

Constructive liability

A person is held liable for an act physically done by someone else, because of his connection with that act through a shared intention or a shared object. The two main provisions are Section 3(5) (common intention) and Section 190 (common object of an unlawful assembly).

Common Intention under Section 3(5)

When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each is liable for that act as if it were done by him alone. These are the same words as Section 34 of the IPC, so the case law on Section 34 still guides.

Requirements

  1. A criminal act done by several persons.
  2. A common intention shared by all of them.
  3. The act done in furtherance of that common intention, so that each person sought to be held liable has participated in some way.
Example

Prince, Zoya and Farhan agree to beat Aadil to death. Prince holds Aadil's arms, Zoya keeps watch at the door and Farhan strikes the fatal blow. All three are liable for murder as if each had struck the blow, because the death was caused in furtherance of the common intention of all three, and each took part in the act.

The meaning of participation was explained by the Privy Council in the following case.

Case

Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor (1924, Privy Council): a group of men entered the post office at Sankaritola in Calcutta, demanded money and shot the sub-postmaster dead. The accused, caught running away, was said by the prosecution to be one of those who fired; he claimed he had only stood outside and had not fired the fatal shot. Held: murder conviction upheld. The "criminal act" means the whole unified criminal behaviour of the group; each person doing different acts in furtherance of a common intention is liable as if he had done the whole. One who stands guard is very much a participant, so even his own story would not save him. Lord Sumner borrowed Milton's line, "they also serve who only stand and wait". Principle: the watcher, the holder and the striker are equally liable as parts of one joint plan.

The leading authority on the second requirement, common intention itself, is also a Privy Council decision.

Case

Mahbub Shah v. Emperor (1945, Privy Council): men cutting reeds on a river bank quarrelled with a nephew of the landowner, who demanded the reeds and called for help. The accused and another man arrived with guns; one reed cutter was killed and another injured. Held: conviction for murder by way of common intention set aside. Common intention implies a pre-arranged plan, and the act must be done in concert under it. The two had come to rescue the nephew; each may have had the same intention, but there was no evidence of a common plan to kill. Since direct evidence of intention is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain, it must usually be inferred from conduct and circumstances. Principle: common intention requires a prior meeting of minds.

Later Supreme Court decisions add that the plan may be formed suddenly, even on the spot, just before the act, but it must still be a shared plan.

Key point

Same intention is not common intention. Five people who independently decide to hit a man, each from personal dislike, have the same intention but not a common one. Common intention requires a meeting of minds, so that they act as partners in a shared plan.

Further points

  • Rule of liability, not an offence: Section 3(5) fixes liability on several persons for an offence defined elsewhere, so a charge is framed as, for example, murder read with Section 3(5).
  • Proof by inference: common intention is almost always inferred from conduct before, during and after the incident, such as arriving together, carrying weapons, acting in a coordinated way and leaving together.

Common Object and Unlawful Assembly: Sections 189 and 190

Unlawful assembly: Section 189(1)

An assembly of five or more persons is unlawful if their common object is one listed in the section, including:

  • overawing the government or a public servant by criminal force;
  • resisting the execution of any law or legal process;
  • committing mischief, criminal trespass or any other offence;
  • taking possession of property by criminal force;
  • compelling a person by criminal force to do what he is not legally bound to do.

By an explanation, an assembly lawful when it gathered may later become unlawful: a peaceful crowd that decides to burn a shop becomes an unlawful assembly at that moment.

Membership: Section 189(2)

Mere presence in a crowd is not membership. A person becomes a member when, being aware of the facts that make the assembly unlawful, he intentionally joins it or continues in it. A passer-by who stops to watch is not a member; a person who knowingly joins the crowd carrying a stick for the attack is.

Liability of every member: Section 190

Section 190 corresponds to Section 149 of the IPC. Where an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly, every person who is a member of that assembly at the time of the offence is guilty of it, if the offence was:

  1. committed in prosecution of the common object; or
  2. one the members knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object.
Case

Mizaji v. State of U.P. (1958, Supreme Court): five men armed with a spear, a pistol and heavy sticks went to take possession of a field by force. When the unarmed occupants objected, Mizaji fired the pistol on his father's order and killed one of them. All five were convicted of murder with the help of the common object provision. Held: convictions upheld. The first part of the section covers an offence committed with a view to accomplish the common object and immediately connected with it; the second covers an offence the members knew was likely, even if not itself the object, and "knew" means more than a mere possibility. The party had gone with deadly weapons and warned the occupants they would be finished if they did not leave; their object was possession by force even if it meant killing, so the murder was immediately connected with that object, and in any case their weapons and conduct showed they knew a killing was likely. A common object needs no prior meeting or plan; it is enough that it is adopted and shared by all members. Principle: Section 190 reaches both offences committed to accomplish the common object and offences the members knew were likely in prosecuting it.

Common Intention and Common Object Compared

Key point

This is one of the most frequently tested distinctions in Criminal Law.

BasisCommon intention: Section 3(5)Common object: Section 190
Number of personsTwo or moreAn unlawful assembly: at least five
Mental bondPrior meeting of minds; a shared plan, even if formed on the spotNo prior concert in the same sense; members need only share the same object, even without discussing a plan
ParticipationEach accused must participate in some way in the criminal actMembership at the time of the offence is enough, even if the member did nothing with his own hands
Nature of provisionOnly a principle of joint liability; creates no separate offenceMakes every member guilty of the offence committed by any member; membership of an unlawful assembly is itself an offence under Section 189
Range of liabilityThe criminal act done in furtherance of the common intentionOffences in prosecution of the common object, and also offences known to be likely in prosecution of it
Example

Six villagers armed with sticks go to take forcible possession of a field. During the clash one of them takes out a hidden knife and kills the owner. If the others knew he carried a knife and that killing was likely in getting possession, all six may be guilty of murder through Section 190. If they had no reason to expect a killing, the others may be guilty only of offences within the common object or known to be likely, such as rioting or hurt. Had only two persons gone, Section 190 would not apply at all, and the prosecution would have to prove a common intention under Section 3(5).

Key point

The building blocks of liability are the act, the mind, the need for both to exist together, and the ways in which liability spreads to several persons. All of these assume that the offence was actually completed. Where a person forms a guilty intention and starts acting on it but the offence is never completed, the law of inchoate offences applies.

Inchoate Offences

Inchoate means "just begun" or "not yet complete". An inchoate offence is one the law punishes even though the main crime the accused had in mind was never completed. The reason: he has already shown a dangerous intention and taken real steps towards harm. If the police had to wait until the victim was actually dead, Criminal Law would fail in its duty to protect society.

Key point

B.N.S. recognises three main inchoate forms of liability: (1) attempt, (2) abetment and (3) criminal conspiracy.

Stages of a Crime

  1. Intention: the mental decision to commit the crime. Not punished. A person who only thinks about killing his enemy has done nothing punishable; thoughts cannot be proved easily, and the law does not punish people for what they merely think.
  2. Preparation: arranging the means needed for the crime, e.g. buying a knife, collecting poison, studying the victim's route. As a general rule not punished, because it is usually ambiguous (a knife may be bought to cut vegetables or to kill) and even one who prepares with a bad intention may change his mind.
  3. Attempt: the person has gone beyond preparation and started actually carrying out the crime, but it is not completed. Punishable.
  4. Completion: the intended offence is fully committed.

Exceptions: preparation itself punished

Where the intended crime is extremely serious, B.N.S. punishes preparation itself:

  • Collecting men, arms or ammunition with the intention of waging war against the Government of India: Section 149.
  • Making preparation to commit dacoity: Section 310(4).
  • Making or possessing instruments for counterfeiting coins or currency.
Key point

The real legal battle is fought on the line between preparation (usually not punishable) and attempt (punishable). Where preparation ends and attempt begins is one of the most difficult questions in Criminal Law.

Attempt under B.N.S.

  1. Specific provisions: attempt to murder (Section 109), attempt to commit culpable homicide (Section 110), attempt to commit robbery (Section 309(5)).
  2. General provision, Section 62 (old Section 511 of the IPC), for all other offences. It applies when a person attempts to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment, and in such attempt does any act towards its commission, where no express provision is made for that attempt. Punishment: imprisonment up to one-half of the imprisonment for life, or one-half of the longest term provided for the offence; or, instead, the fine provided for the offence; or both.
Key point

Key phrase: "does any act towards the commission of the offence". Section 62 does not define attempt, so the courts have had to explain what kind of act is enough.

Example

Illustrations to Section 109: A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it: preparation. A fires the gun at Z: attempt to murder. A mixes poison with food that remains in A's own keeping: still preparation. A places the food on Z's table, or gives it to Z's servants to place there: attempt to murder.

Common thread: while the matter remains within the accused's control and he can still quietly stop, it is usually preparation; when he does an act that sets the crime in motion, it is attempt.

Tests for Attempt

TestWhat it asks
ProximityIs the act sufficiently close to the completed crime, so that but for some interruption the offence would have been committed? Difficulty: "close" is a matter of degree.
Locus poenitentiae (place or opportunity for repentance)While the accused can still change his mind and withdraw voluntarily, his acts are usually only preparation. Once he has gone so far that the crime would have happened but for outside interference, it is attempt.
EquivocalityDoes the act, by itself, clearly show the criminal intention? If it could equally be innocent, it is preparation; if it unequivocally points to the crime, it is attempt. Buying a match box is equivocal; pouring petrol on a house door at midnight and striking a match is not.
Key point

Once an attempt has begun, a later change of heart does not wipe it out. Repentance after the attempt may reduce the sentence but does not undo the offence.

No single test answers every case. Indian courts have not adopted any one of them as a rigid formula; they use them as aids, looking at the act together with the other circumstances that reveal the accused's intention.

Supreme Court decisions

Case

Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar (1961): The accused applied to Patna University to sit for the M.A. (English) examination as a private candidate, falsely claiming to be a graduate and school teacher, with forged certificates. The University accepted his claim and sent his admission card, but the truth came out before he could sit for the examination. Prosecuted for attempting to cheat the University, he pleaded mere preparation. Held (Justice Raghubar Dayal): a person commits attempt when, intending a particular offence and having made preparations, he does an act towards its commission with that intention. The act need not be the penultimate act, but must be done during the course of committing the offence. Preparation ended when he prepared the application; sending it to the University was attempt to cheat. Principle: the basic Indian test; an attempt is not confined to the last act before the crime.

Case

Om Prakash v. State of Punjab (1961; same day, same Bench): The accused ill-treated his wife, Bimla Devi, for years, locked her in a room and deliberately denied her food for days. She escaped through an unlocked door to a hospital, badly emaciated. Convicted of attempt to murder, he argued before the Supreme Court that attempt to murder needs a last act that would by itself cause death, and that starvation over a period was not such an act. Held: attempt to murder is any act towards murder done with intention to murder, whether or not the penultimate act; "act" includes a series of acts. Deliberate starvation intended to cause death is attempt to murder, though no single withheld meal would have killed her. Her escape was the outside event that prevented completion. Principle: an attempt need not be the last act, and a deliberate course of conduct (a series of acts) can be an attempt.

Case

Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab (1968): A law punished export, and attempt to export, of paddy out of Punjab without a permit. A truck with 75 bags of paddy booked for a Delhi firm was stopped at the Samalkha barrier, still well inside Punjab as it then was, about fourteen miles short of the border. Held: driver and cleaner acquitted. Preparation is devising or arranging the means necessary for the offence; attempt is a direct movement towards commission after preparations are made. The test asked was whether the acts done would be completely harmless if the accused changed their mind and went no further. The truck could still have turned back anywhere before the border, so it was only preparation, not punishable under that law. Principle: what writers call locus poenitentiae.

Case

State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub (1980): Acting on secret information, customs officers watched a highway near Bombay at night. A jeep and a truck turned off to a lonely creek near the sea; the accused began unloading bundles, and a motor boat's engine was heard. 43 silver ingots meant to be smuggled out by sea were found. The Sessions Judge acquitted (silver not yet on the boat, so preparation) and the High Court agreed. Held: reversed; convicted of attempting to export silver unlawfully. Justice Sarkaria: attempt begins where preparation ends; the act need not be the last, but must be deliberate, clearly show the intention, and be reasonably proximate to completion. Justice Chinnappa Reddy: proximity is measured in relation to intention, not time and action. A truck stopped at the start of the journey could be going anywhere; silver brought at dead of night to a lonely creek, ready for a boat, revealed the intention with reasonable certainty. The harmlessness test of Malkiat Singh must be read with its facts, or every person caught at the last minute could claim he might still have changed his mind. Principle: attempt begins where preparation ends; proximity is judged in relation to the intention revealed by the act.

PointMalkiat Singh (1968)Mohd. Yakub (1980)
Stage reachedTruck about fourteen miles short of the borderSilver being unloaded at a lonely creek, motor boat at hand
ResultPreparation: acquittedAttempt: convicted
ApproachLocus poenitentiae: acts harmless if the accused went no furtherProximity measured by intention; Malkiat Singh's harmlessness test to be read with the facts of that case

Attempt to Commit the Impossible

Problem: the accused does all he intended, but the crime could not possibly be completed, e.g. A puts his hand into B's pocket to steal a wallet, but the pocket is empty.

Example

Illustrations to Section 62: (1) A breaks open a box to steal jewels and finds none; he has done an act towards theft and is guilty of attempt. (2) A thrusts his hand into Z's pocket to steal, but it is empty; A is guilty of attempt.

Key point

Where the impossibility arises from facts unknown to the accused (an empty pocket or box), he is still guilty of attempt: his dangerous intention and act are complete, and only luck saved the victim. The illustrations deliberately reject an old English view that trying to steal from an empty pocket was no attempt, a view English law itself later abandoned.

Limit 1: harmless means chosen by the accused

Case

Asgarali Pradhania v. Emperor (1933, Calcutta High Court): The accused pressed a woman pregnant by him to take a liquid and a powder to cause a miscarriage; she refused and raised an alarm. The liquid contained no poison, and medical evidence showed neither substance could cause miscarriage. Held: acquitted of attempt to cause miscarriage. Where the offence fails because of a factor independent of the accused (an empty pocket, or poison secretly replaced with water by someone else), it is attempt. Where the accused himself chooses means completely harmless and incapable of causing the result, his act is not one done towards the commission of the offence. Principle: though debated by writers, the distinction shows that the Indian law of attempt looks at the real nature of the act done, not merely at the accused's wish.

In the same way, a person who tries to kill his enemy by reciting a curse does not attempt murder.

Limit 2: no attempt to commit an imaginary crime

Section 62 speaks of attempting an offence. If the intended act would not be an offence even if everything happened as the accused imagined, there is nothing to attempt.

Example

A wrongly believes it is a crime to fly a kite on a public holiday and flies one, thinking he is breaking the law. Despite his guilty feeling he has attempted no offence, because the law punishes no such act. Criminal Law punishes attempts to commit offences, not imaginary crimes.

SituationAttempt?
Failure due to facts unknown to, or a factor independent of, the accused (empty box or pocket; poison replaced by someone else)Yes
Accused himself chooses completely harmless means (harmless substances; a curse)No
Intended act is no offence at all (kite on a holiday)No

Attempt to Commit Suicide under B.N.S.

The old IPC punished attempt to commit suicide; B.N.S. has no general offence of attempting suicide. Section 226 punishes only an attempt to commit suicide made with intent to compel or restrain a public servant from discharging his official duty. Abetment of suicide remains a serious offence under Sections 107 and 108.

Abetment

Criminal Law also punishes the person who encourages, plans or helps an offence: the abettor. Abetment is in Sections 45 to 60 of B.N.S., the core provisions being Sections 45 to 57.

Key point

Section 45: a person abets the doing of a thing (1) by instigating any person to do it; (2) by engaging with one or more persons in a conspiracy for doing it, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of the conspiracy and in order to the doing of that thing; or (3) by intentionally aiding, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of it.

1. Instigation

To provoke, urge, encourage or goad someone to do an act. There must be active suggestion or encouragement; casual advice, or words spoken in anger without intending the other to act on them, are usually not instigation. Explanation 1 to Section 45: one who, by wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of a material fact he is bound to disclose, causes or procures a thing to be done, also instigates it.

Example

A police officer holds a warrant to arrest Z. B, knowing C is not Z, tells the officer that C is Z, and C is arrested. B has abetted the arrest of C by instigation.

2. Conspiracy

The abettor joins an agreement to do the thing, and some act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of it. (Contrasted below with criminal conspiracy as a separate offence.)

3. Intentional aiding

Explanation 2 to Section 45: whoever, before or at the time of the act, does anything to facilitate its commission, and thereby facilitates it, aids the act.

  • The aid must be intentional: if A lends his car to B for a family trip and B, without A's knowledge, uses it for a theft, A has not aided the theft.
  • Mere presence at the scene is not aiding, unless intended to encourage or support the offender.
  • Aiding may be by illegal omission: a watchman bound to lock the gate who deliberately leaves it open for thieves aids the theft.

Important features

  • Section 46: abetment is complete even if the act abetted is never committed. If A instigates B to murder C and B refuses, A is still guilty of abetting murder.
  • The person abetted need not be capable by law of committing the offence, or share the abettor's guilty mind. If A instigates a child below seven to put poison in Z's food and Z dies, the child commits no offence, but A is punishable as if the child were capable and had committed murder.
  • Abetment of an abetment is also an offence.
  • Sections 47 and 48: abetment across borders: a person in India abetting an act abroad, or a person abroad abetting an act in India.

Liability of an Abettor

SectionSituationLiability
49Act abetted committed in consequence of the abetment; no express provision for that abetmentSame punishment as the offence (A instigates B to commit theft; B commits it; A punishable as for theft)
51Person abetted does a different actLiable for the act done as if he had directly abetted it, if it was a probable consequence of the abetment
52Act done is in addition to the act abettedPunishable for both
53Act abetted causes a different effectLiable if he knew the act abetted was likely to cause that effect
54Abettor (liable as such if absent) is present when the offence is committedDeemed to have committed the offence himself
55Offence punishable with death or life imprisonment, not committedUp to 7 years; up to 14 years if hurt is caused
56Offence punishable with imprisonment, not committedUp to one-fourth of the longest term; one-half if the abettor or person abetted is a public servant bound to prevent the offence
57Abetting an offence by the public generally or by more than ten personsPunishable
Example

Section 51: A instigates B and C to break into a house at midnight for robbery and gives them weapons; they kill the owner who resists. A is liable for murder if the killing was a probable consequence of his abetment. But if A instigates B to burn Z's house and B also steals from it, A is not liable for the theft: a distinct act, not a probable consequence of burning.

Criminal Conspiracy

Conspiracy came into Indian law from English common law. The IPC as first enacted punished it mainly as a form of abetment; in 1913 a separate chapter made criminal conspiracy a substantive offence. The idea is now in Section 61 of B.N.S.

Key point

Section 61(1): when two or more persons agree with the common object to do, or cause to be done, an illegal act, or a legal act by illegal means, the agreement is a criminal conspiracy.

  • Proviso: an agreement to commit an offence is enough by itself. An agreement to do any other illegal act, or a legal act by illegal means, is criminal conspiracy only when some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties in pursuance of it.
  • Explanation: it is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of the agreement or only incidental to it.

The very heart of conspiracy is the agreement.

Example

A and B agree in a room to rob a bank next week and do nothing more. Overheard by a third person, they are arrested the next day. They have neither attempted nor physically prepared for the robbery, yet they are guilty of criminal conspiracy: the agreement is itself the crime.

Punishment: Section 61(2)

  • Conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for two years or more: punished as if the party had abetted that offence, unless B.N.S. makes an express provision.
  • Any other criminal conspiracy: imprisonment up to six months, or fine, or both.

Proof of Conspiracy

Conspiracies are hatched in secret, without written agreements. Direct evidence (e.g. a participant who turned approver) is occasional; proof usually rests on circumstantial evidence: whether the conduct, meetings, communications, movements and acts of the accused, taken together, point clearly to an agreement. Not every conspirator need know every detail, take part in every stage, or even know every other conspirator; each must have agreed to the common design.

Case

State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005): On 13 December 2001 five armed terrorists stormed the Parliament complex; nine persons, mostly security personnel, and all five attackers were killed. Four persons were prosecuted for conspiracy. Held: the unlawful agreement, not its accomplishment, is the gist of conspiracy, and the offence is attracted even if no overt act follows. A meeting of minds is essential; mere knowledge or discussion is not enough. Conspiracy is seldom open, so its existence and objects are usually inferred from circumstances and conduct; but those circumstances must be proved, form a chain and be considered together; a few bits here and there will not do. The conviction and death sentence of the main accused, Mohd. Afzal, were upheld; a second accused's conspiracy conviction was set aside and he was convicted only of a lesser offence; the acquittal of the other two, including Navjot Sandhu, was upheld as their being parties to the agreement was not proved. Principle: circumstantial evidence can prove an agreement, but suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof.

Criminal Conspiracy and Abetment by Conspiracy Compared

PointCriminal conspiracy (Section 61)Abetment by conspiracy (Section 45)
Agreement aloneItself the offence where the object is an offenceNot enough; an act or illegal omission must take place in pursuance of the conspiracy and in order to the doing of the thing
NatureSeparate, substantive offenceOnly a mode of abetment, tied to the thing abetted; punishment depends on the offence abetted and whether it was committed
ObjectAny illegal act, or a legal act by illegal meansOnly an offence

Explanation 5 to Section 46: the abettor need not have planned the offence directly with its actual perpetrator; it is enough that he engaged in the conspiracy in pursuance of which it was committed.

Key point

In criminal conspiracy the law punishes the agreement; in abetment by conspiracy it punishes the contribution the agreement makes to the thing being done.

General Exceptions: Why the Law Recognises Them

Criminal Law does not only extend liability; it also recognises cases where a person who has apparently satisfied every element of an offence's definition is still not guilty.

Example

A police officer arresting a murder suspect restrains him against his will; a surgeon cuts open a patient; a woman strikes an attacker to save her life. Read mechanically, these are wrongful confinement, hurt, and hurt or even death; yet none should be punished. The general exceptions tell us when conduct fitting the words of an offence is still not an offence.

  • Location: Chapter III, Sections 14 to 44 of B.N.S. (old Sections 76 to 106 of the IPC).
  • "General" because they apply to every offence in B.N.S.
  • Section 3(1): every definition of an offence, penal provision and illustration is understood subject to the general exceptions, though not repeated in each. The definition of theft is read with the silent words "unless a general exception applies".
Key point

Burden of proof: the law of evidence places on the accused claiming a general exception the burden of proving the circumstances bringing his case within it, but this burden is lighter than the prosecution's: not beyond reasonable doubt, only more likely than not. Even if not fully proved, his evidence may raise a reasonable doubt about the prosecution's own case, and that doubt must benefit him.

Excusable Acts and Justifiable Acts

PointJustificationExcuse
MeaningThe act was right, or at least permitted, in the circumstances; the law approves of it or does not disapproveThe act was harmful and undesirable, but this particular person should not be blamed
ExamplesPrivate defence (reasonable force against a murderous attack is not wrongful); acts under a legal duty; judicial acts; acts with valid consentA child of six who sets fire to a house; unsoundness of mind preventing knowledge of the act; genuine mistake of fact; pure accident
Private defence against the actNot availableAvailable against certain excused acts
Key point

A person of unsound mind who tries to kill you commits no offence (insanity excuses him), yet Section 36 gives you the same right of private defence against him as if he were sane. But against someone lawfully exercising private defence because you attacked him, you have no right of private defence: his act is justified.

Mistake of Fact

Section 14Section 17
Nothing is an offence done by a person bound by law to do it, or who by mistake of fact (not of law) in good faith believes himself bound by lawNothing is an offence done by a person justified by law, or who by mistake of fact in good faith believes himself justified by law
He thinks the law requires him to actHe thinks the law permits him to act
Illustration: a court officer ordered to arrest Y, after due enquiry, believes Z to be Y and arrests Z: no offenceIllustration: A sees Z doing what appears to be a murder and in good faith seizes Z to hand him to the authorities: no offence, even if Z was acting in self-defence

Conditions

  1. The mistake must be one of fact.
  2. The belief must be in good faith: under Section 2(11), nothing is done or believed in good faith without due care and attention, so a careless mistake does not help.
  3. Because of that belief, the accused believed himself bound or justified by law in doing the act.
Example

Late at night, A hears cries of "thief" and sees B running from a neighbour's shop, its window just smashed, with a cash box. A holds B until the police arrive. B was the shopkeeper's assistant rushing the cash to safety after someone else broke the window. A acted under a mistake of fact, in good faith and with due care, believing the law allowed him to seize an apparent thief. He is protected.

Mistake of fact and mistake of law

Mistake of fact: a wrong belief about what actually happened or exists (who a person is, whether a thing belongs to someone). Mistake of law: a wrong belief about what the law says. Sections 14 and 17 expressly exclude mistake of law, reflecting ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of the law is no excuse).

Example

A believes the law allows him to beat his tenant for not paying rent. This is a mistake of law; no protection.

Judicial Acts and Acts Done under Court Orders

  • Section 15: protects a Judge acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law; otherwise every Judge imposing imprisonment could be accused of wrongful confinement. It covers even an honest mistake about the extent of his power.
  • Section 16: protects those carrying out a court's judgment or order (a jailor keeping a convict in custody; an officer executing a warrant). Nothing done in pursuance of a judgment or order, while in force, is an offence, even if the court lacked jurisdiction, provided the person believes in good faith that it had jurisdiction. The officer need not sit in judgment over the court's jurisdiction.

Accident

Section 18: nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune, without criminal intention or knowledge, in doing a lawful act in a lawful manner, by lawful means and with proper care and caution. Every element matters.

Example

Illustration: A is working with a hatchet; its head flies off and kills a man nearby. If A took proper caution, the act is excusable. If A knew the head was loose and kept working near people, there was no proper care and caution, and Section 18 does not help. If A was swinging the hatchet at someone in a fight, the act is not lawful, and what follows is not an accident in the legal sense.

Necessity

Section 19: nothing is an offence merely because it is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if done without any criminal intention to cause harm and in good faith to prevent or avoid other harm to person or property. Explanation: whether the harm to be prevented was so serious and imminent as to justify or excuse the risk is a question of fact.

Example

A ship's captain, through no fault of his own, must either run down a boat with twenty or thirty passengers or change course and risk running down a smaller boat with two, which he may possibly clear. Changing course in good faith to save the larger boat is no offence, even if he runs down the smaller one. In a great fire, pulling down houses to stop it spreading is no offence if the danger was serious and imminent enough.

Key point

Section 19 protects one who knows his act is likely to cause harm, not one who intends harm. Hence necessity can almost never justify the intentional killing of an innocent person.

Case

R. v. Dudley and Stephens (1884, England): After their yacht sank, the captain Dudley, the mate Stephens, a sailor Brooks and a cabin boy of about seventeen, Richard Parker, were adrift in an open boat with almost no food or water. After about twenty days, Dudley, with Stephens' agreement, killed the boy, the weakest; the three survived on his body until rescued a few days later. The jury found they would probably not otherwise have survived and that the boy was likely to die first. Held: necessity cannot justify killing an innocent person to save one's own life; guilty of murder. Lord Coleridge: preserving one's life is generally a duty, but it may be the plainest and highest duty to sacrifice it; and who is to judge such necessity, and by what measure is the comparative value of lives to be measured? The Crown reduced the death sentence to six months' imprisonment, but the principle stood. Principle: necessity does not justify the deliberate killing of an innocent person to save one's own life. Under B.N.S. the same result follows from Section 19, which protects only acts done without criminal intention to cause harm; a deliberate killing is the opposite.

Infancy

Criminal liability assumes a person who can understand the nature of his act and choose to do it; very young children cannot.

PointSection 20Section 21
AgeUnder seven yearsAbove seven and under twelve years
RuleNothing done by such a child is an offenceNothing is an offence done by such a child who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion
NatureAbsolute: incapacity is conclusively presumed, even if a child of six appears to understand exactly what he is doing (doli incapax: incapable of criminal wrongdoing)Qualified: not general intelligence, but whether this child understood this act on this occasion, judged from his conduct
Example

A ten-year-old who carefully hides stolen property, lies about it and sells it secretly may be held to have understood the nature and consequences of his act.

Note

Children below eighteen alleged to have committed offences are dealt with under the Juvenile Justice Act of 2015 (care, protection and rehabilitation). Sections 20 and 21 decide whether the act is an offence at all.

Insanity

Section 22 (same as old Section 84 of the IPC): nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. One of the most important and most misunderstood exceptions.

Case

McNaughton's Case (1843, England): Daniel McNaughton, suffering from delusions of being persecuted and followed by enemies, shot Edward Drummond, private secretary to Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel, in London, mistaking him for Peel. On medical evidence he was found not guilty on the ground of insanity. After a public outcry, the House of Lords put questions to the judges, whose answers became the McNaughton rules. The most important: every man is presumed sane until the contrary is proved; to establish insanity it must be clearly proved that at the time of the act the accused was labouring under a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, so that he did not know the nature and quality of the act or, if he did, did not know it was wrong. Principle: the test is about knowledge (capacity to understand), not emotions or self-control.

The Supreme Court has said old Section 84, now Section 22, is in substance the same as these rules; the one difference is that the Indian section also protects one incapable of knowing that his act is contrary to law.

Ingredients of Section 22

  1. Unsoundness of mind;
  2. existing at the time of doing the act;
  3. by reason of which the accused was incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that it was wrong, or that it was contrary to law.
Example

A, seriously mentally ill, strangles his child believing he is squeezing a lemon: he does not know the nature of the act; Section 22 applies. B, under a severe delusion, kills his neighbour believing God commanded it as a righteous act: he may know he is killing a human being, but if the delusion makes him incapable of understanding that the act is wrong or against the law, Section 22 may apply. C, mentally ill, kills his business rival, hides the weapon, cleans the blood and creates a false alibi: his conduct shows he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong and illegal; Section 22 does not apply, whatever his medical condition.

Medical insanityLegal insanity
Any mental illness or disorder recognised by doctors, e.g. depression, anxiety, schizophrenia, personality disorderNarrower: only where, at the time of the act, unsoundness of mind was so severe that the person could not know the nature of the act, or that it was wrong or contrary to law
Concerned with diagnosisConcerned with responsibility; what Section 22 requires
Key point

A frequently confused distinction. Every legally insane person is medically unwell, but not every medically unwell person is legally insane. One who still understands what he is doing and that it is wrong can choose not to do it. Medical evidence is important but not decisive; the court decides, on all the evidence, whether the Section 22 test is met.

Case

Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand (2011): The accused, a chemist-shop owner, shot a man dead at point-blank range while the victim was sitting in his car, threatened the driver, fled and threw the pistol away. He pleaded insanity on old prescriptions, one recording a psychiatric problem with paranoid features. Held: plea rejected. Even if he had some mental instability, he had to prove legal, not medical, insanity: on a preponderance of probabilities, that at the time of the act he was incapable of knowing its nature, or that it was wrong or contrary to law. Fleeing and discarding the weapon showed he knew he had done wrong. Principle: a court is concerned with legal insanity, not medical insanity.

The crucial time

The relevant moment is the time of the act. Illness months before, or arising afterwards, is irrelevant unless unsoundness of mind existed at that very moment; but the court looks at the condition before and after the act to understand his condition at the time.

Case

Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat (1964): The accused married Kalavati in 1958. One night, with the bedroom bolted from inside, she cried out in the early hours that she was being killed. He refused the neighbours' calls to open the door until the village headman arrived. She was found dead with forty-four knife injuries; he came out with a blood-stained knife, talking irrelevantly and behaving strangely, and pleaded insanity. Held (Justice Subba Rao): (1) the prosecution must always prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the offence with the required mental state; this burden never shifts. (2) The accused is presumed not insane; he may rebut this by oral, documentary or circumstantial evidence, his burden being no higher than a civil litigant's. (3) Even if he does not fully prove insanity, his evidence may raise a reasonable doubt about the mental element, entitling him to acquittal. The crucial time is when the offence was committed, judged from circumstances that preceded, attended and followed it. On facts: he had a motive (anger that his father-in-law had not come to take the wife away as promised); the weapons in the room, the bolted door and his reluctance to come out before the headman arrived suggested a planned killing and fear of being beaten by the crowd; and many sane men give more stabs than necessary. Insanity was not established, not even a reasonable doubt arose, and the murder conviction was upheld. Principle: the burden of proving insanity is no higher than a civil litigant's, and a reasonable doubt about the mental element, even short of full proof, entitles the accused to acquittal.

Unsoundness of Mind (Section 22): What It Does Not Cover

Section 22 does not cover:

  • Irresistible impulse, where a person knows the act is wrong but cannot control himself.
  • Mere emotional disturbance, anger, jealousy or eccentric behaviour.
Key point

Indian law has kept the cognitive test, which asks about knowledge, rather than a test based on loss of self-control.

Intoxication (Sections 23 and 24)

Intoxication is closely connected to insanity, because it can also disturb the mind. But the law treats it very differently depending on whether the intoxication was involuntary or voluntary.

Involuntary intoxication (Section 23)

Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of intoxication, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that what he is doing is wrong or contrary to law. Condition: the thing which intoxicated him must have been administered to him without his knowledge or against his will. The test is the same as the test for insanity.

Example

Farhan secretly mixes a strong drug in Prince's tea. Prince, completely unaware of what he is doing, breaks Farhan's window. Prince is protected.

Voluntary intoxication (Section 24)

A person who chooses to drink cannot use his own drunkenness as a shield. For offences that require a particular knowledge or intent, a person who acts while intoxicated is dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if sober, unless the intoxicant was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will.

Key point

Section 24 presumes knowledge, not intention. Whether a drunken man had a particular intention is decided on the evidence, the court considering whether his intoxication was so severe that he could not form that intention.

PointSection 23 (involuntary)Section 24 (voluntary)
IntoxicantAdministered without his knowledge or against his willTaken by his own choice
EffectNo offence if he was incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that it was wrong or contrary to lawNo shield: knowledge is presumed as if sober; intention must still be found on the evidence
Case

Basdev v. State of PEPSU (1956, Supreme Court): a retired military officer of junior rank, very drunk at a wedding, asked a boy of about fifteen or sixteen to move aside so that he could have a convenient seat. When the boy did not move, he shot him in the abdomen with a pistol, and the boy died. He argued that he was too drunk to form the intention required for murder, so the offence was only culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Held: as to knowledge, an intoxicated man is treated as having the same knowledge as if he were sober. Intention is gathered from the general circumstances of the case, paying due regard to the degree of intoxication. A man so drunk that he was completely out of his senses cannot be fixed with the intention; but if he still knew what he was about, the ordinary presumption applies that a man intends the natural consequences of his act. The accused had chosen his seat, asked the boy to move, tried to get away after the shot, and later realised what he had done and begged for forgiveness. He could form the intention, and his conviction for murder was upheld. Principle: knowledge is presumed; intention depends on the circumstances and the degree of intoxication.

B.N.S. 2023 deals with consent in Sections 25 to 30, and Section 31, on communication made in good faith, belongs to the same family. A person can agree to suffer some harm, and in such cases the person who causes the harm should not be punished. Boxers, wrestlers and patients all consent to some harm.

It is not an offence if:

  • the act is not intended, and not known by the doer to be likely, to cause death or grievous hurt;
  • it causes harm to a person above eighteen years of age; and
  • that person has consented, expressly or impliedly, to suffer that harm or to take the risk of it.
Example

Two persons fence with each other for amusement. Each impliedly consents to the harm that may be caused without foul play.

Section 26: Act done in good faith for the benefit of the consenting person

Section 26 goes further. It covers acts done in good faith for the benefit of the person who consents. The act may even be known to be likely to cause death, as long as it is not intended to cause death.

Example

A surgeon knows that an operation is likely to cause the death of a patient suffering from a painful condition, but performs it with the patient's consent, in good faith, intending the patient's benefit. He commits no offence even if the patient dies.

Section 27: Child under twelve or person of unsound mind, with the guardian's consent

Section 27 covers acts done in good faith for the benefit of a person under twelve years of age, or a person of unsound mind, with the consent of the guardian. A parent can consent to a necessary operation on a young child. The protection never extends to intentionally causing death or attempting to cause death. It also does not extend to doing anything known to be likely to cause death, or voluntarily causing or attempting to cause grievous hurt, for any purpose other than preventing death or grievous hurt or curing a grievous disease or infirmity; nor to abetting an offence to which it would not extend.

Note

Updated from the lecture: the lecture applied the "for any purpose other than preventing death or grievous hurt or curing a grievous disease" qualifier to intentional killing as well, and left out the abetment limb. The correct position is that the proviso to Section 27 excludes intentionally causing or attempting to cause death absolutely; the qualifier applies only to acts known to be likely to cause death and to causing or attempting grievous hurt; and the protection does not cover abetment of any offence to which it would not extend. Source: The B.N.S., Section 27 (Indian Kanoon).

Consent is not valid if it is given:

  1. under fear of injury or under a misconception of fact, but only if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given because of that fear or misconception;
  2. by a person who, because of unsoundness of mind or intoxication, cannot understand the nature and consequence of what he consents to;
  3. by a person under twelve years of age, unless the context shows otherwise.
Key point

Section 28 is applied again in kidnapping and in sexual offences.

Section 29: Acts that are offences independently of harm

The consent exceptions do not apply to acts which are offences independently of any harm they cause to the consenting person. Causing miscarriage, except in good faith to save the woman's life, is the example: her consent does not make it lawful.

Section 30: Good faith act for a person's benefit without consent

An act done in good faith for a person's benefit is protected even without consent, when it is impossible for that person to give consent and there is no guardian from whom consent can be obtained in time.

Example

A surgeon who operates on an unconscious accident victim is protected. So is a person who fires at a tiger carrying away Z, knowing that the shot may kill Z, but intending only Z's benefit.

Explanation: mere monetary benefit is not benefit within these sections. A person cannot harm someone and then defend himself by saying that he did it to make him rich.

Section 31: Communication made in good faith

No communication made in good faith is an offence because of any harm it causes to the person to whom it is made, if it is made for that person's benefit. A doctor who, in good faith, gives his opinion that a patient cannot live is not guilty if the patient dies of shock.

Compulsion by Threats (Section 32)

Except murder and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats. Each condition is strict:

  1. The threat must be of instant death to that person, not of hurt or future harm.
  2. The threat must exist at the time of the act and must reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death will otherwise be the consequence.
  3. The person must not have placed himself in that situation of his own accord, or out of fear of some lesser harm.

Murder is never covered: the law expects a person to give up his own life rather than take an innocent life. The two explanations to Section 32 make the last condition clear.

Example

A person who joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, of his own accord or even out of fear of a beating, cannot later claim that the gang compelled him. But a blacksmith who is seized by a gang of dacoits and forced, under threat of instant death, to break open the door of a house, is protected.

Trivial Acts (Section 33)

Section 33 expresses the principle de minimis non curat lex: the law does not concern itself with trifles. Nothing is an offence by reason of harm so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of it. Whether harm is slight depends on all the circumstances, including the nature of the injury, the position of the parties, and the knowledge or intention with which the act was done.

Example

Taking a sheet of paper from a colleague's desk to note a phone number, or brushing against a stranger in a crowded bus, may technically fit some definition, but the harm is too slight to deserve punishment.

The Right of Private Defence (Sections 34 to 44)

The right of private defence is the most important justification in Criminal Law. The State must protect life and property, but the police cannot be everywhere. When a person faces an unlawful attack and there is no time to obtain the authorities' help, the law allows him to protect himself and others.

Key point

Section 34: nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence.

What may be defended (Section 35)

Subject to the restrictions in Section 37, every person has a right to defend:

  • Body: his own body and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting the human body.
  • Property: his own or any other person's property, movable or immovable, against theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or an attempt to commit them.

The right is not limited to protecting oneself. A stranger may defend a victim being attacked on the street.

Restrictions on the right (Section 37)

  1. Public servants: no right of private defence against an act done by a public servant, or by his direction, acting in good faith under colour of his office, even if the act is not strictly justifiable by law, provided the act does not reasonably cause apprehension of death or grievous hurt.
  2. Recourse to authorities: no right when there is time to have recourse to the protection of the public authorities.
  3. Necessary harm only: most important, the right in no case extends to inflicting more harm than is necessary for the purpose of defence.
Key point

Private defence is a right to defend, not a right to punish. It is preventive, not punitive. Once the danger has passed, the right ends.

Example

Prince is attacked by Farhan, overpowers him, and then, while Farhan lies helpless, beats him further to teach him a lesson. Prince is no longer defending himself. He is retaliating, and retaliation is revenge, not defence.

When death may be caused

Death may be caused in private defence, but only in the serious situations listed in B.N.S.

Defence of the body (Sections 38 and 39)

Under Section 38, the right extends to voluntarily causing death or any other harm to the assailant if the offence occasioning the right is:

  1. an assault that may reasonably cause the apprehension of death;
  2. an assault that may reasonably cause the apprehension of grievous hurt;
  3. an assault with the intention of committing rape;
  4. an assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust;
  5. an assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting;
  6. an assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, in circumstances that may reasonably make him fear that he will be unable to get help from the public authorities for his release;
  7. throwing or administering acid, or an attempt to do so, which may reasonably cause the apprehension of grievous hurt.

In all other cases, Section 39 extends the right to causing any harm other than death.

Defence of property (Sections 41 and 42)

Under Section 41, the right extends to causing death in four situations:

  1. robbery;
  2. house-breaking after sunset and before sunrise;
  3. mischief by fire or explosive on a building, tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or for keeping property;
  4. theft, mischief or house-trespass in circumstances that may reasonably cause apprehension of death or grievous hurt.

In other cases of theft, mischief or criminal trespass, Section 42 allows any harm other than death.

When the right begins and ends

Body (Section 40)

The right begins as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an attempt or threat to commit an offence, even though the offence has not been committed, and continues as long as that apprehension continues. A person does not have to wait to be struck first.

Case

Deo Narain v. State of U.P. (1972, Supreme Court): in a long dispute over land, the accused was in possession and cultivating it when the complainant's party came to obstruct the cultivation unlawfully. In the clash he was struck on the head with a lathi, causing only a minor injury. He struck one attacker in the chest with a spear, and that man died. The Sessions Judge acquitted him on the ground of private defence. The High Court convicted him of culpable homicide, reasoning that since his own injury was minor he had used more force than necessary, and that such force may be used only after a serious injury. Held: the Supreme Court called this a complete misunderstanding of the law and acquitted him. The right begins as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger arises from an attempt or threat, even before the offence is committed. A person need not wait to be seriously injured, and a lathi blow on the head can reasonably cause an apprehension of death or grievous hurt. Principle: the right is preventive, not punitive; a person facing grave aggression cannot be expected to coolly weigh, as if in golden scales, the exact force needed to repel it.

Property (Section 43)

The right begins when a reasonable apprehension of danger to the property begins, and continues:

AgainstThe right continues
TheftUntil the offender has escaped with the property, or the help of the public authorities is obtained, or the property is recovered
RobberyAs long as the offender causes or attempts to cause death, hurt or wrongful restraint, or the fear of instant death, hurt or restraint continues
Criminal trespass or mischiefAs long as the offender continues the trespass or mischief
House-breaking after sunset and before sunriseAs long as the house-trespass that began with the house-breaking continues

Risk of harm to an innocent person (Section 44)

If a person facing a deadly assault cannot effectively defend himself without risk of harm to an innocent person, his right extends to running that risk.

Example

A man attacked by a murderous mob cannot defend himself without firing into the mob, although young children are mingled in it. If he fires and harms a child, he commits no offence.

Reasonable apprehension and proportionality

  • Reasonable apprehension: the question is not whether the danger was actually as serious as the defender believed, but whether a reasonable person in his position would have apprehended that danger.
  • Proportionality: the force used must not be more than necessary, but a person facing sudden danger cannot be expected to measure his response with perfect precision.
Case

James Martin v. State of Kerala (Supreme Court, end of 2003): on the day of a nationwide bandh in 1988, the accused and his father were running a flour mill and a bread factory inside their own compound near Kochi. Bandh supporters, violent and some armed, climbed over the walls, demanded that the mill be shut and attacked an employee. The accused fired a gun from a window of the house, and two intruders died. The trial court and the High Court held that he had exceeded the right and convicted him of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Held: the Supreme Court acquitted him; his acts were within the reasonable limits of the right of private defence of person and property. Principle: the right is one of defence, not retribution, meant to repel unlawful aggression; but it is a very valuable right serving a social purpose and should not be construed narrowly. A person facing a violent mob in the spur of the moment cannot weigh his response in golden scales. The Court added that no one has any right, in the name of a bandh or strike, to destroy another person's property or threaten life.

Exceeding the right

A person who had the right but used more force than necessary and caused death gets no complete acquittal, but is not treated as a murderer either. Under Exception 2 to Section 101 the killing is culpable homicide not amounting to murder if he acted in good faith, without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than necessary for defence.

Aggressors, pleading and burden

  • Not for the aggressor: a person who starts a fight cannot claim private defence when his victim fights back. When two groups deliberately come together to fight, neither can usually claim the right, because both are aggressors.
  • No formal plea needed: if the evidence on record, including the prosecution's own evidence, shows that the accused acted in private defence, the court can consider the plea even if he did not raise it in so many words.
  • Burden: on the accused, but only on a balance of probabilities.

Unit Four: Offences Against the Human Body

After the general principles (act, mind, joint liability, inchoate liability and defences) come the specific offences. B.N.S. 2023 arranges offences in a new order:

  • Chapter V (from Section 63): offences against women and children, including sexual offences.
  • Chapter VI (from Section 100): offences affecting the human body, including culpable homicide, murder, hurt, kidnapping and abduction.

Homicide and Culpable Homicide (Section 100)

Homicide means the killing of a human being by a human being. Not every homicide is a crime: killing in the lawful exercise of private defence, or causing death by pure accident, is homicide but not punishable. Punishable homicide is graded according to the mental state of the killer, and that grading is the key to this entire topic.

Key point

Section 100 (old Section 299 of the IPC): whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.

The offence has two parts:

  • Physical part: causing the death of a human being by doing an act.
  • Mental part, in three alternative forms: (1) intention to cause death; (2) intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; (3) knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. If any one accompanies the act and death results, there is culpable homicide.
Example

The pit: A lays sticks and turf over a pit, intending to cause death or knowing that death is likely, and Z falls in and dies. A commits culpable homicide.

The bush: A knows that Z is behind a bush; B does not. A, intending Z's death or knowing it is likely, induces B to fire at the bush, and Z is killed. B may be guilty of no offence, because he had no guilty mind, but A commits culpable homicide, using B as an innocent instrument.

The fowl: A shoots at a fowl intending to kill and steal it, and kills B, who was hiding behind a bush, without knowing B was there. Although A was doing an unlawful act, he is not guilty of culpable homicide, because he neither intended death nor knew that his act was likely to cause death.

Explanations to Section 100:

  1. A person who causes bodily injury to someone already suffering from a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby hastens that person's death, is deemed to have caused the death.
  2. Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person causing the injury is deemed to have caused the death even if proper treatment might have prevented it.
  3. Causing the death of a child in the mother's womb is not homicide. But causing the death of a living child, any part of which has been brought forth, may be culpable homicide, even if the child has not breathed or been completely born.

Murder (Section 101)

Section 101 (old Section 300 of the IPC) says that, except in the cases excepted, culpable homicide is murder in four situations. B.N.S. 2023 labels them clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d); the old IPC called them firstly, secondly, thirdly and fourthly, names still found in judgments.

Clause (IPC name)The act by which death is caused is done
(a) FirstlyWith the intention of causing death
(b) SecondlyWith the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused (special knowledge about the victim)
(c) ThirdlyWith the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
(d) FourthlyWith knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse for incurring that risk
Example

Clause (b): A knows that Z is suffering from a disease such that a blow is likely to cause his death. A strikes Z intending to cause bodily injury, and Z dies. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have killed a healthy person. But if A did not know of the disease, and gave a blow that would not ordinarily kill a healthy person, A is not guilty of murder.

Clause (c): A intentionally gives Z a sword cut or club wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended Z's death.

Clause (d): A, without any excuse, fires a loaded cannon into a crowd and kills one person. A is guilty of murder, even though he had no premeditated design to kill any particular person.

Culpable Homicide and Murder: The Distinction

If both culpable homicide and murder include intention to cause death, what exactly is the difference?

Key point

Culpable homicide is the genus and murder is the species. Every murder is culpable homicide, but not every culpable homicide is murder. Picture a large circle (culpable homicide) with a smaller circle inside it (murder). A killing inside the large circle but outside the small one is culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Two routes decide whether a culpable homicide falls inside the smaller circle:

  1. Compare the mental state with the four clauses of Section 101. If none is satisfied, it is culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
  2. Even if a clause is satisfied, check whether any of the five exceptions to Section 101 applies. If one does, it is again culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Comparing the mental states limb by limb

Section 100 limbMatching clause of Section 101Difference
Intention to cause deathClause (a)Exact match: murder unless an exception applies
Intention to cause bodily injury likely to cause deathClause (b)Adds special knowledge about the particular victim
Intention to cause bodily injury likely to cause deathClause (c)Raises the degree of probability: injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death
Knowledge that the act is likely to cause deathClause (d)Higher degree: act so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, and done without any excuse for running that risk
Key point

"Likely to cause death" (Section 100) and "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" (Section 101) both speak of probability, but the second needs a higher degree. Likely means death is a probable result. Sufficient in the ordinary course of nature means death is the most probable result, what would normally follow unless something unusual intervened.

Case

R. v. Govinda (1876, Bombay High Court, Justice Melvill): the accused, a young man of eighteen, kicked his wife, a girl of fifteen, and struck her with his fists. When she fell, he put one knee on her chest and struck her two or three times on the face with his closed fist. The blows caused bleeding on the brain, and she died. The Sessions Judge convicted him of murder and sentenced him to death. Held: setting the two sections side by side, there was no intention to cause death, and the injury was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, since a blow with the fist would not ordinarily kill. But a violent blow on the face of a person lying with her head on the ground was certainly likely to cause death. The case fell within the second limb of culpable homicide, not the third clause of murder, and the conviction was reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Principle: if death is a likely result, it is culpable homicide; if it is the most probable result, it is murder. In practice, the question will often turn on the nature of the weapon used.

Case

State of Andhra Pradesh v. R. Punnayya (1976, Supreme Court, Justice Sarkaria): in a village divided by bitter factions, the accused followed the leader of a rival faction, a man of fifty-five, when he got off a bus, and despite his pleas beat him repeatedly on his legs and arms with heavy sticks. He suffered nineteen injuries, including many fractures, and died the next morning from shock and bleeding. The High Court reduced the conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, partly because no blow was aimed at a vital part of the body. Held: the Supreme Court restored the conviction for murder. In the scheme of the Code, culpable homicide is the genus and murder its species. The Court identified three degrees of culpable homicide, compared the two sections limb by limb, and suggested a three-stage approach (below). The injuries were intentionally inflicted and together sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, which brought the case within the third clause of murder even though no single blow was aimed at a vital part. Principle: the distinction between these offences is fine but real, and overlooking it may result in a miscarriage of justice.

Key point

The Punnayya three-stage approach: (1) Did the accused do an act that caused the death? (2) If so, does it amount to culpable homicide? (3) Does it fall within any clause of murder, and if so, does any exception apply?

Three degrees of culpable homicide

DegreeWhat it coversPunishment
HighestMurderSection 103
MiddleCulpable homicide not amounting to murder done with intention to cause death, or to cause bodily injury likely to cause death, where an exception applies or the injury intended falls short of the murder clausesSection 105, first part: imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of not less than five years which may extend to ten years, and fine
LowestOnly knowledge that the act was likely to cause death, without any such intentionSection 105, second part: imprisonment up to ten years and fine
Note

Updated from the lecture: the lecture gave the punishment for the second part of Section 105 as imprisonment up to ten years, or fine, or both. The correct position is that the second part of Section 105 provides imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years "and with fine", so a sentence of fine alone is not available. Source: The B.N.S., Section 105 (Indian Kanoon).

Example

Clause (a): Prince shoots Farhan in the chest from close range, wanting him dead. Farhan dies. Murder under the first clause.

Clause (b): Prince, knowing that Farhan has a very fragile skull because of a recent operation, deliberately slaps him hard on the head. Farhan dies. Murder under the second clause, because Prince knew the injury was likely to kill this particular person.

Clause (c): Prince stabs Farhan in the abdomen with a long knife, intending to cause that wound, which is found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Farhan dies. Murder under the third clause, even if Prince says he only wanted to injure.

Not culpable homicide: Prince hits Farhan once with a light stick on the arm in a quarrel. Unexpectedly, Farhan falls, hits his head on a stone and dies. Prince intended neither death nor an injury likely to cause death, and did not know death was likely. This is not culpable homicide at all; Prince may be guilty only of causing hurt.

Clause (c) of Section 101 and the Virsa Singh Test

The third clause is the one most often used in practice, because killers rarely admit that they intended death.

Case

Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (1958, Supreme Court, Justice Vivian Bose): the accused thrust a spear into the abdomen of Khem Singh. The wound was so deep that three coils of the intestine came out, and Khem Singh died the next day. There was only this one injury, and the trial court found that the accused had not intended to kill. He argued that, under the third clause, the prosecution must prove that he intended to inflict an injury sufficient to cause death. Held: the argument was rejected and the conviction for murder upheld. The Court laid down four steps for the prosecution (below); once they are proved, the offence is murder, even though there was no intention to cause death. Principle: no one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and claim that they are not guilty of murder.

The prosecution must prove:

  1. quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;
  2. the nature of the injury;
  3. an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is, it was not accidental or unintentional, and some other kind of injury was not intended;
  4. that the injury of that type is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This step is purely objective and has nothing to do with the intention of the accused.
Key point

The test separates two questions. Whether the accused intended the particular injury is subjective. Whether that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is objective, decided mainly on medical evidence. The accused cannot escape by saying he did not know the injury was so serious. Once he intended that particular injury, and that injury was objectively sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the law treats the killing as murder.

Clause (d) of Section 101: Imminently Dangerous Acts

The fourth clause covers cases with no intention to cause any particular injury to any particular person, where the act is so dangerous that death is almost certain: firing into a crowd, driving a vehicle at high speed into a procession, or setting fire to an occupied house at night. The words "without any excuse" matter: if a person runs such a risk for a lawful and pressing reason, the fourth clause may not apply.

Case

Gyarsibai v. The State (1952, High Court of Madhya Bharat): the accused lived with her husband, three young children and her sister-in-law, amid constant quarrels. After her sister-in-law told her to leave, she went out with the three children, saying that she would jump into a well, and did so with all three. Hours later she was found alive, holding on to the side of the well, but all three children had died. She intended to end her own life, not to kill the children, so the first three clauses of murder did not apply. Held: she was guilty of murder under the fourth clause. Every sane person is presumed to have some knowledge of the nature of his act, and only insanity takes it away; she must have known that jumping into a well with small children was so imminently dangerous that it would in all probability cause their death. There was no excuse, because the harassment at home could have been escaped by other means. An imminently dangerous act is not murder if it is done to prevent a greater evil, but this was not such a case. Recognising the tragic circumstances, the court recommended to the Government that her sentence be reduced. Principle: knowledge of extreme danger, combined with the absence of any excuse, makes a killing murder even without any intention to kill.

Transferred Intention (Section 102)

Section 102 deals with transferred malice. If a person does something which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, and thereby causes the death of a person whose death he neither intended nor knew to be likely, the culpable homicide is of the same description as if he had killed the intended person.

Example

Prince shoots at Farhan intending to kill him, misses, and kills Aadil, who was standing nearby. Prince is guilty of the murder of Aadil, just as if he had killed Farhan. The intention moves with the bullet.

The Exceptions to Murder

Section 101 has five exceptions. In each, even though the killing satisfies one of the four clauses, the law reduces it from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Key point

The exceptions do not acquit the accused. They reduce the seriousness of the offence because his blameworthiness is reduced.

Exception 1: Grave and sudden provocation

Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, while deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation, or of any other person by mistake or accident.

Provisos: the provocation must not be:

  1. sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or harming anyone;
  2. given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of his powers;
  3. given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

Explanation: whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough is a question of fact.

  • Grave: serious enough to make a reasonable person lose self-control.
  • Sudden: it comes without warning, and the killing follows before there is time to cool down.
  • Actual loss of self-control at the time of the killing. If there was time for passion to cool and he killed after deliberation, the exception will not help.
Case

K. M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (1961, Supreme Court): the accused, a naval officer, learnt from his wife that she had been having an affair with his friend, Prem Ahuja. He dropped his wife and children at a cinema, took a revolver and cartridges from his ship on a false pretext, went to Ahuja's office and then to his flat, entered his bedroom and shot him dead, about three hours after his wife's confession. The jury found him not guilty, but on a reference the High Court convicted him of murder. Held: the Supreme Court upheld the conviction for murder and laid down four principles (below). The accused had enough time to cool down; arranging for his family, collecting the revolver on a false pretext and searching for Ahuja showed a deliberate and calculated killing. Principle: no abstract standard of reasonableness can be laid down, because what provokes a reasonable person depends on the customs, manners and social background of the community.

The four Nanavati principles:

  1. Test: would a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused, and placed in the same situation, be so provoked as to lose his self-control?
  2. In India, words and gestures may also amount to grave and sudden provocation.
  3. The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be taken into account.
  4. The fatal blow must be clearly traced to the influence of passion arising from that provocation, and not to a time after the passion has cooled and there has been room for premeditation and calculation.

Exception 2: Private defence exceeded

Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes death, without premeditation and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for defence.

Example

Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in a way likely to cause grievous hurt. A draws a pistol. Z continues the assault, and A, believing in good faith that he can prevent the horsewhipping in no other way, shoots Z dead. A has committed not murder, but only culpable homicide.

Exception 3: Public servant exceeding his powers

A public servant, or a person aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, who exceeds his legal powers and causes death, is covered if he acted in the good faith belief that the act was lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty, and without ill will towards the person killed.

Exception 4: Sudden fight

Culpable homicide is not murder if committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel, and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation: it does not matter which party offered the provocation or committed the first assault. The protection is lost by taking undue advantage, such as attacking an unarmed man with a weapon, continuing to strike a person who has fallen down, or acting in a cruel manner.

Key point

Students often confuse Exception 4 with Exception 1. The difference is set out below.

Exception 1: Grave and sudden provocationException 4: Sudden fight
One person provokes and the other loses self-controlA mutual fight; both parties are in the heat of passion
The offender must actually be deprived of the power of self-control by the provocationNo question of who provoked whom; it does not matter which party offered the provocation or committed the first assault

Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above eighteen years of age, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent. A classic example is a suicide pact, where one partner kills the other at the other's genuine request.

Example

If A instigates a child to commit suicide, the child, because of his youth, cannot give consent, and so A has abetted murder.

  • Section 103(1): murder is punished with death or imprisonment for life, and the offender shall also be liable to fine. Under settled law, the death penalty is imposed only in the rarest of rare cases, when the alternative of life imprisonment is unquestionably ruled out.
  • Section 103(2) (new): when a group of five or more persons acting in concert commits murder on the ground of race, caste or community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or any other similar ground, each member of the group is punished with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. This responds to murders committed by mobs.
  • Section 104: a person who commits murder while under a sentence of imprisonment for life is punished with death or imprisonment for life, which shall mean the remainder of that person's natural life.
  • Section 106: causing death by a rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide. This is a separate offence, not a degree of culpable homicide; for example, causing death by careless driving without the intention or knowledge required by Section 100. Punishment: up to five years; for a registered medical practitioner causing death by negligence while performing a medical procedure, up to two years. New Section 106(2), for a driver who causes death and escapes without reporting it, provides up to ten years, but the Central Government has not yet brought it into force.

Kidnapping (Section 137)

Kidnapping is the first of the offences that interfere with a person's liberty and with the authority of guardians. Under Section 137(1), kidnapping is of two kinds:

  1. Kidnapping from India (clause (a)): whoever conveys any person beyond the limits of India without the consent of that person, or of some person legally authorised to consent on that person's behalf. This applies to a person of any age.
  2. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship (clause (b)): whoever takes or entices any child or any person of unsound mind out of the keeping of the lawful guardian, without the guardian's consent.
Example

If Prince secretly carries an adult across the border without that adult's consent, Prince kidnaps him from India.

B.N.S. 2023 uses the word child, and Section 2(3) defines a child as any person below the age of eighteen years.

PointOld IPCB.N.S. 2023
BoyProtected only if under sixteenProtected if under eighteen
GirlProtected if under eighteenProtected if under eighteen
Key point

Today the age limit for kidnapping from lawful guardianship is eighteen for every child, whatever the child's gender.

Kidnapping from Lawful Guardianship (continued)

Ingredients

  1. The victim must be a child or a person of unsound mind.
  2. The accused must take or entice that person.
    • Taking: causing the child to go with the accused. Force is not required.
    • Enticing: inducing the child, by persuasion, promises or temptation, to leave the guardian.
  3. The taking or enticing must be out of the keeping of the lawful guardian.
  4. It must be without the consent of the guardian.

Keeping of the lawful guardian

"Keeping" does not require the child to be physically inside the guardian's house. A child who has gone to school, to the market or to a friend's house remains in the guardian's keeping, because the guardian's control and protection continue.

By the Explanation, a lawful guardian includes any person lawfully entrusted with the care or custody of the child, such as a school teacher, a hostel warden, or a relative entrusted with the child.

Key point

The offence protects the right of the guardian, and the law assumes that a child cannot give meaningful consent to leaving the guardian's protection. The consent of the child is irrelevant; only the guardian's consent matters. If a 16-year-old girl says she went with the accused willingly, that does not help him if he took or enticed her.

Exception

The clause does not extend to a person who in good faith believes himself to be the father of an illegitimate child, or believes himself entitled to the lawful custody of the child, unless the act is committed for an immoral or unlawful purpose.

Punishment and graver forms

  • Section 137(2): imprisonment up to 7 years and fine.
  • Section 139: kidnapping a child for begging.
  • Section 140: kidnapping or abducting for murder, ransom, secret confinement or slavery.

Taking and Enticing

Three Supreme Court decisions settle when the accused has taken or enticed a child who leaves home on her own while the accused only goes along.

Case

State of Haryana v. Raja Ram (1972): Jai Narayan wanted to seduce a girl of about 14; her father forbade him from visiting the house. Jai Narayan used the accused Raja Ram, a neighbour, as go-between. Raja Ram persuaded the girl, arranged a message asking her to come out at midnight, took her and handed her to Jai Narayan. The High Court acquitted him because she went willingly. Held (Supreme Court): conviction restored. The law protects minors from seduction for improper purposes and protects guardians' rights. "Keeping" implies the guardian's charge, protection and control, consistent with the child's freedom to move about. The minor's consent is wholly immaterial; only the guardian's consent takes the case out of the offence. Force or fraud is unnecessary. Principle: persuasion creating the minor's willingness to leave is enough; here he actively helped form her intention to leave.

Case

S. Varadarajan v. State of Madras (1964): a college student a few weeks short of 18 told her sister she wished to marry the accused, a neighbour. Her father moved her to a relative's house. She left it on her own, telephoned the accused to meet her on a road, got into his car, and they registered an agreement to marry. The lower courts convicted him. Held (Supreme Court): acquitted. Taking a minor differs from merely allowing a minor to accompany. Where a minor who understands what she is doing voluntarily leaves and joins the accused, he has not taken her unless he held out some inducement or actively helped form her intention to leave. The initiative here came entirely from a mature girl on the verge of majority; the Court decided on these facts alone. Principle: merely allowing a minor to accompany is not taking.

Case

Thakorlal D. Vadgama v. State of Gujarat (1973): a wealthy businessman befriended the family of a school-going girl below 15, and over many months gave her gifts, took the family on trips and wrote her letters. Her mother grew suspicious and warned her. Eventually, at his instance, she left home and went to him. Relying on Varadarajan, he argued she came on her own. Held (Supreme Court): conviction upheld. "Entice" means inducement or allurement by raising hope or desire, and it may work gradually over a long period. Having laid the foundation by earlier inducements, he cannot escape because she came voluntarily at the final moment. Principle: the accused's act need not be the immediate cause of the minor leaving.

Key point

An active role by the accused (persuading, inducing, promising or arranging for the child to leave) is taking or enticing, even if the child appeared to go willingly. If the child, with full knowledge and capacity, decided on her own to leave and he only allowed her to accompany him, there is no taking.

Proof of age

The prosecution must prove that the child was below 18 at the time of the taking or enticing. In many cases the age, proved through school records, birth certificates or medical opinion, decides whether the offence is made out at all.

Abduction

Section 138: whoever by force compels, or by any deceitful means induces, any person to go from any place, is said to abduct that person.

Ingredients

  1. The person must be compelled or induced to go from any place.
  2. The means must be force (physical force used to make the person go) or deceitful means (any trick or false representation).
Example

A tells B, an adult woman, that her mother is seriously ill in hospital. On this false story B gets into A's car and goes with him. A has abducted B by deceitful means.

Punishable only with a purpose

Unlike kidnapping, abduction by itself is not punished; it is punishable only when done with a particular purpose, for example:

  • Section 140: abduction in order to murder, for ransom, for secret and wrongful confinement, or for grievous hurt or slavery.
  • Section 87: kidnapping or abducting a woman to compel her marriage against her will, or to force or seduce her to illicit intercourse.

A continuing offence

A person is abducted not only when first moved but every time he is moved from one place to another by force or deceit. If A forcibly takes B from one city to another and then to a third, the abduction continues throughout. Kidnapping from lawful guardianship, by contrast, is complete the moment the child is taken out of the guardian's keeping and does not continue.

Kidnapping and Abduction Compared

A very commonly tested distinction.

BasisKidnapping from lawful guardianshipAbduction
Age of the victimOnly a child under 18 or a person of unsound mindA person of any age
MeansOnly taking or enticing; no force or deceit requiredForce or deceitful means required
ConsentChild's consent irrelevant; only the guardian's consent mattersNo abduction if the person freely consents to go with full knowledge of the facts
Interest protectedRight of the guardianLiberty of the person abducted
NatureComplete on removal from the guardian's keeping; a substantive offence by itselfContinuing offence; punishable only when done with a purpose stated in B.N.S.

Sexual Offences: Rape

These offences are among the gravest violations of dignity and bodily autonomy. The central idea running through the topic is consent.

Definition (Section 63)

  • Section 63 of B.N.S. corresponds to old Section 375 of the IPC as amended in 2013.
  • It is gender-specific: an offence by a man against a woman. Under Section 2(35), a woman is a female human being of any age.
  • Its four clauses describe a range of penetrative and other sexual acts. The definition is deliberately broad, not limited to one physical act, and penetration to any extent is enough.

The seven circumstances

The physical act becomes rape only if done in any of these circumstances:

  1. Against her will.
  2. Without her consent.
  3. With her consent, obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or hurt.
  4. With her consent, when the man knows he is not her husband and she consents believing he is another man to whom she is, or believes herself to be, lawfully married.
  5. With her consent, when at the time she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the act because of unsoundness of mind, intoxication, or a stupefying substance given by him or through another.
  6. With or without her consent, when she is under 18.
  7. When she is unable to communicate consent.

Circumstances 1 and 2 cover absence of will or consent; 3 to 5 cover consent that is not real consent (fear, mistaken identity, inability to understand), closely following the rule on invalid consent in Section 28; 6 makes consent legally irrelevant below 18; 7 covers inability to communicate consent.

Key point

The age of consent under the present law is 18 years.

Key point

Explanation 2 to Section 63: consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman, by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act. Proviso: a woman who does not physically resist shall not, by reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting.

  • Unequivocal: clear, not ambiguous.
  • Voluntary: free from force, fear or pressure.
  • Specific: agreeing to one thing is not agreeing to everything.
  • No resistance is not consent.

Consent is a free and positive act of the will, given with knowledge of what is agreed to. Submission is merely yielding out of helplessness, fear or being overpowered. Every consent involves a kind of submission, but not every submission is consent: a woman who stops resisting because she is terrified, or is in her assailant's custody, has submitted, not consented. The law came to reflect this only after a much-debated decision.

Case

Tukaram v. State of Maharashtra (1978): a young orphan labourer was brought to a police station at night over a complaint filed by her brother. After the others were asked to leave, she alleged, two constables on duty sexually assaulted her inside the station. The Sessions Court acquitted; the High Court convicted, holding that helpless surrender under fear in police custody was not consent. Held (Supreme Court): both acquitted, as there were no marks of injury, she raised no alarm, and it was not proved that her consent was obtained by fear of death or hurt, as the definition then required. Principle: this reasoning, treating absence of resistance as consent, has since been rejected by statute.

  • The judgment caused a nationwide outcry; legal scholars wrote an open letter to the Chief Justice criticising it.
  • 1983: Parliament introduced stricter punishment for custodial rape and a presumption about absence of consent in certain aggravated cases, now in Section 120 of B.S.A.
  • 2013: consent itself was defined. Explanation 2 directly rejects the reasoning of that decision: absence of physical resistance is not consent, and a woman in police custody who submits out of helplessness has not consented.

The Two Exceptions to Section 63

  • Exception 1: a medical procedure or intervention is not rape.
  • Exception 2: sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under 18, is not rape.

The words "not being under eighteen years of age" did not appear in this form in the old IPC; they reflect a Supreme Court decision.

Case

Independent Thought v. Union of India (2017): a public interest petition challenged the old marital exception, which protected a husband whose wife was not under 15. Intercourse with any girl below 18 was rape, yet the husband of a girl aged 15 to 18 was protected, though child-protection laws, such as the law against child sexual abuse, treated everyone below 18 as a child. Held (Supreme Court): a married girl aged 15 to 18 is still a child; the exception drew an arbitrary and discriminatory line between married and unmarried girl children. The Court read it down (without striking it down) to apply only where the wife is not under 18, and left open marital rape of adult women. Principle: a wife below 18 is outside the marital exception. B.N.S. has written this ruling into Exception 2.

Two further points

  • Section 67 punishes a husband who has sexual intercourse with his wife without her consent while she is living separately, under a decree of separation or otherwise.
  • Whether the marital exception for adult wives is constitutionally valid is pending before a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, which in September 2026 listed the matter for final hearing. Until it decides, Exception 2 remains law.

Under Section 28, consent given under a misconception of fact is not valid if the accused knew or had reason to believe it was given because of that misconception. The difficulty arises where a woman agrees to a sexual relationship on a promise to marry that the man later refuses to keep.

False promiseBroken promise
False from the very beginning, made only to obtain consent, with no intention of keeping itGenuinely intended at the time, but not kept because of changed circumstances
Consent may be vitiated by misconception of factDoes not convert a consensual relationship into rape

A long consensual relationship between two adults does not become rape merely because it ends without marriage.

Section 69 (new provision)

Whoever, by deceitful means or by a promise to marry a woman without any intention of fulfilling it, has sexual intercourse with her, not amounting to rape, is punishable with imprisonment up to 10 years and fine. "Deceitful means" includes inducement for, or false promise of, employment or promotion, and marrying by suppressing identity.

Key point

Note the words "without any intention of fulfilling the same": for a promise to marry, the offence depends on the man's intention at the time he made the promise.

Punishment and Aggravated Forms of Rape

Section 64(1): rigorous imprisonment (RI) of not less than 10 years, which may extend to imprisonment for life, and fine.

Section 64(2): aggravated situations

Cases where the offender abuses a position of power or the victim is especially vulnerable.

Position of the offender

  • A police officer, within his police station or on a woman in his custody.
  • A public servant, on a woman in his custody.
  • A member of the armed forces, in an area of deployment.
  • The staff of a jail, remand home, hospital or similar institution.
  • A relative, guardian, teacher, or person in a position of trust, authority, control or dominance.

The victim or the circumstances

  • Rape during communal or sectarian violence.
  • Rape of a woman known to be pregnant.
  • Rape of a woman incapable of giving consent, or suffering from mental or physical disability.
  • Rape causing grievous bodily harm or endangering life.
  • Repeated rape of the same woman.

Punishment: rigorous imprisonment of not less than 10 years, extendable to imprisonment for life meaning the remainder of natural life, and fine.

Other provisions

ProvisionSituationPunishment
Section 65Woman under 16RI not less than 20 years, extendable to the remainder of natural life, and fine
Section 65Woman under 12Same minimum; may also be death
Section 66Person guilty under Section 64 inflicts, in the course of the rape, injury causing death or a persistent vegetative stateNot less than 20 years, up to the remainder of natural life, or death
Section 68Person in authority or a fiduciary relationship, public servant, or manager of a jail, remand home, institution or hospital abuses his position to induce or seduce a woman in his custody or charge to intercourse not amounting to rapeRI not less than 5 years, up to 10 years, and fine

Gang Rape (Section 70)

Where a woman is raped by one or more persons constituting a group or acting in furtherance of a common intention, each of them is deemed to have committed rape.

  • Punishment: RI not less than 20 years, extendable to the remainder of natural life, and fine.
  • Woman under 18: imprisonment for the remainder of natural life and fine, or death, for each person.

Section 70 is a provision of constructive liability: it need not be proved that each member personally committed the physical act. It applies the logic of common intention with special force to a grave offence.

Key point

B.N.S. replaces the old separate categories of gang rape on a girl under 16 and under 12 with one category: a woman under 18.

Sexual offences against children are dealt with in detail by the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, which is gender-neutral and protects every child below 18. In practice both laws are often applied together.

Offences Against Property: The Basic Vocabulary

Chapter 17 of B.N.S. contains offences against property. Five are studied here: theft, extortion, robbery, dacoity and cheating, all relying on these Section 2 definitions.

Dishonestly, wrongful gain and wrongful loss

  • Dishonestly (clause 7): doing a thing with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another.
  • Wrongful gain (clause 36): gain by unlawful means of property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled.
  • Wrongful loss (clause 37): loss by unlawful means of property to which the person losing it is legally entitled.
  • Clause 38: one gains wrongfully by wrongfully acquiring or retaining property, and loses wrongfully by being wrongfully deprived of it or kept out of it.
Note

Updated from the lecture: the lecture placed the definition of "dishonestly" in clause 6 of Section 2. The correct position is that "dishonestly" is defined in B.N.S. Section 2(7); clause 6 defines "death". Source: The B.N.S. (India Code).

Key point

Because of clause 38, even a temporary deprivation can be a wrongful loss.

Fraudulently (clause 9)

Doing a thing with intent to defraud, but not otherwise. Dishonestly concerns wrongful gain or loss of property; fraudulently concerns deceit. As the courts explain, the deceiver aims at some advantage for himself or some injury to the deceived, which need not always be a loss of property.

Movable property (clause 21)

Property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth.

Valuable security (clause 31)

A document by which a legal right is created, extended, transferred, restricted, extinguished or released, or by which a person acknowledges that he is under a legal liability or does not have a certain legal right. Examples: a promissory note, a cheque, a bond, a sale deed.

Theft

Key point

Section 303(1): whoever, intending to take dishonestly any movable property out of the possession of any person without that person's consent, moves that property in order to such taking, commits theft.

Five ingredients: (1) dishonest intention to take; (2) movable property; (3) in the possession of some person; (4) taken without that person's consent; (5) moving of the property in order to such taking.

1. Dishonest intention

This is the heart of theft, and it must exist at the time of moving the property. If A takes Z's umbrella from a stand honestly believing it to be his own, there is no theft. But an intention to keep the property permanently is not required: if A takes Z's property intending to keep it until Z pays a reward for its return, A has committed theft.

Case

Pyare Lal Bhargava v. State of Rajasthan (1962): the accused, a Superintendent in the Chief Engineer's office at Alwar, had a friend with a matter pending with the government. At the friend's request, he got the relevant file, which contained some of the friend's papers, from the office through a clerk and took it home, where the friend removed some papers and substituted others. The file was returned the next day. He argued that a temporary taking was not theft. Held (Supreme Court): conviction upheld. The file was in the department's possession, not his. Theft does not require permanent taking; wrongful loss may be caused even by temporary dispossession, and taking the file out of the department's possession even for a day dishonestly caused it. Principle: under Indian law, intention to deprive the owner permanently is not necessary for theft.

2. Movable property

Land cannot be stolen. Under Explanation 1, a thing attached to the earth becomes capable of being stolen once severed; under Explanation 2, the moving effected by the same act which causes the severance may itself be theft. If A cuts down a tree on Z's land intending to take it dishonestly, theft is committed the moment the tree is severed.

3. Possession

Theft is an offence against possession, not just ownership, so even an owner can steal his own property.

Example

A pawns his watch with Z and takes it back without Z's consent before repaying the loan. A commits theft, because Z was in lawful possession. By contrast, a ring lying on a public road is in no one's possession; picking it up is not theft, though dishonestly keeping it may be criminal misappropriation.

Section 3(3) of B.N.S.: property in the possession of a person's spouse, clerk or servant, on account of that person, is in that person's possession.

Explanation 5: consent may be express or implied, given by the person in possession or by anyone authorised by him. If A's friend takes a book from A's shelf to read, believing A would not mind, there may be implied consent and no theft.

5. Moving the property

Theft is complete as soon as the property is moved, however slightly, with dishonest intention; it need not be carried away.

  • Explanation 3: a thing is moved by removing an obstacle that prevented it from moving, or by separating it from another thing, as well as by actually moving it.
  • Explanation 4: one who causes an animal to move moves that animal and everything that moves because of it.
Example

A puts bait in his pocket to make Z's dog follow him, intending to take the dog dishonestly. Theft is complete when the dog begins to follow.

Punishment and snatching

  • Section 303(2): imprisonment up to 3 years, or fine, or both. Second or subsequent conviction: RI of at least 1 year and up to 5 years, with fine.
  • Community service (a humane innovation): where the stolen property is worth less than ₹5,000 and the person is convicted for the first time, he is punished with community service, when he returns the value or restores the property.
  • Snatching (Section 304), a new separate offence: theft where the offender suddenly, quickly or forcibly seizes or grabs movable property from a person.

Extortion

Key point

Section 308(1): whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits extortion.

Ingredients: (1) intentionally putting a person in fear of injury (2) to that person or anyone else; (3) thereby dishonestly inducing delivery; (4) actual delivery of property, a valuable security, or a signed or sealed thing convertible into one.

Injury

Section 2(14): any harm whatever illegally caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or property. So the fear need not be of physical harm.

Example

Extortion: threatening to publish a defamatory statement about Z unless Z pays money; threatening to keep Z's child in wrongful confinement unless Z signs and delivers a promissory note; and (a new illustration in B.N.S.) A messaging Z through an electronic device that Z's child is in his possession and will be put to death unless Z sends ₹1 lakh, and Z sends it.

Delivery and punishment

Extortion is complete only on actual delivery by the person put in fear. Punishment under Section 308(2): imprisonment up to 7 years, or fine, or both. If the victim refuses, there is no extortion, though the accused may be punished for putting the person in fear in order to commit extortion under Section 308(3), (4) or (6).

Example

A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly induces Z to sign a blank paper and deliver it to A. This is extortion, because the signed blank paper may be converted into a valuable security.

Theft and Extortion Compared

BasisTheftExtortion
ConsentTaken without the owner's consentOwner consents and delivers, but consent is obtained by fear
Who moves the propertyThe offenderThe victim delivers it
PropertyOnly movable propertyNot limited to movable property: "any property", plus a valuable security or signed or sealed document
FearNot an elementFear of injury is the very core
Key point

In theft, the thief takes. In extortion, the victim gives, but gives because he is afraid.

Robbery

Section 309(1): in all robbery there is either theft or extortion. Robbery is an aggravated form of one of them.

Theft as robbery (Section 309(2))

Theft is robbery if, in order to commit it, while committing it, or while carrying away or attempting to carry away the stolen property, the offender for that end voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death, hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death, instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint. Two elements: the violence or fear must be for the purpose of the theft, and at the time of the theft.

Example

A steals Z's bag and an hour later beats Z in the street over an old quarrel: not robbery, as the violence was not for the purpose of the theft. A holds Z down and takes money from his clothes: robbery, as wrongful restraint was caused to commit the theft.

Extortion as robbery (Section 309(3))

Extortion is robbery if the offender, at the time of committing it, is in the presence of the person put in fear, commits it by putting that person in fear of instant death, instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint to that person or someone else, and thereby induces him then and there to deliver the thing extorted. By the Explanation, the offender is present if sufficiently near to put the other in fear of instant death, hurt or restraint. So three elements: presence, instant harm, delivery then and there.

Example

A meets Z on the highway, shows a pistol and demands Z's purse; Z hands it over: robbery by extortion. A sends a message that Z's child is with his gang and will be killed unless Z sends ₹10,000, and Z sends it: extortion, not robbery, as the threat is not of instant harm in Z's presence and delivery is not then and there.

Robbery differs fromBecause of
Simple theftViolence or fear of instant violence used for the purpose of the theft
Simple extortionPresence of the offender, the instant nature of the threat, and immediate delivery

Punishment

  • Section 309(4): RI up to 10 years and fine; up to 14 years if committed on a highway between sunset and sunrise.
  • Section 309(5): attempt to commit robbery.
  • Section 309(6): if any person voluntarily causes hurt in committing or attempting robbery, he and every other person jointly concerned are punishable with imprisonment for life or RI up to 10 years, and fine (joint liability).

Dacoity

Section 310(1): when five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit robbery, or where those conjointly committing or attempting it, together with those present and aiding, amount to five or more, every person committing, attempting or aiding commits dacoity.

Requirements: (1) robbery or an attempt at it; (2) five or more persons, counting those present and aiding (such as one keeping watch outside or waiting in a vehicle to help the others escape); (3) acting conjointly, that is together, in concert, for the common purpose of the robbery.

Example

Four persons rob a house while a fifth waits outside in a car to drive them away: all five commit dacoity. If only four are involved, it is robbery, however violent.

Key point

Every dacoity is a robbery, but robbery becomes dacoity only when five or more persons conjointly take part.

  • Section 310(2): imprisonment for life or RI up to 10 years, and fine.
  • Section 310(3), dacoity with murder: if any one of five or more persons conjointly committing dacoity commits murder in so doing, every one of them is punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or RI not less than 10 years, and fine, even if the others did not intend or take part in the murder. One of the strictest rules of constructive liability in B.N.S.
  • Section 310(4): preparation to commit dacoity, one of the rare cases where preparation is punished.
  • Section 310(5): assembling for the purpose of committing dacoity.
  • Section 310(6): belonging to a gang associated for habitually committing dacoity.

Cheating

Section 318(1) (old Section 415 of the IPC). The foundation of every case is deception: a false statement, false conduct, or (by the Explanation) a dishonest concealment of facts. The definition has two branches.

  1. Property branch: by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly inducing him to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property. Example: A falsely pretends to be a government officer and induces Z to give him goods on credit, which A never intends to pay for. A cheats.
  2. Harm branch: by deceiving a person, intentionally inducing him to do or omit anything he would not do or omit if not deceived, where the act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to him in body, mind, reputation or property. No delivery of property is needed. Example: A, falsely claiming to be a qualified doctor, induces Z to undergo a dangerous treatment that harms Z's health. A cheats under the second branch.

Punishment

ProvisionSituationPunishment
Section 318(2)CheatingUp to 3 years, or fine, or both
Section 318(3)Cheat knows wrongful loss is likely to a person whose interest he was bound by law or a legal contract to protectUp to 5 years, or fine, or both
Section 318(4) (old Section 420 of the IPC)Person deceived dishonestly induced to deliver property, or to make, alter or destroy a valuable securityUp to 7 years and fine

Section 319, cheating by personation: cheating by pretending to be some other person, real or imaginary, or representing that he or another person is someone else.

The Time of the Dishonest Intention

Key point

The dishonest intention must exist at the time of making the representation or inducement. Intention to deceive from the beginning is cheating; honesty at the beginning followed by a later failure to keep the promise is not.

Case

Mahadeo Prasad v. State of West Bengal (1954): a Calcutta trader agreed to buy 25 ingots of tin on "cash against delivery" (payment on delivery). He took delivery at his shop, kept the complainant's employee waiting, went away, never returned and never paid, later claiming a credit sale and a civil dispute. He was heavily overdrawn at his bank and had offered his other tin to the bank as security that same day, leaving almost no means to pay. Held (Supreme Court): conviction upheld. Intention to pay at the time of promising would make a later failure not cheating; but having no intention whatsoever to pay when taking delivery, and promising cash against delivery merely to induce delivery, is cheating. Principle: that intention may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.

Cheating and Breach of Contract

A practically vital distinction: those who fail to pay, deliver or complete work are often accused of cheating, as a criminal case puts more pressure than a civil suit.

Example

Illustration to Section 318: A intentionally deceives Z into believing that A means to deliver a certain quantity of indigo plant, which A does not intend to deliver, and so dishonestly induces Z to advance money. A cheats. But if A, when obtaining the money, intends to deliver and afterwards breaks the contract, he does not cheat; he is liable only to a civil action for breach of contract.

The test: was there a dishonest intention at the very beginning of the transaction? If yes, it may be cheating. If the intention was honest at the beginning and the failure came later, it is a breach of contract, remediable in a civil court.

Courts infer the initial intention from all the circumstances, such as use of a false name or address, a cheque from a closed account, disappearing immediately after receiving the money, or making the same promise to many people knowing it cannot be kept. But a mere failure to pay or perform, without more, does not prove dishonest intention at the start, and the criminal law should not be used as a tool to recover money in what is really a civil dispute.

Case

Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar (2000): three brothers sold land to a housing society; most of the price was paid and the sale deed registered, but some of the buyer's cheques later bounced. The buyer's side then filed a cheating complaint against the sellers for not disclosing a pending family partition suit. Held (Supreme Court): complaint quashed. The line between breach of contract and cheating is fine and turns on intention at the time of inducement, which later conduct may show but is not the only test. A mere breach cannot support a cheating prosecution unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning; none appeared, so continuing would be an abuse of process. Principle: in the Court's words, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence.

Cheating: deception by a claim of divine powers

Deception can take many forms, including a false claim of supernatural power.

Case

Shri Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwanandha Maharaj v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1999), Supreme Court: a self-styled godman claimed divine powers and said he could cure the complainant's daughter, a girl of fifteen unable to speak since birth. He demanded a large amount in instalments; the father paid part of it. The girl was not cured and the promised date kept being postponed. The accused sought quashing of the cheating case. Held: quashing refused. Praying to God for the cure of an ailment is not fraud; but representing that one has divine powers, making the other believe it, and thereby inducing him to pay money is the inducement the definition of cheating speaks of. The accused was not convicted, as the case was only at the quashing stage; it had to go to trial, where he could try to show he had not cheated. Principle: a false representation about any fact, even a claimed supernatural power, can be a deception if used to obtain property.

Cheating completes the offences against property and the specific offences.

Bringing it all together

The real strength of Criminal Law under B.N.S. 2023 lies in seeing how its parts fit together. The aim is to understand not just what the law says, but why it says it.

Actus reus and mens rea

Every criminal case begins with two questions:

  1. What did the accused do? The actus reus: external conduct, circumstances and consequences.
  2. What was in his mind when he did it? The mens rea, or guilty mind: intention, knowledge, rashness or negligence, depending on how the offence is defined.
Key point

The two must exist together. A guilty mind on one day and a harmful act on another day do not make a crime.

Strict liability: only in offences of strict liability, created for special reasons of public welfare, does the law sometimes dispense with the guilty mind; even then, courts presume mens rea is required unless the statute clearly excludes it.

Who is liable

Criminal Law reaches beyond the person whose hand did the act.

  • Common intention (Section 3(5) B.N.S.): partners in a shared plan are equally liable for what any of them does in furtherance of it.
  • Common object (Section 190 B.N.S.): every member of an unlawful assembly is liable for offences committed in prosecution of its object, or known to be likely.
  • Abetment: reaches those who instigate, conspire or intentionally aid.
  • Criminal conspiracy (Section 61 B.N.S.): the very agreement to commit an offence is punished.

How early the law steps in

Intention alone is never punished; preparation is usually not punished; liability begins when the accused moves from preparation to attempt. Tests: proximity, locus poenitentiae and equivocality.

Example

Picking an empty pocket is factually impossible, yet under our law it is still an attempt.

General exceptions

The general exceptions answer when a person who appears to fit the definition of an offence should still go free. Some acts are justified; others are excused.

JustifiedExcused
Private defence; acts under a legal dutyYoung children; persons who, because of unsoundness of mind, could not know the nature or wrongfulness of their acts; genuine mistake of fact; pure accident

Vital distinctions: medical insanity versus legal insanity; voluntary versus involuntary intoxication.

Key point

Private defence is a right to defend, never a right to punish or take revenge.

Specific offences

Offences against the human body

A killing is graded by the killer's state of mind: murder at the top, then the two degrees of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, then death by negligence. The five exceptions reduce murder to culpable homicide.

KidnappingAbduction
Protects the guardian's custody of a childProtects every person's liberty against force and deceit

Sexual offences are built around free, voluntary and unequivocal consent.

Offences against property

OffenceEssence
TheftTaking without consent
ExtortionDelivery obtained by fear
RobberyTheft or extortion aggravated by instant violence or the fear of it
DacoityRobbery by five or more persons acting together
CheatingObtaining property or causing harm by deception, with dishonest intention present from the very beginning

Connecting threads

IdeaWhere it appears
Guilty mindTheft (dishonest intention); cheating (intention at the time of the promise); murder (the four clauses of Section 101)
Joint liabilityCommon intention, common object, gang rape, dacoity
ConsentGeneral exceptions, kidnapping, sexual offences, theft
FearCompulsion, extortion, robbery

Once these connecting threads are seen, Criminal Law stops being a long list of sections and becomes one coherent system.

Method for any problem

For any problem in Criminal Law, whether in an examination hall or in a courtroom, ask the same questions in the same order:

  1. What exactly was done?
  2. What was the mental state at that moment?
  3. Which offence does the conduct fit, ingredient by ingredient?
  4. Who else is liable, and on what principle?
  5. Was the offence complete, or only attempted, abetted or conspired?
  6. Does any general exception justify or excuse the conduct?
Key point

Exam tip: answer these questions carefully, with the precise words of the statute and the principles laid down by the courts, and the answer will rarely go wrong. Keep reading the sections, keep testing yourself with simple examples, and keep asking why the law draws each line where it does.

Quick revision

  • A claimed divine power, falsely represented to obtain money, can be deception for cheating (1999).
  • Actus reus and mens rea must coexist; strict liability is the exception, and mens rea is still presumed.
  • Joint liability: common intention (Section 3(5) B.N.S.), common object (Section 190 B.N.S.), abetment, criminal conspiracy (Section 61 B.N.S.).
  • Intention never punished, preparation usually not, attempt is; an impossible attempt is still an attempt.
  • General exceptions either justify or excuse; medical insanity is not legal insanity; private defence never permits punishment or revenge.
  • Killing is graded by mental state: murder, two degrees of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, death by negligence; the five exceptions reduce murder to culpable homicide.
  • Kidnapping protects the guardian's custody of a child; abduction protects every person's liberty against force and deceit.
  • Theft: taking without consent; extortion: delivery by fear; robbery: plus instant violence or its fear; dacoity: robbery by five or more; cheating: deception with dishonest intention from the beginning.
  • Recurring threads: guilty mind, joint liability, consent and fear.
  • Problem method: act, mental state, offence by ingredients, liability of others, complete or inchoate, general exception.

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