Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy, a retired judge of the Karnataka High Court, challenged the Aadhaar scheme in the Supreme Court in 2012. Under Aadhaar, citizens' biometric data (identifying information drawn from the body, such as fingerprints and iris scans) and demographic data (such as name, address and date of birth) was being collected. The petitioners argued that this violated citizens' privacy rights.

In 2015, during the hearing, the Attorney General pointed to two earlier Supreme Court judgments: M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954, eight judges) and Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1962, six judges). He said both had held that the right to privacy was not clearly written into the Constitution and was therefore not a fundamental right.

This created a technical problem. In later cases such as Gobind, R. Rajagopal and P.U.C.L., smaller benches had treated privacy as a right, but the earlier larger-bench decisions stood against that view. A smaller bench cannot overrule a larger bench. So the Aadhaar challenge was put on hold until it was settled whether privacy was a fundamental right. The matter first went to a five-judge bench. On 18 July 2017, that bench, led by the Chief Justice, held that a nine-judge Constitution Bench would decide whether M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh had been correctly decided.

1. Is privacy a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution?

2. If it is, does it form part of Articles 21, 19 and 14?

3. What is the doctrinal basis for privacy?

4. What are its scope and elements?

5. What role does the State have, and can it regulate this right at all?

Petitioners: The right to privacy is a natural right that stays with a person from birth to death. Life and personal liberty under Article 21 is not limited to mere physical existence; it includes a dignified life. M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh were wrongly decided because they rested on the A.K. Gopalan approach, which read every fundamental right as sitting in its own separate compartment. That approach had already been rejected in R.C. Cooper and Maneka Gandhi. Privacy is not merely a legal right but a fundamental right protected under Part III, and it is also part of international human rights norms.

Union of India: The Constitution contains no clear mention of privacy. The scope of privacy, and how far it should be regulated, is for Parliament to decide. Privacy is a vague concept that can only be regulated through statute. The earlier judgments were correct in holding that privacy is not a fundamental right. The Union also argued that privacy is an elitist concept that belongs only to those with means, and that for poor people food, clothing and shelter matter far more.

The Supreme Court unanimously declared that the right to privacy is a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution. M.P. Sharma (1954) and Kharak Singh (1962) were overruled to the extent that they had held privacy was not a fundamental right. Privacy is an intrinsic part of life and personal liberty under Article 21, and it is also protected as part of the other freedoms guaranteed in Part III.

The Court held that Article 21 is not limited to mere survival. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, whose opinion was the plurality opinion of four judges, said privacy is an inseparable part of liberty and dignity. He said it is a natural right that the Constitution only recognises, not a gift handed down by the Constitution. Justice J. Chelameswar identified three facets of privacy: repose (peace of mind and the right to be left alone), sanctuary (a secure private space) and intimate decisions (control over one's most personal choices). Justice S.A. Bobde said dignity is not possible without privacy. The State cannot take this right away arbitrarily.

The Court recognised physical, informational and decisional privacy. It held that privacy attaches to the person, not to a place, so being in a public place does not end a person's privacy.

Privacy is not absolute. The State may restrict it only by satisfying a three-fold test: legality (a valid law), legitimate aim (such as national security or prevention of crime) and proportionality (the step must be no more than necessary). Justice S.K. Kaul stressed procedural safeguards alongside proportionality, and mentioned the right to be forgotten in the context of informational privacy. Justice Chelameswar added that only the most serious privacy claims would attract the strictest test, which requires a compelling State interest.

Justice Chandrachud said privacy has a negative aspect (the State must not interfere) and a positive aspect (the State must actively protect it). He urged a strong data protection law, since the threat to privacy now comes from big technology companies as well as the State. The Court rejected the argument that privacy is elitist. It held that civil and political rights and socio-economic rights complement each other, and that poor people deserve the same dignity and privacy as anyone else.

In the same judgment, Justice Chandrachud expressly overruled A.D.M. Jabalpur and criticised the reasoning in Suresh Kumar Koushal.

Constitution of India, Article 21; Constitution of India, Article 19; Constitution of India, Article 14; Constitution of India, Part III; Aadhaar Act, Section 57 (struck down in the later 2018 Aadhaar judgment); Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023

The case settled that privacy is a fundamental right in India. It overruled two larger-bench decisions and expressly overruled A.D.M. Jabalpur. It widened the scope of Article 21 and gave the three-fold test of legality, legitimate aim and proportionality for any State restriction on privacy.

It became the foundation for the Aadhaar judgment of 2018 and for the data protection debate that led to the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. It is also linked to later cases discussed in the lecture, such as Selvi and Navtej. It is a frequent exam topic in Constitutional Law.

Hypothetical: A State government orders that every citizen must share their mobile location data with the police at all times, without any law passed for this purpose. Neha challenges the order. Applying Puttaswamy, the court would ask three questions. Is there a valid law? Is there a legitimate aim, such as preventing crime? Is the step proportionate? Since there is no law and tracking everyone at all times goes far beyond what is necessary, the order would fail the test. In contrast, suppose a valid law allows police to access Farhan's location data only during an investigation into a specific serious crime, with proper procedural safeguards. That narrower measure is far more likely to be upheld.