Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala

Sabarimala is an ancient Hindu temple in Kerala where Lord Ayyappa is worshipped. The deity is believed to be a naishtika brahmachari, an eternal celibate who has taken a vow of lifelong celibacy.

Under the temple's tradition and customs, women between 10 and 50 years of age, the age group in which menstruation generally occurs, were not allowed to enter. This tradition was supported by Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Authorisation of Entry Rules, 1965. In 1991 the Kerala High Court had upheld this restriction as valid.

The Indian Young Lawyers Association filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court under Article 32. It argued that the restriction was based only on tradition and was a gender-based restriction that violated Articles 14, 15 and 25 and Article 51A(e), the fundamental duty to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women. An intervenor raised an argument based on Article 17 (untouchability).

1. Was the exclusion of women on biological grounds discrimination against women, and did it violate Articles 14, 15 and 17?

2. Was the tradition an essential religious practice entitled to protection under Article 25? (An essential religious practice is one that forms the core of a religion, without which the nature of the religion would change. This test comes from the 1954 Shirur Mutt case.)

3. Were the devotees of Sabarimala a separate religious denomination entitled to the rights under Article 26?

4. Did Rule 3 permit a religious denomination to ban the entry of women between 10 and 50 years of age, and if so, did that violate Articles 14 and 15?

5. Was Rule 3(b) ultra vires the 1965 Act, and did it violate the fundamental rights in Part III?

Petitioners (the side representing women):

The devotees of Ayyappa are not a separate religious denomination. They are simply Hindus with no separate name or separate doctrine, so Article 26 does not apply.

The temple is managed by the Travancore Devaswom Board, a statutory body. So the temple falls within Article 12, and Articles 14 and 15 apply to it.

A religious practice that discriminates against women cannot be an essential religious practice. Keeping women out is not part of worship, and Hinduism generally does not allow such discrimination. However old a tradition is, it cannot continue if it goes against the basic values of the Constitution.

The tradition is linked to celibacy, but not every pilgrim takes that vow, and the presence of women does not destroy the vow. Regulation might be allowed, but a complete ban is not constitutional.

Temple's side:

The tradition has continued since ancient times.

Article 25(2)(b) does not apply because this is not a complete ban but a limited restriction.

The restriction exists because Lord Ayyappa is a naishtika brahmachari. Pilgrims must observe a 41-day vratham (strict vow), and women in this age group could not complete it for biological reasons. So the restriction is a spiritual discipline meant to protect the deity's vow of celibacy, not discrimination.

A devaprasnam (a traditional astrological query) held at the temple indicated that the deity did not wish young women to be present.

The restriction does not cover all women, only one age group.

The Supreme Court decided the case on 28 September 2018 by a 4:1 majority.

Majority view:

1. Not a separate denomination: The devotees of Ayyappa are simply Hindus with no separate name, organisation or doctrine, so Article 26 does not protect them. Sabarimala is a public place of worship managed by the Travancore Devaswom Board, so Article 25(1) applies against the board. Women are also Hindus and cannot be denied entry.

2. Scope of Article 25(1): The right belongs to all persons, men and women alike. No one can be denied the right to worship in a temple on the basis of gender. The right also protects intra-faith equality, meaning equal rights for everyone within the same religion.

3. Meaning of morality: Article 25 is subject to public order, morality and health. Here morality means constitutional morality, not the morality of any tradition or religious view. Constitutional morality stands above social and religious morality.

4. Not an essential religious practice: No scripture or text was produced to show that the ban was a core part of Hinduism. Women had in fact visited the temple earlier, for example for a child's Annaprashan (first feeding ceremony). The tradition was not uniform and continuous, so it could not be an essential practice.

5. Rule 3(b) invalid: Chief Justice Dipak Misra held that the rule violated women's right under Article 25(1). Justice R. F. Nariman held that it also violated Article 15(1). The rule was also ultra vires Section 3 of the 1965 Act, which says Hindu places of public worship are open to all classes of Hindus, and this includes all genders. In his concurring opinion, Justice D. Y. Chandrachud held that excluding women because of menstruation was a form of untouchability prohibited by Article 17.

Final conclusion of the majority: Sabarimala is a public religious institution. Excluding women violates their right to worship under Article 25(1). Rule 3(b) is unconstitutional, and denying entry to women aged 10 to 50 is illegal. Constitutional morality is supreme.

Dissent of Justice Indu Malhotra:

Article 25 protects individual rights and Article 26 protects denominational rights. The equality rule under Article 14 cannot override religious freedom.

The respondents had made out a plausible case that worshippers of Lord Ayyappa are a separate religious denomination. This mixed question of fact and law should be decided by a civil court.

Even if a tradition appears irrational or outdated, courts should not interfere if it is part of a faith, because a rationality test cannot be applied to religious matters.

The entry ban is not untouchability, so Article 17 does not apply.

Rule 3(b) is valid, because the 1965 Act also gives religious denominations the right to manage their own religious affairs.

Later developments:

After large-scale protests in Kerala, review petitions were filed. On 14 November 2019, a five-judge bench, by a 3:2 majority, kept the review petitions pending. It referred major questions on religion and fundamental rights to a larger bench. These included the scope of the essential religious practices test, the relationship between Articles 25 and 26, the entry of women into mosques, and the entry into fire temples of Parsi women who marry outside their religion. The 2018 judgment was not stayed.

In February 2020, a nine-judge bench held that the reference was maintainable and framed the questions. According to the lecture, a nine-judge bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant heard the matter in April and May 2026 and reserved judgment on 14 May 2026. That judgment is still awaited.

Constitution of India, Article 12; Article 14; Article 15 (including Article 15(1)); Article 17; Article 25 (including Article 25(1) and Article 25(2)(b)); Article 26; Article 32; Article 51A(e); Rule 3(b), Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Authorisation of Entry Rules, 1965; Section 3 of the 1965 Act (the lecture calls it only 'the nineteen sixty-five Act')

This is a leading case on the clash between freedom of religion and gender equality. Students must know it for several reasons.

It explains the essential religious practices test, which comes from the Shirur Mutt case.

It sets out the meaning of a 'religious denomination' under Article 26.

It holds that 'morality' in Article 25 means constitutional morality.

It contains the Article 17 untouchability view of Justice Chandrachud.

It includes the influential dissent of Justice Indu Malhotra on judicial restraint in matters of faith.

It is also important for examinations because of the 2019 review reference. The 2018 judgment remains the law, but its key questions are pending before a nine-judge bench. These include the essential religious practices test and the relationship between Articles 25 and 26.

Hypothetical: Zoya, aged 32, is a devoted Hindu. She tries to enter a public Hindu temple managed by a statutory temple board. Neha, the board's officer, stops her and cites an old custom that bars women of menstruating age.

Zoya argues that, under the Sabarimala ruling, her right to worship under Article 25(1) is equal to that of male devotees. The board is a statutory body, and 'morality' in Article 25 means constitutional morality, not custom.

The board claims that the devotees form a separate denomination. On this, the majority's test would ask whether the devotees have a separate name, organisation and doctrine. The board would also have to show that the ban is an essential religious practice that has been uniform and continuous.

If the board cannot prove these points, Zoya cannot be denied entry.