About this subject
Family Law I is the personal law of marriage and family for Hindus and Muslims in India, studied in five units, from what a personal law is and where it comes from, to adoption and the care of a child and the child's property. Marriage, divorce, maintenance and custody touch almost every home, and sooner or later every lawyer meets them. The subject carries great weight in university, Judicial Services, UGC NET and CLAT PG examinations, and in practice: family courts are among the busiest in the country, with petitions for divorce, maintenance, custody and protection from domestic violence filed every day. A sound grasp of the subject lets a lawyer help real people from the very first year at the Bar.
For every important case, learn what happened, what the court had to decide, what it decided and why it matters. The principle matters most, because it is what is applied in examination answers.
Unit 1: Introduction to Personal Laws
What a personal law is
Most branches of Indian law are common to everyone: the same law of contract and the same criminal law apply to a Hindu, Muslim, Christian or Parsi. But in family matters (marriage, divorce, maintenance, adoption, guardianship and succession) a person is largely governed by the law of his or her religious community. This body of law is called personal law.
Whether the marriage of Prince, a Hindu, to Neha is valid is decided by Hindu law. Whether the marriage of Farhan, a Muslim, to Zoya is valid is not decided by the same law.
Personal law is "personal" because it follows the person, not the place. A Hindu carries Hindu law with him when he moves from Kolkata to Chennai; a Muslim carries Muslim law in the same way.
India thus has several parallel systems of family law. Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Parsis and Jews each have their own, and alongside them stand secular laws that apply to everyone, whatever their religion. This subject covers Hindu law and Muslim law in detail, together with the secular laws that touch them.
Personal law sits where law, religion and custom meet. It grew out of religious texts, was shaped by the customs of castes, regions and families, and was later reshaped by judges and legislatures.
| Hindu family law | Muslim family law |
|---|---|
| Mostly codified in Acts of Parliament, such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. | Still largely uncodified: rests mainly on religious sources and judicial decisions, with a few statutes such as the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. |
How India came to have separate personal laws
- Warren Hastings' judicial plan, 1772: when the East India Company began to administer justice, suits about inheritance, marriage, caste and other religious usages were to be decided by the laws of the Quran for Muslims and the Shastras for Hindus.
- Pandits and maulvis sat in the courts to advise British judges on these laws until the practice was abolished in 1864.
- The judges built a large body of case law, often called Anglo-Hindu law and Anglo-Muhammadan law. Where no rule could be found, they applied justice, equity and good conscience.
Legislative reform
| Statute | Effect |
|---|---|
| Hindu Widows' Remarriage Act, 1856 | Allowed Hindu widows to remarry. |
| Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 | Punished child marriages. |
| Shariat Act, 1937 | Replaced many local customs with Muslim personal law. |
| Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 | Gave Muslim wives the right to seek divorce through the court. |
After Independence, Hindu law was codified in four Acts: the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and, all of 1956, the Hindu Succession Act, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.
Who Is a Hindu and Who Is a Muslim
Since personal law depends on religion, the first practical question is who belongs to which community.
Who is a Hindu: Section 2, Hindu Marriage Act
The other Hindu Acts use almost the same words. The Act applies to:
- any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat, or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj;
- Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs;
- any other person domiciled in India who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that such a person would not have been governed by Hindu law.
Children and converts:
- a child, legitimate or illegitimate, is a Hindu if both parents are Hindus;
- a child with one Hindu parent is a Hindu if brought up as a member of that parent's community;
- a person who converts or reconverts to Hinduism is a Hindu.
"Hindu" in these Acts is wider than the religion: it covers everyone who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew, unless the contrary is proved.
Sastri Yagnapurushadji v. Muldas Bhudardas Vaishya: The followers of the Swaminarayan sect claimed they were not Hindus, so that a temple entry law would not apply to their temples. Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar explained that Hinduism has no single prophet, no single God, no single dogma and no single set of rituals, and may broadly be described as a way of life. Held: the followers were Hindus.
Exception for Scheduled Tribes: Section 2(2)
Nothing in the Act applies to the members of any Scheduled Tribe, unless the Central Government, by notification, directs otherwise. Tribal communities therefore continue to follow their own customs in family matters. This exception decided the bigamy case of Dr. Surajmani Stella Kujur v. Durga Charan Hansdah (see the conditions of a valid Hindu marriage below).
Who is a Muslim
A person is a Muslim by birth or by conversion. Anyone who professes Islam, that is, believes in one God and accepts Prophet Muhammad as His messenger, is a Muslim. Courts do not test how deeply a person practises the faith. But a conversion made only to escape the law of an existing marriage will not be allowed to defeat that law (Sarla Mudgal, below).
Personal Law and Article 13
- Article 13(1): all laws in force before the Constitution, so far as inconsistent with the fundamental rights, are void to that extent.
- Article 13(2): the State shall not make any law that takes away or abridges those rights.
- Article 13(3): "law" includes any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having the force of law.
The question: is uncodified personal law, such as a rule of Hindu or Muslim law taken from religious texts, a "law in force" or a "custom" within Article 13? If it is, a court can strike down a rule that violates equality or liberty. If it is not, that personal law stands outside the reach of the fundamental rights, and only the legislature can change it.
State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali: Decided soon after the Constitution began. The Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946 made a second marriage by a Hindu void and punishable. It was challenged as discriminatory, since Muslim men could still marry up to four wives. The Bombay High Court (Chief Justice M.C. Chagla and Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar) upheld the Act. Held: (1) personal law is not a "law in force", nor a "custom or usage", within Article 13, so it cannot be tested against the fundamental rights; Chief Justice Chagla reasoned that the framers treated personal law as distinct, since Article 44 itself asks the State to replace personal laws with a uniform code in the future. (2) The State may reform one community at a time: Article 25(2)(b) allows laws for social welfare and reform, and the legislature may go step by step.
Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir: A High Court judge had said that the old Smriti rule barring a Shudra from becoming a sanyasi was no longer valid because of the fundamental rights. The Supreme Court observed that Part III of the Constitution does not touch upon the personal laws of the parties, and that a court applying personal law cannot bring in its own modern ideas but must apply the law from its recognised sources. Even so, the Court gave effect to a usage allowing a Shudra to become a sanyasi.
C. Masilamani Mudaliar v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil: A case about a Hindu woman's rights in property. Justice K. Ramaswamy took the opposite view: personal laws derived from scriptures must be consistent with the Constitution, and if they violate fundamental rights they are void under Article 13.
The debate concerns only uncodified personal law. Once Parliament puts personal law into a statute, the statute is plainly "law" and is tested against the fundamental rights. That is why the Supreme Court examined the validity of restitution of conjugal rights under the Hindu Marriage Act and of the guardianship rule in the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act.
Shayara Bano v. Union of India (the triple talaq case, studied in Unit 3): Justice R.F. Nariman, with Justice U.U. Lalit, held that the Shariat Act, 1937 gives statutory force to Muslim personal law, so triple talaq could be tested as a law in force. Chief Justice J.S. Khehar and Justice S. Abdul Nazeer held that personal law is not State action and is protected by the freedom of religion. Justice Kurian Joseph decided on a different ground altogether.
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (the Sabarimala temple case): Justice D.Y. Chandrachud expressed serious doubt whether Narasu Appa Mali was rightly decided. The larger questions about religious freedom and fundamental rights were then referred to a bench of nine judges, which heard them in 2026 and reserved its judgment in May.
Exam tip: present both views. The Narasu view: uncodified personal law lies outside Article 13. The later view: no rule, whatever its source, can stand above the fundamental rights.
Sources of Hindu Law
A source is the place from which a legal rule draws its authority. Hindu law has ancient and modern sources.
Ancient sources
| Shruti ("what was heard") | Smriti ("what was remembered") |
|---|---|
| The Vedas, believed to have been revealed to ancient sages. | Texts composed by sages to set out rules of conduct, duties and law; best known are the Manusmriti, Yajnavalkya Smriti and Narada Smriti. |
| Highest authority in theory, but very little law: mostly rituals, prayers and philosophy, only here and there marriage, duties or property. | Deal with marriage, adoption, inheritance, crimes and procedure. |
| Prevailed over Smriti in a conflict, in theory. | The real source of legal rules in practice. |
Commentaries and digests
Commentaries explained the Smriti texts; digests combined them. The two most important:
- Mitakshara: a commentary on the Yajnavalkya Smriti, written by Vijnaneshwara in the eleventh century.
- Dayabhaga: a digest on inheritance and partition, written by Jimutavahana.
These works adapted the old texts to the customs of their regions and gave birth to the schools of Hindu law.
Custom
A custom is a rule of conduct that a community has followed for so long that it has acquired the force of law.
Collector of Madura v. Moottoo Ramalinga Sathupathy (Privy Council): Held: under the Hindu system of law, clear proof of usage will outweigh the written text of the law. Principle: a proved custom can override even a Smriti text.
Section 3(a), Hindu Marriage Act: a custom or usage is a rule which, having been continuously and uniformly observed for a long time, has obtained the force of law among Hindus in any local area, tribe, community, group or family. The rule must be certain and not unreasonable or opposed to public policy, and a family custom must not have been discontinued by the family. So a valid custom must be:
- ancient;
- certain;
- reasonable (not opposed to public policy); and
- continuous.
The person relying on a custom must plead it and prove it by clear evidence.
Modern sources
- Judicial precedent: decisions of the Privy Council in the past, and of the Supreme Court and High Courts today, bind the courts below them.
- Legislation: now the most important source, since most of Hindu family law lies in the Acts of 1955 and 1956.
- Justice, equity and good conscience: applied when no other rule is found.
Schools of Hindu Law
A school of Hindu law is a body of rules followed in a particular region, based on a particular commentary. The two main schools are the Mitakshara and the Dayabhaga.
| School | Sub-school | Where it prevails |
|---|---|---|
| Dayabhaga | - | Bengal and Assam |
| Mitakshara | Banaras | Northern India, including Odisha |
| Mitakshara | Mithila | Tirhut and parts of northern Bihar |
| Mitakshara | Maharashtra or Bombay | Western India, including Gujarat |
| Mitakshara | Dravida or Madras | Southern India |
Each Mitakshara sub-school follows its own leading texts.
| Point | Mitakshara | Dayabhaga |
|---|---|---|
| Interest by birth | A son acquires an interest in ancestral property by birth. | No one acquires property by birth; the father is the full owner during his lifetime. |
| Devolution | A deceased coparcener's interest passes to the surviving coparceners by survivorship. | The father's heirs take the property only on his death, by succession. |
| Basis of inheritance | Nearness of blood. | Religious efficacy: the heir's capacity to confer spiritual benefit on the deceased through offerings called pinda. |
Do the schools still matter? Much less than before. The Acts of 1955 and 1956 apply to all Hindus, whatever their school. The schools still matter in areas the Acts did not fully cover, such as parts of the law of the joint family. Even there, since 2005, a daughter too is a coparcener by birth, and survivorship no longer applies.
Exam tip: name the two schools and the four sub-schools, and give the main differences.
Sources of Muslim Law
Muslim law is based on the Shariat, literally "the path to the watering place", that is, the path God has laid down for believers. Its sources are primary and secondary.
Primary sources
- Quran: the holy book of Islam, believed by Muslims to be the word of God revealed to Prophet Muhammad; the supreme source. Some verses are of direct legal importance, for example on marriage, dower, divorce, the waiting period called iddat, and the shares of heirs.
- Sunna: the practice of the Prophet, including his sayings, his actions and his silent approval of what others did in his presence. The reports of these are called Hadith. The Sunna explains and supplements the Quran.
- Ijma: the consensus of the qualified jurists of a particular age on a question of law.
- Qiyas: analogical deduction, applying a rule found in the Quran or the Sunna to a new situation that shares the same reason.
Wine is forbidden because it intoxicates, so by Qiyas jurists applied the same prohibition to other intoxicants.
Secondary sources
Custom (urf), accepted where it did not conflict with the primary texts; judicial decisions; legislation; and justice, equity and good conscience.
The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937
The most important statute in India. It was needed because several Muslim communities, such as the Khoja and Memon communities, and many families in Punjab, followed customs that differed from Muslim law, especially customs that denied women their shares in property.
Section 2 applies notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary: where the parties are Muslims, the rule of decision shall be Muslim personal law in matters of intestate succession; special property of females; marriage; dissolution of marriage, including talaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat; maintenance; dower; guardianship; gifts; trusts; and wakf. Questions about agricultural land were left out.
Section 3 allows a Muslim to declare that he wishes to be governed by Muslim personal law in matters of adoption, wills and legacies.
Schools of Muslim Law
After the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632, the community divided over who should lead it. The majority accepted leaders chosen by the community, beginning with Abu Bakr: the Sunnis. A minority believed that leadership belonged to the Prophet's family, through his cousin and son-in-law Ali: the Shias.
| Sunni schools (named after jurists of the 8th or 9th century) | Shia schools |
|---|---|
| Hanafi (Abu Hanifa): the great majority of Indian Muslims | Ithna Ashari (the Twelvers): the largest, followed by most Indian Shias |
| Maliki (Malik ibn Anas) | Ismaili: includes the Khoja and Bohra communities |
| Shafii (al-Shafii): followers in parts of Kerala and on the Konkan coast | Zaidi: almost no followers in India |
| Hanbali (Ahmad ibn Hanbal) | - |
When an Indian court applies Sunni law, it usually applies Hanafi law.
Why the schools matter: the rules differ, so a court must first find out which school the parties belong to. For example:
- Sunni law requires two witnesses for a marriage; Shia law does not.
- The Ithna Ashari school recognises a temporary marriage called muta; Sunni law does not.
- Shia law has never recognised triple talaq.
Article 44 and the Uniform Civil Code
Article 44: the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.
A uniform civil code (UCC) means one common set of family laws on marriage, divorce, maintenance, adoption, guardianship and succession, applying to all citizens whatever their religion.
Article 44 is a Directive Principle of State Policy. Under Article 37, the Directive Principles are not enforceable by any court, but are fundamental in the governance of the country, and the State must apply them in making laws. So Article 44 directs the legislature; it gives no citizen a right a court can enforce.
Constituent Assembly debates
Several Muslim members wanted personal laws protected from change. Others, including K.M. Munshi, Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, argued that the State must have the power to reform family law. Dr. Ambedkar explained that the Article only asks the State to try to secure a code and does not say it must be forced on every citizen; he even suggested that a future Parliament might begin with a code applying only to those who chose it.
Legislative power: Entry 5, Concurrent List
Family law falls under Entry 5 of the Concurrent List: marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption; wills, intestacy and succession; joint family and partition; and all matters on which the parties were governed by their personal law before the Constitution. Both Parliament and the State legislatures can therefore make family laws.
Steps toward uniformity
- The Hindu Code of 1955 and 1956 unified the law for Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs, removing many differences between schools and castes.
- The Special Marriage Act, 1954 created a secular form of marriage open to any two persons, whatever their religion.
- Secular laws apply to everyone: the maintenance provision of the criminal procedure law, the Dowry Prohibition Act, the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, the Guardians and Wards Act and the Juvenile Justice Act. This is often called indirect reform, because these laws quietly create common standards across communities.
Goa, Uttarakhand and Gujarat
Goa has long had a common civil code, inherited from Portuguese times, applying to all its residents.
Jose Paulo Coutinho v. Maria Luiza Valentina Pereira: The Supreme Court described Goa as a shining example of an Indian State with a uniform civil code, though that code still protects certain limited rights of particular communities.
In 2024, Uttarakhand became the first State since Independence to pass its own Uniform Civil Code, in force from 27 January 2025. It applies to the residents of the State except members of Scheduled Tribes; prohibits polygamy; fixes the same minimum marriage ages for all communities; and requires registration of marriages, and even of live-in relationships. In March 2026, the Gujarat Assembly also passed a Uniform Civil Code Bill.
The Law Commission
The 21st Law Commission, in a 2018 consultation paper, said a uniform civil code was neither necessary nor desirable at that stage, and suggested instead that each personal law be reformed to remove discrimination against women. The 22nd Law Commission invited public views on the question again in 2023.
The Supreme Court on Article 44
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (studied fully in Unit 4): Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud regretted that Article 44 had remained a dead letter, and said that a common civil code would help national integration.
Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India: Justice Kuldip Singh urged the Government to take a fresh look at Article 44. (Its holding on bigamy by conversion is noted under the conditions of a valid Hindu marriage.)
John Vallamattom v. Union of India: The Court struck down Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act, which restricted Christians from leaving property by will for religious or charitable purposes. Chief Justice V.N. Khare again regretted that Article 44 had not been given effect.
Maharshi Avadhesh v. Union of India and Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India: The Court refused to step in. Principle: the Court cannot order Parliament to enact a code; these are matters of policy for the legislature.
The debate
| Supporters say a uniform code would | Critics say |
|---|---|
| secure equality before the law under Article 14 | India's diversity must be respected |
| end discrimination against women under Article 15 | Articles 25 and 26 protect the practices of religious communities |
| promote national unity | a code imposed from above may be resisted |
| simplify the law | the better path is to reform each personal law from within to secure gender justice |
Exam tip: present both sides fairly, then give your own reasoned view.
Unit 2: Nature, Conditions and Kinds of Marriage
The nature of marriage
Is marriage a sacrament or a contract? A sacrament is a holy union created by religious rites. A contract is an agreement created by the free consent of two parties, which the parties can also bring to an end. For Hindus and Muslims, the traditional answers differed.
Hindu marriage
In classical Hindu law, marriage was a sanskar, one of the sacred rites every Hindu was expected to undergo. It was:
- permanent: it could not be dissolved;
- eternal: the union was believed to continue even in future lives;
- holy: it was completed by religious ceremonies before the sacred fire.
Its three purposes were dharma (performance of religious duties), praja (progeny) and rati (pleasure). The bride's consent had little place; a father could give his daughter in marriage even as a child.
| Eight forms in the Smritis: approved | Disapproved |
|---|---|
| Brahma | Asura: the bridegroom paid a price to the bride's family |
| Daiva | Gandharva: a union by mutual love |
| Arsha | Rakshasa: marriage by capture |
| Prajapatya | Paishacha: marriage by fraud or while the girl was unconscious |
These forms now have little legal importance, because the Hindu Marriage Act prescribes none of them.
The Hindu Marriage Act changed the character of Hindu marriage: it made monogamy compulsory, gave importance to the consent of the parties, fixed minimum ages and allowed divorce. Hindu marriage today is often described as partly a sacrament and partly a contract. The sacramental element remains, because a valid Hindu marriage still requires ceremonies.
Dolly Rani v. Manish Kumar Chanchal: Both parties, trained commercial pilots, obtained a marriage registration certificate under the Uttar Pradesh rules but never performed any Hindu marriage ceremony. When disputes arose, the question was whether they were married at all. Held (Supreme Court, Justice B.V. Nagarathna): a Hindu marriage is a sanskar and a sacrament, not an event for song and dance or for wining and dining. Where the ceremonies required by Section 7 are not performed, there is no valid Hindu marriage, and a registration certificate cannot make it valid. Principle: registration only proves a marriage that has actually taken place.
Muslim marriage
In Muslim law, marriage, called nikah, is essentially a contract.
Abdul Kadir v. Salima: Justice Mahmood of the Allahabad High Court described Muslim marriage as purely a civil contract.
Like a contract, nikah needs a proposal and an acceptance; the parties must be competent and their consent free; the dower works somewhat like consideration; it can be ended by the acts of the parties; and its terms can be varied by agreement, within the limits of the law.
The terms of a nikah may give the wife the power to divorce herself if the husband takes a second wife.
But it is not only a contract. Chief Justice Sulaiman of the Allahabad High Court later referred to authorities showing that Muslim marriage is not a mere civil contract but also a religious sacrament. The balanced view: Muslim marriage is a civil contract with religious and social dimensions.
| Point | Hindu marriage | Muslim marriage |
|---|---|---|
| Traditional nature | Sacrament | Contract |
| Completed by | Religious ceremonies | Proposal and acceptance |
| Dissolution | Traditionally could not be dissolved | Can be dissolved |
| Modern law (the two have moved toward each other) | Depends on consent and can be dissolved | Keeps its religious character |
Ceremonies of Marriage
Section 7, Hindu Marriage Act
A Hindu marriage may be solemnised in accordance with the customary rites and ceremonies of either party. Where those rites include the saptapadi (the taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride jointly before the sacred fire), the marriage becomes complete and binding when the seventh step is taken.
The Act prescribes no single ceremony; it accepts the customs of either the bride's side or the bridegroom's side.
Ceremonies and bigamy
A marriage without the essential ceremonies is no marriage at all, which is crucial in bigamy cases. Section 17: a marriage between two Hindus solemnised after the Act is void if either party had a living spouse, and the offence of bigamy applies. That offence was in Sections 494 and 495 of the Indian Penal Code; it is now in Section 82 of the B.N.S., 2023. The prosecution must prove that the second marriage was actually solemnised with the essential ceremonies.
Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra: A husband went through a second marriage in the Gandharva form while his first wife was alive, without the essential ceremonies of invocation before the sacred fire and saptapadi. Held (Supreme Court): the second marriage had not been solemnised in law, so bigamy was not made out.
Kanwal Ram v. Himachal Pradesh Administration: Held (Supreme Court): even the accused's own admission of the marriage is not enough. Principle: the ceremonies must be proved.
Tamil Nadu: Section 7A
A Tamil Nadu State amendment added Section 7A, recognising self-respect or reformist marriages. Such a marriage may be solemnised in the presence of relatives, friends or other persons by any one of three acts:
- each party declares, in a language both understand, that each takes the other as spouse;
- the parties garland each other or put a ring on the other's finger; or
- a thali is tied.
No priest and no saptapadi is needed.
S. Nagalingam v. Sivagami: The husband married Sivagami in 1970. In 1984, while she was alive, he married another woman in a marriage hall at Tiruttani. The Magistrate acquitted him of bigamy because the saptapadi had not been performed; the Madras High Court reversed and convicted him, and the Supreme Court upheld the conviction. Held: in Tamil Nadu, Section 7A governs such marriages and does not require the saptapadi, so the second marriage was valid in law and bigamy was proved. Principle: the essential ceremonies are those required by the law that applies to the parties.
Solemnisation of a Muslim marriage
No religious ceremony and no priest is essential. What is essential is a proposal (ijab) by or on behalf of one party and an acceptance (qubul) by or on behalf of the other, made at the same meeting.
- Sunni law: in the presence of two adult, sane Muslim witnesses, either two men or one man and two women.
- Shia law: witnesses are not required.
A Qazi usually performs the nikah and records it in a nikahnama, a written record of the marriage and the dower, but his presence is not a legal requirement.
Musammat Ghulam Kubra Bibi v. Mohammad Shafi Mohammad Din (court at Peshawar): Mohammad Shafi sued the girl for restitution of conjugal rights, claiming she was his wife. Her grandfather had arranged the nikah, but no one had asked the girl, about seventeen, whether she agreed. Held: no valid marriage was proved. A Muslim girl who has attained puberty can be married only with her own consent; the man and the woman, or persons authorised by them, must agree at one meeting before two witnesses. Her consent was never obtained and the witnesses gave only vague evidence, so the suit was dismissed.
Conditions of a Valid Hindu Marriage
Section 5, Hindu Marriage Act: a marriage may be solemnised between any two Hindus if five conditions are fulfilled. Both parties must be Hindus.
Gullipilli Sowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani: Held (Supreme Court): a marriage between a Hindu and a Christian solemnised under the Hindu Marriage Act was void, because the Act applies only when both parties are Hindus. Such a couple may marry under the Special Marriage Act.
(i) Monogamy
Neither party may have a spouse living at the time of the marriage. A marriage in breach is void under Section 11, and the offence of bigamy applies. Before the Act a Hindu man could marry more than one wife; the Act ended that for all Hindus.
Binod Kumar Singh v. Union of India (Patna High Court, Division Bench): An Assistant Sub-Inspector of the Central Reserve Police Force married a woman constable while his first marriage subsisted. On his first wife's complaint, a departmental inquiry found him guilty and he was dismissed from service. He argued that his first wife had consented. Held: even if she had consented, her consent could not give him a right to marry again during her lifetime, because the second marriage is void by law. Appeal dismissed.
Service rules forbid a government servant with a living spouse from marrying again, so a bigamous marriage can cost a person his job.
Dr. Surajmani Stella Kujur v. Durga Charan Hansdah: The wife belonged to the Oraon tribe and the husband to the Santhal tribe; they had married in Delhi by Hindu rites. When the husband married again, the wife prosecuted him for bigamy. Held (Supreme Court): the Hindu Marriage Act did not apply, since both were members of Scheduled Tribes and no notification had been issued under Section 2(2). Their marriage was governed by custom, and a second marriage would be void only if a tribal custom prohibited it; the wife had neither pleaded nor proved such a custom. Bigamy was not made out and her appeal was dismissed. Principle (twofold): the Act does not reach tribal communities unless notified, and a custom must be proved, not assumed.
Conversion to escape monogamy
Prince, a Hindu husband, converts to Islam only to marry a second wife, without dissolving his first marriage, since Muslim law allows a man up to four wives. His second marriage is void.
Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India: Held (Justice Kuldip Singh): a Hindu marriage continues until it is dissolved under the Hindu Marriage Act. Conversion alone does not dissolve it; it only gives the other spouse a ground for divorce. The second marriage is void and the husband is guilty of bigamy. The Court saw such conversions as a way to get around the law and escape punishment.
Lily Thomas v. Union of India: Petitions argued that Sarla Mudgal violated the freedom of religion and should be reconsidered. Held: Sarla Mudgal reaffirmed. Prosecuting a person for bigamy after a conversion made only to marry again does not violate the freedom of religion, because Article 25 protects faith, not a device to escape the law. Sarla Mudgal had only expressed views on a uniform civil code and had not directed the Government to enact one.
(ii) Mental capacity
At the time of the marriage, neither party must:
- be incapable of giving a valid consent because of unsoundness of mind;
- though capable of consenting, suffer from a mental disorder of such a kind or extent as to be unfit for marriage and the procreation of children; or
- have been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity.
Epilepsy was also mentioned until 1999, when it was removed. Breach makes the marriage voidable under Section 12, not void.
(iii) Age
The bridegroom must have completed 21 years and the bride 18 years. Under the Hindu Marriage Act itself, breach makes the marriage neither void nor voidable: Section 11 (void marriages) does not mention the age clause, and neither does Section 12. The Act provides only two consequences:
- punishment under Section 18: rigorous imprisonment up to two years, or fine up to one lakh rupees, or both; and
- a special ground of divorce for a wife married before the age of 15 (studied in Unit 3).
Updated from the lecture: the notes said an under-age Hindu marriage is neither void nor voidable. The correct position is that this is so only under the Hindu Marriage Act. Section 3 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, which applies to every child marriage, makes such a marriage voidable at the option of the party who was a child at the time (a man under 21 or a woman under 18), by a petition to the district court filed before that party turns 20 (two years after majority); Section 12 makes a child marriage void in certain cases, such as where the minor was enticed away, forced or sold. Source: Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (India Code).
Pinninti Venkataramana v. State (Andhra Pradesh High Court, Full Bench headed by Chief Justice B.J. Divan): A wife filed a bigamy complaint against her husband. They had married in 1959, when he was thirteen and she was nine. He argued the marriage was void because both were under age, so there could be no bigamy. Held: a marriage in breach of the age condition is valid. The legislature deliberately made some breaches void, some voidable, and left the age clause only to punishment. The 1976 amendment giving a wife married before fifteen the right to repudiate the marriage would make no sense if such marriages were void anyway. The bigamy complaint could proceed.
(iv) Prohibited degrees and (v) sapinda relationship
The parties must not be within the degrees of prohibited relationship, and must not be sapinda of each other, unless in either case a custom governing each of them permits the marriage. Breach of either makes the marriage void.
Degrees of prohibited relationship: Section 3(g)
Two persons are within these degrees if:
- one is a lineal ascendant of the other (father and daughter);
- one was the wife or husband of a lineal ascendant or descendant of the other (a man and his stepmother; a man and his son's widow);
- one was the wife of the other's brother, or of the other's father's or mother's brother, or of the other's grandfather's or grandmother's brother; or
- they are brother and sister, uncle and niece, aunt and nephew, or the children of a brother and sister or of two brothers or two sisters.
Relationship includes half blood and uterine blood, illegitimate relationships, and relationship by adoption.
Sapinda relationship: Section 3(f)
Sapinda relationship extends up to the third generation (inclusive) in the line of ascent through the mother, and up to the fifth generation (inclusive) through the father, the person concerned being counted as the first generation. Two persons are sapinda if one is a lineal ascendant of the other within these limits, or if they have a common lineal ascendant within these limits with reference to each of them.
Prince and Neha have the same great-grandfather, each through the father's side. Counting Prince as the first generation, his father is the second, his grandfather the third and his great-grandfather the fourth; the same counting applies to Neha. The common ancestor is within five generations on the father's side for both, so they are sapinda, and their marriage would be void unless a custom allowed it.
Why the custom exception: in parts of South India, some communities have long practised marriages between certain close relatives, such as a man and his maternal uncle's daughter, and a proved custom allows such a marriage.
Neetu Grover v. Union of India (Delhi High Court): The sapinda prohibition was challenged and upheld. The Court observed that if the choice of partners were left wholly unregulated, incestuous relationships could gain legitimacy.
Consequences of breach
| Condition broken | Effect |
|---|---|
| (i) Monogamy | Void; offence of bigamy |
| (ii) Mental capacity | Voidable |
| (iii) Age | Valid but punishable under the Act; voidable by the child party under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 |
| (iv) Prohibited degrees | Void, unless custom permits |
| (v) Sapinda relationship | Void, unless custom permits |
Formula: (i), (iv), (v) broken = void; (ii) = voidable; (iii) = punishable but valid under the Hindu Marriage Act, though voidable by the child party under the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006. A former condition requiring the consent of the guardian of a bride under eighteen was removed in 1978, when the marriage ages were raised.
Updated from the lecture: the formula gave an under-age marriage as simply punishable but valid. The correct position is that it is valid and punishable under the Hindu Marriage Act, but under Section 3 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 it is voidable at the option of the party who was a child, and under Section 12 it is void in certain cases. Source: Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (India Code).
Conditions of a Valid Muslim Marriage
Muslim law being largely uncodified, these rules come from the texts and from judicial decisions.
- Capacity: every Muslim of sound mind who has attained puberty may marry. In the absence of evidence, puberty is presumed on completion of 15 years. A minor, or a person of unsound mind, may be given in marriage by a guardian, the wali; the main guardians for marriage are the father and, after him, the paternal grandfather.
- Free consent: the marriage of a Muslim who has attained puberty and is of sound mind, without his or her consent, is void (Ghulam Kubra Bibi).
- Proposal and acceptance at one meeting and, for Sunnis, before two witnesses.
- Absence of any legal bar: some bars make the marriage void, others only irregular.
Absolute prohibitions: marriage void
- Consanguinity (blood): a man cannot marry his mother or grandmother, daughter or granddaughter, sister, niece or grandniece, or aunt or great-aunt.
- Affinity (marriage): a man cannot marry his wife's mother or grandmother, the wife of his father or grandfather, the wife of his son or grandson, or his wife's daughter or granddaughter. The last bar applies only if his marriage with the wife was consummated.
- Fosterage: a child nursed in infancy by a woman other than its mother becomes her foster child, and similar prohibitions apply between a person and his or her foster relations, with a few exceptions.
A marriage within any of these relationships is void from the beginning.
Relative prohibitions: marriage irregular under Sunni law
The bar is temporary or can be removed. Five main examples:
- Unlawful conjunction: a man cannot have at the same time two wives so related that, if one had been a male, they could not have married each other, such as two sisters, or an aunt and her niece.
- A fifth wife: a Muslim man may have up to four wives at a time.
- Absence of witnesses, under Sunni law.
- Difference of religion: a Muslim man may validly marry a Muslim woman or a kitabiya (a Jewish or Christian woman), but his marriage with an idolatress or a fire-worshipper is irregular.
- Marriage with a woman undergoing iddat, the waiting period after a divorce or her husband's death.
Further rules
- A Muslim woman cannot marry a non-Muslim man under Muslim law; authorities differ on whether such a marriage is void or only irregular. Such couples may marry under the Special Marriage Act.
- Shia law does not recognise irregular marriage: a marriage is either valid or void.
- Polyandry is prohibited: a woman cannot marry a second husband while her first marriage subsists. Such a marriage is void and the offence of bigamy applies.
- The Quran attaches a condition of equal treatment to having more than one wife, which many jurists read as very demanding. Courts have used it to protect the first wife, and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act lets a wife seek divorce if she is not treated equitably.
Dower (Mehr)
Dower (mehr) is a sum of money or other property which the wife becomes entitled to receive from the husband in consideration of the marriage. It belongs to the wife alone, not her family; it is not a price for the bride but an obligation imposed on the husband as a mark of respect for the wife; and it is so essential that if the parties fix none, the law implies one.
| Specified dower | Proper dower (mehr-ul-misl) |
|---|---|
| Fixed by the parties, before, at or even after the marriage. | Fixed by the court when no amount was specified, looking at the dower given to other women of the wife's father's family and at her personal qualities and social position. |
Minimum dower: 10 dirhams (Hanafi), 3 dirhams (Maliki); Shia law fixes no minimum.
| Prompt dower | Deferred dower |
|---|---|
| Payable immediately on demand. | Payable when the marriage is dissolved by death or divorce, or on the happening of an agreed event. |
Specified dower is usually divided into prompt and deferred. If the contract does not say how much is prompt, Hanafi law looks to custom, while Shia law treats the whole dower as prompt.
Remedies for non-payment
- Dower is a debt: the wife, or her heirs after her death, can sue for it.
- Before consummation, the wife may refuse to live with the husband until her prompt dower is paid.
- Even after consummation, if the husband sues for restitution of conjugal rights, the court may make its decree conditional on payment of the prompt dower.
- A widow who has lawfully obtained possession of her husband's property in lieu of unpaid dower may retain it until the dower is paid.
Maina Bibi v. Chaudhri Vakil Ahmad (Privy Council): Recognised the widow's right of retention: she may keep her husband's property, lawfully possessed in lieu of unpaid dower, until the dower is paid.
Dower (Mahr) and Dowry Distinguished
| Dower (mahr) | Dowry |
|---|---|
| Paid by the husband to the wife | Property given or agreed to be given in connection with the marriage, usually demanded by the bridegroom or his family |
| The wife's legal right | Prohibited and punishable under the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 |
Do not confuse dower with dowry. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 itself says that dowry does not include mahr.
Option of Puberty (Khiyar-ul-Bulugh)
A minor may be given in marriage by a guardian. Muslim law allows the minor, on attaining puberty, to repudiate the marriage: the option of puberty, khiyar-ul-bulugh. Under the old Hanafi law, the option was generally not available if the father or paternal grandfather had arranged the marriage, unless the guardian had acted fraudulently or negligently.
Section 2(vii), Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939
A woman married under Muslim law may obtain a decree dissolving her marriage if:
- she was given in marriage by her father or other guardian before she attained 15 years;
- she repudiated the marriage before attaining 18 years; and
- the marriage has not been consummated.
Under the 1939 Act, the wife's option exists even where the father arranged the marriage.
Ghulam Sakina v. Falak Sher Allah Baksh (Lahore High Court): the girl, born in 1931, was married off by her father when about a year old. After puberty she repudiated the marriage and sued for dissolution; the husband claimed consummation, which would defeat her option. Held: decree granted. Consummation was not proved as a fact, and her refusal to undergo a medical examination was no proof of it. Cohabitation while she was a minor could not end her option. Principle: her assent must come after puberty.
| Point | Muslim wife (1939 Act) | Hindu wife (Section 13(2)(iv), Hindu Marriage Act) |
|---|---|---|
| Marriage | Given in marriage by father or guardian before 15 | Married before 15 |
| Repudiation | Before 18 | After 15 but before 18 |
| Consummation | Marriage must not have been consummated, though consummation during her minority does not defeat her right | Divorce available whether or not consummated |
Child Marriage
| Law | Status of a child marriage |
|---|---|
| Hindu Marriage Act | Valid but punishable; a wife married before 15 may repudiate it |
| Muslim personal law | Valid after puberty; a minor's marriage arranged by a guardian is valid, subject to the option of puberty |
| Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 | A secular law above both, which replaced the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929: a child marriage is voidable, and void in certain cases |
The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006
Child: a male who has not completed 21 years, or a female who has not completed 18 years.
Voidable (Section 3): every child marriage is voidable at the option of the party who was a child at the time of the marriage, who may petition for a decree of nullity. A minor may petition through a guardian or next friend, along with the Child Marriage Prohibition Officer, at any time before completing two years after attaining majority.
Void (Section 12): a child marriage is void where a minor child is taken or enticed out of the keeping of the lawful guardian, is forced or deceived into leaving any place, or is sold for the purpose of marriage, and is then made to go through a form of marriage; or where, after the marriage, the minor is sold, trafficked or used for immoral purposes. A child marriage solemnised in breach of a court injunction under the Act is also void.
Protection on annulment
- The court may order the husband, or his parent or guardian if he is a minor, to maintain the girl until her remarriage, and may provide for her residence.
- Children are legitimate for all purposes.
- The court must make custody orders, treating the children's welfare as paramount, and may order their maintenance.
Offences
| Offender | Punishment |
|---|---|
| Male adult above 18 who contracts a child marriage | Rigorous imprisonment up to 2 years, or fine up to one lakh rupees, or both |
| Anyone who performs, conducts, directs or abets it | Rigorous imprisonment up to 2 years and fine up to one lakh rupees |
| Anyone, including a parent, who promotes or permits it, or negligently fails to prevent it | The same |
- No woman can be punished with imprisonment for promoting or permitting a child marriage.
- The offences are cognizable and non-bailable.
- Courts can issue injunctions to prevent a child marriage; the District Magistrate can act to stop mass child marriages on certain auspicious days.
- Karnataka has amended the Act so that every child marriage solemnised there after the amendment is void from the beginning.
The Act and personal law
Court on its own Motion (Lajja Devi) v. State (Full Bench, Delhi High Court, Acting Chief Justice A.K. Sikri): Held: a child marriage is voidable, not void, except in the Section 12 situations, and becomes fully valid if no petition is filed within time. The Act is a secular law, overriding personal laws to the extent of any inconsistency. A husband cannot claim custody of his minor wife merely because Hindu law names him her natural guardian. The Court pointed out gaps, including the marital exception in the law of rape, and urged the legislature to act. Principle: the welfare of the girl is paramount.
Independent Thought v. Union of India: Held: the Supreme Court read down the marital exception in the rape law. Principle: sexual intercourse by a man with his wife below 18 years of age is rape.
The B.N.S. now says the same: the marital exception applies only where the wife is not under 18 years of age.
Does the Act override Muslim personal law?
Muslim law treats puberty as the age of capacity, and High Courts have differed:
- The Punjab and Haryana High Court has, in several cases, protected Muslim couples where the girl was above 15, relying on personal law. In August 2025, the Supreme Court dismissed the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights' appeal against one such order, holding that the Commission had no standing to challenge a protection order; it did not decide the larger question.
- Other High Courts, including the Kerala High Court, have held that the Act, and the law on sexual offences against children, apply to every person, whatever the religion.
Exam tip: the question remains open, so present both views.
Society for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action v. Union of India (2024): Held: the Supreme Court issued detailed directions for enforcing the Act. It also noted that child betrothals may escape the Act, and asked Parliament to consider outlawing them.
A Bill of 2021 to raise the marriage age of women to 21 lapsed when the Lok Sabha was dissolved in 2024.
Registration of Marriage and the Special Marriage Act, 1954
Registration means recording a marriage in an official register. Under the personal laws, it is proof of a marriage, not a condition of its validity.
Hindu marriages (Section 8, Hindu Marriage Act): State Governments may make rules for registration, to make proof easier. A State may make registration compulsory, with a fine of up to 25 rupees for breach, but failure to register does not affect the validity of the marriage.
Seema v. Ashwani Kumar: the Supreme Court noted that non-registration hurts women, especially when a husband denies the marriage, and lets child marriages and bigamy go unchecked. Held: marriages of all citizens, whatever their religion, must be compulsorily registered in the States where solemnised, and States were asked to frame rules. Many States have since made the registration of all marriages compulsory.
Muslim marriages: proved by the nikahnama and by witnesses. Some States have special registration laws; in 2024, Assam replaced its law of 1935 with a new law for compulsory registration of Muslim marriages and divorces.
The Special Marriage Act, 1954
The Act provides a civil form of marriage that any two persons may use, whatever their religion, especially useful for couples of different faiths. A marriage solemnised before a Marriage Officer is entered in the Marriage Certificate Book, and the certificate is conclusive evidence of solemnisation under the Act. Under Section 15, a marriage already celebrated in another form, such as under personal law, may be registered if the Act's conditions are met; it is then treated as if solemnised under the Act.
Conditions (Section 4)
- Neither party has a spouse living.
- Neither is incapable of a valid consent, or suffers from a disqualifying mental disorder or recurrent insanity.
- The male has completed 21 years and the female 18.
- They are not within the degrees of prohibited relationship, though a custom governing at least one of them may permit the marriage.
Under this Act, a marriage below the minimum age is void, because Section 24 makes breach of any Section 4 condition a ground of nullity. Under the Hindu Marriage Act it is valid but punishable.
Procedure
- Notice: written notice to the Marriage Officer of a district where at least one party has lived for at least 30 days.
- Publication and objection: the notice is published; anyone may object within 30 days that a Section 4 condition is not met, and the officer inquires.
- Solemnisation: after 30 days, before the officer and three witnesses, in any form; but each party must say to the other, in a language they understand, that he or she takes the other as lawful wife or husband.
The public notice has been criticised for exposing inter-faith couples to family pressure. In 2021, the Allahabad High Court held that publishing it should be optional, at the parties' request.
Special effects
A member of an undivided Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain family who marries under the Act is deemed separated from that family, and succession to the property of persons married under the Act is governed by the Indian Succession Act. Since 1976, neither rule applies where both parties are Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs or Jains.
Void and voidable marriages
| Void (Section 24) | Voidable (Section 25) |
|---|---|
| A condition of Section 4 is broken | Non-consummation owing to the respondent's wilful refusal |
| Respondent impotent at the time of the marriage and of the suit | Wife pregnant by another man at the time of the marriage |
| — | Consent obtained by coercion or fraud, as defined in the Indian Contract Act |
Asha Qureshi v. Afaq Qureshi (Madhya Pradesh High Court): the parties married under the Act in Jabalpur in 1990. The husband later learnt that the wife had concealed that she was a widow of an earlier marriage, and sought annulment for fraud. Held: decree of nullity upheld; active concealment of her earlier marriage and widowhood, a material fact, was fraud within the meaning of the Indian Contract Act. Principle: the marriage was voidable under Section 25.
Void and Voidable Marriages under Hindu Law
Under the Hindu Marriage Act, a marriage is valid, void or voidable.
| Void (Section 11) | Voidable (Section 12) |
|---|---|
| No marriage at all; a nullity from the beginning | Valid until annulled |
| No decree needed; the parties never become husband and wife, and either may treat it as void | Annulled only at the option of one party, by a court decree |
| A decree of nullity, on either party's petition, only declares the existing legal position | If that party does not act, it continues as valid; strangers cannot challenge it |
Section 11: a marriage solemnised after the Act is void if it breaks clause (i), (iv) or (v) of Section 5.
Grounds of voidability (Section 12)
- Non-consummation owing to the respondent's impotence, meaning physical or mental incapacity to consummate, not inability to have children.
- Breach of the mental capacity condition in clause (ii) of Section 5.
- Petitioner's consent obtained by force, or by fraud as to the nature of the ceremony or any material fact or circumstance concerning the respondent.
- Respondent pregnant at the marriage by some person other than the petitioner.
| Ground | Conditions |
|---|---|
| Force or fraud | Petition within one year after the force ceased or the fraud was discovered; no living together as husband or wife, with full consent, after that |
| Pregnancy | Petition within one year of the marriage; petitioner ignorant of the pregnancy at the marriage; no marital intercourse with the petitioner's consent after discovering it |
Neha's family hid from Prince a serious illness she was suffering from. Prince may seek annulment for fraud as to a material fact, but only within one year of discovering the truth.
Children (Section 16)
A child of a void marriage is legitimate, whether or not a decree of nullity is passed; so is a child of an annulled voidable marriage born or conceived before the decree. Such a child can claim property only from the parents, not other relatives.
Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun (three-judge bench led by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud): Held: such children inherit from their parent's share in joint family property, worked out by imagining a partition just before the parent's death. Principle: they are not coparceners by birth and cannot claim other relatives' property.
Even the spouse of a void marriage can claim permanent alimony under the Hindu Marriage Act (Unit Four).
Valid, Void and Irregular Marriages under Muslim Law
Muslim law classifies marriages as valid (sahih), void (batil) and irregular (fasid).
| Point | Void (batil) | Irregular (fasid) |
|---|---|---|
| Prohibition broken | Absolute | Relative, which can be removed: unlawful not in itself but because of something curable |
| Examples | Relative by blood, marriage or fosterage; another man's wife | Fifth wife; wife's sister while the first marriage continues; no witnesses; woman undergoing iddat |
| Effects | No civil rights or obligations; children illegitimate | See below |
Irregular marriage: either party may end it at any time, before or after consummation, by words showing an intention to separate. Before consummation it has no legal effect. After consummation, the wife is entitled to dower (the lesser of the proper and the specified dower) and must observe iddat, and the children are legitimate and can inherit; but husband and wife do not inherit from each other.
Chand Patel v. Bismillah Begum (Supreme Court): the husband married his first wife's sister during the first marriage. The second wife claimed maintenance for herself and her child under Section 125 CrPC; he argued the marriage was void. Held: under Hanafi law this unlawful conjunction makes the marriage irregular, not void, so she remained his wife and was entitled to maintenance. Principle: an irregular marriage continues until ended by the parties or declared void by a competent court.
Muta Marriage
Muta (meaning enjoyment) is a temporary marriage recognised only by the Ithna Ashari Shia school: a marriage for a fixed period (a day, a month or several years) for a fixed dower. Sunni law treats it as void.
Essentials: the period must be fixed and the dower specified. A Shia man may contract a muta with a Muslim, Christian or Jewish woman, or even a fire-worshipper; a Shia woman may not contract it with a non-Muslim.
Consequences
- It ends automatically on expiry of the period or the death of either party. There is no divorce, but the husband may end it early by a gift of the remaining term (hiba-e-muddat).
- Dower: half if not consummated; full if consummated.
- Iddat: two courses after a consummated muta ends by expiry; four months and ten days on the husband's death.
- Children are legitimate and inherit from both parents.
- Spouses do not inherit from each other, and under Shia law the wife is not entitled to maintenance.
Classifications Compared: Hindu Law and Muslim Law
| Point | Hindu Marriage Act | Sunni law |
|---|---|---|
| Classes | Valid, void, voidable | Valid, void, irregular |
| Middle category | Voidable: valid until annulled, at the option of one party, by a court decree | Irregular: no effect until consummation; ended by either party without any court; after consummation, wife gets dower and children are legitimate |
| Void marriage | No marriage at all, though the Act protects the children's legitimacy | No marriage at all |
Voidable (Hindu) versus irregular (Muslim) marriage is a frequently asked comparison.
Same-Sex Marriage
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (five-judge bench): Held: Section 377 IPC, so far as it punished consensual sexual acts between adults, was unconstitutional. Principle: this removed the criminal stigma but created no right to marry.
Supriyo alias Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India (2023): same-sex couples sought recognition of a right to marry, mainly through a gender-neutral reading of the Special Marriage Act. A five-judge bench led by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud decided on 17 October 2023. Held: the unanimous and split points are set out below. Principle: any right to marry or to a civil union must come from Parliament.
Unanimous points:
- The Constitution gives no unqualified fundamental right to marry.
- The Court cannot strike down or rewrite the Special Marriage Act to include same-sex couples; that is for Parliament.
- Queer persons have the right to choose a partner and live together, and the State must protect them from harassment and violence.
- A transgender person in a heterosexual relationship can marry under existing laws.
| Issue (3:2) | Minority: Chief Justice Chandrachud, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul | Majority: Justices S. Ravindra Bhat, Hima Kohli, P.S. Narasimha |
|---|---|---|
| Civil union | Queer couples have a right to a civil union | No enforceable right unless the legislature creates it |
| Joint adoption | Queer couples may jointly adopt | Upheld regulations excluding unmarried couples from joint adoption |
The Government told the Court that a committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary would examine practical entitlements of queer couples, such as joint bank accounts, ration cards and pension benefits. In January 2025, a five-judge bench dismissed the review petitions.
Present position: same-sex marriage is not legally recognised in India. Same-sex relationships are lawful and the partners are entitled to protection, but any right to marry or to a civil union must come from Parliament.
Live-in Relationships
A live-in relationship is an arrangement in which two adults live together in an intimate relationship without marrying. No law in India prohibits it.
S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal: many criminal complaints were filed against a well-known actress who had spoken in favour of premarital sex and live-in relationships. Held: the Supreme Court quashed them all. Principle: two adults living together commit no offence, even if some regard it as immoral.
Lata Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh: Held: the police were directed to protect an adult woman who had married outside her caste, and to act against those threatening the couple. Principle: an adult has the right to choose a partner.
Badri Prasad v. Deputy Director of Consolidation: Held: the Supreme Court presumed a marriage from a cohabitation of about 50 years, noting that the presumption is rebuttable. Principle: long cohabitation as husband and wife raises a presumption of marriage, and the children are then legitimate and can inherit.
Rights under the Domestic Violence Act
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (Unit Four) protects a woman in a domestic relationship, defined to include a relationship in the nature of marriage. Such a woman can claim protection, residence and maintenance under it.
D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (Justice Markandey Katju): Patchaiammal claimed she had married Velusamy and lived with him, and sought maintenance under Section 125 CrPC; he said he was already married. Held: case sent back, as the first wife had not been heard; if he was already married, Patchaiammal could not be his wife under Section 125. Principle: a woman who is not a wife may still claim under the Domestic Violence Act if the relationship is in the nature of marriage.
Velusamy requirements:
- The couple hold themselves out to society as akin to spouses.
- They are of legal age to marry.
- They are otherwise qualified to marry, including being unmarried.
- They have voluntarily cohabited for a significant period.
Keeping a woman mainly for sexual purposes or as a servant, or a one-night stand, does not qualify.
Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan): an unmarried woman lived for about 18 years with a man she knew had a wife and children, and later claimed maintenance under the Domestic Violence Act. Held: not a relationship in the nature of marriage, because she knew he was married; the Court urged Parliament to protect women so left without support. Principle: a relationship with a known married partner does not qualify.
Indra Sarma guidelines: duration; shared household; pooling of resources and financial arrangements; domestic arrangements; sexual relationship; children; appearing in public as a couple; and the intention and conduct of the parties.
| Relationship in the nature of marriage | Other live-in relationship |
|---|---|
| Looks like a marriage in every way except the ceremony | A casual arrangement, a relationship with a married partner, or a purely sexual arrangement |
| Both unmarried and of marriageable age; live together for a significant period, share a household, present themselves as spouses | Lacks these features |
| Protected under the Domestic Violence Act | Not protected under that Act |
Every relationship in the nature of marriage is a live-in relationship, but not every live-in relationship is a relationship in the nature of marriage.
- A live-in partner is not a wife in law, so she cannot ordinarily claim maintenance as a wife under the criminal procedure law, unless the court presumes a marriage from long cohabitation.
- In 2010, the Supreme Court referred to a larger bench whether a wider reading of "wife" is possible; no larger bench has answered it so far.
- The Uttarakhand Uniform Civil Code requires live-in couples there to register, and treats children of such relationships as legitimate.
Unit Three: Matrimonial Reliefs and Bars to Matrimonial Relief
When a marriage runs into trouble, the law offers remedies called matrimonial reliefs. The Hindu Marriage Act offers four:
| Relief (Hindu Marriage Act) | Effect |
|---|---|
| Restitution of conjugal rights | Tries to save the marriage |
| Judicial separation | Suspends it |
| Nullity | Declares that a valid marriage never came into being, or annuls a voidable one |
| Divorce | Ends a valid marriage |
The Special Marriage Act offers the same four. Muslim law has its own system of divorce, together with the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939.
Restitution of Conjugal Rights
Neha leaves the matrimonial home, goes to live with her parents and refuses to return. Prince, who wants her back, can petition for restitution of conjugal rights.
Conjugal rights are the rights of husband and wife to each other's company, that is, to live together as spouses.
Section 9, Hindu Marriage Act
When either spouse has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply to the District Court, which may decree restitution if satisfied that the statements in the petition are true and that there is no legal ground for refusing it. An Explanation added in 1976 puts the burden of proving reasonable excuse on the person who has withdrawn.
Elements: (1) withdrawal by one spouse from the society of the other; (2) without reasonable excuse; (3) no legal ground for refusing relief.
Reasonable excuse: conduct that would itself be a ground for matrimonial relief, such as cruelty or adultery. Before 1976, only such grounds were allowed as defences; since that limit was removed, courts also accept grave and weighty conduct falling short of a ground.
The working wife
Kailashwati v. Ayodhia Parkash (Full Bench, Punjab and Haryana High Court): both spouses were teachers at different places. After some months with the husband, the wife got a transfer to her parents' village and stayed there, refusing to resign and join him. Held: the trial court's restitution decree was upheld; a wife who, without the husband's agreement, insists on living elsewhere for her job withdraws without reasonable excuse. Principle: the husband, who must maintain the wife, decides the matrimonial home if he acts in good faith and has the means.
Swaraj Garg v. K.M. Garg (Delhi High Court, Justice V.S. Deshpande): the wife, a well-paid headmistress of a government school in Sunam, did not join the husband in Delhi, where he had no stable job and no house of his own. Held: restitution refused; with the better job and income, her refusal was a reasonable excuse. Principle: spouses are equals, in line with Article 14; no rule of Hindu law lets the husband alone choose the home.
| Kailashwati | Swaraj Garg |
|---|---|
| Husband decides the matrimonial home | Home decided by weighing the needs and convenience of both |
| Based on the husband's duty to maintain | Based on equality of spouses (Article 14) |
| Working wife's refusal: no reasonable excuse | Working wife's refusal: can be a reasonable excuse |
Exam tip: learn these two cases as a pair. The equality-based view of Swaraj Garg fits the modern law.
Constitutional validity
T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah (Andhra Pradesh High Court, Justice P.A. Choudary): Held: Section 9 struck down. Principle: a decree forcing a woman to live with a man and have sexual relations against her will violates her privacy and dignity under Article 21.
Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry (Delhi High Court): Held: disagreed with Sareetha. Principle: the object of restitution is cohabitation, not merely sexual intercourse; introducing constitutional law into the home is like introducing a bull into a china shop.
Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha (Supreme Court, Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji): the wife obtained a restitution decree with the husband's consent; he did not comply and after a year sought divorce for non-restitution. Held: Section 9 upheld, approving the Delhi view and overruling the Andhra Pradesh view. Restitution serves a social purpose, as an aid to prevent the break-up of marriage. It cannot be enforced by physical force; under Order 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is enforced only by attaching the property of the party who wilfully disobeys. The husband got his divorce, since mere non-compliance is not a wrong that bars relief, but had to keep maintaining the wife and their daughter. Principle: restitution is constitutional.
In practice, restitution is often filed as a first step: if the decree is not obeyed for one year, either party can seek divorce under Section 13(1A). A fresh challenge to restitution was filed in the Supreme Court in 2019.
Restitution under Muslim law
Muslim law also recognises a suit for restitution of conjugal rights. The court decides it on equitable principles. The wife may defend it by showing cruelty, non-payment of prompt dower before consummation, or some other just cause.
Itwari v. Asghari (Allahabad High Court, Justice S.S. Dhavan): after the first wife went to live with her parents, the husband took a second wife; when she claimed maintenance, he sued for restitution. Held: his appeal dismissed; his suit was a mere counter-blast to her maintenance claim. A restitution court acts like a court of equity and will not compel a wife to return where the husband's conduct makes it unjust. The Quran insists on equal treatment of wives, which several Muslim jurists regarded as impossible. Principle: under modern conditions, taking a second wife raises a presumption of cruelty to the first, shifting to the husband the burden of proving no insult or cruelty to her.
Recall also the Ghulam Kubra Bibi case, where the husband's restitution suit failed at the first step, because he could not prove a valid marriage.
Nullity of Marriage
Under Section 11, either party to a void marriage may petition for a declaration that it is void; under Section 12, the aggrieved party to a voidable marriage may petition to annul it. Either way, the children remain legitimate under Section 16.
Only a competent court, on a proper petition, can annul a marriage.
Shafin Jahan v. K.M. Asokan (the Hadiya case): Akhila, a homeopathy student from Kerala, converted to Islam as Hadiya. Her father filed a habeas corpus petition alleging forcible conversion and that she might be taken abroad. While it was pending, she married Shafin Jahan, and the Kerala High Court annulled the marriage in those proceedings and placed her in her father's custody. Held: the Supreme Court (Chief Justice Dipak Misra for himself and Justice A.M. Khanwilkar; Justice D.Y. Chandrachud concurring) set the order aside; a High Court cannot annul an adult woman's marriage in a habeas corpus petition. Principle: the right to marry a person of one's choice is integral to personal liberty under Article 21; faith and choice of partner lie at the core of personal autonomy, and neither the State, society nor the family can dictate them.
Judicial Separation
Judicial separation is a middle path for a spouse who does not want to end the marriage (for religious reasons or for the children's sake) but cannot live with the other. It suspends the duty to live together while the marriage continues.
- Grounds (Section 10): any divorce ground under Section 13(1); a wife may also use her special grounds under Section 13(2). Before 1976 it had separate grounds; the amendment made them the same as for divorce.
- Effect: the petitioner need not live with the respondent, but they remain husband and wife, so neither can remarry.
- Rescission: the court may rescind the decree on either party's petition if just and reasonable, for example on reconciliation.
- Divorce: if cohabitation is not resumed for one year or more after the decree, either party may seek divorce under Section 13(1A).
A wife who wants protection and maintenance without the finality of divorce may prefer it, and it leaves room for reconciliation.
Theories of Divorce
| Theory | Idea |
|---|---|
| Fault (guilt or offence) theory | Divorce only when one spouse has committed a matrimonial offence (adultery, cruelty, desertion) and the other is innocent; only the innocent spouse gets relief. The original Hindu Marriage Act was built mainly on it. |
| Consent theory | Spouses who freely agree may part without proving fault: Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act and Section 28 of the Special Marriage Act. |
| Breakdown theory | The question is whether the marriage has broken down beyond repair, not who is at fault; keeping it alive in law serves no purpose. Section 13(1A) reflects it; irretrievable breakdown is studied later. |
| Frustration or no-fault theory | Divorce where the purpose of the marriage is defeated by circumstances such as incurable mental disorder, conversion, renunciation of the world or long disappearance, though no one has committed an offence. |
Development
- Classical Hindu law did not allow divorce, though custom allowed it in many communities.
- Some provinces passed divorce laws before Independence, such as the Bombay Hindu Divorce Act, 1947.
- The Hindu Marriage Act introduced divorce for all Hindus in 1955.
- The Marriage Laws Amendment Act, 1976 made cruelty and desertion grounds for divorce, introduced divorce by mutual consent, and gave wives two new grounds, based on a maintenance order and on the option of puberty.
Grounds of Divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act
Section 13(1) lists the grounds available to either spouse.
Adultery
The respondent has, after the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse. Before 1976, the petitioner had to prove that the respondent was "living in adultery"; now a single act is enough. Direct evidence being rare, courts accept circumstantial evidence, judged by the preponderance of probabilities.
Joseph Shine v. Union of India: Held: adultery is no longer a crime. Principle: it remains a ground for divorce.
Cruelty
The respondent has, after the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty. The Act does not define cruelty; it may be physical or mental.
N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane (Justice Y.V. Chandrachud): the husband sought annulment for fraud, alleging that the wife's father had hidden the true nature of her earlier mental illness; alternatively, divorce for unsoundness of mind, and judicial separation for cruelty (then a ground only for judicial separation). The wife had abused and humiliated him and his family and threatened to end her own life. Held: (1) the standard of proof in matrimonial cases is the preponderance of probabilities, as in other civil cases, not proof beyond reasonable doubt; (2) cruelty meant conduct causing a reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious to live with the respondent, without need to endanger life, limb or health; (3) her conduct was cruelty, but the husband had condoned it, as they lived together afterwards and a child was born; her later conduct did not revive it, so his petition failed. Principle: condonation means forgiveness, with the offending spouse restored to the original position.
That test was stated under the old wording. Since 1976 the Act simply says "treated with cruelty", and courts ask whether the conduct is so grave and weighty that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.
Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (Justice Dalveer Bhandari): the spouses had lived apart for over 16 years, the husband alleging a long course of cold and humiliating treatment. Held: the trial court's divorce decree restored, with illustrative instances of mental cruelty. Principle: trivial irritations, quarrels and normal wear and tear are not cruelty; married life must be reviewed as a whole; after a long, continuous separation the marriage may become a fiction, and refusing to end it may itself cause mental cruelty.
Instances of mental cruelty (Samar Ghosh) include:
- conduct causing acute mental pain and suffering that makes living together impossible;
- a sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment;
- unilateral refusal of sexual relations for a long time without good reason;
- a unilateral decision after marriage not to have a child;
- a vasectomy by the husband, or an abortion or sterilisation by the wife, without medical reason and without the other's consent or knowledge.
V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat: Held: false and defamatory allegations, such as calling a spouse mentally ill in the pleadings, are cruelty.
K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa: Held: filing false criminal complaints against the husband and his family is cruelty.
Narendra v. K. Meena: Held: persistently pressuring a husband to leave his parents, with threats of suicide, is cruelty.
Desertion
Desertion for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately before the petition.
Desertion (Explanation): desertion of the petitioner by the other party without reasonable cause and without the petitioner's consent or against the petitioner's wish; it includes wilful neglect of the petitioner.
Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati (Justice B.P. Sinha; under the old Bombay Hindu Divorce Act): the husband saw a letter from the wife to another man suggesting intimacy; soon after, she went to her parents' home, and he alleged desertion. Held: desertion not proved. She left out of guilt, not to desert, and was later willing to return, but the husband's attitude prevented it; her intention to end cohabitation permanently was not shown for the whole statutory period of four years. Principle: desertion is the intentional, permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other, without the other's consent and without reasonable cause.
| Deserting spouse | Deserted spouse |
|---|---|
| Fact of separation | Absence of consent |
| Intention to end cohabitation permanently (animus deserendi) | No conduct giving the other reasonable cause to leave |
The petitioner must prove all of these. Constructive desertion: the deserter is not always the one who leaves the house.
If Prince, by his cruelty, forces Neha to leave, it is Prince who has deserted her.
Other grounds under Section 13(1)
- Conversion: the respondent has ceased to be a Hindu by converting to another religion.
- Mental disorder: the respondent has been incurably of unsound mind, or has been suffering, continuously or intermittently, from mental disorder of such a kind and extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.
- Venereal disease in a communicable form.
- Renunciation of the world by entering a religious order.
- Not heard of as alive for seven years or more by those who would naturally have heard of it.
Leprosy was also a ground until Parliament removed it in 2019, because leprosy is curable and the ground stigmatised patients.
Section 13(1A): breakdown grounds
Either party may seek divorce where there has been no resumption of cohabitation for one year or more after a decree of judicial separation, or no restitution of conjugal rights for one year or more after a restitution decree. Even the party against whom the decree was passed may use these grounds.
Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar: the wife obtained a restitution decree and, after the two years then required, herself sought divorce. The husband argued that she had ignored his letters asking her to return, and was taking advantage of her own wrong. Held: merely refusing to resume cohabitation is not a wrong serious enough to deny relief. Principle: a spouse who does not resume cohabitation after the decree is not barred from divorce under Section 13(1A) on that account alone.
Section 13(2): wife's additional grounds
- In a marriage solemnised before the Act, the husband had another wife living at the time of the marriage, still alive when the petition is filed.
- The husband has, since the marriage, been guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality.
- A maintenance order has been passed in her favour under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act or the criminal procedure law, and cohabitation has not been resumed for one year or more since.
- She was married before 15 and repudiated the marriage after 15 but before 18, whether or not it was consummated.
Divorce by Mutual Consent
Under Section 13B, both parties may present a petition together on the ground that they have been living separately for one year or more, have not been able to live together, and have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.
After a waiting period, both must make a second motion, not earlier than six months and not later than 18 months after the petition. If the petition has not been withdrawn, the court hears the parties and makes such inquiry as it thinks fit; if satisfied that the statements are true, it passes a decree of divorce.
Divorce by Mutual Consent: Withdrawal of Consent and the Waiting Period
Withdrawal of consent before the decree
Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash: the wife joined a petition for divorce by mutual consent but later withdrew her consent, saying it had been obtained under pressure. Held (Supreme Court, Justice K. Jagannatha Shetty): mutual consent must continue until the decree. Either party may withdraw it unilaterally before the decree, and the court then cannot pass a decree on the basis of mutual consent. Also: living separately means not living as husband and wife, even if the parties stay under the same roof.
Withdrawn consent and the curative petition
A dispute of the same kind led to a landmark in constitutional procedure.
Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra: at an earlier stage of the case, the Supreme Court had granted a divorce to Ashok Hurra although his wife, Rupa, had withdrawn her consent, using its special power under Article 142 to do complete justice. Rupa then filed a writ petition challenging that final judgment. Held (Constitution Bench): a final judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be challenged by a writ petition under Article 32. But to prevent abuse of process and a gross miscarriage of justice, the Court created a new remedy, the curative petition. It may be filed even after a review petition is dismissed, on narrow grounds such as a violation of natural justice.
Waiver of the six-month waiting period
The six-month period exists so that the parties can think again. But where they have lived apart for years and settled everything, it only prolongs their agony.
Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur: the parties had lived separately for more than eight years and had settled all disputes, including permanent alimony and custody of the children. Held (Supreme Court, Justice A.K. Goel): the six-month period in Section 13B(2) is directory, not mandatory, and the court may waive it.
Four conditions for waiver:
- The statutory period of six months, along with the one year of separation, is already over before the first motion.
- All efforts at mediation and reconciliation have failed.
- The parties have genuinely settled their differences, including alimony and custody of children.
- The waiting period would only prolong their agony.
The application for waiver may be filed one week after the first motion.
Sections 14 and 15
- Section 14: no petition for divorce may be presented within one year of the marriage. The court may allow an earlier petition on the ground of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent.
- Section 15: either party may remarry when there is no right of appeal, or the time for appeal has expired without an appeal, or an appeal has been dismissed.
Divorce under Muslim Law
Modes of dissolution
A Muslim marriage may be dissolved by the death of a spouse; by the acts of the parties without going to court (non-judicial or extra-judicial divorce); or by a decree of the court (judicial divorce, now governed mainly by the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939).
| Extra-judicial divorce by | Forms |
|---|---|
| The husband | Talaq, ila, zihar |
| The wife | Under a power delegated to her |
| Both (mutual consent) | Khula, mubarat |
Talaq
Talaq literally means release: the husband's power to dissolve the marriage by pronouncement. Classical law recognised two main kinds: talaq-ul-sunnat, the approved form, which follows the practice of the Prophet and has two sub-forms (ahsan and hasan); and talaq-ul-biddat, the disapproved or innovative form. A tuhr is a period when the wife is free from menstruation.
| Form | Procedure | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Ahsan (most approved) | A single talaq pronounced during a tuhr; the husband then abstains from intercourse during the iddat. | Revocable during the iddat, by words or by resuming cohabitation; becomes final only when the iddat ends. |
| Hasan | Three pronouncements in three successive periods of purity, without intercourse in between. | The third pronouncement makes the divorce final. |
| Talaq-ul-biddat | Three pronouncements in a single tuhr, usually all at once, or a single pronouncement clearly intending an irrevocable divorce. | Takes effect immediately; cannot be revoked. Hanafi law: sinful but valid. Shia law never recognised it. |
Halala: after three pronouncements, the parties could remarry each other only if the wife first married another man, that marriage was consummated, and it too was dissolved. The practice has been widely criticised.
Judicial control over talaq
For a long time, Indian courts accepted that a Muslim husband could divorce at will, without giving reasons. Change came through the courts.
Shamim Ara v. State of Uttar Pradesh: the wife claimed maintenance; the husband replied in his written statement that he had divorced her years earlier. Held (Supreme Court, Justice R.C. Lahoti): a mere plea of divorce in a written statement or affidavit is not a valid talaq; it must actually be pronounced. Approving two Gauhati High Court decisions of Justice Baharul Islam, the Court held that talaq must be for a reasonable cause and be preceded by attempts at reconciliation by two arbiters, one from the wife's family and one from the husband's. None of this was proved, so the marriage subsisted and the husband remained liable to maintain her.
Masroor Ahmed v. State (National Capital Territory of Delhi): the husband claimed he had divorced his wife by triple talaq, and its validity became the central question in a criminal case between them. Held (Delhi High Court, Justice Badar Durrez Ahmed): (1) after Shamim Ara, where a talaq is disputed, the husband must prove pronouncement, a reasonable cause and attempts at reconciliation; (2) a triple talaq in one sitting is to be treated as a single revocable talaq; (3) for a revocable talaq, the attempt at reconciliation may come even after the pronouncement, during the iddat, but for an irrevocable form it must come before.
Triple talaq set aside: Shayara Bano
Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017): married for about fifteen years, Shayara Bano received a letter from her husband pronouncing triple talaq. She challenged triple talaq, polygamy and halala. Held: on 22 August 2017 a five-judge bench, by a majority of 3:2, set aside triple talaq. The challenges to polygamy and halala were not decided.
Examiners frequently ask about the three separate opinions in Shayara Bano: two judges on manifest arbitrariness (Article 14), one on the Quran (Article 25), and two dissenting.
| Judges | Opinion |
|---|---|
| Justice R.F. Nariman, with Justice U.U. Lalit | Triple talaq is manifestly arbitrary: it lets the husband break the marriage whimsically, without any attempt at reconciliation. The Shariat Act of 1937 enforces Muslim personal law, so it is a law in force; to the extent it recognises and enforces triple talaq, it is void under Article 13 for violating Article 14. |
| Justice Kurian Joseph (agreeing in result) | Triple talaq is against the basic tenets of the Quran, so it cannot be part of Muslim personal law protected by Article 25. What is bad in theology is bad in law as well. |
| Chief Justice J.S. Khehar and Justice S. Abdul Nazeer (dissent) | Triple talaq is part of the personal law of Sunni Hanafi Muslims, protected by Article 25, so only Parliament could change it. They would have restrained husbands from pronouncing it, at first for six months, while Parliament legislated. |
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019
After Shayara Bano, Parliament passed this Act, which took effect from 19 September 2018.
- Section 3: any pronouncement of talaq by a Muslim husband upon his wife, by words spoken or written, in electronic form or in any other manner, is void and illegal. Talaq here means talaq-e-biddat or any similar form having the effect of an instant and irrevocable divorce.
- Section 4: an offence punishable with imprisonment up to three years and fine.
- The wife is entitled to a subsistence allowance for herself and dependent children, and to custody of her minor children.
- The offence is cognizable if information is given by the wife or a relative; compoundable at her instance with the Magistrate's permission; bail only after hearing her.
Critics ask why an act already void should be a crime; supporters say punishment is needed as a deterrent. The Act's validity has been challenged before the Supreme Court, and petitions questioning talaq-e-hasan have also reached that Court.
Divorce by the wife: talaq-e-tafweez (delegated divorce)
The husband may delegate his power of talaq to the wife, or to a third person, absolutely or on conditions, often in the nikahnama. When the condition happens, she may exercise the power, and the divorce is as effective as if the husband had pronounced it. The delegation is valid if its conditions are reasonable and not against public policy.
Aadil agrees that if he takes a second wife, or fails to maintain Zoya for six months, she may divorce herself. When either condition happens, Zoya may exercise the power.
Ila and zihar
- Ila: the husband swears to abstain from intercourse with his wife for four months or more, and keeps the vow.
- Zihar: the husband compares his wife to a woman within the prohibited degrees, such as his mother. The wife may refuse cohabitation until he performs a penance, and may seek divorce through the court.
Both are rare today.
Khula and mubarat
| Khula | Mubarat |
|---|---|
| At the instance of the wife: she asks to be released and offers something in return, usually the return of her dower. | Aversion is mutual; both desire separation, and either may make the offer. |
In both, once the offer is accepted, the divorce is complete and irrevocable, and the wife must observe iddat.
Does khula need the husband's consent?
Classical texts treated khula as a contract needing his acceptance. High Courts have recently held otherwise. In 2021, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court held that a Muslim wife may end her marriage by khula outside the court, without her husband's consent.
Mohd. Arif Ali v. Afsarunnisa (2025): Held (Telangana High Court): a Muslim wife has an absolute right to khula. The husband's consent is not required, and no certificate from a mufti is needed. The husband may only negotiate about the return of the dower, and an effective attempt at reconciliation must first be made. The question has also reached the Supreme Court.
Judicial Divorce: The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939
Before 1939, a Hanafi wife had almost no way to obtain a divorce through the court; some wives even renounced Islam, because apostasy was treated as dissolving the marriage. The 1939 Act, drawing on the more liberal Maliki school, gave Muslim wives clear grounds for judicial divorce.
Grounds under Section 2
- Husband's whereabouts not known for four years.
- Husband has neglected or failed to provide for her maintenance for two years.
- Husband sentenced to imprisonment for seven years or more.
- Husband has failed, without reasonable cause, to perform his marital obligations for three years.
- Husband was impotent at the time of marriage and continues to be so.
- Husband has been insane for two years, or is suffering from a virulent venereal disease.
- Option of puberty (covered in the previous unit).
- Cruelty.
- Any other ground recognised as valid under Muslim law, such as lian, where the husband falsely accuses his wife of adultery.
The cruelty clause
It is wide, and covers a husband who:
- habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruelty of conduct, even if not amounting to physical ill-treatment;
- associates with women of evil repute or leads an infamous life;
- attempts to force her to lead an immoral life;
- disposes of her property or prevents her exercising her legal rights over it;
- obstructs her in the observance of her religious profession or practice; or
- has more wives than one and does not treat her equitably in accordance with the injunctions of the Quran.
Safeguards
- Disappearance: the decree does not take effect for six months; if the husband reappears within that time and satisfies the court that he is prepared to perform his conjugal duties, the decree is set aside.
- Imprisonment: no decree until the sentence is final.
- Impotence: the court must first give the husband, if he applies, one year to show that he has ceased to be impotent.
Sections 4 and 5
- Section 4: a married Muslim woman's renunciation of Islam, or conversion to another faith, does not by itself dissolve her marriage.
- Section 5: preserves her right to dower on dissolution.
A. Yousuf Rawther v. Sowramma: Sowramma, a young Hanafi girl, was married to a much older man running a business in Coimbatore. After about a month in his house she returned to her parents, and he did not maintain her for over two years. She sued for dissolution for failure to maintain; he pleaded that she had stayed away without reason, so he was not bound to maintain her. Held (Kerala High Court, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer): defence rejected, decree upheld. The clause asks only whether the husband in fact failed to maintain her for two years, not why; even where there was a cause for non-maintenance, the wife could obtain a divorce. Failure to maintain is an index of the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. He also criticised the popular belief that a Muslim husband has an arbitrary, unilateral power to inflict instant divorce, as not according with Islamic injunctions.
Hindu and Muslim divorce compared
| Hindu Marriage Act | Muslim law (traditional) |
|---|---|
| Every divorce needs a decree of the court. | The husband could divorce without the court. |
| Grounds largely the same for both spouses, with some extra grounds for the wife. | The wife needed delegation, the husband's agreement or a decree. |
The gap has narrowed: triple talaq is void and punishable; talaq must be for a reasonable cause, with attempts at reconciliation; and High Courts have recognised the wife's right to khula.
Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage
Irretrievable means that which cannot be recovered. A marriage has broken down irretrievably when the relationship is dead beyond any hope of revival and the legal tie has become a mere formality. The idea: when a marriage is dead, the law should give it a decent burial instead of forcing the parties to prove fault.
Position under the Hindu Marriage Act
It is not a ground as such. The Law Commission recommended adding it in its 71st Report (1978) and 217th Report (2009). A Bill to do so was passed by the Rajya Sabha in 2013 but lapsed. Parliament has not added the ground.
Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli: the Supreme Court urged the Union Government to consider seriously amending the law.
Dissolution under Article 142
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court began dissolving dead marriages itself under Article 142, which empowers it to pass any decree necessary for doing complete justice.
Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan (2023): Constitution Bench, 1 May 2023, judgment by Justice Sanjiv Khanna. Held: the Supreme Court can dissolve a marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown under Article 142, even if one spouse opposes it. This is a matter of discretion, not a right of the parties, and the breakdown must be established on facts. The Court can also waive the six-month period for divorce by mutual consent.
Relevant factors: the period of cohabitation; when the parties last lived together; the nature of the allegations; the effect of the litigation; the attempts at settlement; and the length of separation (about six years or more is a relevant factor). The Court must also ensure fairness to the wife and children through alimony and custody arrangements.
The power belongs only to the Supreme Court. High Courts and family courts cannot grant divorce on this ground, and a party cannot file a writ petition demanding it.
Breakdown was already recognised in part: Justice Krishna Iyer read it into Muslim divorce law in Yousuf Rawther; and for Hindus, divorce by mutual consent and the grounds in Section 13(1A) recognise it in part.
The debate
| Supporters | Critics |
|---|---|
| A dead marriage causes misery to both parties and their children. | An economically weaker spouse, often the wife, may be abandoned against her will. |
| Fault-based litigation only increases bitterness. | A party may create the breakdown by his own wrong and then take advantage of it. |
Exam conclusion: any reform must come with strong financial protection for the weaker spouse.
Bars to Matrimonial Relief: Section 23, Hindu Marriage Act
Even when a ground is proved, the court will refuse relief if a bar applies. Under Section 23, the court shall decree relief only if satisfied that:
- No advantage from own wrong or disability: the petitioner is not taking advantage of his or her own wrong or disability for the purpose of the relief. This rests on the maxim that no one may benefit from his own wrong.
- No accessory, connivance or condonation: where the ground is adultery, the petitioner has not been accessory to, connived at or condoned it; where the ground is cruelty, the petitioner has not condoned it.
- Free consent: where the ground is mutual consent, the consent was not obtained by force, fraud or undue influence.
- No collusion: the petition is not presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent.
- No delay: there has been no unnecessary or improper delay in bringing the proceeding.
- No other legal ground exists for refusing relief.
A husband who drives his wife out of the house cannot seek divorce on the ground that she deserted him.
Dharmendra Kumar and Saroj Rani (studied earlier): merely not complying with a decree of restitution is not a wrong serious enough to bar divorce under Section 13(1A).
Accessory: actively helping in the adultery. Connivance: knowingly permitting or encouraging it. Condonation: forgiving it; it is conditional forgiveness, so if the offending spouse commits a fresh matrimonial offence, the old offence may revive. Collusion: an agreement between the parties to deceive the court, for example by inventing a ground or suppressing a defence.
N.G. Dastane (studied earlier): the husband's continued cohabitation and the birth of a child showed that he had condoned the wife's cruelty.
Divorce by mutual consent is lawful, but a secret agreement to fake a ground such as adultery is collusion.
Duty to attempt reconciliation
Before granting any relief, the court must, in every case where it is possible consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case, make every endeavour to bring about a reconciliation.
- The duty does not apply to grounds such as conversion, mental disorder, venereal disease, renunciation of the world and presumed death, where reconciliation would be pointless.
- The court may adjourn the case for up to fifteen days and refer the parties to a person they name, or one it nominates, to attempt reconciliation.
Section 23A: a respondent may not only oppose the relief but also claim relief on the ground of the petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion.
Mediation, Counselling and Family Courts
Family disputes differ from ordinary civil disputes: the parties often have children and a shared history, and may have to deal with each other for years. A bitter court fight can destroy whatever goodwill remains, so the law encourages settlement.
| Counselling | Mediation |
|---|---|
| Professional help to understand and resolve the emotional causes of the conflict. | A neutral person, the mediator, helps the parties reach their own settlement; the mediator decides nothing. Voluntary and confidential. |
Many disputes about maintenance, custody, residence and property, and even the decision to part by mutual consent, are settled in court-annexed mediation centres. Mediation is not suitable where one spouse faces serious violence or threats.
Supporting provisions
- Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act: efforts at reconciliation.
- Order 32A, Code of Civil Procedure (added in 1976): courts dealing with family disputes must first try to help the parties settle.
- Section 89, Code of Civil Procedure: courts may refer disputes to mediation and other methods of settlement.
- The Mediation Act, 2023.
K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa: the Supreme Court directed mediation centres to set up pre-litigation desks for matrimonial disputes, and directed criminal courts to refer suitable cruelty complaints by wives to mediation at an early stage, where both parties are willing.
The Family Courts Act, 1984
Passed because women's organisations and the Law Commission had long demanded a less formal and more conciliatory forum for family disputes.
- Section 3: the State Government, after consulting the High Court, must establish a Family Court for every city or town with a population exceeding one million, and may establish them elsewhere.
- Section 4: every effort is to be made to select judges committed to protecting and preserving the institution of marriage and promoting the welfare of children, with experience in settling disputes by conciliation and counselling. Preference is to be given to women.
- Section 7: a Family Court exercises the jurisdiction of a District Court or subordinate civil court in family suits and proceedings: nullity, restitution, judicial separation and divorce; validity of a marriage or matrimonial status; property of the spouses; injunctions arising out of a marriage; legitimacy; maintenance; and guardianship and custody of children. It also exercises a Magistrate's jurisdiction under the maintenance provisions of the criminal procedure law.
- Section 9: in the first instance, the court must try to persuade the parties to settle, and may adjourn where there is a reasonable possibility of settlement.
- Sections 5 and 6: association of social welfare agencies, and counsellors.
- Procedure: the court may lay down its own procedure; may hold proceedings in camera, and must if either party wishes; may take the help of medical and welfare experts; and, the strict rules of evidence being relaxed, may receive any report or document that helps it deal effectually with the dispute.
- Section 13: no party is entitled, as of right, to be represented by a legal practitioner, though the court may seek a legal expert's help as amicus curiae. In practice, lawyers are often permitted.
- Section 19: appeal lies to the High Court from every judgment or order, other than an interlocutory order, on facts and law; within thirty days; heard by a bench of two or more judges. No appeal lies from a consent order. A maintenance order under the criminal procedure law can be challenged in the High Court only in revision.
- Section 20: overriding effect over any other law.
Renu leaves Prince because of repeated humiliation and his false allegation that she is mentally ill. Prince files for restitution. Renu has a reasonable excuse, because the false allegation is itself mental cruelty, and she may seek judicial separation or divorce on that ground. Had she returned and lived happily with him for years after the incidents, the court would ask whether she had condoned the cruelty. If both agree to part, they may seek divorce by mutual consent after a year of separation, and the court may waive the six-month wait if the waiver conditions are met. Throughout, the Family Court will first try counselling and mediation.
Unit 4: Alimony and Maintenance
A divorce or separation raises an urgent question: how will the dependent spouse and the children live?
Maintenance: provision of food, clothing, residence, education, medical care and other necessities, suited to the status of the parties. Alimony: maintenance paid to a spouse in matrimonial proceedings. Maintenance pendente lite (Latin: while the litigation is pending): alimony during the proceedings. Permanent alimony: alimony granted at the end of the case, on or after the decree.
Maintenance is not charity but a legal obligation: a person who has taken on responsibility for dependants must not leave them destitute.
Sources
- Hindu Marriage Act: spouses and children in matrimonial proceedings.
- Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act: Hindu wives, children, parents and other dependants.
- Criminal procedure law: a secular remedy for people of every religion.
- Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986: divorced Muslim women.
- Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act: victims of domestic violence.
A person may have remedies under more than one of these laws.
Maintenance under the Hindu Marriage Act
Section 24: maintenance pendente lite and expenses
In any proceeding under the Act, a wife or husband with no independent income sufficient for support and the necessary expenses of the proceeding may apply; the court may order the other spouse to pay those expenses and a monthly sum during the proceeding, considering the income of both. Since 2001, the application must, as far as possible, be decided within sixty days of service of notice. "Any proceeding" includes a case in which the claimant is the respondent, and even a petition to declare the marriage void.
The Hindu Marriage Act is gender-neutral: a husband without sufficient income can claim maintenance from an earning wife. The criminal procedure remedy is available to a wife but not to a husband.
Section 25: permanent alimony
- Either spouse may apply at the time of passing any decree or at any time afterwards.
- The court may order the other spouse to pay a gross sum or a monthly or periodical sum, for a term not exceeding the applicant's life, considering the income and property of both parties, their conduct and other circumstances.
- If necessary, payment may be secured by a charge on the immovable property of the paying spouse.
- The order may be varied or modified if circumstances change, and varied or rescinded if the recipient has remarried, if a recipient wife has not remained chaste, or if a recipient husband has had sexual intercourse with any woman outside wedlock.
Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur (2025): High Courts had differed on whether the spouse of a void marriage can claim permanent alimony. Held (three-judge bench, 12 February 2025, Justice Abhay S. Oka): a spouse whose marriage is declared void under Section 11 may seek permanent alimony under Section 25, which applies at the time of passing any decree, including a decree of nullity. Interim maintenance under Section 24 may also be granted even if the court prima facie finds the marriage void. Both reliefs are discretionary, and conduct is considered. The Court strongly criticised the expressions "illegitimate wife" and "faithful mistress" in an earlier Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court as violating a woman's dignity, protected by Article 21.
Section 26: children
In any proceeding, the court may make interim orders and provisions in the decree about the custody, maintenance and education of minor children, consistently with their wishes wherever possible. Applications for children's maintenance and education during the proceeding should, as far as possible, be decided within sixty days.
Guidelines and quantum
Rajnesh v. Neha: maintenance cases were slow and unpredictable, and parties ran parallel cases under different laws. Held (Supreme Court, Justice Indu Malhotra), binding guidelines: (1) in all maintenance proceedings, both parties must file an affidavit of assets and liabilities in a prescribed form; (2) a party claiming in more than one proceeding must disclose earlier proceedings and orders, and the later court must consider adjusting or setting off the amount already awarded; (3) the court must consider the status of the parties, reasonable needs of the wife and children, income and property of both sides, the wife's education and employment, and the husband's other liabilities; (4) maintenance should be awarded from the date of the application; (5) orders are enforceable like money decrees, including by attachment of property and civil detention.
Manju Sharma v. Vipin: the wife, turned out of the matrimonial home with her young daughter, claimed maintenance under the Domestic Violence Act. The husband disclosed a modest income, but his business websites showed large turnovers in several ventures; the trial court fixed a low amount. Held (Delhi High Court, Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva): at the interim stage only a prima facie view is needed; the court may rely on material such as business listings, and a husband cannot use such subterfuges to deprive his wife of support. She is entitled to live in a manner similar to her life in the matrimonial home. Maintenance was raised to three times the earlier amount.
Kalyan Dey Chowdhury v. Rita Dey Chowdhury: the Supreme Court said that 25 per cent of the husband's net salary would be a just and proper amount of maintenance for the wife. This is a guide, not a fixed rule.
Rinku Baheti v. Sandesh Sharda: permanent alimony should secure a decent life for the dependent spouse; it is not meant to punish the other spouse or to equalise their wealth.
Maintenance under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956
The Hindu Marriage Act gives maintenance only in matrimonial proceedings. This Act gives a Hindu wife an independent right without seeking divorce or separation, and extends to children, aged parents and other dependants.
Section 18: wife
A Hindu wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime, and to live separately without losing maintenance:
- if he is guilty of desertion (abandoning her without reasonable cause and without her consent or against her wish, or wilfully neglecting her);
- if he has treated her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it will be harmful or injurious to live with him;
- if he has any other wife living;
- if he keeps a concubine in the same house, or habitually resides with a concubine elsewhere;
- if he has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion;
- if there is any other cause justifying her living separately.
She is not entitled to separate residence and maintenance if she is unchaste or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion.
Only a wife can claim under Section 18, and she can do so while the marriage continues, without seeking any other relief.
Section 19: widowed daughter-in-law
She is entitled to maintenance from her father-in-law if she cannot maintain herself from her own earnings or property, or from the estate of her husband, father or mother, or from her son or daughter. The obligation arises only if the father-in-law has the means from coparcenary property in which she has received no share, and ends if she remarries.
Section 20: children and aged parents
- A Hindu must, during his or her lifetime, maintain legitimate or illegitimate children and aged or infirm parents.
- A child, legitimate or illegitimate, may claim from the father or the mother so long as the child is a minor.
- For an aged or infirm parent or an unmarried daughter, the obligation extends only so far as they cannot maintain themselves from their own earnings or property.
- "Parent" includes a childless stepmother.
The duty under Section 20 falls on both father and mother, and an unmarried daughter unable to maintain herself can claim even after becoming a major, until her marriage.
Sections 21 and 22: dependants of a deceased Hindu
Dependants include, each subject to conditions: the father; the mother; the widow, so long as she does not remarry; minor sons and grandsons; unmarried daughters and granddaughters; a widowed daughter; a son's widow; a minor illegitimate son; and an unmarried illegitimate daughter. The heirs taking the estate must maintain them out of it, in proportion to the value of their shares.
Section 23: amount
| Wife, children, aged or infirm parents | Dependants |
|---|---|
| Position and status of the parties; reasonable wants of the claimant; whether a separately living claimant is justified; value of the claimant's own property and income; number of persons entitled. | Net value of the estate after debts; any provision by will; degree of relationship; past relations with the deceased; the dependant's reasonable wants and own property; number of dependants. |
Other rules
- No one can claim under the Act after ceasing to be a Hindu by conversion.
- The amount may be altered on a material change of circumstances.
- Debts of the deceased have priority over dependants' claims.
- A dependant's claim is not a charge on the estate unless created by will, decree, agreement or otherwise; but if the estate is transferred, it is enforceable against a transferee with notice or one who took the property free of cost.
The Secular Remedy: Section 125 CrPC and Section 144 B.N.S.S.
The most widely used remedy was for fifty years Section 125 of the CrPC, 1973. From 1 July 2024 the B.N.S.S., 2023 replaced that Code, and the same provision now appears, in almost the same words, as Section 144. Most leading cases were decided under Section 125, so know both numbers.
The remedy is secular (it applies to every religion) and summary (quick and simple), and is heard by a Magistrate of the first class, or a Family Court where one exists.
Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai: the purpose is to prevent vagrancy and destitution by giving a deserted wife a speedy remedy for food, clothing and shelter. A wife is unable to maintain herself if she cannot maintain herself in the way she was used to in her husband's house.
Who can claim
If a person with sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain any of the following, the Magistrate may order a monthly allowance:
- his wife, unable to maintain herself;
- his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, married or not, unable to maintain itself (Section 144 leaves out the word "minor" here; its effect is debated);
- his legitimate or illegitimate major child, not a married daughter, unable to maintain itself because of physical or mental abnormality or injury;
- his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself.
A father or mother can claim from a daughter as well as a son.
Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai: Held (Supreme Court): a married daughter with sufficient means is also bound to maintain her parents.
- There is no upper limit on the amount.
- Interim maintenance may be ordered; the application should, as far as possible, be decided within sixty days of service of notice.
- Maintenance runs from the date of the order or, if so ordered, from the date of the application; the Rajnesh guidelines now require it from the date of the application.
Who is a wife; the three bars
By the Explanation, wife includes a woman divorced by, or who has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried; so a divorced wife can claim until she remarries. A wife is not entitled if (1) she is living in adultery, (2) she refuses to live with her husband without sufficient reason, or (3) they live separately by mutual consent. If the husband offers maintenance on condition that she lives with him and she refuses, the Magistrate may still grant it if she has just grounds; the law expressly makes his marriage to another woman, or keeping a mistress, a just ground.
Sanjivani Ramchandra Kondalkar v. Ramchandra Bhimrao Kondalkar: the husband obtained divorce on the ground of the wife's adultery; her earlier maintenance was cancelled by the Sessions Court. Held (Bombay High Court, Justice Nitin W. Sambre): cancellation upheld; the "living in adultery" bar applies to a woman divorced on the proven ground of adultery. Earlier Supreme Court decisions allowing divorced wives maintenance were distinguished, as those divorces were not based on adultery.
Sanjay Damodar Kale v. Kalyani Sanjay Kale: on divorce by mutual consent the wife agreed not to claim maintenance; years later, after the husband remarried, she applied. Held (Bombay High Court, Justice N.J. Jamadar): an agreement giving up the right to maintenance is opposed to public policy and void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act; the statutory right cannot be bargained away. Her earnings from a beauty parlour did not disentitle her. The award was upheld with a small reduction.
Updated from the lecture: the lecture named the judge as Justice N.J. Jamdar. The correct position is that the judgment was delivered by Justice N.J. Jamadar of the Bombay High Court. Source: Sanjay Damodar Kale v. Kalyani Sanjay Kale (Bombay High Court, 26 May 2020), Indian Kanoon.
The second wife
Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav: the man already had a living wife, so his marriage with Yamunabai was void. Held (Supreme Court): such a woman is not a "wife" under Section 125 and cannot claim maintenance, even if she did not know of the first marriage.
Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse: the husband married Urmila concealing his existing wife, and relied on Yamunabai when she claimed maintenance for herself and their child. Held (Supreme Court, Justice A.K. Sikri): he cannot benefit from his own fraud; where a husband remarries concealing his first marriage, the second wife must be treated as his wife for maintenance under Section 125. Principle: the provision is a measure of social justice for women and children, to be interpreted purposively, through social context adjudication.
Chand Patel (studied earlier): a wife in an irregular Muslim marriage is a wife for this purpose until the marriage is ended.
Parents and senior citizens
The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 allows parents and senior citizens who cannot maintain themselves to claim maintenance from children or relatives before a Maintenance Tribunal. A senior citizen may also have a transfer of property declared void where it was made on condition that the transferee would look after him, and the transferee fails to do so.
Enforcement
On failure without sufficient cause to obey the order, the Magistrate may issue a warrant to recover the amount as a fine, and may sentence the person to imprisonment up to one month for each month's unpaid allowance, or until earlier payment. The recovery application must be made within one year from the date the amount became due.
Maintenance of Muslim Women
The maintenance rights of Muslim women have seen the most dramatic legal history in this subject. Under Muslim personal law, a husband must maintain his wife during the marriage, unless she refuses without lawful cause to live with him. After divorce, he must maintain her during the iddat, and she is entitled to any unpaid dower. Classical law placed no further duty on the former husband.
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (often called the most famous case in family law): Shah Bano had been married for over forty years to Mohd. Ahmed Khan, a lawyer of Indore; they had five children. He turned her out, and when she claimed maintenance under Section 125, he divorced her by irrevocable talaq. He argued that his duty ended with the iddat, that he had paid maintenance for about two years, and that he had deposited her dower in court. Held (five-judge bench, Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud): (1) Section 125 is secular, applies to all religions, and its Explanation includes a divorced wife; (2) a divorced Muslim wife unable to maintain herself after the iddat can claim under Section 125, and there is no conflict with Muslim personal law, the Court referring to Quranic verses on a provision for divorced women; (3) dower is not a sum payable on divorce that ends the husband's liability, but an obligation arising from the marriage itself, as a mark of respect for the wife.
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986
The judgment caused a political storm, and Parliament passed this Act. Many read it as reversing Shah Bano, because it seemed to limit the husband's duty to the iddat period.
- Section 3: a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to (a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance, made and paid within the iddat period by her former husband; (b) maintenance for two years from the birth of any child of the marriage whom she maintains; (c) an amount equal to her dower; and (d) all properties given to her before, at or after marriage by her relatives or friends, or by the husband or his relatives or friends. If unpaid, she may apply to a Magistrate.
- Section 4: if she has not remarried and cannot maintain herself after the iddat, the Magistrate may order the relatives who would inherit her property to maintain her, in proportion to their shares. If she has children, the order is only against them, and if they cannot pay, against her parents. If there are no such relatives or they cannot pay, the State Wakf Board may be ordered to pay.
- Section 5: by a joint or separate declaration at the first hearing, the parties may choose to be governed by the maintenance provisions of the criminal procedure law instead.
Danial Latifi v. Union of India: Held (five-judge bench, Justice S. Rajendra Babu): the 1986 Act is valid, but read so as to preserve the substance of Shah Bano. Provision and maintenance mean different things: the husband must make a reasonable and fair provision for the divorced wife's future, including her maintenance, and must make and pay it within the iddat period, but it is not limited to that period and must be enough to provide for her future. So the husband's liability does not end with the iddat. Read this way, the Act is fair and does not violate Articles 14, 15 and 21.
Within the iddat (time of payment) is not the same as for the iddat (period covered): under Danial Latifi, the provision is paid within the iddat but must cover the divorced wife's future.
Maintenance of Divorced Muslim Women: Forum and Present Position
The Act of 1986 speaks of a Magistrate, but many cities have Family Courts. Which court should hear applications under it?
Rana Nahid v. Sahidul Haq Chisti: a Family Court converted a divorced wife's claim into an application under the Act of 1986 and granted maintenance; the Rajasthan High Court set that aside. Held: a split verdict. Justice R. Banumathi: a Family Court has no jurisdiction, since the Act gives jurisdiction to a Magistrate. Justice Indira Banerjee: it does, because the Family Courts Act has overriding effect. The question was referred to a larger bench.
Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana (10 July 2024): in concurring judgments, Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Augustine George Masih held that Section 125 applies to all married women, including Muslim women. The Act of 1986 does not take away that secular remedy, but adds to it. Principle (present position): a divorced Muslim woman may claim maintenance under the Act of 1986, under Section 125 CrPC (now Section 144 of the B.N.S.S.), or under both.
The story in four steps: Shah Bano gave divorced Muslim women the secular remedy; the Act of 1986 seemed to take it away; Danial Latifi read that Act to require a fair provision for her future; Abdul Samad confirmed that the secular remedy remains available as well. A woman on whom her husband pronounces the void triple talaq can claim a subsistence allowance under the Act of 2019.
Maintenance under the Domestic Violence Act
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is a civil law, backed by criminal enforcement, giving women quick protection within the home. It applies to women of every religion.
Aggrieved person and domestic relationship
Aggrieved person: any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent, and who alleges that she has been subjected to domestic violence by the respondent.
Domestic relationship: a relationship between two persons who live, or have at any time lived, together in a shared household, related by blood, by marriage, through a relationship in the nature of marriage, by adoption, or as members of a joint family.
So a wife, a woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage, a mother, a sister or a widow living in a joint family can all use the Act.
Respondent
The Act originally defined a respondent as an adult male person, though a wife could also complain against her husband's relatives.
Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora: Held: the Supreme Court struck down the words "adult male". Principle: a complaint may now be filed against women and minors too, even when no adult male is a respondent.
Domestic violence (Section 3)
It includes physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse, and economic abuse. Economic abuse includes depriving the woman of financial resources to which she is entitled (such as maintenance), disposing of her assets, and restricting her access to the shared household. Harassment to meet an unlawful dowry demand is also domestic violence.
Reliefs (Sections 12 and 20)
The woman may apply to a Magistrate under Section 12. The Magistrate may grant:
- protection orders, stopping the respondent from committing violence or contacting her;
- residence orders, protecting her right to live in the shared household;
- monetary relief, custody orders for children, and compensation for injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress;
- interim and ex parte orders.
These reliefs may also be sought in other proceedings, such as a divorce case in a Family Court.
Monetary relief (Section 20) covers expenses and losses caused by the violence (loss of earnings, medical expenses, loss of property) and maintenance for the woman and her children, which may be in addition to an order under the criminal procedure law. It must be adequate, fair and reasonable, consistent with the standard of living to which she is accustomed, and may be a lump sum or monthly payments.
Right of residence in the shared household
This is one of the most important features of the Act.
Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (three-judge bench): Held: a shared household need not be owned or rented by the husband; it includes a house of his relatives, such as his father, where the woman lived in a domestic relationship. This overruled S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra, which had limited it to a house owned or rented by the husband, or a joint family house of which he is a member. Principle: the right is a right to reside, not of ownership, and the court must balance the interests of the in-laws.
Penalty and relation with other laws
Breach of a protection order is an offence: imprisonment up to one year, or fine up to Rs 20,000, or both. The Act adds to other laws and does not replace them.
Rajnesh guidelines: a woman may claim maintenance under this Act, the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, the criminal procedure law and in a divorce case, but she must disclose every claim, and the courts will adjust the amounts.
Comparison of the Main Maintenance Remedies
| Law | Who can claim | Nature of remedy |
|---|---|---|
| Hindu Marriage Act | Either spouse | Alimony, only in matrimonial proceedings |
| Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act | Hindu wife, children, parents, dependants | Independent right, without any matrimonial case |
| Criminal procedure remedy | Only wife, children and parents | Secular, quick and summary |
| Act of 1986 | Divorced Muslim woman | Fair provision for her future |
| Domestic Violence Act | Any woman facing domestic violence in a domestic relationship, including one in the nature of marriage | Maintenance with protection and a right of residence |
Adoption under Hindu Law
Adoption is the process by which a child is permanently taken out of the family of birth and made a member of another family, with all the rights and duties of a child born into it.
In classical Hindu law, adoption had a religious purpose: a son was needed to perform the funeral rites and offer the pinda, offerings believed to secure the spiritual welfare of the ancestors. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 gave it a secular purpose and some equality.
| Classical Hindu law | Act of 1956 |
|---|---|
| Generally only a son could be adopted | A daughter may be adopted |
| A woman could adopt only for her husband | A woman may adopt in her own right |
| Datta homam (offering into the sacred fire) often performed | Datta homam not essential |
Section 5: no adoption shall be made by or to a Hindu except in accordance with the Act; an adoption in breach of it is void.
Requisites of a valid adoption (Section 6)
- The person adopting has the capacity and the right to adopt.
- The person giving in adoption has the capacity to do so.
- The person adopted is capable of being adopted.
- The adoption complies with the other conditions of the Act.
Capacity to adopt (Sections 7 and 8)
Male Hindu (Section 7): any male Hindu of sound mind and not a minor may adopt a son or a daughter. If he has a wife living, he needs her consent, unless she has completely and finally renounced the world, has ceased to be a Hindu, or has been declared by a court to be of unsound mind. With more than one wife, he needs the consent of all, with the same exceptions.
Female Hindu (Section 8): today any female Hindu of sound mind and not a minor may adopt a son or a daughter; if married, she needs her husband's consent, subject to the same three exceptions. This is the position only since 2010. Before that, a married woman could not adopt at all while her husband was alive and the marriage subsisted, unless an exception applied.
Brijendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh: Mishri Bai, a woman with a physical disability, married in 1948; her husband soon left her, and her parents gave her land for maintenance. In 1970, with her husband alive and no divorce, she adopted Brijendra Singh; the adoption was questioned in a land ceiling dispute. Held: invalid. There is a conceptual difference between a divorced woman and one only living like a divorced woman; still legally married, with no exception applying, she lacked capacity under the old Section 8. Appeal dismissed. Soon afterwards, the Personal Laws Amendment Act, 2010 changed Section 8 so that a married woman can adopt with her husband's consent.
Who may give in adoption (Section 9)
- Only the father, the mother or the guardian of the child.
- Father and mother have an equal right to give a son or daughter, but neither can do so without the other's consent, unless the other has renounced the world, has ceased to be a Hindu, or has been declared of unsound mind.
- Where both parents are dead, have renounced the world, have abandoned the child, or have been declared of unsound mind, or the parentage is unknown, the guardian may give the child, with the previous permission of the court, to any person, including himself. The court must be satisfied that the adoption is for the child's welfare and that no payment has been made for it.
Who may be adopted (Section 10)
The child must be a Hindu, not already adopted, not married, and must not have completed 15 years. The last two conditions may be relaxed where a custom applicable to the parties permits.
Other conditions (Section 11)
- Adopting a son: no Hindu son, son's son or son's son's son of the adoptive parent may be living.
- Adopting a daughter: no Hindu daughter or son's daughter may be living.
- A man adopting a daughter, or a woman adopting a son, must be at least 21 years older than the child.
- The same child cannot be adopted by two or more persons at the same time.
- The child must actually be given and taken by the parents or guardian, with the intention of transferring the child from the family of birth to the family of adoption. Datta homam is not essential.
Prince and Hansa have a daughter and want to adopt a girl. They cannot adopt a daughter under the Hindu Act, as they have a Hindu daughter living. They can adopt a son, or adopt a girl under the Juvenile Justice Act.
Effects of adoption (Section 12)
The adopted child is deemed the child of the adoptive father or mother for all purposes from the date of adoption; all ties with the family of birth are severed and replaced by ties in the adoptive family. Provisos:
- The child cannot marry anyone he or she could not have married in the family of birth.
- Property vested in the child before adoption stays with him or her, subject to attached obligations.
- The child does not divest anyone of an estate vested before the adoption.
Sections 13 to 17
- Section 13: adoption does not take away the adoptive parents' power to dispose of their property, unless agreed otherwise.
- Section 14: decides the adoptive mother. When a married man adopts, his wife is the adoptive mother; if a bachelor adopts and later marries, his wife is the child's stepmother.
- Section 15: a valid adoption cannot be cancelled by the adoptive parents or anyone else, and the child cannot renounce it and return to the family of birth.
- Section 16: a registered document recording an adoption, signed by the persons giving and taking the child, raises a presumption that the adoption complied with the Act, unless disproved.
- Section 17: prohibits and punishes any payment or reward for an adoption.
Guardianship under Hindu Law
A minor cannot manage his or her own affairs, make binding contracts or deal with property, so a guardian looks after the minor's person (upbringing, health, education) and property.
- Natural guardian: a guardian by law itself, because of the relationship, such as the father or mother.
- Testamentary guardian: appointed by a parent's will.
- Guardian appointed or declared by a court under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, a secular law for all communities. For Hindus, the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 supplements it.
Section 4: a minor is a person who has not completed 18 years. A guardian is a person having the care of the person of a minor, or of his property, or of both.
Natural guardians (Sections 6 and 7)
For the minor's person and property, excluding his undivided interest in joint family property:
| Minor | Natural guardian |
|---|---|
| Boy or unmarried girl | Father, and after him, mother; custody of a child under 5 ordinarily with the mother |
| Illegitimate boy or illegitimate unmarried girl | Mother, and after her, father |
| Married girl | Husband |
| Adopted son (Section 7) | Adoptive father, and after him, adoptive mother |
No one may act as natural guardian who has ceased to be a Hindu or has completely and finally renounced the world as a hermit or ascetic. Father and mother do not include a stepfather or stepmother.
"After him"
Read literally, the mother would be guardian only after the father's death, and inferior throughout his lifetime.
Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India: the Reserve Bank refused bonds she applied for in her minor son's name as his guardian, insisting on the father's signature. She challenged Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, and a similar Guardians and Wards Act provision, as discriminating against women in violation of Articles 14 and 15. Held (main judgment, Justice U.C. Banerjee): read down, not struck down. "After" means in the absence of the father, not necessarily after his lifetime. Absence covers a father wholly indifferent to the minor's affairs, one not in actual charge of them, or a mutual understanding that the minor is in the mother's care. The mother can then act as natural guardian while the father lives, and her acts are valid; the Bank was wrong.
In 2015 the Law Commission recommended making both parents equal natural guardians, but the Act's text is unchanged.
Powers of a natural guardian (Section 8)
- He may do all acts necessary, or reasonable and proper, for the minor's benefit or the protection of the minor's estate, but cannot bind the minor by a personal covenant.
- Without the court's previous permission, he cannot mortgage, sell, gift or exchange the minor's immovable property, or lease it for over 5 years or for over 1 year beyond the minor's majority.
- A disposal in breach is voidable at the instance of the minor or anyone claiming under him.
- Permission is given only for necessity or evident advantage to the minor.
Prince, as father, sells his minor son's plot without the court's permission. The son may set the sale aside on attaining majority.
Other rules
- A Hindu father may appoint a testamentary guardian by will, but the appointment has no effect if the mother survives him, unless she dies without appointing a guardian herself.
- A minor cannot be guardian of another minor's property.
- A de facto guardian (merely looking after the minor without legal authority) cannot deal with the minor's property on that basis.
- No guardian is appointed for a minor's undivided interest in joint family property; an adult family member manages it.
Welfare of the minor (Section 13)
In a court's appointment or declaration of a guardian of a Hindu minor, the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration; no one is entitled to guardianship if the court thinks it is not for the minor's welfare. Paramount means above all other considerations, so parental rights yield to the child's welfare.
Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal: a custody dispute between Christian parents. Justice I.D. Dua said that children are not mere chattels, nor mere playthings for their parents.
Welfare is more than material comfort: it includes moral upbringing, emotional security, education and health, a parent's love and care, and, where the child is old enough, the child's own wishes.
Guardians and Wards Act, Section 17: the court is guided by the minor's welfare, considering the minor's age, sex and religion, the character and capacity of the proposed guardian, a deceased parent's wishes, and the minor's own preference if old enough to form an intelligent one.
Guardianship under Muslim Law
Muslim law here is uncodified, applied by courts through the Guardians and Wards Act. It recognises guardianship of the person, of property, and in marriage.
Hizanat
Custody of the minor's person, especially a young child, is hizanat. It belongs first to the mother, because a young child needs a mother's care.
| School | Son | Daughter |
|---|---|---|
| Hanafi | Until he completes 7 years | Until puberty |
| Ithna Ashari Shia | Until he completes 2 years | Until she completes 7 years |
Under Hanafi law, if the mother is absent or disqualified, the right passes to other female relatives, such as the mother's mother and father's mother, in a set order. The mother may lose it if she marries a man not related to the child within the prohibited degrees, leads an immoral life, or neglects the child.
Guardianship of person, property and marriage
Custody is not guardianship. The father remains natural guardian of the minor's person even while the mother has custody.
Property (Hanafi): legal guardians, in order, are the father, his executor, the father's father, and the father's father's executor. The mother is not a legal guardian of property, though a court may appoint her. A de facto guardian has no power to transfer the minor's immovable property.
Imambandi v. Mutsaddi (Privy Council): Held: a de facto guardian's transfer of a minor's immovable property is void.
Marriage: guardianship lies with the father, then the paternal grandfather and other relatives, subject to the minor's option of puberty.
In court, these rules yield to the child's welfare under the Guardians and Wards Act, so courts have sometimes let a mother keep custody beyond the hizanat ages, or given custody to the father earlier.
Acknowledgement of Paternity (Ikrar)
Muslim law bases legitimacy on a valid or irregular marriage of the parents. Where the marriage, or its date, cannot be proved, a man may acknowledge a child as his legitimate child (ikrar), and the law may presume both marriage and legitimacy.
Conditions
- He must acknowledge the child as his legitimate child, not merely his child.
- He must be at least 12½ years older than the child.
- The child must not be known to be another man's child.
- The child must not be the offspring of an unlawful union: marriage between the man and the mother must have been possible at conception. If she was then married to someone else, or related to him within the prohibited degrees, it fails.
- He must be adult and of sound mind.
- A child old enough to understand must not reject it.
Effects and limits
An acknowledgement is irrevocable. The child becomes legitimate and inherits from the father, and a presumption may arise that the man married the mother, so she too may claim rights as his wife.
Acknowledgement is only a rule of presumption where paternity is uncertain. It cannot make legitimate a child proved to be illegitimate.
Habibur Rahman Chowdhury v. Altaf Ali Chowdhury (Privy Council): made clear that acknowledgement cannot legitimate a child proved illegitimate.
Section 116 of the B.S.A. (all communities): a child born during a valid marriage, or within 280 days after its dissolution while the mother remains unmarried, is conclusively presumed the husband's legitimate child, unless it is shown that the spouses had no access to each other when the child could have been conceived.
No adoption: Muslim personal law does not recognise adoption as making another's child one's own legitimate child for all purposes. A child may be brought up under guardianship, often called kafala, but does not become an heir.
Adoption under the Juvenile Justice Act
The Hindu Act is open only to Hindus and Hindu children. Others long had only guardianship under the Guardians and Wards Act, which does not create the full parent-child relationship. A secular law was needed, especially for orphaned and abandoned children.
Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India: the Supreme Court laid down detailed safeguards for adoptions of Indian children by foreigners, to prevent trafficking and protect the children. From that work grew the Central Adoption Resource Authority (CARA).
The Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as amended in 2006, gave a secular basis to adoption of orphaned, abandoned and surrendered children. The law now is the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, with the Adoption Regulations, 2022 (replacing those of 2017).
Meaning and scope
Adoption: the process through which the adopted child is permanently separated from his biological parents and becomes the lawful child of his adoptive parents, with all the rights, privileges and duties of a child born to them.
- Available for orphaned, abandoned and surrendered children, and for adoption by a relative or step-parent.
- Does not apply to adoptions under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.
- CARA, a statutory body under the Ministry of Women and Child Development, regulates in-country and inter-country adoptions and is India's central authority under the Hague Convention on inter-country adoption.
Who can adopt (Section 57 and Regulations)
- Prospective parents must be physically fit, financially sound, mentally alert and highly motivated.
- A couple needs both spouses' consent and at least two years of stable marital relationship.
- A single or divorced person may adopt, but a single man cannot adopt a girl child.
- Age limits depend on the child's age; the minimum age gap between the child and either parent is 25 years, except for a relative or step-parent.
Religion does not matter. A Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Parsi or person of no religion may adopt under this Act, even with an existing child of the same sex.
Procedure
- The Child Welfare Committee declares the child legally free for adoption: for an abandoned child, after efforts to trace the parents; for a surrendered child, after the time given to the parents to reconsider.
- Prospective parents register online with CARA; a specialised adoption agency prepares a home study report.
- A child is referred; on acceptance, the child may be placed in pre-adoption foster care.
- The agency applies for an adoption order, issued by the District Magistrate. Since a 2021 amendment, effective September 2022, this power lies with the District Magistrate instead of the court, to reduce delays.
- Follow-up after adoption ensures the child's welfare.
Effect (Section 63) and offences
From the date of the adoption order, the child is the child of the adoptive parents for all purposes, including intestate succession, as if born to them. All ties with the birth family are severed, though property already vested in the child continues with the child.
Adoption without following the Act's procedure: imprisonment up to three years, or fine of Rs 1 lakh, or both. Sale and procurement of children is punished more severely.
Leading cases
In re Adoption of Payal alias Sharinee (Bombay High Court, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud): Hindu couple Vinay Pathak and Sonika Sahay Pathak, having a biological daughter, could not adopt the girl Payal from an orphanage under the Hindu Act, so applied under the Juvenile Justice Act. Held: adoption allowed; they were declared her adoptive parents with all legal consequences. Principle: the Juvenile Justice Act is a secular, enabling law giving any person, of any religion, an independent route to adoption; the Hindu Act's restriction does not apply to it.
Shabnam Hashmi v. Union of India: Shabnam Hashmi, a social activist, brought home a girl from an adoption home but was told she could only be the child's guardian. She sought a declaration that the right to adopt is a fundamental right, and guidelines so that people of all faiths could adopt. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board opposed, saying Muslim law does not recognise adoption and allows only kafala. Held (three judges, Chief Justice P. Sathasivam): the Juvenile Justice Act is an optional, enabling, secular law; anyone may adopt under it whatever his or her religion, and personal law cannot stand in the way, while a Muslim who does not wish to adopt may follow personal law. Given differing community views, the Court declined, at that stage, to declare the right to adopt a fundamental right.
The same-sex marriage case: the majority upheld the regulations barring an unmarried couple from adopting jointly; the minority would have allowed queer couples to adopt.
Hindu Act and Juvenile Justice Act compared
A favourite examination comparison:
| Point | Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act | Juvenile Justice Act |
|---|---|---|
| Who can adopt | Only a Hindu | Any person, any religion |
| Who can be adopted | Hindu child under 15, unmarried (unless custom allows) | Orphaned, abandoned or surrendered child below 18 |
| Existing children | Hindu son bars adopting a son; Hindu daughter bars adopting a daughter | Irrelevant |
| Mode | Actual giving and taking, no official order; registered deed raises presumption of validity | Child declared legally free; supervised by CARA and agencies; order of the District Magistrate |
| Effect | Child of adoptive parents for all purposes | Same |
Zoya and Farhan, a Muslim couple, cannot adopt under personal law but can adopt an abandoned child under the Juvenile Justice Act, and the child is theirs in law. If Farhan dies, custody of their young son would ordinarily stay with Zoya under hizanat, and a court appointing a guardian of the child's property would be guided, above all, by the child's welfare.
Quick revision
- A divorced Muslim woman may claim under the Act of 1986, Section 144 of the B.N.S.S., or both (Shah Bano, Danial Latifi, Abdul Samad); void triple talaq attracts a subsistence allowance under the Act of 2019.
- The Domestic Violence Act gives any woman in a domestic relationship maintenance with protection and residence; all parallel claims must be disclosed (Rajnesh).
- Hindu Act adoption is limited to Hindus and Hindu children under 15; the Juvenile Justice Act is open to all religions, by order of the District Magistrate.
- Hizanat keeps a young child with the mother, but the child's welfare prevails over everything.
- In every problem, first identify the community of the parties and the governing law, personal or secular.
- Always name the section and support it with the leading case.
- Where two concepts look similar (void and voidable marriages; live-in relationship and relationship in the nature of marriage), write their differences clearly, with an example.