I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab

Two land reform Acts were challenged: the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 and the Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961. The Golaknath family of Jalandhar, Punjab held fairly large agricultural land. Under the Punjab Act, a large part of it was declared surplus, meaning land above the ceiling that the State could take over.

Both Acts had been placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Seventeenth Amendment Act, 1964. This meant they could not be challenged on the ground of fundamental rights.

The petitioners approached the Supreme Court under Article 32. They argued that the Seventeenth Amendment was wrong, that fundamental rights could not be amended at all, and that the earlier decisions in Shankari Prasad (1951) and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1964) were wrong. Those two cases had held that Parliament could amend even Part III, because a constitutional amendment is not 'law' under Article 13(2).

1. Does Article 368 only lay down the procedure for amendment, or does it also give Parliament the power to amend?

2. Can fundamental rights be amended?

3. Is a constitutional amendment 'law' within the meaning of Article 13(2)?

4. Are fundamental rights permanent and incapable of ever being changed?

5. Does the Seventeenth Amendment violate Article 13(2)?

6. Are the land reform Acts unconstitutional?

Petitioners: The Seventeenth Amendment was wrong. Fundamental rights cannot be amended at all, and Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh were wrongly decided.

Position of the dissenting judges (the lecture gives their reasoning, not the State's arguments): The power to amend lies in Article 368 itself, which gives both the power and the procedure. It does not come from Articles 245 and 248. 'Law' in Article 13(2) means ordinary law, not a constitutional amendment, because an amendment becomes part of the Constitution as soon as it is passed. Since the Constitution evolves, fundamental rights may also need to change, and making them permanent is not practical. Prospective overruling should not apply in India, because a law declared unconstitutional is invalid from the very beginning. Under stare decisis, many laws had been made relying on Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh, so reversing them would create legal chaos.

The Court decided by a majority of six to five. Chief Justice K. Subba Rao wrote the majority opinion for himself and four other judges. Justice Hidayatullah agreed separately, which made the majority six.

The majority held that Parliament cannot take away or curtail fundamental rights. For the first time, the Court held that a constitutional amendment is also 'law' under Article 13(2), because it too is made by Parliament. An amendment that takes away or abridges fundamental rights would therefore be void. Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh stood overruled.

The five-judge opinion of Chief Justice Subba Rao added that Article 368 only lays down the procedure for amendment. In this view, the power to amend comes from Parliament's general legislative power under Articles 245, 246 and 248 (Article 248 being the residuary power). That opinion also said the Constitution had given fundamental rights a transcendental position, beyond Parliament's reach. Justice Hidayatullah rejected this point. He held that the amending power is sui generis, a power of its own unique kind. So only five of the eleven judges accepted the residuary-power argument.

To avoid striking down the First (1951), Fourth (1955) and Seventeenth (1964) Amendments and undoing years of land reform, the five-judge opinion applied the doctrine of prospective overruling. Past amendments would be treated as valid, but from that day on, no amendment could touch fundamental rights. Three conditions were laid down: the doctrine applies only in constitutional matters, only the Supreme Court can apply it, and the Court decides its scope at its discretion.

Justice Hidayatullah did not rely on this doctrine. He held that the First and Fourth Amendments had long been accepted by everyone and could not now be challenged. He held invalid the particular section of the Seventeenth Amendment that placed forty-four State Acts in the Ninth Schedule. Even so, he held both challenged Acts valid because they had the protection of Article 31A and the President's assent.

Final result: the First, Fourth and Seventeenth Amendments were not invalidated, and the challenged land reform Acts survived. From that day on, Parliament could no longer touch Part III in this way.

Constitution of India, Article 13(2); Article 13(4) (added by the Twenty-fourth Amendment, 1971); Article 32; Article 368; Part XX; Articles 245, 246 and 248; Seventh Schedule; Ninth Schedule; Article 31A; Part III (Fundamental Rights); Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951; Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955; Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964; Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971; Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953; Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961

Golaknath was a major turning point in the debate on Parliament's power to amend fundamental rights. Students should remember the exam chain from the lecture:

- Shankari Prasad (1951) and Sajjan Singh (1964): an amendment is not law.
- Golaknath (1967): an amendment is law, fundamental rights cannot be amended, and prospective overruling applies.
- Twenty-fourth Amendment (1971): undid Golaknath's effect by adding Article 13(4) and amending Article 368 to state Parliament's constituent power. It also made the President's assent necessary for amendment bills.
- Kesavananda Bharati (1973): overruled Golaknath and upheld the Twenty-fourth Amendment. Parliament can amend fundamental rights but cannot destroy the basic structure.

After the decision, MP Nath Pai brought a private member's bill in 1967 to change Article 368. It did not pass, but its idea was fulfilled by the Twenty-fourth Amendment.

Two contributions lasted: the doctrine of prospective overruling, which the Court used again, and the idea that fundamental rights are the soul of the Constitution, later refined as the basic structure. The case has been criticised because deriving the amending power from the residuary power in Article 248 was weak, when the Constitution has a separate Part XX and Article 368 for amendment.

Hypothetical: Neha's farmland was taken as surplus years ago under a State law protected by an old constitutional amendment. Later, Farhan challenges a similar amendment, and the Supreme Court (following the Golaknath approach) rules that amendments abridging fundamental rights are void. Because the Court uses prospective overruling, Neha cannot get her land back, since the old amendment and past actions remain valid. But if Parliament now passes a fresh amendment cutting down Aadil's fundamental right, it would be void. (This shows the position as it stood right after Golaknath. It was later changed by the Twenty-fourth Amendment and Kesavananda Bharati.)