About this topic
Some acts look like offences on their face, yet the law says that nothing is an offence. The reason lies in a set of general exceptions in Chapter III of the B.N.S. (2023): Sections 19 to 24, and Sections 30, 31 and 32.
Five problems to keep in mind
Each of the following people did something that, on its face, looks like an offence. The five problems are decided at the end, once the principles are in place.
The trekker: Prince is trekking in the mountains of Himachal Pradesh when a sudden blizzard traps him. He finds a locked shepherd's hut, breaks the lock, and burns a wooden bench inside to survive the night.
The ten year old: Farhan, a ten year old boy, is scolded by a farmer. That evening he sets fire to the farmer's haystack. He then throws the matchbox into a pond and tells everyone that another boy did it.
The ragging victim: Aadil, a first year college student, is held down by seniors during ragging and forced to swallow strong liquor. Half an hour later, confused and unsteady, he smashes the glass door of a nearby shop.
The lifeguard: A lifeguard on a beach in Goa pulls an unconscious swimmer out of the sea. While giving him chest compressions to restart his breathing, she cracks two of his ribs. He survives.
The clerk: A clerk in a land records office is ordered by an armed man, with a pistol pressed against his chest, to change the name of the owner in a land record. He does it.
The key idea: three questions about the mind
Criminal law does not punish a body that moves. It punishes a mind that chooses wrongly. So whenever a harmful act comes before a court, three questions can be asked about the mind behind it:
- Capacity: could this person understand what he was doing?
- Purpose: what was this person really aiming at?
- Freedom: was this person free to choose?
Each of these general exceptions removes one of these three.
| Question | What it asks | Exceptions that remove it |
|---|---|---|
| Capacity | Could the person understand what he was doing? | Section 20 (child under seven), Section 21 (child of seven to twelve of immature understanding), Section 22 (unsoundness of mind), Sections 23 and 24 (intoxication) |
| Purpose | What was the person really aiming at? | Section 19 (necessity), Section 30 (act for the benefit of a person without consent), Section 31 (communication in good faith) |
| Freedom | Was the person free to choose? | Section 32 (act compelled by threats) |
Memory aid: capacity, purpose, freedom. Each of these general exceptions works by removing one of these three elements of a blameworthy choice.
Burden of proof when a General Exception is claimed
One rule applies to all of these exceptions. Under Section 108 of the B.S.A. (2023):
- when a person claims a General Exception, the burden of proving the circumstances that bring the case within it is on that person; and
- the court presumes that such circumstances are absent.
The accused, however, need not prove the exception beyond reasonable doubt. Showing that it is more probable than not is enough. Courts call this a preponderance of probabilities.
Section 108 B.S.A.: the accused who pleads a General Exception must prove it, and the court starts by presuming it absent. Standard of proof for the accused: preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 20: Act of a child under seven years of age
The question of capacity begins with the clearest example of a mind that cannot yet judge: the mind of a very young child. Section 20 carries the heading "Act of a child under seven years of age". Its text is just one line:
"Nothing is an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age."
A switch that is fully off
- Below seven, criminal responsibility simply does not exist.
- The law expresses this through the Latin phrase doli incapax, which means incapable of criminal wrong.
- This is a conclusive presumption. No evidence about the child's intelligence can displace it.
- The only fact the court needs is the child's age.
A six year old quietly takes a gold ring from a neighbour's table and hides it in his toy box. On paper, the act looks like theft. In law, it is no offence at all, because the child is under seven.
The protection does not travel to the adult behind the child
The immunity under Section 20 stays with the child. It does not protect an adult who uses the child. Explanation 3 to Section 46 of the B.N.S. says:
"It is not necessary that the person abetted should be capable by law of committing an offence, or that he should have the same guilty intention or knowledge as that of the abettor, or any guilty intention or knowledge."
An uncle sends the same six year old to pick up the neighbour's gold ring. The child commits no offence, but the uncle is guilty of abetting theft.
The B.N.S. illustration goes further. A person who, intending murder, instigates a child under seven to do an act that causes death is punished as if the child had been capable of committing murder.
Section 20 protects only the child. Under Explanation 3 to Section 46, the person abetted need not be legally capable of committing an offence, so the adult who uses a child under seven is liable as an abettor.
Section 21: Act of a child above seven and under twelve of immature understanding
Once a child crosses seven, the law turns the switch into a dimmer. Section 21 carries the heading "Act of a child above seven and under twelve years of age of immature understanding". It says:
"Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve years of age, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion."
Essentials
- The child is above seven and under twelve years of age.
- The child has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding.
- The immaturity relates to judging the nature and consequences of his conduct.
- It is judged on that occasion.
A dimmer, not a switch
- Protection depends on how much light of understanding the particular child had.
- A child in this age group is presumed to be doli capax, which means capable of criminal wrong.
- It is therefore for the defence to show that the child lacked sufficient maturity.
"On that occasion"
Maturity is not tested in the air. It is tested against the very act done.
A nine year old may perfectly understand that taking money from a purse is wrong, yet may not grasp that a push near a deep pond could cost a friend his life. His maturity may be sufficient for the first act and insufficient for the second.
How courts judge maturity
Courts read the child's behaviour like a story:
- Before the act: what he said.
- During the act: how he acted.
- After the act: what he did afterwards.
Planning, hiding evidence, or blaming someone else usually reveals understanding.
Ulla Mahapatra v. The King (Orissa High Court, 1950): decided under Section 83 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which was then in force. The accused, a boy above eleven but below twelve years of age, picked up a knife, moved towards the victim with a threatening gesture and declared that he would cut him to bits. He then struck the victim, who died, and was convicted of murder. On appeal, the defence relied on Section 83 and argued that a child of his age could not have understood the nature and consequences of his act. The question was whether this particular boy had sufficient maturity of understanding on that occasion. Held: yes. The boy's own words announced what he meant to do, and his conduct showed that he knew a blow with a knife would produce exactly that result. The defence of immaturity failed and the conviction for murder was upheld. Principle: age opens the door to this defence, but conduct decides whether the child walks through it. The same rule is now found in Section 21 of the B.N.S.
A child who loses this defence
A child who fails to prove immaturity is still not tried like an adult. Children in conflict with law are dealt with under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which focuses on care and reform.
Section 20 and Section 21 compared
| Point | Section 20 | Section 21 |
|---|---|---|
| Age group | Under seven | Above seven and under twelve |
| Picture | A switch fully off | A dimmer |
| Presumption | Doli incapax (incapable of criminal wrong); conclusive | Presumed doli capax (capable of criminal wrong) |
| Can evidence displace it? | No. No evidence about the child's intelligence can displace it | Yes. The defence must show lack of sufficient maturity |
| What the court looks at | Only the child's age | The child's maturity of understanding on that occasion, read from conduct before, during and after the act |
Section 22: Act of a person of unsound mind
Childhood is a stage that every person passes through. A disorder of the mind is different: it can strike an adult at any age. Section 22 carries the heading "Act of a person of unsound mind". It says:
"Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law."
Essentials
- Unsoundness of mind at the time of doing the act. The unsoundness must exist "at the time of doing it". A mental illness that appears months later, or one that had been cured months earlier, does not satisfy the Section by itself.
- Incapacity caused by that unsoundness. The unsoundness must make the person incapable of knowing one of two things:
- (a) the nature of the act; or
- (b) that the act is wrong or contrary to law.
Not knowing the nature of the act: a man in a severe psychotic episode believes he is chopping firewood, when in truth he is striking a human being. He does not know the nature of his act.
Not knowing that the act is wrong: a woman who, because of a severe illness, sincerely believes that a divine command requires her to do a terrible act, and believes it to be right, may know what she is doing but not know that it is wrong.
Medical insanity and legal insanity
Picture two circles, one inside the other. The large outer circle is medical insanity. The small inner circle is legal insanity. Only a person inside the small circle is protected by Section 22.
| Medical insanity (outer circle) | Legal insanity (inner circle) |
|---|---|
| Covers every mental illness a doctor can diagnose. | Covers only a person whose illness destroyed the power to know the nature of the act or its wrongfulness. |
| Many people with real mental illness still know exactly what they are doing and that it is wrong. | The person did not know the nature of the act, or did not know that it was wrong or contrary to law. |
| Section 22 does not help them. | Section 22 protects them. |
Every legally insane person is medically insane, but not every medically insane person is legally insane. Section 22 protects only legal insanity: incapacity, caused by unsoundness of mind at the time of the act, to know the nature of the act or that it is wrong or contrary to law.
Origin of the test: McNaghten's case
The test was not invented in India. It was shaped by a criminal trial in England in 1843, known as McNaghten's case.
Delusion: a fixed false belief that a person holds firmly, even against clear evidence.
McNaghten's case (England, 1843): Daniel McNaghten suffered from delusions. He was convinced that the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, and his party were persecuting him. In January 1843 he shot Edward Drummond, the Prime Minister's private secretary, apparently believing him to be Peel. Drummond died a few days later. At the trial, the defence argued that McNaghten's delusions had robbed him of the power to understand and control his conduct, and medical witnesses supported this. Held: the jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity, and he spent the rest of his life in mental asylums. The verdict caused a public outcry. In response, the House of Lords put a series of questions to the judges about the law of insanity, and their answers became known as the McNaghten Rules.
The McNaghten Rules
The judges' answers give a starting point, a test and a special rule.
| Part | Rule |
|---|---|
| Starting point | Every person is presumed to be sane and to possess enough reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary is proved. |
| The test | To succeed, it must be clearly proved that at the time of the act, the accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act, or, if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. |
| Special rule on partial delusions | A person under a partial delusion is to be judged as if his imagined facts were true. |
Partial delusion: if a man wrongly believed that someone was about to kill him, and killed that person in what he thought was self defence, he would be excused. But if he believed that the person had seriously injured his reputation and fortune, and killed him in revenge, he would be punished.
Indian law adopted this approach, and Section 22 of the B.N.S. still carries it.
How courts decide the plea in practice
The court decides this question on the full picture. It examines:
- medical records;
- the behaviour of the accused before the act;
- the act itself; and
- what he did after it.
A clear motive, careful planning, or an effort to escape or destroy evidence usually shows that the person knew the act was wrong. The presumption of sanity gives way only to convincing material.
Section 23: Intoxication caused against one's will
Disease is not the only thing that can cloud a mind. A substance can do it too. Section 23 carries the heading "Act of a person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will". It says:
"Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is, by reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law; provided that the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will."
Essentials
- Same test of incapacity as Section 22. By reason of intoxication, the person is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that it is wrong or contrary to law.
- At the time of the act. The incapacity must exist at the time of doing it. Being slightly drunk, cheerful or careless is not enough.
- Involuntary intoxication (the proviso). The intoxicant must have been administered either:
- without his knowledge; or
- against his will.
Intoxication here includes alcohol and any drug or other substance that clouds the mind.
Without his knowledge: a hospital attendant, by mistake, injects a patient with a powerful sedative instead of a vitamin.
Against his will: someone is physically forced to swallow the intoxicant.
Voluntary intoxication is excluded
Voluntary intoxication can never bring a person within Section 23. The law sees the choice to drink or take a drug as the moment where responsibility begins. A person who knowingly weakens his own self-control must answer for what follows.
Section 22 and Section 23 compared
| Point | Section 22 | Section 23 |
|---|---|---|
| Cause of incapacity | Unsoundness of mind | Intoxication (alcohol, drug or other substance) |
| Test of incapacity | Incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that it is wrong or contrary to law | The same |
| Time | At the time of doing the act | At the time of doing the act |
| Additional condition | None stated | The intoxicant was administered without his knowledge or against his will |
Section 24: Offence requiring particular intent or knowledge committed by an intoxicated person
Voluntary intoxication leaves a difficult question. Some offences need more than an act: they need a particular intention or a particular knowledge. Murder is the best example. What should the law do with a person who commits such an offence after drinking voluntarily? Section 24 answers this. Its heading is "Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge committed by one who is intoxicated". It says:
"In cases where an act done is not an offence unless done with a particular knowledge or intent, a person who does the act in a state of intoxication shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as he would have had if he had not been intoxicated, unless the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his will."
Basdev v. State of Pepsu (Supreme Court, 1956): the accused, a retired junior officer of the army, had been drinking heavily at a wedding. When the guests sat down to eat, he asked a young boy to move aside so that he could take a convenient seat. The boy did not move, and the accused shot him dead. The question was whether this was murder, or only culpable homicide not amounting to murder, because he was drunk. Held: knowledge is to be judged as if the accused were sober, because the Section says so. Intention is not mentioned in the Section, so it must be gathered from all the circumstances, giving due weight to the degree of intoxication. If a man was so drunk that his mind was entirely gone, he cannot be fixed with the intention the offence requires. But if he still knew what he was about, the ordinary rule applies, that a person intends the natural consequences of his act. On the facts, the accused was not so drunk as to be incapable of forming the intention, and his conviction for murder was upheld. Principle: under Section 24, sober knowledge is imputed to a voluntarily intoxicated person; intention is inferred from the facts.
Knowledge and intention under Section 24
| Knowledge | Intention |
|---|---|
| The law "lends" the drunk person his sober knowledge, without asking whether he actually had it. | Intention is not lent. It must be found from the facts. |
| Judged as if the accused were sober, because the Section says so. | Gathered from all the circumstances, giving due weight to the degree of intoxication. |
| Imputed regardless of how drunk he was. | If his mind was entirely gone, he cannot be fixed with the required intention. If he still knew what he was about, he is taken to intend the natural consequences of his act. |
Why voluntary drunkenness rarely helps
- Culpable homicide under Section 100 of the B.N.S. can rest on the knowledge that an act is likely to cause death, and that knowledge is lent to the drunk person.
- At most, where intoxication was so deep that no intention could form, an offence that depends on intention may come down to one that depends only on knowledge.
- Voluntary intoxication is never a complete escape.
Section 23 and Section 24 compared
| Point | Section 23 | Section 24 |
|---|---|---|
| Kind of intoxication | Involuntary: administered without his knowledge or against his will | Voluntary (the rule does not apply where the intoxicant was administered without his knowledge or against his will) |
| Effect | Complete defence: nothing is an offence, if the person was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it was wrong or contrary to law | No complete defence: he is dealt with as if he had the same knowledge as when sober; intention is gathered from the circumstances |
Involuntary intoxication (Section 23) can excuse completely. Voluntary intoxication (Section 24) never excuses completely: sober knowledge is imputed, and at most an offence requiring intention may be reduced to one requiring only knowledge.
Good faith: the foundation of the purpose exceptions
Sections 20 to 24 complete the first question, capacity: in each of them, the question was whether the mind could understand. The next group concerns people whose minds work perfectly well. They know exactly what they are doing, and they know that harm may follow. Yet the law excuses them because of what they were aiming at. This is the question of purpose, covered by Sections 19, 30 and 31.
All three Sections in this group depend on good faith. Section 2(11) of the B.N.S. says:
"Nothing is said to be done or believed in good faith which is done or believed without due care and attention."
Good faith in criminal law means honesty plus care. A well meaning but careless person does not act in good faith.
Section 19: Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to prevent other harm
"Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property."
Explanation:
"It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of doing the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm."
The defence of necessity
Section 19 is the defence of necessity, often linked with the Latin maxim necessitas non habet legem, which means necessity knows no law. Picture a person standing at a fork where both roads lead to some harm. He chooses the road with less damage.
Essentials
- No criminal intention to cause harm, though he may know that harm is likely.
- Good faith.
- Purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm, to a person or to property.
Illustrations in the B.N.S.
The ship's captain: a ship's captain, through no fault of his own, must either run down a boat carrying twenty or thirty passengers, or change course and risk hitting a boat with only two, which he may possibly clear.
The great fire: a person pulls down houses in a great fire to stop it from spreading.
Both are excused if the danger justified the risk.
Weighing the harms under the Explanation
Whether the defence applies is a question of fact. The Explanation makes the court weigh two things:
- how serious the threatened harm was; and
- how close (imminent) it was.
| Point | The trekker (Prince) | The swerving driver |
|---|---|---|
| Facts | Breaks the lock of a shepherd's hut and burns a bench to survive a blizzard | Sees a cardboard box lying on the road and, to avoid crushing it, swerves sharply onto a crowded footpath |
| Harm avoided | Deadly and immediate cold | Trivial |
| Harm or risk created | A broken lock and a burnt bench: small losses in comparison | Grave risk to people on the footpath |
| Result under Section 19 | His act fits the Section | The Section gives him nothing |
Limit: necessity and the deliberate killing of an innocent
A boundary is written into the words of the Section itself. It protects a person who knows that harm is likely, not one who sets out to cause it. That is why necessity is generally not accepted as a defence to the deliberate killing of an innocent person.
Regina v. Dudley and Stephens (England, 1884): shipwrecked sailors adrift without food killed a young cabin boy so that they could survive. Held: necessity was no defence to murder. Principle: necessity does not excuse the deliberate killing of an innocent person.
Section 30: Act done in good faith for benefit of a person without consent
Necessity deals with a choice between two harms. Section 30 deals with something more personal: helping someone who cannot say yes. It says:
"Nothing is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause to a person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, even without that person's consent, if the circumstances are such that it is impossible for that person to signify consent, or if that person is incapable of giving consent, and has no guardian or other person in lawful charge of him from whom it is possible to obtain consent in time for the thing to be done with benefit."
The four conditions ("four gates")
- The act must be done in good faith.
- It must be for the benefit of the very person who is harmed.
- That person must be unable to consent, either because the situation makes it impossible to signify consent or because the person is incapable of giving consent.
- There must be no guardian or other person in lawful charge from whom consent can be obtained in time for the thing to be done with benefit.
If a parent is standing in the hospital corridor, the doctor must ask the parent. Consent can be obtained in time, so the fourth condition is not met.
Applying the conditions
The lifeguard: she passes all four gates. The swimmer was unconscious and could not consent, nobody could be asked in time, and she acted honestly and carefully to save his life.
B.N.S. illustrations: (1) a surgeon operates on a man lying unconscious after a fall from his horse. (2) A person fires at a tiger carrying a man away, knowing that the shot may kill the man, but intending only to save him.
The four provisos
The protection is fenced by four provisos. The Section says, "Provided that this exception shall not extend to", and then lists them:
| Clause | Text: the exception shall not extend to | In simple words |
|---|---|---|
| (a) | "the intentional causing of death, or the attempting to cause death" | An absolute bar. A person may never aim at death. |
| (b) | "the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity" | A known risk of death is allowed only to fight death, grievous hurt, or a grievous disease or infirmity. |
| (c) | "the voluntary causing of hurt, or to the attempting to cause hurt, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or hurt" | Deliberate hurt is allowed only to prevent death or hurt. |
| (d) | "the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend" | A person cannot abet what the Section itself would not allow him to do. |
The cracked ribs of the swimmer are covered despite clause (c), because the hurt was caused to prevent death.
Explanation: mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit
"Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit within the meaning of sections 26, 27 and this section."
Pecuniary means relating to money. The benefit must concern the person's life, health or welfare.
A person cannot cut down an unconscious neighbour's mango trees and defend it by saying that timber prices were high and he was saving the neighbour money. Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit under Section 30.
Section 30: good faith + benefit of the person harmed + inability to consent + no guardian or person in lawful charge reachable in time. Never extends to intentionally causing or attempting death; a known risk of death only to prevent death or grievous hurt or to cure a grievous disease or infirmity; voluntary hurt only to prevent death or hurt; and money benefit alone does not count.
Section 31: Communication made in good faith
Harm does not always come from hands. Sometimes it comes from words. Section 31, headed "Communication made in good faith", says:
"No communication made in good faith is an offence by reason of any harm to the person to whom it is made, if it is made for the benefit of that person."
An eye specialist tells a young truck driver that his eyesight has become so weak that he must stop driving at once. The news is crushing, and the driver suffers a breakdown. The specialist commits no offence, because the truth was told honestly, with care, and for the driver's own benefit.
B.N.S. illustration: a surgeon, in good faith, tells a patient that he cannot live, after which the patient dies of shock.
Two limits
- The protection covers harm to the person to whom the words are spoken.
- The words must be for that person's benefit.
Someone who delivers frightening news to a heart patient simply to hurt him stands outside Section 31.
Section 32: Act to which a person is compelled by threats
The last question is freedom. Here the person understands everything, and he does not want the harm at all. Yet he does it, because someone else has put his life in immediate danger. Section 32, headed "Act to which a person is compelled by threats", says:
"Except murder, and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats, which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to that person will otherwise be the consequence."
Essentials
Every word in the Section narrows the defence.
- Threat of death. Not a threat of a beating or of loss of property.
- Instant death. The death threatened must be instant.
- Fear at the time of the act. The apprehension must be present at the time of doing it.
- Reasonable fear. The threat must reasonably cause the apprehension.
- Death to that person himself. The words "to that person" make clear that the threatened death must be to the person doing the act.
A moneylender warns, "Pay by next week or you will not live." This does not create the defence, because the death threatened is not instant: there is time to seek protection.
Offences excluded
Even when all the conditions are satisfied, two kinds of offences stay outside the shelter:
- murder; and
- offences against the State punishable with death, such as waging war against the Government of India.
The law will not let a person buy his own life with the life of an innocent person, or with the safety of the nation.
The clerk: with a pistol pressed against his chest, the clerk faced instant death. Altering a land record is a serious offence, but it is neither murder nor an offence against the State punishable with death. He is protected. Had he been ordered to kill someone, he would not be.
Proviso: a person who places himself in the situation
"Provided that the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint."
In other words, a person who walks into danger by choice cannot later complain of the danger.
The two Explanations
Explanation 1:
"A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of this exception, on the ground of his having been compelled by his associates to do anything that is an offence by law."
Explanation 2:
"A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of instant death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to take his tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of this exception."
Dacoity is robbery committed conjointly by five or more persons.
| Point | Explanation 1 | Explanation 2 |
|---|---|---|
| How he came to be with the dacoits | Joined the gang of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being beaten, knowing their character | Seized by the gang and forced by threat of instant death |
| Benefit of Section 32 | Not entitled | Entitled (for example, the smith forced to open the door of a house for the dacoits) |
The difference between the two men in the Explanations is not what they did, but how they came to be there. Section 32 requires a reasonable fear of instant death to the person himself at the time of the act, never covers murder or offences against the State punishable with death, and is lost by a person who placed himself in the situation of his own accord.
The five problems decided
| Person | Provision | Result and reason |
|---|---|---|
| Prince, the trekker | Section 19 | Protected. The danger to his life was serious and immediate, and the damage to the hut was far smaller. |
| Farhan, the ten year old | Section 21 | Throwing away the matchbox and blaming another boy are signs that he understood what he had done. Unless his defence shows immaturity of understanding on that occasion, the dimmer is bright enough for liability. His case would go before the juvenile justice system rather than an adult court. |
| Aadil, the student forced to drink | Section 23 | Protected, provided the liquor left him incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that it was wrong. The liquor was given against his will. The seniors who forced it on him will have their own case to answer. |
| The lifeguard | Section 30 | Protected. The third proviso (clause (c)) does not stand in her way, because the hurt was caused to prevent death. |
| The clerk | Section 32 | Protected. The threat was of instant death to himself, and the offence was neither murder nor one against the State punishable with death. |
Quick revision
- Criminal law punishes a mind that chooses wrongly. Three questions: capacity, purpose and freedom.
- Capacity is removed by Section 20 (child under seven), Section 21 (child of seven to twelve of immature understanding), Section 22 (unsoundness of mind) and Section 23 (involuntary intoxication); Section 24 deals with voluntary intoxication, which is never a complete escape.
- Purpose: Section 19 (necessity), Section 30 (act in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent) and Section 31 (communication in good faith), all resting on good faith, which means honesty plus care.
- Freedom: Section 32 (compulsion by threats of instant death), excluding murder and offences against the State punishable with death.
- The burden of proving a General Exception is on the accused under Section 108 of the B.S.A., on a preponderance of probabilities.
- Prince (trekker): Section 19. Farhan (ten year old): Section 21, likely liable, before the juvenile justice system. Aadil (forced to drink): Section 23. The lifeguard: Section 30. The clerk: Section 32.
- When one of the three questions is missing in the way the law describes, the law steps back. When all three are present, these general exceptions offer no shelter.
