In Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018), a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously struck down Section 497 of the IPC, which made adultery a crime. It also struck down Section 198 of the CrPC insofar as it applied to adultery. The Court held that the law treated a wife as her husband's property and violated Articles 14, 15 and 21, so adultery is now only a civil wrong and a ground for divorce, not a crime.
In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court, by a 3:2 majority, upheld the anti-defection law in the Tenth Schedule. It struck down only Paragraph 7, which barred courts completely, because that change needed ratification by the States and had not received it. The Court held that the Speaker acts as a tribunal when deciding disqualification, so the decision is open to limited judicial review. The case saved the anti-defection law and also made sure the Speaker's power is not absolute.
The Supreme Court held that the Governor's discretion under Article 163 is limited. The Governor cannot advance (prepone) an Assembly session or fix its agenda without the aid and advice of the Chief Minister and Council of Ministers, and his actions are open to judicial review. The Court also held that a Speaker facing a pending removal notice should not decide disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule. It restored the status quo ante and reinstated the Nabam Tuki government, which makes this a landmark case on federalism and the office of the Governor.
The Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 in its entirety. It held that the section violated freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a), was vague and overbroad, and could not be saved under Article 19(2). The Court upheld the website-blocking power in Section 69A and read down Section 79, which is why the case is called the landmark internet freedom judgment.
In I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967), an eleven-judge bench of the Supreme Court held by six to five that Parliament cannot take away or curtail fundamental rights, because a constitutional amendment is also 'law' under Article 13(2). It overruled Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh. To avoid legal chaos, it applied the doctrine of prospective overruling for the first time in India, so the past amendments and the challenged land reform Acts stayed valid.
During the 1975 Emergency, a five-judge bench held by a 4:1 majority that once the enforcement of Article 21 was suspended by a Presidential order under Article 359(1), no person had locus standi to file a habeas corpus petition under Article 226, even against an illegal detention. Justice H. R. Khanna's lone dissent, which said that the right to life and liberty does not come from the Constitution alone, is celebrated as the moral high point of the judiciary. The judgment was later answered by the Forty-fourth Amendment (1978) and expressly overruled in K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017).
In Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi (2020), the Supreme Court interpreted Article 233. It held that people already in judicial service, or with mixed experience as advocate and judge, cannot apply for the 25% direct recruitment (Bar) quota for District Judges. That quota is only for practising advocates with at least seven years of practice. Students must also know that a five-judge Constitution Bench expressly overruled this decision on 9 October 2025 in Rejanish K. V. v. K. Deepa.
A five-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (now Section 144 B.N.S.S.) is a secular provision that applies to all wives, including divorced Muslim women, regardless of religion. A divorced Muslim wife who cannot maintain herself can claim maintenance beyond the iddat period, and payment of mehr does not end this duty. The judgment started a nationwide debate on personal law versus secular law, led to the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, and revived the debate on a Uniform Civil Code under Article 44.
The Supreme Court held that repeatedly re-promulgating the same ordinance, without ever placing it before the legislature, is unconstitutional. The Court called it a fraud on the Constitution and a colourable exercise of power. The case limits the ordinance power under Article 213 (and Article 123) to genuine emergencies, so that the executive cannot replace the legislature as the law-maker.
In Waman Rao v. Union of India, the Supreme Court upheld Articles 31A and 31B and the unamended Article 31C. It held that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule before 24 April 1973 (the date of the Kesavananda Bharati judgment) are safe from the basic structure test, but laws added after that date can be challenged if they damage the basic structure. This cut-off line later shaped I. R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007) and is central to the law on Parliament's amending power.
The Supreme Court held that the executive power of a State is residuary and coextensive with the legislative power, so the government can act, including carrying on a trade like publishing school textbooks, without a specific law, as long as it does not violate anyone's fundamental rights or any law. The publishers' petition under Article 32 failed because they had no fundamental right to have their books prescribed in schools. The case is a leading authority on the nature of executive power and on separation of powers in India.
The Supreme Court held that the Karnataka Contract Carriages Acquisition Act, 1976 was not repugnant to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, so the State Act remained valid. Applying the doctrine of pith and substance, the Court found that the State Act was a law of acquisition under Entry 42 of List III, while the Central Act was a general regulatory law under Entry 35 of List III. The case is a leading example of how Article 254 and repugnancy should be approached: identify each law's real purpose first, and do not assume a conflict in a hurry.
