Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan

Parliament passed the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act, 1964. It changed Article 31A and widened the definition of 'estate', so that more types of agricultural land would come within land reform laws.

At the same time, forty-four land reform Acts were placed in the Ninth Schedule to protect them from judicial review. The Ninth Schedule had been created by the First Amendment in 1951 to protect land reform and socio-economic justice laws from challenge on the ground of fundamental rights.

People directly affected by these laws, especially big zamindars, filed writ petitions in the Supreme Court under Article 32. They argued that the amendment violated their fundamental rights.

1. When Parliament amends Part III (fundamental rights), must it follow the special procedure in the proviso to Article 368? That proviso requires ratification by at least half the State legislatures when an amendment affects certain provisions, such as the power of the High Courts under Article 226.

2. Does Article 13(2), which says the State shall not make any law that takes away or abridges fundamental rights, also apply to a constitutional amendment?

3. Does Parliament have the power to amend fundamental rights at all?

These questions were very important. If the Court had held that fundamental rights could not be amended, the whole land reform framework built on the First, Fourth and Seventeenth Amendments would have become unconstitutional.

The petitioners made five main arguments:

1. Article 226 was affected. The Seventeenth Amendment indirectly affected the writ power of the High Courts, because once a law went into the Ninth Schedule, even a High Court could not examine it on the ground of fundamental rights. So the proviso to Article 368 (ratification by the States) should have applied.

2. The Court should reconsider Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951), in which the First Amendment had been challenged but upheld.

3. The correct amendment procedure was not followed, because the approval of the States was not taken, so the amendment was invalid.

4. Land falls under Entry 18 of the State List, so Parliament could not directly make such an amendment touching land laws.

5. Their biggest argument: Article 368 gives Parliament the power to amend the Constitution, but not the power to abolish or curtail fundamental rights.

All five judges held the Seventeenth Amendment valid. The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice P. B. Gajendragadkar, with Justice K. N. Wanchoo and Justice Raghubar Dayal agreeing.

1. Article 226: The impact on Article 226 was only minor, indirect and incidental, a side effect. Only a major and direct impact would require State ratification, so the proviso to Article 368 did not apply.

2. Shankari Prasad remained good law. A settled decision should not be casually reopened, because that would put earlier amendments, and the land reforms built on them, in danger.

3. Under Article 368, Parliament has full power to amend any part of the Constitution, including Part III.

4. Parliament had not made any new land law. It had only validated existing State laws by placing them in the Ninth Schedule, so the State List argument failed.

5. An amendment is not 'law' under Article 13(2). Article 13 applies only to ordinary laws. The Court called the Constitution an organic, living document that must meet changing social and economic needs. If the framers had wanted fundamental rights to be unamendable, they would have said so clearly in Article 368.

Separate opinions: Justice M. Hidayatullah and Justice J. R. Mudholkar agreed that the amendment was valid but expressed serious doubts. Justice Hidayatullah said he would need stronger reasons than those in Shankari Prasad to accept that fundamental rights are not really fundamental and can be changed as easily as the rest of the Constitution. Justice Mudholkar asked whether changing the basic features of the Constitution would be mere amendment or a rewriting of the Constitution. He called the Preamble the epitome of the Constitution's basic features and referred to a decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan on fundamental features. He gave no final opinion and left these questions open. These observations were not part of the actual judgment.

Constitution of India, Article 368 and its proviso; Article 13(2); Article 31A; Article 32; Article 226; Part III (Fundamental Rights); Ninth Schedule; Entry 18, State List; Preamble; Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951; Constitution (Fourth Amendment); Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964

Sajjan Singh is a key link in the history of Parliament's amending power. It is the second case in the chain: Shankari Prasad (1951), Sajjan Singh (1964/65), Golaknath (1967) and Kesavananda Bharati (1973).

It repeated Shankari Prasad's view that an amendment is not 'law' and saved the land reform framework. Golaknath later overruled Sajjan Singh, and Kesavananda Bharati overruled Golaknath, holding that the amending power exists but is limited by the basic structure.

Most importantly for exams, Justice Mudholkar's separate opinion on 'basic features' is treated as the first seed of the basic structure doctrine. Whenever you write about the history of the basic structure, mention it.

Hypothetical: Prince owns a large area of farmland. His State passes a land reform law that limits how much land one person can hold, and Parliament later places that law in the Ninth Schedule through a constitutional amendment. Prince's lawyer, Farhan, argues that the amendment is invalid because it takes away Prince's fundamental right to property and was not ratified by the States. Applying Sajjan Singh, the court would say that Parliament may amend Part III, an amendment is not 'law' under Article 13(2), and the indirect effect on the High Court's writ power does not require State ratification. Farhan's argument would fail under the position in Sajjan Singh (a position later changed by Golaknath and then by Kesavananda Bharati's basic structure limit).