Quick answer
Yes. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985), a five-judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India held that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to livelihood, because no person can live without the means of living. But the Court also held that no one has a right to occupy public pavements for private use. It upheld the power to remove encroachments, provided the procedure is fair, just and reasonable.
The case
Olga Tellis & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors., Supreme Court of India, judgment of 10 July 1985, reported as AIR 1986 SC 180 and (1985) 3 SCC 545. Bench: Y.V. Chandrachud CJ (author), Syed Murtaza Fazalali, V.D. Tulzapurkar, O. Chinnappa Reddy and A. Varadarajan JJ. Pavement and slum dwellers in Bombay challenged their forcible eviction under Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888, arguing that losing their shelter near their workplaces meant losing their livelihood.
What the Court held
- Article 21: "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."
- Livelihood is part of life: the easiest way to deprive a person of life would be to take away the means of livelihood. So the right to livelihood is an integral part of the right to life.
- Support from directive principles: Articles 39(a) and 41 (adequate means of livelihood and the right to work) help explain the content of Article 21.
- Not an absolute right: Article 21 does not forbid every deprivation of livelihood. It forbids deprivation except by a procedure established by law that is fair, just and reasonable.
- No right to encroach: pavements are public property meant for pedestrians, and putting up a dwelling on them is trespass. Section 314 was held valid, read as requiring reasonable exercise of power.
- No estoppel against fundamental rights: an earlier undertaking given by the petitioners did not stop them from claiming their fundamental rights.
- Humane directions: slums were not to be removed until 31 October 1985. Pavement dwellers counted in the 1976 census were to get alternative sites, though not as a condition for removal. Slum dwellers given identity cards in the 1976 census had to be given alternative sites. Slums that had existed for a long time (say 20 years or more) and had been improved were not to be removed unless the land was needed for a public purpose.
Right to livelihood: what it does and does not mean
| Olga Tellis does mean | Olga Tellis does not mean |
|---|---|
| Loss of livelihood engages Article 21 | The State must give everyone a job |
| Eviction must follow a fair, just and reasonable procedure | Eviction from public land is always forbidden |
| Authorities must consider the hardship to the poor | Anyone may occupy pavements or public streets |
Example
Renu supports her family from a small vegetable stall on a busy road. The municipality wants to clear the road for pedestrians. Olga Tellis was about dwellings on pavements, but its reasoning applies here too. Renu cannot claim a right to keep her stall on the public road forever. But because the action affects her livelihood, the municipality must act under law and follow a fair, just and reasonable procedure, not remove her arbitrarily. Her livelihood deserves constitutional attention even if the removal is finally lawful.
Current-law note
Olga Tellis remains good law and is a leading authority on the right to livelihood under Article 21. It applies the idea of fair, just and reasonable procedure from Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, which the judgment cites.
Exam point
Olga Tellis (1985): the right to livelihood is part of the right to life under Article 21, but it can be taken away by a fair, just and reasonable procedure. There is no right to encroach on public pavements.
