Landmark judgments, explained

Horne, a former managing director bound by a promise not to solicit his old employer's customers, set up a new company and solicited those customers through it. The Court of Appeal held that the new company was a mere cloak or sham formed to escape his promise, and granted an injunction against both Horne and the company. The case is a leading example of lifting the corporate veil where a company is used to escape a legal obligation.

The company was held bound by a bond its directors gave to the Royal British Bank, even though the general resolution required by the company's deed of settlement had not been passed. The bank was taken to know the deed, but it was entitled to assume that internal formalities like passing the resolution had been completed. The case gave the doctrine of indoor management its other name, 'the rule in Turquand's case'.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that taking blood and semen samples from an accused for medical examination is not 'testimonial compulsion' and so does not violate Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The case matters because it draws the line between physical evidence from the body, which can be taken, and testimonial evidence from the mind, which cannot be forced out of an accused.

In Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal (2014), the Supreme Court held that a photograph of tennis player Boris Becker posing nude with his fiancee, published with an anti-racism message, was not obscene, and it quashed the criminal proceedings under Section 292 IPC. The Court rejected the old Hicklin test and adopted the community standards test. It also held that material must be judged in its full context. This judgment changed the direction of obscenity law in India and strengthened press and artistic freedom.

A unanimous nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 (the date of the Kesavananda Bharati decision) are not fully immune. They can be tested against the basic structure, including the 'golden triangle' of Articles 14, 19 and 21. The case matters because it holds that judicial review is part of the basic structure and that the Ninth Schedule is not a safe haven for unconstitutional laws.

A nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the President's satisfaction under Article 356 is not absolute and is open to judicial review. The Court held that a government's majority must be tested on the floor of the Assembly, not at Raj Bhavan, and declared secularism and federalism to be basic features of the Constitution. The case put a clear brake on the misuse of President's Rule against State governments.

The Supreme Court held that the right to privacy is part of life and personal liberty under Article 21, and that telephone conversations are protected by privacy and by free speech under Article 19(1)(a). It did not strike down Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, but laid down binding interim guidelines to stop arbitrary phone tapping. These guidelines later shaped the Indian Telegraph Rules (Rule 419A) and India's surveillance law.

A five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, by a 4:1 majority, held that barring women aged 10 to 50 from the Sabarimala temple was unconstitutional. It struck down Rule 3(b) of the 1965 Rules and held that the right to worship under Article 25(1) belongs equally to women. The case matters because it uses constitutional morality and the essential religious practices test to resolve the clash between faith and gender equality, and its larger questions are now pending before a nine-judge bench.

The Supreme Court held that the 'procedure established by law' under Article 21 must be fair, just and reasonable, not merely any procedure laid down by a law. It also held that Articles 14, 19 and 21 must be read together, and that natural justice (audi alteram partem) is implied in the Passports Act, 1967. This judgment rejected the narrow A. K. Gopalan approach and opened the way for the wide expansion of Article 21.

In this case the Supreme Court held that employing children in factories or hazardous industries, such as the matchstick and fireworks units of Sivakasi, violates their fundamental right under Article 24. The Court gave detailed, step-by-step directions for withdrawing such children from work and for their rehabilitation and education. These included an employer compensation of Rs. 20,000 per child and a State contribution of Rs. 5,000, both paid into a Child Labour Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund. The case matters because it treated child labour as a question of fundamental rights, not merely of policy.

Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (1979) was a series of Supreme Court orders. They held that a speedy trial is an essential part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, and that free legal aid for poor accused persons is part of a fair, just and reasonable procedure. The case led to the release of a large number of undertrial prisoners in Bihar. It is a foundation of public interest litigation, legal aid law and later bail reforms in India.

In Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017), a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, by a 3:2 majority, set aside instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat). Two judges held it unconstitutional as manifestly arbitrary under Article 14, and a third held it was not part of Islamic law. The case is a landmark for the dignity and equality of Muslim women.