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Constitutional Law II Complete notes

Constitutional Law II: Complete Notes

Constitutional Law II deals with civil liberties. It is studied in eight units, from the question of who is a citizen of India to how the Constitution enforces the rights it gives. These rights are at work in ordinary life: when a person speaks his mind online, prays in his own way, or is stopped b…

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Constitutional Law II deals with civil liberties. It is studied in eight units, from the question of who is a citizen of India to how the Constitution enforces the rights it gives. These rights are at work in ordinary life: when a person speaks his mind online, prays in his own way, or is stopped by the police on the road. Connecting every rule to real life makes it easier to understand and remember.

Key point

For every important case, learn the facts, the question before the court, the decision and the principle. The principle matters most, because it is what is applied in examination answers.

Unit 1: Citizenship under the Indian Constitution

Why citizenship comes first

Before asking what rights the Constitution gives, one must ask to whom it gives them.

HolderRights
Every person in India, citizen or foreignerEquality before the law (Article 14); right to life (Article 21)
Citizens onlyFreedoms in Article 19; rights against discrimination (Articles 15 and 16); cultural and educational rights (Articles 29 and 30)

Only citizens can vote, or become President, a judge of the Supreme Court or a member of Parliament. Citizenship decides which doors are open to a person, which is why the study of civil liberties begins with it.

Citizenship, nationality and domicile

ConceptMeaningWhere it matters
CitizenshipFull membership of a State under its own lawCarries rights (such as the right to vote) and duties (such as allegiance)
NationalityMainly an idea of international law; tells other countries which State a person belongs toFor example, which State may protect him abroad. In India, it usually goes together with citizenship
DomicileThe place a person treats as his permanent homeMostly private matters, such as marriage and succession

A person can be a citizen of one country and have his domicile in another. Domicile matters here because Article 5 used it to decide who became a citizen when the Constitution began. India recognises only one domicile, the domicile of India; there is no separate domicile of Uttar Pradesh or Kerala.

Case

Pradeep Jain v. Union of India (1984): Held: India recognises only one domicile, the domicile of India. Principle: there is no State-wise domicile.

Case

Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel (2025): Decided on 29 January 2025, applying the single-domicile idea. Held: reserving postgraduate medical seats on the basis of residence in a State violates Article 14; such seats must be filled on merit, with only a limited institutional preference allowed. Principle: no residence-based reservation in postgraduate medical seats.

Birth, blood and the birthright lottery

MethodMeaningRule
Jus soli"Right of the soil"A child born on the territory becomes a citizen, whoever the parents are
Jus sanguinis"Right of blood"A child takes citizenship from the parents, wherever the child is born

The scholar Ayelet Shachar calls birthright citizenship a "birthright lottery": where a person is born, and to whom, decides much of his life chances, yet it is pure luck.

Key point

Indian law has moved from jus soli towards jus sanguinis.

Partition and the Citizenship Articles (Articles 5 to 11)

The Constitution was written while Partition (1947) was uprooting millions. Families crossed the new borders in both directions, often in panic, and some later went back. So the framers could not simply say that everyone born in India is a citizen; they had to decide the status of people who had moved. Articles 5 to 11, in Part II, deal with this. Articles 5 to 9 came into force early, on 26 November 1949, the day the Constitution was adopted.

Article 5: the basic rule

At the commencement of the Constitution, a person became a citizen if he had his domicile in India and met any one of three conditions:

  1. he was born in India; or
  2. either of his parents was born in India; or
  3. he had been ordinarily resident in India for at least five years immediately before the commencement.

Article 6: persons who came from Pakistan

It applied where the person, or a parent or grandparent, was born in undivided India.

  • Migrated before 19 July 1948: a citizen if ordinarily resident in India since then.
  • Came on or after 19 July 1948: had to get himself registered.

The date matters because, from 19 July 1948, a permit system controlled movement from Pakistan.

Article 7: persons who went to Pakistan

A person who migrated from India to Pakistan after 1 March 1947 was not a citizen, even if Article 5 or 6 would otherwise cover him. But if he came back under a permit for resettlement or permanent return, he could qualify like a person who migrated after 19 July 1948.

Articles 8 to 11

  • Article 8: persons of Indian origin living abroad could register at Indian embassies.
  • Article 9: a person who voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State is not a citizen of India.
  • Article 10: existing citizenship continues, subject to any law of Parliament.
  • Article 11: nothing in these Articles takes away Parliament's power to make any provision about the acquisition and termination of citizenship and all other matters relating to it.
Key point

Article 11 is the key: the Constitution settled the position on the first day, and then Parliament took charge.

The Citizenship Act, 1955

Parliament passed the Citizenship Act, 1955 using Article 11.

Five ways of acquiring citizenship

  1. Birth.
  2. Descent: a child born outside India to an Indian parent.
  3. Registration: groups such as persons of Indian origin and persons married to Indian citizens.
  4. Naturalisation: foreigners long resident in India, normally for 12 months immediately before applying and for 11 years in all during the 14 years before that.
  5. Incorporation of territory: as when the people of Goa were declared citizens after it became part of India.

Three ways of losing citizenship

ModeHow it works
RenunciationA voluntary declaration giving it up
TerminationAutomatic, when a citizen voluntarily acquires the citizenship of another country
DeprivationAn order of the Central Government taking away citizenship obtained by registration or naturalisation, on grounds such as fraud or disloyalty to the Constitution

Citizenship by birth: Section 3

Section 3 is the most important provision. It has changed twice, and each change moved India away from pure jus soli.

Born in IndiaCitizen by birth if
On or after 26 January 1950 and before 1 July 1987Always, whoever the parents were
On or after 1 July 1987 and before 3 December 2004At least one parent was an Indian citizen at the time of the birth
On or after 3 December 2004 (when the 2003 amendment came into force)Both parents are Indian citizens, or one parent is a citizen and the other is not an illegal migrant at the time of the birth

Illegal migrant

A foreigner who entered India without a valid passport or other travel document, or who entered with valid documents but stayed beyond the permitted time. An illegal migrant cannot become a citizen by registration or naturalisation.

Example

Farhan was born in Delhi in 1980 to two foreign tourists. He is a citizen by birth, because the first period required nothing more. Prince was born in Delhi in 2010 to an Indian mother and a foreign father who entered India without a passport. His father is an illegal migrant, so Prince is not a citizen by birth.

Assam, the Assam Accord and Section 6A

Migration into Assam from the east is old, but it rose sharply around 1971, when the war in East Pakistan led to the birth of Bangladesh. From 1979, a mass movement led by students demanded the detection and deportation of foreigners. It ended with the Assam Accord of 15 August 1985 between the Central Government and the movement's leaders. To give effect to it, Parliament inserted Section 6A into the Citizenship Act in 1985.

Section 6A: three groups

It covers persons of Indian origin who came to Assam from the territory that is now Bangladesh.

Entry into AssamStatus
Before 1 January 1966, and living in Assam sinceTreated as citizens
On or after 1 January 1966, before 25 March 1971Detected as foreigners and must register; for 10 years from detection they have all citizens' rights except the right to vote; after 10 years they become citizens
On or after 25 March 1971Illegal migrants, liable to be detected and deported

Why 25 March 1971? On that date the Pakistani army began its crackdown in East Pakistan, causing a huge flow of refugees and the war that created Bangladesh.

Case

Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India (2005): The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983 applied only in Assam and made the State prove that a person was a foreigner, while everywhere else, under the Foreigners Act, a person had to prove he was not one. Held (12 July 2005): the Act was struck down. A large-scale influx of illegal migrants amounted to external aggression and internal disturbance; Article 355 places a duty on the Union to protect every State against these, and the Act defeated that duty. It also discriminated against the people of Assam. Principle: a law cannot defeat the Union's duty under Article 355.

Later, under the Supreme Court's supervision, the National Register of Citizens (NRC) was updated for Assam. Its final list, published on 31 August 2019, left out about 19 lakh people.

Case

In Re Section 6A of the Citizenship Act (2024): Groups from Assam argued that granting citizenship to migrants arriving up to 1971, only in Assam, was discriminatory and threatened the culture of the people of Assam. Held (17 October 2024): a Constitution Bench upheld Section 6A by 4:1. Justice Surya Kant wrote the main judgment for himself and two other judges; Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud agreed separately. Principle: a special rule for Assam is a reasonable classification.

The majority held:

  1. Article 11 gave Parliament the power to enact it.
  2. Treating Assam differently was a reasonable classification, because the scale of migration into Assam was unique, and the cut-off of 25 March 1971 had a rational basis.
  3. The mere presence of different ethnic groups does not violate the citizens' right under Article 29 to conserve their culture, unless they show the law actually prevents them from doing so.

The Court also issued directions for detecting and deporting those who came after the cut-off. Dissent: Justice J.B. Pardiwala held that Section 6A had become unconstitutional with the passage of time, mainly because detection under it had no time limit; he would have applied his ruling only for the future.

No Dual Citizenship: the Overseas Citizen of India

India does not allow dual citizenship; a citizen who voluntarily acquires foreign citizenship stops being an Indian citizen. To give people of Indian origin abroad a lasting link with India, the law created the Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) from 2005.

Key point

Despite its name, OCI is not citizenship. It is a registration under Sections 7A to 7D of the Act. In 2015 the older Person of Indian Origin card was merged into it.

An OCI cardholder getsAn OCI cardholder does not get
A lifelong, multiple-entry visaThe right to vote
Freedom from registering with the authorities, however long he staysHigh constitutional offices, such as President or judge
Parity with non-resident Indians in many economic and educational mattersA right to public employment; the right to buy agricultural land

Since a notification of 4 March 2021, a cardholder also needs special permission for research, journalism, missionary work, mountaineering and similar activities. A person is not eligible if he, or any of his parents, grandparents or great-grandparents, has ever been a citizen of Pakistan or Bangladesh.

Cancellation

  • Grounds in Section 7D, such as fraud or disaffection towards the Constitution.
  • Added by the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019: violating the Citizenship Act or any other law the Central Government notifies, after a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Supporters see a reasonable safeguard; critics feared even a minor violation could cost a person the card.
  • In August 2025, the government notified that registration may be cancelled if a cardholder is sentenced to imprisonment for two years or more, or is charge-sheeted for an offence punishable with seven years or more.

The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019

The CAA is the most debated citizenship law of our time. It received the President's assent on 12 December 2019, came into force on 10 January 2020, and its rules were notified on 11 March 2024.

What it does

  1. It adds a proviso to the definition of illegal migrant: a person of the Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian community, from Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan, who entered India on or before 31 December 2014 and has been exempted by the Central Government under the laws on passports and foreigners, shall not be treated as an illegal migrant.
  2. A new Section 6B gives them a special route to citizenship by registration or naturalisation.
  3. For naturalisation, the 11 years of residence are reduced to 5.
  4. On receiving citizenship, pending proceedings against them about illegal entry come to an end.
  5. The route does not apply to the Sixth Schedule tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura, or to areas under the Inner Line permit system.

The constitutional questions

Union of India's defencePetitioners' arguments
Article 11 gives Parliament full power over citizenshipArticle 14 protects every person, not only citizens
Article 14 allows reasonable classification; the three countries are neighbours with a State religion, where these six communities are persecuted religious minoritiesChoosing beneficiaries by religion is not a reasonable classification
The object is to protect persecuted minorities; the cut-off date is a rational limitIt leaves out Muslims, including sects such as the Ahmadiyyas, said to face persecution in Pakistan, and persecuted groups from other neighbours, such as Tamils from Sri Lanka and Rohingya from Myanmar
It takes away no one's citizenship; every other foreigner can still apply under the ordinary lawIt violates secularism and conflicts with the Assam Accord's cut-off of 25 March 1971

Present position

More than 200 petitions are pending in the Supreme Court. The Court has not stayed the Act or its rules, so the law is in force and, like every statute, is presumed constitutional until the Court decides otherwise.

The Court fixed the final hearing for May 2026, and its judgment is awaited.

From 1 September 2025, this Act replaced the Foreigners Act and three other laws.

An order under it exempts members of these six communities from the three countries, who entered India up to 31 December 2024, from the need for a passport or visa.

Key point

The 2025 order does not change the CAA cut-off for citizenship, which is still 31 December 2014. Overall: the Constitution settled citizenship on the first day, and Article 11 handed the future to Parliament, which has moved from birth towards descent.

Unit 2: Locating the State and the Boundaries of Fundamental Rights

The next question is: against whom can fundamental rights be claimed, and how far do they reach?

Example

A neighbour stops Aadil from walking across the neighbour's courtyard. Aadil cannot file a writ petition in the Supreme Court claiming violation of his fundamental right to move freely.

Most fundamental rights are guarantees against the State, not against every private person. So the court first asks a threshold question: is the wrongdoer the State? Article 12 answers it. In Part III, unless the context otherwise requires, "the State" includes:

  1. the Government and Parliament of India;
  2. the Government and the Legislature of each State;
  3. all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.

Local authorities are bodies such as municipalities and panchayats. The real difficulty lies in the words other authorities: do they cover only bodies doing the work of government, or also a public sector company, a research council or a sports board? The Supreme Court answered step by step.

"Other Authorities": How the Tests Developed

Statutory authorities

Case

Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal (1967): Mohan Lal, a permanent employee of the Rajasthan Government whose services were placed at the Board's disposal, was left out of promotion while away on deputation. He alleged discrimination under Articles 14 and 16 and won in the Rajasthan High Court. The Board argued it was not the State but a commercial body supplying electricity. Held: majority by Justice V. Bhargava (Justice J.C. Shah concurring separately) rejected this; the Board lost. Principle: a body created by law, and given power by law to bind others, is the State.

  • No narrow reading; no ejusdem generis: "other authorities" is not to be read narrowly. Under the ejusdem generis rule ("of the same kind"), general words following specific words take their colour from them. It cannot apply, because the bodies named in Article 12 share no common kind.
  • Statutory power: other authorities include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. The Board was created by the Electricity Supply Act, 1948 and could issue directions, some carrying criminal penalties.
  • Commercial activity irrelevant: the Constitution itself allows the State to do business.

Statutory corporations and the instrumentality test

Case

Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram (1975): Employees of the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, the Life Insurance Corporation and the Industrial Finance Corporation, all statutory corporations, were removed in breach of service regulations; the High Court had declared the removal of Bhagat Ram (an Oil and Natural Gas Commission employee) void. Are these corporations the State, and do their regulations have the force of law? Held: yes to both, by 4:1 (Chief Justice A.N. Ray; Justice A. Alagiriswami dissenting). The corporations owed their existence to statutes and their regulations were made under statutory power, so they had the force of law; an employee removed in breach was entitled to a declaration that he continued in service. Principle: corporations that owe their existence to statutes are the State, and regulations made under statutory power have the force of law.

Justice K.K. Mathew, concurring, said the real question is whether a body is an agency or instrumentality of the government; when the State acts through a corporation, it cannot escape its constitutional duties by that choice. This became the instrumentality test.

Case

Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India (1979) and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1980): Justice P.N. Bhagwati developed the instrumentality test. Ajay Hasia concerned admissions to the Regional Engineering College in Srinagar, run by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, not created by statute. Students refused admission said the interview was arbitrary. Held: even a registered society can be the State if it is an instrumentality of the government. Principle: a body that is an instrumentality of the government is the State, judged by the Ajay Hasia tests below.

The Ajay Hasia tests:

  1. Does the government hold the entire share capital?
  2. Does government money meet almost all its expenses?
  3. Does it enjoy a monopoly conferred or protected by the State?
  4. Is there deep and pervasive State control?
  5. Are its functions of public importance and closely related to governmental functions?
  6. Was a government department transferred to it?
Key point

No single test is decisive; the court looks at the whole picture.

Refining the tests

Case

Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002): In Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India (1975), the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was held not to be the State, being only a registered society. Employees of a CSIR laboratory, the Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, challenged their termination, and the issue went to seven judges. Held: by 5:2 (Justice Ruma Pal; Justice R.C. Lahoti and one other judge dissenting), the CSIR is the State; Sabhajit Tewary overruled. The Prime Minister was its President by virtue of office, the government funded it and controlled its work. Principle: the control test below.

The question is whether the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the government. The control must be particular to that body and pervasive. Mere regulatory control, which every business faces under general laws, is not enough.

Key point

Formula: financial, functional and administrative control, which is deep and pervasive, makes a body the State.

Is the BCCI the State?

Case

Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India (2005): In 2004 the BCCI invited bids for television rights to cricket matches. Zee made the highest offer, but the BCCI cancelled the whole process. Zee filed a writ petition directly in the Supreme Court under Article 32, alleging violation of Article 14 and of its freedom of trade. The first question was whether the BCCI is the State. Held (Constitution Bench, 3:2; majority judgment by Justice N. Santosh Hegde): the BCCI is not the State, so a petition under Article 32 did not lie. It is a society registered under a Tamil Nadu law, not created by statute; the government holds no shares in it, does not fund it and did not confer its monopoly over cricket; its control is only regulatory, not deep and pervasive. But the BCCI performs public duties, such as selecting the team that represents the country, so an aggrieved person may approach a High Court under Article 226, which allows writs against any person or authority. Justice S.B. Sinha, dissenting with one other judge, held it is the State because of its public functions and control over the game. Principle: not the State, but answerable under Article 226.

Case

Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Cricket Association of Bihar (2015): After the 2013 betting and spot-fixing scandal in the Indian Premier League, the Cricket Association of Bihar went to court. Held (January 2015): since the BCCI discharges public functions, its actions are open to judicial review and must be fair and free from conflict of interest. An amended BCCI rule allowing office-bearers commercial interests in the league was struck down. A committee headed by Justice R.M. Lodha, former Chief Justice of India, recommended reforms; in July 2016 the Court accepted most, including an age limit of 70 for office-bearers, cooling-off periods between terms, and a bar on ministers and government servants holding office. Principle: public functions attract judicial review.

Key point

A body that is not the State may still be answerable to the courts when it performs public functions.

International Bodies and Social Media Companies

Bodies set up by several countries, such as United Nations agencies, are created by treaties, not Indian law, and are not controlled by the Government of India, so they are generally outside Article 12.

Case

G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (2003): An international research institute. Held: it was neither the State nor amenable to writs, and enjoyed immunity under the United Nations (Privileges and Immunities) Act, 1947. Principle: treaty-based international bodies fall outside Article 12.

Social media companies raise a newer question. Much public speech now happens on private platforms, but these companies are not the State, because the government does not own, fund or control them. A user whose post is removed cannot simply claim a breach of Article 19 against the platform. Courts have been asked whether such platforms, like the BCCI, perform public functions attracting writs under Article 226. When the government orders a platform to block content, that order is State action and must satisfy the Constitution (see Unit 4).

Private Actors and Horizontal Application

Some rights apply horizontally, that is, against private persons too:

  • Article 15(2): no discrimination in access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment, or in the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats and roads.
  • Article 17: abolishes untouchability, practised mostly by private persons.
  • Article 23: forbids trafficking in human beings and forced labour by anyone.
  • Article 24: forbids child labour in factories, mines and hazardous work.
Case

Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023): Held (Constitution Bench, 4:1): rights under Articles 19 and 21 can be enforced even against persons other than the State; Justice B.V. Nagarathna disagreed on this point. Principle: the idea that fundamental rights bind only the State is no longer absolute.

A High Court under Article 226 can issue writs to any person or authority, so a private body performing a public duty, such as a private trust running an aided college, can be directed to perform it. An ordinary private dispute, however, is not a matter for writs.

Case

St. Mary's Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava (2022): Held: a teacher of a private unaided school could not use a writ petition for an ordinary service dispute. Principle: no writ in purely private disputes.

Article 13 and the Meaning of "Law"

Article 12 says who is bound; Article 13 says what happens to a law that violates fundamental rights.

  • Clause (1): pre-Constitution laws are void to the extent of inconsistency with fundamental rights.
  • Clause (2): the State shall not make any law taking away or abridging fundamental rights; a law in contravention is void to the extent of the contravention.
  • Clause (3): "law" includes any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having the force of law in India.
  • Clause (4) (added in 1971): Article 13 does not apply to a constitutional amendment under Article 368.
Example

A municipal bye-law says only men may run food stalls in a market. A bye-law is law under Article 13, and this part discriminates on the ground of sex, so it is void. But only that part is void. The rest of the bye-law, on hygiene and timings, survives.

Key point

Note the words "to the extent": Article 13 does not destroy a whole law merely because one part is bad.

Doctrines under Article 13

No retrospective effect

Case

Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay (1951): A prosecution began in 1949 under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, for publishing a pamphlet without authority. After the Constitution came into force, the accused argued that the law was now void, so the prosecution must end. Held: Article 13 is not retrospective. A pre-Constitution law becomes void only from 26 January 1950 and only for the future; earlier acts and liabilities already incurred are unaffected, so the prosecution could continue. Principle: Article 13(1) does not wipe out the past.

Doctrine of eclipse

Case

Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1955): A Central Provinces and Berar law, amended in 1947, let the provincial government take over the whole motor transport business, excluding private operators. After 1950 it conflicted with Article 19(1)(g), as it then stood; in 1951 the First Amendment changed Article 19(6) to allow State monopolies. Held: the law never died; it was only overshadowed by the fundamental right, as the moon is darkened in an eclipse. Once the amendment removed the shadow, the law became fully effective again without being passed afresh. Principle: doctrine of eclipse.

Key point

Doctrine of eclipse: an inconsistent law is not wiped off the statute book; it only becomes unenforceable while the conflict lasts.

Case

Deep Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1959) and Mahendra Lal Jaini v. State of Uttar Pradesh: Held: a post-Constitution law violating a fundamental right is void from birth, because the State had no power to make it, so a later amendment cannot revive it. Principle: eclipse generally does not apply to post-Constitution laws.

Case

State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills (1974): Held: a post-Constitution law violating a citizens-only right (such as those in Article 19) is void only as against citizens; it stays valid against non-citizens, including companies. Principle: refinement of the void-from-birth rule.

PointPre-Constitution lawPost-Constitution law
Effect of conflictEclipsed: unenforceable while the conflict lastsVoid from birth
Later amendment removing the conflictRevives the lawCannot revive it
Citizens-only rights—Void only as against citizens; valid against non-citizens

Doctrine of severability

Because a law is void only to the extent of inconsistency, courts ask whether the bad part can be cut away.

Case

R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India (1957): Held: if the valid and invalid parts are so mixed up that they cannot be separated, the whole law falls; if they are distinct and the legislature would have enacted the valid part on its own, the valid part stands. The Prize Competitions Act, 1955 was read to apply only to competitions of a gambling nature and upheld to that extent. Principle: test of severability.

Case

A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950): Held: Section 14 of the Preventive Detention Act, which stopped the grounds of detention from being disclosed even to a court, was struck down; the rest of the Act survived. Principle: severability applied.

Doctrine of waiver

Case

Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income Tax: Basheshar Nath agreed to a settlement under a special tax procedure later held discriminatory. Did his agreement waive his Article 14 right? Held: no. Chief Justice S.R. Das and Justice J.L. Kapur: Article 14, in particular, cannot be waived, being a command to the State and not merely a private benefit. Justice N.H. Bhagwati and Justice K. Subba Rao: no fundamental right can be waived at all. Principle: fundamental rights are not just private property; they are limits on the State in the public interest.

Case

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985): Pavement dwellers in Bombay told the High Court they claimed no fundamental right to live on the pavements, but later challenged their eviction in the Supreme Court. Held: there can be no estoppel against the Constitution (estoppel binds a person to his earlier statement); their concession did not bar their claim. Principle: no estoppel against fundamental rights.

Example

A public employer makes Prince sign a paper promising never to complain of discrimination. The paper cannot bar his claim under Article 16.

Personal Laws and Article 13

Are uncodified personal laws, such as Hindu or Muslim rules on marriage and succession, "law" under Article 13? If so, every such rule can be tested against fundamental rights.

Case

State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali (1951, Bombay High Court): The Bombay Prevention of Hindu Bigamous Marriages Act, 1946 made bigamy by Hindus void and punishable. It was attacked as interfering with Hindu religion, and as discriminating against Hindus since Muslim men could still marry more than once. Held: Chief Justice M.C. Chagla and Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar upheld the Act. Principle: uncodified personal law is not "law" under Article 13.

Three reasons:

  1. Uncodified personal law is not a law in force under Article 13, nor custom or usage, so it cannot be tested against fundamental rights; the framers deliberately left personal laws to be reformed by the legislature.
  2. Under Article 25, the State may regulate religious practices in the interest of social welfare and reform.
  3. Under Article 14, the legislature may reform the law of one community at a time.
Case

Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir: Held (Supreme Court): Part III does not touch the personal laws of the parties. Principle: follows Narasu Appa Mali.

The consequence: a personal law rule that discriminates against women escapes review simply because it is not in a statute, which is why the view has been questioned. Two later developments matter.

Case

Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017): On instant triple talaq (see Unit 6). Held: Justice R.F. Nariman and Justice U.U. Lalit held that instant triple talaq was recognised and enforced by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, a law in force, so it could be tested under Article 14. Principle: personal law recognised by statute can be tested.

Case

Sabarimala case (2018): Justice D.Y. Chandrachud said the Narasu Appa Mali view needs to be revisited, because it keeps personal law beyond constitutional scrutiny. Note: this was his individual view, not a holding of the Court.

Key point

Narasu Appa Mali has not been formally overruled.

The Amending Power and the Basic Structure

Article 368 gives Parliament power to amend the Constitution, while Article 13(2) bars any law taking away or abridging fundamental rights. Is a constitutional amendment "law" under Article 13? If yes, Parliament cannot amend fundamental rights; if no, it can amend them freely.

Case

Shankari Prasad v. Union of India (1951): Held: "law" in Article 13 means ordinary legislation, not a constitutional amendment, so the First Amendment, which protected land reform laws, was valid. Principle: amendment is not "law".

Case

Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965): Held: the majority agreed with Shankari Prasad. Justice M. Hidayatullah and Justice J.R. Mudholkar expressed doubts; Justice Mudholkar asked whether the basic features of the Constitution could be changed at all. Principle: the seed of the basic structure idea.

Case

I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967): Held (eleven judges, 6:5): an amendment is law under Article 13, so Parliament could not take away or abridge fundamental rights. Chief Justice K. Subba Rao, for five judges, used prospective overruling: the ruling applied only to future amendments, so earlier land reform amendments remained valid. Principle: amendment is "law"; prospective overruling.

Parliament responded with the Twenty-fourth Amendment (1971), adding Article 13(4) and making clear that Parliament may amend any provision of the Constitution.

Case

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973): Kesavananda Bharati headed a math in Kerala whose property was affected by State land reform laws. His petition tested the Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth Amendments. Thirteen judges, the largest bench in Indian history, decided it on 24 April 1973. Held: (1) Golaknath overruled; an amendment is not law under Article 13, and the Twenty-fourth Amendment is valid; (2) the amending power extends to every part of the Constitution, including fundamental rights; (3) by 7:6, the power to amend does not include the power to destroy or alter the basic structure. Principle: basic structure doctrine.

Justice H.R. Khanna tipped the balance: the word "amendment" itself carries a limit, and after an amendment the Constitution must survive with its basic identity. Basic features named by the judges include the supremacy of the Constitution, the republican and democratic form of government, secularism, separation of powers, federalism, and the dignity and freedom of the individual. Later cases added judicial review, the rule of law, free and fair elections and the independence of the judiciary.

The basic structure at work

Case

Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975): Held: a clause of the Thirty-ninth Amendment, which put the Prime Minister's election beyond judicial review, was struck down using the basic structure doctrine. Principle: amendments violating basic features are invalid.

The Forty-second Amendment (1976) added clauses (4) and (5) to Article 368: no amendment could be questioned in any court, and there was no limit on the amending power.

Case

Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980): Held: both clauses were struck down. A limited amending power is itself a basic feature. Principle: a limited power cannot be turned into an unlimited one.

Case

Waman Rao v. Union of India: Held: laws placed in the Ninth Schedule before 24 April 1973 stay protected. Principle: 24 April 1973 is the dividing line for Ninth Schedule laws.

Case

I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007): Held (nine judges): laws added to the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 can be tested against the basic structure, including the essence of Articles 14, 19 and 21. Principle: Ninth Schedule protection is not absolute.

Case

National Judicial Appointments Commission case (2015): Held: the Ninety-ninth Amendment was struck down by 4:1 as damaging the independence of the judiciary. Principle: judicial independence is basic.

Critics of the doctrineSupporters of the doctrine
Unelected judges should not have the last word over elected representatives, and judges themselves decide what is basicA constitution must protect its identity from a passing majority
Key point

Either way, the basic structure doctrine is settled law and the most important limit on Parliament's power.

The Right to Property

The original Constitution had two property rights: Article 19(1)(f), every citizen's freedom to acquire, hold and dispose of property; and Article 31, under which no person shall be deprived of property save by authority of law, and compulsory acquisition was allowed only for a public purpose, with compensation.

The new Republic wanted to abolish the zamindari system and redistribute land, and courts struck down several reform laws. The response:

  1. First Amendment (1951): added Article 31A (protecting laws acquiring estates), Article 31B and the Ninth Schedule; Acts in the Schedule were protected from challenge for violating fundamental rights.
  2. Bela Banerjee (case below): compensation means a just equivalent.
  3. Fourth Amendment (1955): made adequacy of compensation non-justiciable.
  4. R.C. Cooper (1970, case below): compensation on relevant principles.
  5. Twenty-fifth Amendment (1971): replaced "compensation" with "amount".
  6. Kesavananda Bharati: Justice Khanna, whose opinion decided the case, said the right to property is not part of the basic structure.
Case

State of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee: Held: compensation meant a just equivalent of what the owner lost. Principle: compensation must be a just equivalent.

Case

R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (1970): The bank nationalisation case, decided after the Fourth Amendment. Held: compensation must still be fixed on relevant principles. Principle: the courts continued to insist on principled compensation.

Forty-fourth Amendment and Article 300A

The Forty-fourth Amendment (1978) deleted Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 with effect from 1979, and inserted Article 300A outside Part III: "No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law."

PointBeforeAfter
ProvisionsArticles 19(1)(f) and 31, in Part IIIArticle 300A, outside Part III
StatusFundamental rightConstitutional right
RemedyArticle 32No direct petition under Article 32; High Court under Article 226, or a civil suit

"Authority of law" means a valid law made by a legislature; a mere executive order is not enough.

Case

K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2011): Held (Constitution Bench): Article 300A is not part of the basic structure. Principle: property is not a basic feature.

Case

Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2020): An elderly widow's land was taken for a road in the late 1960s without acquisition proceedings or compensation. Held: the right to property is not only a constitutional right but also a human right; a welfare State cannot claim its own citizen's land by adverse possession (gaining title by occupying land openly for a long time). Compensation with interest was ordered. Principle: no adverse possession by the State against its citizen.

Case

Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah (2024): Decided on 16 May 2024. Held: "authority of law" requires more than a bare statute; Article 300A contains seven procedural rights. Principle: the procedure must actually be followed.

The seven rights: (1) the owner's right to notice; (2) the right to be heard; (3) the right to a reasoned decision; (4) the State's duty to acquire only for a public purpose; (5) the right to fair compensation; (6) the right to an efficient process completed within reasonable time; (7) the right to the formal conclusion of the process.

Example

Prince cannot lose his shop to a road merely because a statute exists; the procedure must actually be followed.

Exceptions to the Fundamental Rights

Three Articles titled "saving of certain laws" still work as exceptions:

ArticleProtectsFrom challenge under
31ALaws on matters such as acquisition of estates and taking over management of propertyArticles 14 and 19
31BActs in the Ninth ScheduleAny fundamental right, subject to the basic structure test of I.R. Coelho
31C (added 1971)Laws giving effect to Article 39(b) (distributing the community's material resources for the common good) and 39(c) (preventing concentration of wealth)Articles 14 and 19
Case

Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra (2024): Decided by nine judges on 5 November 2024. The Forty-second Amendment had extended Article 31C to all directive principles; Minerva Mills struck down that extension, and some argued nothing was left of the Article. Held: (1) the original Article 31C, as upheld in Kesavananda Bharati, continues in force; (2) by majority, not every privately owned resource is a "material resource of the community" under Article 39(b); it depends on factors such as its nature, scarcity and impact on the community's well-being. The broad view of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, in an earlier minority opinion, that all private property falls within the clause, was rejected. Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia dissented on this point. Principle: Article 39(b) does not cover all private property.

Other exceptions

  • Article 33: Parliament may restrict the fundamental rights of the armed forces and the police, to keep discipline.
  • Article 34: restrictions while martial law is in force.
  • Articles 358 and 359: during a national emergency, Article 19 may be suspended, and the enforcement of other rights suspended.
Key point

Since the Forty-fourth Amendment, the enforcement of Articles 20 and 21 can never be suspended.

Unit Three: Equality Jurisprudence

Once the State and the limits of its power are located, the first promise the State makes to every person is the promise of equality.

Equality and the Rule of Law

A.V. Dicey, the British jurist, explained the rule of law in three ways:

  1. No arbitrary power: no person can be punished except for a clear breach of law proved in the ordinary courts.
  2. No one above the law: every official is subject to the ordinary courts.
  3. Rights secured by courts: individual rights are secured by the decisions of the courts.
Formal rule of lawSubstantive rule of law
Asks whether rules are clear, public, general and equally applied.Also asks whether the law respects basic rights and justice.

The Constitution contains both versions. The Supreme Court treats the rule of law as part of the basic structure, and Article 14 is its most direct expression.

The Two Parts of Article 14

Article 14: The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.

Article 14 protects any person, including a foreigner and a company.

PointEquality before the lawEqual protection of the laws
NatureNegative ideaPositive idea
SourceEnglish lawAmerican Constitution
MeaningNo one is above the law; no one gets special privilegesPersons in the same situation must be treated alike
Key point

Article 14 does not demand identical treatment for all. It demands that equals be treated equally, and allows unequals to be treated differently.

Reasonable Classification

Article 14 forbids class legislation but allows reasonable classification. This is the Supreme Court's answer to when unequals may be treated differently.

Key point

A classification is valid only if it passes two tests: (1) intelligible differentia: a real and understandable difference between those included in the group and those left out; and (2) rational nexus: the difference must be logically connected with the object of the law.

Example

Free bus passes for school students: students are a real and distinct group, and the object (helping children reach school) is directly connected with that group, so the classification is valid. Passes only for students whose parents are government employees: the difference is real but has no connection with helping children reach school, so the classification fails.

Case

State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952): A West Bengal law of 1950 let the State government send any case to a Special Court, which followed a shorter procedure with fewer safeguards for the accused. Anwar Ali Sarkar was convicted by such a court. Held: the provision was struck down, because the Act gave no standard for choosing which cases would go there; the government could send one accused to the harsher procedure and leave another, in exactly the same position, in the ordinary courts. Principle: that is discrimination, not classification.

Presumption of Constitutionality

A law challenged under Article 14 is presumed valid, and the challenger must clearly show otherwise. The legislature is elected and is presumed to understand the needs of the people and where the problems lie, so the court will assume any state of facts that could reasonably justify the law.

Case

Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. Union of India (1950): The Court explained the presumption of constitutionality.

Case

Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar (1958): The presumption was explained more fully. Held: a law may even deal with a single person or company, if special circumstances apply to him alone.

Limits: the presumption is not a shield for clear discrimination. In recent cases on colonial criminal laws, judges have said that it carries less weight for a pre-Constitution law, which no elected Indian legislature ever tested against the fundamental rights.

The Rule Against Arbitrariness

Case

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1973): Decided in November 1973; added a second test under Article 14. Justice P.N. Bhagwati, writing for three of the five judges, said equality is a dynamic concept which cannot be confined within traditional limits. Held: equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; an arbitrary act is unequal and so violates Article 14.

Key point

Arbitrariness means action based on whim and fancy, without any adequate principle. Even without any classification, irrational State action violates Article 14.

The approach was applied in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) and in the cases on State bodies (see Unit Two).

Arbitrariness and Legislation

Does the arbitrariness test apply to laws made by the legislature too? For some years there was doubt.

Case

State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell and Co. (1996): Held: a statute cannot be struck down merely because a court thinks it unreasonable or arbitrary.

Case

Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017): Justice R.F. Nariman wrote for himself and Justice U.U. Lalit. Held: legislation can be struck down for manifest arbitrariness.

Key point

Manifest arbitrariness: something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally, or without adequate determining principle, or something excessive and disproportionate.

Constitution Benches applied this test in 2018 to the challenges to the old laws on homosexuality and adultery.

Case

Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024), the electoral bonds case (15 February 2024): Held (unanimous Constitution Bench): an amendment allowing companies to make unlimited contributions to political parties was manifestly arbitrary.

Formal and Substantive Equality

This is the most important idea in equality jurisprudence.

Formal equalitySubstantive equality
Treats everyone exactly alike, whatever their situation.Looks at real outcomes: whether a rule, in practice, helps or harms groups that have long been disadvantaged.
Example

A running race is not fair merely because everyone starts from the same line, if one runner has been kept in chains for years.

The Constitution chose substantive equality.

Case

State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1975): Held: special provisions for backward classes are not exceptions to equality but a means of achieving it.

Case

Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India (2007): An old law barred women, and men below 25, from working where liquor was served. Held: struck down; protection cannot rest on stereotypes that limit women's choices.

Case

Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India (2021): Criteria for permanent commission looked neutral but in practice disadvantaged women officers, who had been denied equal opportunities earlier in their careers. Held: indirect discrimination recognised. Principle: a rule equal on its face can still discriminate in effect.

Articles 15 and 16

Article 14 protects every person; Articles 15 and 16 protect citizens and are more specific.

Article 15

  • 15(1): the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
  • 15(2): applies even to private places such as shops and hotels.
  • 15(3): special provisions for women and children.
  • 15(4) (First Amendment): special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, and for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
  • 15(5) (93rd Amendment, 2005): extends this to admissions in private educational institutions, aided or unaided, but not minority institutions.
  • 15(6) (2019): up to 10 per cent reservation for economically weaker sections.
Key point

Note the word "only" in 15(1). A law that treats people differently for another reason, such as residence or income, is not barred merely because the group also happens to share a listed feature.

Case

State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951): A government order allotted seats in medical and engineering colleges community by community. Held: struck down under Article 29(2), which forbids denial of admission to State-aided institutions on grounds only of religion, race, caste or language. The First Amendment then added Article 15(4).

Article 16: Public Employment

  • 16(1): equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.
  • 16(2): no discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth or residence.
  • 16(4): reservation of appointments or posts for any backward class of citizens that, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State.
  • 16(4A) and 16(4B): promotions and unfilled vacancies (below).
  • 16(6): up to 10 per cent reservation for economically weaker sections.

Affirmative Action and Its Scheme

Key point

Affirmative action: positive steps by the State to bring historically excluded groups into education, jobs and public life. In India it mainly takes the form of reservation.

  1. Scheduled Castes: castes listed by the President under Article 341, communities that suffered untouchability.
  2. Scheduled Tribes: tribal communities listed under Article 342.
  3. Socially and educationally backward classes: commonly called Other Backward Classes (OBCs).
  • Article 46 (directive principle): asks the State to promote their educational and economic interests.
  • Article 335: claims of SCs and STs to public posts must be considered consistently with the efficiency of administration.
  • Article 340: the President may appoint a commission to investigate the conditions of backward classes.

Identifying the Backward Classes

Who is backward? This is the hardest question in the whole subject.

Case

M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1962): The State reserved 68 per cent of seats in engineering and medical colleges. Held: struck down. Backwardness under Article 15(4) must be both social and educational; caste may be relevant but cannot be the sole or dominant test; special provisions must be reasonable and, generally and broadly, less than 50 per cent.

Case

R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore (two years after Balaji): Held: backward classes may be identified by other factors, such as occupation and income, without relying on caste at all.

Backward Classes Commissions

  • First: headed by Kaka Kalelkar; reported in 1955; not acted upon.
  • Second: headed by B.P. Mandal; appointed in 1979; reported on 31 December 1980, using eleven indicators.
Mandal indicatorsNumberExamplesPoints each
Social4Caste considered socially backward by others; dependence mainly on manual labour3
Educational3Proportion of children who never attended school2
Economic4Value of family assets1

Total: 22 points; a caste scoring 11 or more was treated as backward. The Commission identified 3,743 castes, put the OBCs at about 52 per cent of the population, and recommended 27 per cent reservation, so that the total with SCs and STs would stay below 50 per cent.

Indra Sawhney v. Union of India

Case

Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992): The leading case on reservation. An office memorandum of 13 August 1990 implemented the Mandal recommendations, reserving 27 per cent of central government posts for socially and educationally backward classes, and sparked widespread protests. A second memorandum (September 1991) preferred the poorer sections within these classes, and reserved 10 per cent of posts for economically backward people of other classes not covered by any existing scheme. A nine-judge bench decided the challenge on 16 November 1992; the main majority opinion was by Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy. Held: the seven holdings below.

Key point

Learn the holdings of Indra Sawhney as a list:

  1. Article 16(4) is not an exception to Article 16(1); it is an instance of the classification that equality permits.
  2. A backward class can be identified by caste, because in India a caste can be, and quite often is, a social class. But the class must be backward mainly in a social sense, and inadequately represented.
  3. The creamy layer among the OBCs must be excluded.
  4. Reservations should not normally exceed 50 per cent, except in extraordinary situations, such as for people from far-flung and remote areas.
  5. Article 16(4) does not permit reservation in promotions; existing reservations in promotion could continue for five years.
  6. The 10 per cent reservation for economically backward people of other classes was struck down: economic criteria alone cannot identify a backward class under Article 16(4).
  7. A permanent body must examine requests for inclusion and exclusion, which led to the National Commission for Backward Classes.

Reservation in Promotions and Procedural Requirements

Amendment after Indra SawhneyChange
77th (1995)Article 16(4A): reservation in promotion for SCs and STs.
85th (2001)Consequential seniority: a reserved candidate promoted earlier keeps the seniority gained by that promotion.
81st (2000)Article 16(4B): unfilled reserved vacancies carried forward as a separate class, outside the 50 per cent limit for that year.
82nd (2000)Proviso to Article 335: qualifying marks and standards of evaluation may be relaxed for SCs and STs in promotion.
Case

S. Vinod Kumar v. Union of India: Held: such relaxation in promotion is impermissible. Undone by the 82nd Amendment.

Case

M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006), Constitution Bench, 19 October 2006: Held: all these amendments upheld, but they only enable reservation in promotion. Before providing it, the State must collect quantifiable data showing that (1) the class is backward; (2) it is inadequately represented in the posts; and (3) reservation will not harm overall efficiency of administration under Article 335. The creamy layer principle was also applied.

Case

Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta (2018), Constitution Bench, 26 September 2018: Held: corrected one part of Nagaraj. SCs and STs are presumed backward because they are listed in the President's orders, so no data is needed to prove their backwardness. The other two conditions remain, and the creamy layer principle can apply to them in promotions.

Case

B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India (2019): Held: a Karnataka law giving consequential seniority to promoted SC and ST employees was upheld, because the State had collected adequate data.

The Fifty Per Cent Ceiling

The 50 per cent rule began in M.R. Balaji and was confirmed in Indra Sawhney.

Case

Dr. Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil v. Chief Minister, Maharashtra (2021): A Maharashtra law of 2018 gave reservation to the Maratha community, taking the total well above 50 per cent. Held (5 May 2021): a Constitution Bench unanimously struck it down; no extraordinary circumstances justified crossing the limit, and Indra Sawhney need not be reconsidered. By 3:2, it also held that after the 102nd Amendment (Article 342A) only the President could identify socially and educationally backward classes.

Parliament quickly reversed that second part by the 105th Amendment (2021), restoring the power of the States to prepare their own lists.

Economically Weaker Sections

The 103rd Amendment (2019) allowed up to 10 per cent reservation for economically weaker sections not covered by the existing reservations.

Case

Janhit Abhiyan v. Union of India (2022), 7 November 2022: Held: a Constitution Bench upheld the amendment by 3:2. Majority: Justices Dinesh Maheshwari, Bela M. Trivedi and J.B. Pardiwala. Dissent: Chief Justice U.U. Lalit and Justice S. Ravindra Bhat.

MajorityDissent
Economic criteria alone can support special provisions; the 50 per cent ceiling applies only to reservations for backward classes; excluding classes that already have reservation was reasonable.Excluding the poor among those very groups violated the equality code, which is part of the basic structure.
Key point

The 50 per cent limit binds reservations for backward classes; the 10 per cent for economically weaker sections stands outside it. Several State laws crossing 50 per cent are still being challenged in the courts.

The Creamy Layer

Key point

Creamy layer: the advanced members of a backward class, whose families have already risen socially and economically.

Indra Sawhney required their exclusion from OBC reservation; otherwise the top of each class would capture the benefit and the truly needy would get nothing. The Central Government fixes the income limit: ₹8 lakh a year since 2017.

Group and stageCreamy layer
OBCsMust be excluded (Indra Sawhney).
SCs and STs: promotionsCan apply (Jarnail Singh).
SCs and STs: initial appointmentsFour judges in the sub-classification case (Davinder Singh) suggested the State evolve a policy to identify a creamy layer among them; not necessary for the decision, so not a binding direction. On 9 August 2024, the Union Cabinet stated that the Constitution does not provide for a creamy layer among SCs and STs.

Sub-classification of the Scheduled Castes

Can a State divide the Scheduled Castes into sub-groups and prefer the most backward among them?

Case

E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004): Held: no. The Scheduled Castes form one homogeneous class, and only the President's list can define them.

Case

State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh (2024), seven judges, 1 August 2024: Held: E.V. Chinnaiah overruled by 6:1. The Scheduled Castes are not homogeneous; some castes in the list have benefited far less than others. A State may sub-classify them and set apart part of the quota for the more backward, but must base this on empirical data about inadequate representation, and cannot reserve the whole quota for one sub-group. Justice Bela M. Trivedi dissented: States cannot tinker with the President's list, which only Parliament can alter.

Reservation and Merit

Argument against reservationArgument for reservation
Jobs and seats should go to those who score the most; reservation lowers efficiency.Scores reflect privilege as well as talent; a child whose family could afford coaching, books and time to study does not start from the same line as a first-generation learner.

The Supreme Court has moved towards the second view.

Case

B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India (2019): Justice D.Y. Chandrachud: merit must be understood in a wider sense. A meritorious candidate is not only one who scores highly, but also one whose appointment fulfils the constitutional goals of uplifting SCs and STs and creating a diverse and representative administration.

Case

Neil Aurelio Nunes v. Union of India (2022), 20 January 2022: Held: OBC reservation in the all-India quota for medical admissions upheld. A high score in an open competitive examination does not by itself reflect merit, as it ignores the social and economic advantages some candidates enjoy. After N.M. Thomas, there is no constitutional basis for treating merit and reservation as opposites.

Scholars studying institutions such as the Indian Institutes of Technology similarly argue that the very idea of merit can carry the advantages of caste.

Is Reservation a Fundamental Right?

Can a member of a backward class demand in court that the State introduce reservation? The settled answer is no.

Key point

Articles 15(4), 16(4) and 16(4A) are enabling provisions: they give the State power to make reservations but impose no duty to do so.

Case

Mukesh Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand (2020), 7 February 2020, Justices L. Nageswara Rao and Hemant Gupta: Held: there is no fundamental right to claim reservation in promotions, and the State is not bound to provide it.

Some scholars disagree: since N.M. Thomas and Indra Sawhney, reservation is a facet of equality itself, so the State cannot simply ignore inadequate representation of a backward class. The binding position remains that there is no enforceable right to demand reservation.

Untouchability and Article 17

Article 17 is one of the shortest and strongest Articles in the Constitution.

Article 17: Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.

The Constitution does not define untouchability. Courts read it as the practice, grown out of the caste system, of treating some castes as polluting and excluding them from temples, wells, schools and social life. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, who led the drafting of the Constitution, was born into a community treated as untouchable; he rejected the theory that caste and untouchability rested on racial difference, and argued that they were social creations kept alive by religious sanction and custom.

Key point

Article 17 is absolute (no reasonable restrictions attached) and operates against private persons, not only the State.

Legislation

  • Untouchability Offences Act, 1955: renamed the Protection of Civil Rights Act in 1976.
  • Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989: a stronger law. It creates special offences (such as insulting or humiliating a member of these communities in public view, forcing them to eat inedible substances, or wrongfully taking their land) and provides for special courts. Section 18 says the anticipatory bail provision of the CrPC does not apply to its offences.
Key point

Anticipatory bail: an order protecting a person from arrest before he is actually arrested. Prima facie: at first sight.

Case

Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra (2018), 20 March 2018: Two judges, concerned that the Act was being misused, issued the directions in the table below. The judgment led to widespread protests.

SubjectMahajan directionsSection 18A (inserted 2018)
Arrest of a public servantOnly with approval of the appointing authorityNo approval needed before arrest
Registering a casePreliminary enquiry could be held firstNo preliminary enquiry needed
Anticipatory bailAvailable where no prima facie case is made outBar applies notwithstanding any judgment of a court

Parliament responded in 2018 by inserting Section 18A in the Act (right-hand column above). On 1 October 2019, a three-judge bench allowed the Union's review petition and recalled the directions.

Case

Prithvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India (2020), 10 February 2020: Held: Section 18A upheld, with one safeguard: where a complaint does not make out a prima facie case under the Act at all, the bar does not apply, and a court may grant anticipatory bail or quash the proceedings to prevent abuse.

Case

Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018): Justice D.Y. Chandrachud held that excluding women of a certain age from the Sabarimala temple, on notions of purity and pollution, was itself a form of untouchability. The other majority judges did not rest on Article 17, so this is his individual view. Principle: Article 17 is not frozen in the forms of 1950.

Key point

Equality grew from a rule against unreasonable classification into a rule against arbitrariness, and then into a promise of substantive equality.

Unit Four: Citizens' Freedoms

Equality tells the State how to treat people; the freedoms let citizens live, speak and work as they choose.

The Six Freedoms of Article 19

Article 19(1)FreedomRestrictions
(a)Speech and expressionClause (2)
(b)To assemble peaceably and without armsClause (3)
(c)To form associations or unions, and co-operative societiesClause (4)
(d)To move freely throughout the territory of IndiaClause (5)
(e)To reside and settle in any part of IndiaClause (5)
(f)Property: deleted by the 44th Amendment (see Unit Two)Not applicable
(g)To practise any profession, or carry on any occupation, trade or businessClause (6)
  • The freedoms belong only to citizens; a foreigner or a company cannot claim them.
  • No freedom is absolute: clauses (2) to (6) allow reasonable restrictions, but only on the grounds listed in each clause.
Key point

When a law restricts an Article 19 freedom, the court asks: (1) Is the restriction for a permitted ground? (2) Is it reasonable?

Example

Farhan wants to hold a rally on a busy road at midnight with loudspeakers. He has a freedom to assemble and to speak, but the police may impose conditions on time, place and sound level in the interests of public order. The only question is whether the restriction is reasonable.

Freedom of Speech and Expression

Three reasons are usually given for protecting speech strongly in a democracy:

  1. Truth is best found when ideas compete openly, like goods in a market.
  2. Citizens cannot govern themselves wisely unless they can hear and debate all views, including criticism of the government.
  3. Expressing oneself is part of being a free and dignified person.

The Supreme Court reads the freedom very widely: it includes the freedom of the press, the right to receive information, and speech through the internet.

Case

Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950): Held: the freedom includes the freedom of the press; a ban on the entry of a journal into the State was struck down.

Case

Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002): Held: voters have a right to know the criminal record, assets and education of candidates.

Case

Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020): Held: freedom of speech and freedom of trade through the internet are protected; an order suspending the internet must be published and must be proportionate.

Key point

Proportionate: the restriction must not go further than necessary to achieve its aim.

Case

Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024), 15 February 2024: The electoral bond scheme allowed anonymous donations to political parties. Held: a unanimous Constitution Bench struck it down. Voters have a right under Article 19(1)(a) to information about the funding of political parties, because such funding can influence policy; secrecy was not the least restrictive way of achieving the scheme's aims, such as curbing black money.

The Right to Remain Silent

Freedom of speech includes the freedom not to speak.

Case

Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986): Three children, Bijoe, Binu Mol and Bindu, were Jehovah's Witnesses, a Christian group whose faith forbids joining in any song of worship other than to their God; they regarded the national anthem as such a song. They stood respectfully while the anthem was sung at school assembly but did not sing, and were expelled on an education officer's instruction. The Kerala High Court upheld the expulsion. Held (August 1986, Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy): they must be readmitted, for three reasons:

  1. No law required anyone to sing the national anthem; standing respectfully showed proper respect.
  2. The expulsion violated their freedom of speech, which includes the freedom to remain silent. The instructions relied on were departmental circulars, not law, and a restriction under Article 19(2) must be imposed by law.
  3. It violated their freedom of religion under Article 25. The question is not whether a belief seems reasonable to others, but whether it is genuinely and conscientiously held.

The judgment ends with a famous thought: our tradition teaches tolerance, our philosophy preaches tolerance, our Constitution practises tolerance; let us not dilute it.

Reasonable Restrictions on Speech

Article 19(2) lists the only grounds for restricting speech: sovereignty and integrity of India; security of the State; friendly relations with foreign States; public order; decency or morality; contempt of court; defamation; incitement to an offence.

StageChange to Article 19(2)
Romesh Thappar decidedPublic order was not on the list.
First Amendment (1951)Added public order, friendly relations with foreign States, and incitement to an offence; also added the word "reasonable", letting courts judge the restriction.
16th Amendment (1963)Added sovereignty and integrity of India.
Case

Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023): Held (Constitution Bench): the grounds in Article 19(2) are exhaustive; the State cannot invent new grounds to restrict speech. A restriction must also be proportionate, going no further than necessary.

Case

S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989): Held: the link between speech and the feared danger must be close, like a spark in a powder keg; a remote or far-fetched danger is not enough.

Regulating Speech Online

  • Section 69A, Information Technology Act, 2000: the Central Government may block online content on grounds taken from Article 19(2).
  • Section 79: intermediaries, such as social media platforms, are protected from liability for users' content if they follow due diligence.

Rule 9 of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 required digital news publishers and streaming platforms to follow a code of ethics, with a three-tier system of oversight and the government at the top.

Case

Agij Promotions of Nineteenonea Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2021), Bombay High Court, August 2021: Held: operation of Rule 9(1) and 9(3) stayed. Prima facie, the rules went beyond the parent Act, and compelling publishers to follow a vague code under threat of government oversight could chill free speech. The Madras High Court later observed that the stay operates across the country. The larger challenge is still pending.

Fake news: false information can cause panic and even violence, but if the government itself decides what is true, it may silence criticism. A 2023 amendment let a Central Government fact check unit mark information about the government's business as fake, false or misleading; platforms keeping such content could lose their legal protection.

Case

Kunal Kamra v. Union of India (2024): Two Bombay High Court judges disagreed; in March 2024 the Supreme Court stayed the notification setting up the unit. Held (20 September 2024): the third judge, Justice A.S. Chandurkar, held the rule unconstitutional as vague and disproportionate, and the High Court struck it down. The State has no duty under Article 19 to ensure that citizens receive only information it considers true. The Union's appeal is pending in the Supreme Court.

Criminalising Speech

Speech crimes are tested strictly, because the threat of prosecution silences not only the guilty but also those who fear being accused.

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India

Case

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015): Section 66A of the Information Technology Act punished sending, through a computer or phone, information that was grossly offensive or menacing, or false information sent to cause annoyance, inconvenience, insult or ill will. Arrests for ordinary social media posts caused public outrage, and a law student, Shreya Singhal, challenged it. Held (24 March 2015, Justice R.F. Nariman): Section 66A struck down entirely. Principle: a speech crime must be precise, and must be tied to a ground in Article 19(2).

Kind of speechPosition
DiscussionProtected, however unpopular
AdvocacyProtected, however unpopular
Incitement (tends to cause public disorder)May be punished in the interest of public order

Why Section 66A failed:

  • It was not limited to incitement.
  • Words such as "annoying" and "grossly offensive" were vague and could cover innocent speech.
  • Chilling effect: the vagueness would make people stop speaking for fear of prosecution.
  • Overbreadth: it caught protected speech along with unprotected speech.

Other holdings: Section 69A and the blocking rules were upheld because of their safeguards, such as a hearing and reasons recorded in writing. Section 79 was read down: an intermediary must remove content only on actual knowledge through a court order, or a government notification, relating to the grounds in Article 19(2).

Obscenity

Hicklin test (English, 1868)Contemporary community standards test
Whether the material tends to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. Long used by Indian courts.The material is judged as a whole, by the standards of an average person in contemporary society, and in its context.
Case

Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra (1964): Held: applying the Hicklin test, the conviction of a bookseller for selling the novel Lady Chatterley's Lover was upheld.

Case

Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal (2014): In 1993 a German magazine published a photograph of tennis player Boris Becker posing nude with his fiancée, Barbara Feltus, a dark-skinned actress, as a protest against racism. It was reproduced in an Indian sports magazine and in the Bengali newspaper Anandabazar Patrika (editor: Aveek Sarkar), and a lawyer filed a criminal complaint alleging obscenity. Held (3 February 2014, Justice K.S. Radhakrishnan): proceedings quashed. The Hicklin test is no longer the law; the contemporary community standards test applies. The context was a message against racial discrimination, and nudity alone is not obscenity, so the photograph was not obscene.

Speech that Hurts Religious Feelings

Case

Sri Baragur Ramachandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007): In 1997 the Karnataka government, using its CrPC power, forfeited all copies of Dharmakarana, a Kannada novel by P.V. Narayana, finding that it portrayed the twelfth-century reformer Basaveshwara in a way that deeply hurt the feelings of the Veerashaiva community. Held (2 May 2007): forfeiture upheld; the objectionable passages had no basis in history and were likely to outrage the religious feelings of a large community and disturb public order. Principle: freedom of speech does not protect writing that deliberately insults the deepest beliefs of a community.

That forfeiture power is now in Section 98 of the B.N.S.S. Courts have also warned against using such powers too readily.

Case

Imran Pratapgarhi v. State of Gujarat (2025), 28 March 2025: A Member of Parliament was booked over a video in which a poem was recited. Held: case quashed. Justice Abhay S. Oka: the effect of spoken or written words must be judged by the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous people, not people with weak and wavering minds. For speech offences, the police should normally hold a preliminary enquiry before registering a case, as the B.N.S.S. allows.

Sedition

Section 124A of the IPC punished words or signs that bring or attempt to bring hatred or contempt towards, or excite or attempt to excite disaffection towards, the government established by law. The colonial government used it against freedom fighters, including Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi.

Case

Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962): A political worker in Bihar was prosecuted for a speech attacking the ruling party and the government in strong words; the question was whether this colonial offence could survive the Constitution. Held (Constitution Bench, Chief Justice B.P. Sinha): Section 124A upheld but read down. It punishes only words that incite violence, or have the intention or tendency to create public disorder; strong criticism of the government, however harsh, is not sedition. So understood, it is a reasonable restriction in the interest of public order.

Key point

Reading down: giving a law a narrower meaning so that it stays within the Constitution.

After Kedar Nath Singh, the Court insisted on this narrow reading.

Case

Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab (1995): Held: casually raising slogans a few times, provoking no reaction from anyone, was not sedition.

Case

S.G. Vombatkere v. Union of India (2022): Prosecutions continued despite the narrow reading. Held (11 May 2022): all pending proceedings under Section 124A kept in abeyance, and no fresh cases to be registered, while the government re-examined the law.

In September 2023, whether Kedar Nath Singh should be reconsidered was referred to a larger bench.

Section 152 of the B.N.S.

The IPC was replaced by the B.N.S. (2023) from 1 July 2024. It has no offence called sedition.

PointSection 124A, IPCSection 152, B.N.S.
ProtectsGovernment established by lawSovereignty, unity and integrity of India
ConductHatred, contempt or disaffection towards the governmentExciting or attempting to excite secession, armed rebellion or subversive activities, or encouraging feelings of separatist activities
MeansWords or signsWords, signs, electronic communication, financial means or otherwise

The government says sedition has been abolished and the new offence protects the nation, not the government. Critics say its words are wide enough to be misused in the old way. A challenge to Section 152 is pending in the Supreme Court.

Key point

Lesson of Kedar Nath Singh and Shreya Singhal: criticism of the government, however strong, is protected. Only speech that incites violence or disorder, or truly threatens the nation, may be punished.

Assembly and Protest

Article 19(1)(b): the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. Article 19(3): reasonable restrictions only in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, and public order. The right to protest flows from the freedoms of speech and assembly; a peaceful march, sit-in or demonstration is a way of speaking to the government.

Case

Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar (1962): Held: a rule banning every form of demonstration by government servants was struck down, because a peaceful demonstration is a form of expression; the ban on strikes was upheld, because there is no fundamental right to strike.

Case

Ramlila Maidan case (2012): The Court criticised the police for using force at midnight against a crowd of sleeping protesters.

Case

Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police (2020), the leading modern case: From December 2019, people protesting against the Citizenship Amendment Act sat on a public road at Shaheen Bagh, Delhi, for months, blocking traffic. Held (7 October 2020): peaceful protest is protected, but public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied indefinitely; demonstrations must be in designated places, and the authorities must remove obstructions. A review was dismissed in February 2021, adding that the right to protest cannot be exercised anytime and everywhere.

Case

Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India (2018): Held: a complete ban on protests at Jantar Mantar and the Boat Club in Delhi was not permissible; the police must regulate them with reasonable rules.

Key point

Protest is protected, but so is the right of others to use roads and live in peace. The power to prohibit gatherings in urgent cases, earlier in Section 144 of the CrPC, is now in Section 163 of the B.N.S.S.

Association, Unions and Strikes

Article 19(1)(c): the right to form associations or unions. Article 19(4): restrictions in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, public order or morality. Workers may form a trade union, but the right to a union does not include a right to strike.

Case

All India Bank Employees Association v. National Industrial Tribunal (1961): Held: the right to form a union does not carry with it a right to strike or a right to collective bargaining.

Note

Updated from the lecture: the lecture dated this case to 1962. The correct position is that the Supreme Court delivered the judgment on 28 August 1961; 1962 is only the year in which it was reported. Source: Indian Kanoon, All India Bank Employees Association v. National Industrial Tribunal (28 August 1961).

Case

T.K. Rangarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu (2003): A mass strike by State government employees. Held: they have no fundamental, legal, moral or equitable right to go on strike.

Key point

A strike may be lawful under labour law if its procedures are followed, but it is not a fundamental right.

Case

Damyanti Naranga v. Union of India (1971): A law forced new members into a Hindi literary society against its will. Held: struck down. Principle: the right to associate protects the association's choice of members.

Movement and Residence

Article 19(1)(d) and (e): every citizen may move freely throughout India, and reside and settle anywhere in India. These rights make India one country for its citizens; a State cannot treat the people born there as its own property, or stop them moving to another State to live and work. Article 19(5) allows restrictions only in the interests of the general public, or to protect the interests of any Scheduled Tribe.

Example

Some tribal areas require an inner line permit, which protects tribal land and culture.

These rights belong only to citizens; a foreigner has no fundamental right to stay in India.

Case

Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta (1955): Held: detention of a German national pending his expulsion upheld; the State has wide power to expel foreigners.

Case

Mohammad Salimullah v. Union of India (2021), April 2021: Held: the Court refused to stop the deportation of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. The right not to be deported is part of the right to reside and settle in India, which only citizens have.

Key point

Article 21 protects every person, including a foreigner, who cannot be deprived of life or liberty except according to procedure established by law.

Case

State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushalya (1963): A provision of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 let a magistrate remove a woman engaged in prostitution from an area; the Allahabad High Court had struck it down. Held: restriction on movement in the interests of the general public was reasonable, and the classification valid.

Historians have shown that women affected by this law went to court themselves, arguing that their work was their livelihood.

Profession, Trade and Business

Article 19(1)(g) protects the right to practise any profession, or carry on any occupation, trade or business. Article 19(6) allows reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public, and lets the State prescribe professional or technical qualifications.

Example

A person cannot practise medicine without the required degree.

Case

Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1950): A law banned bidi-making in certain villages during the agricultural season, so that labourers would be available for farming. Held: struck down as excessive, because it banned even those who could never do farm work, such as the old and the infirm. Principle: a restriction must still be reasonable.

Case

Khoday Distilleries v. State of Karnataka: Held: there is no fundamental right to trade in intoxicating liquor. Principle: some activities are so harmful that there is no fundamental right to trade in them at all.

State Monopoly

The State may shut out private business and run a trade itself. The First Amendment added Article 19(6)(ii): nothing in Article 19 stops a law relating to the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the complete or partial exclusion of citizens. This amendment also revived a transport law under the doctrine of eclipse (see Unit Two). Even a monopoly law is protected only so far as the monopoly needs.

Case

Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa (1962), December 1962: Held: a State monopoly over trade in kendu leaves upheld. But Article 19(6) protects only provisions basically and essentially necessary for creating the monopoly; other provisions, such as how the State chooses its agents, must separately be reasonable.

Key point

Every freedom in Article 19 has its own list of restrictions, and every restriction must be made by law, for a listed ground, and be reasonable and proportionate.

Unit 5: Right to Life and Personal Liberty

These rights protect every person, citizen or not, when the State tries to take away liberty itself.

Fundamental rights in the criminal process

A person is most at the mercy of the State when he is accused of a crime, arrested and detained.

  • Article 20 protects against retrospective criminal laws, double punishment and compelled self-incrimination.
  • Article 22 protects a person who is arrested or detained.
  • Article 21 stands behind all of them.

Ex Post Facto Laws: Article 20(1)

Article 20(1) has two parts:

  1. No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violating a law in force at the time of the act.
  2. No person shall be subjected to a penalty greater than that which could have been imposed under the law in force at the time of the offence.
Key point

An ex post facto law is a law that punishes, after the event, an act that was innocent when it was done.

Example

If smoking in a park is made an offence from 1 January, Prince cannot be prosecuted for smoking there in December. If the punishment for cheating is raised from three years to seven, Farhan, who cheated before the change, can still get only three.

Three further points

1. Only criminal law is covered.

Case

Hathisingh Manufacturing Company Limited v. Union of India (1960): an employer challenged a provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, given retrospective effect, requiring compensation to workmen when an undertaking closed down. Held: Article 20(1) applies only to criminal offences. Principle: failing to meet a civil liability is not an offence, so such a liability may be imposed retrospectively.

2. No vested right in procedure. A change in the procedure of trial can apply to pending cases.

3. The clause protects the accused, so he may take the benefit of a later law that reduces punishment.

Case

Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab: a boy of sixteen, already convicted. Held: he was given the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, which came into force afterwards.

Double Jeopardy: Article 20(2)

No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. Jeopardy means danger: the rule protects a person from being put in danger of punishment twice for the same thing.

Key point

Both words are needed: prosecuted and punished. The first proceeding must have been a prosecution before a court or judicial tribunal, ending in punishment. If it ended in acquittal, Article 20(2) does not apply, but the ordinary criminal law gives similar protection: formerly Section 300 of the CrPC, now Section 337 of the B.N.S.S., 2023.

Case

Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay (1953): customs authorities confiscated gold a passenger had brought into India without declaring it; he was later prosecuted. Held: confiscation by customs officers was not a prosecution before a court or judicial tribunal, so the prosecution was not barred.

Case

S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India (1954): a government servant was dismissed after a departmental inquiry, then prosecuted for the same conduct. Held: the inquiry was not a prosecution, and dismissal was not a punishment imposed by a court.

Example

If Farhan is dismissed for taking a bribe, he can still be prosecuted for bribery. But once convicted and punished for that bribe, he cannot be punished for it again.

Self-Incrimination: Article 20(3)

No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. The prosecution must prove guilt with its own evidence and cannot force the accused to help it. The rule also discourages torture, because forced confessions cannot be used.

Three conditions must be met:

  1. the person must be accused of an offence;
  2. there must be compulsion; and
  3. the compulsion must be to be a witness against himself.
Case

State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961): eleven judges. Held: "to be a witness" means giving personal knowledge relevant to the case, orally or in writing. Giving fingerprints, specimen handwriting or signatures, or showing parts of the body, is not being a witness, because such physical evidence cannot incriminate by itself.

Case

Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani (1978): Held: the protection extends to police questioning, and covers any answer that may tend to incriminate the person.

Selvi v. State of Karnataka

In several cases, the police had subjected accused persons and suspects to three techniques without their consent:

  • Narcoanalysis: injecting a drug that lowers a person's inhibitions, so that he talks freely.
  • Polygraph (the "lie detector"): records changes in blood pressure, pulse and breathing while he answers questions.
  • Brain mapping: records the electrical activity of the brain when he is shown material connected with the crime.
Case

Selvi v. State of Karnataka (5 May 2010): three judges led by Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan. Held: compulsorily administering any of these techniques violates Article 20(3). The answers come from the subject's own mind, so they are testimonial even when he is not in conscious control of what he says. Forced tests also violate mental privacy and personal liberty under Article 21, and amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The tests are allowed only with free consent and safeguards, such as access to a lawyer and consent recorded before a magistrate. Even then, the results cannot be used as evidence by themselves. But a fact discovered through a voluntary test, such as a hidden weapon, can be proved under the rule on discovery: formerly Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, now the proviso to Section 23(2) of the B.S.A., 2023.

Case

Ritesh Sinha v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2019): Held: a magistrate may order a person to give a voice sample, because, like a fingerprint, it is not testimony.

Section 349 of the B.N.S.S. now allows a magistrate to order any person, even one not arrested, to give specimen signatures, finger impressions, handwriting or voice samples.

Arrest and Detention: Article 22

An arrested person has four protections:

  1. He must be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds of his arrest.
  2. He may consult, and be defended by, a lawyer of his choice.
  3. He must be produced before the nearest magistrate within 24 hours, excluding the time of the journey.
  4. He cannot be kept in custody beyond that without the authority of a magistrate.

These safeguards do not apply to an enemy alien, or to a person arrested under a law of preventive detention.

Case

D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal: Held: the Court added requirements for every arrest, such as a memo of arrest attested by a witness, informing a relative or friend, and a medical examination.

Grounds of arrest: recent cases

Case

Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India (October 2023): Held: a person arrested under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act must be given the grounds of arrest in writing.

Case

Prabir Purkayastha case (May 2024): Held: the same rule applies to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.

Case

Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana (February 2025): Held: failure to inform the grounds makes the arrest itself illegal.

Case

Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra (6 November 2025): Held: the rule applies to every offence. The grounds must ordinarily be given in writing, in a language the arrested person understands, and at least two hours before he is produced before the magistrate. Otherwise the arrest is illegal and he must be released.

Preventive Detention

The State detains a person not for what he has done, but to prevent him from doing something harmful in the future, such as acting against public order or the security of the State.

Ordinary arrestPreventive detention
Follows a crime alleged to have been committedAims to prevent a future harmful act
Protected by the four safeguards of Article 22No trial and no conviction; rests on the satisfaction of the government; separate safeguards in Article 22(4) to (7)

Safeguards: Article 22(4) to (7)

The framers allowed this power in the troubled years after Partition, but with safeguards:

  1. No detention beyond three months unless an Advisory Board, of persons who are, have been or are qualified to be High Court judges, reports sufficient cause, or the detention is under a law made by Parliament under Article 22(7).
  2. The grounds of detention must be communicated to the detenu as soon as may be.
  3. He must get the earliest opportunity to make a representation against the order.
Note

Updated from the lecture: the lecture said detention beyond three months always needs an Advisory Board of persons qualified to be High Court judges. The correct position is that under Article 22(4)(a) the Board may consist of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, High Court judges, and under Article 22(4)(b) read with Article 22(7) Parliament may by law allow detention beyond three months without the Board’s opinion. Source: Article 22, Constitution of India (Indian Kanoon).

Facts whose disclosure would be against the public interest may be withheld.

Detention laws

The Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) was used widely during the Emergency of 1975 and repealed in 1978. The main central law today is the National Security Act, 1980.

Case

A.K. Roy v. Union of India (1981): Held: the National Security Act, 1980 was upheld.

The Forty-fourth Amendment made the Advisory Board provisions stricter, but the government never brought that part into force, and the Court held that it could not order the government to do so.

Strict construction

Courts read these laws strictly, in favour of the detenu; every safeguard must be followed exactly. They also separate public order from law and order.

Case

Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (1965): the Court used three concentric circles. Law and order is the largest, public order lies within it, and the security of the State is the smallest. A single theft disturbs only law and order; public order is disturbed only when the life of the community at large is affected. Principle: preventive detention cannot be used merely because it is easier than proving an ordinary case.

Note

Updated from the lecture: the lecture dated this case 1966. The correct position is that the Supreme Court decided it on 7 September 1965; 1966 is only the year it was reported. Source: Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, 7 September 1965 (Indian Kanoon).

Case

Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana (March 2024): Held: preventive detention is an exceptional power, to be used with great caution.

Article 21: From Gopalan to Maneka

No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.

Through interpretation, these few words have become the source of dozens of rights. The story has three stages: A.K. Gopalan (1950), R.C. Cooper (1970) and Maneka Gandhi (1978).

Case

A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950): Gopalan, a communist leader, was detained under the Preventive Detention Act. He argued that "procedure established by law" meant a fair procedure, like American due process, and that the law must also satisfy Article 19. Held (four to two): both arguments rejected. "Law" means law enacted by the State, so any procedure laid down by a valid statute is enough. Each fundamental right is a separate code, so a detention law is tested only under Articles 21 and 22. Justice Fazl Ali and Justice M.C. Mahajan dissented. The Court did strike down Section 14 of the Act, which barred disclosure of the grounds of detention even to a court (see Unit 2).

Case

R.C. Cooper v. Union of India (1970): the second stage, which broke down the idea of separate codes. Held: fundamental rights are not isolated compartments. Principle: a law must satisfy every right that it actually affects.

Case

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (25 January 1978): in July 1977 the government impounded her passport in the public interest and refused to give reasons. Held (seven judges): (1) the right to travel abroad is part of personal liberty under Article 21; (2) a law depriving personal liberty must satisfy Articles 14, 19 and 21 together; (3) most importantly, "procedure established by law" must be right, just and fair, not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive, so a fair hearing based on natural justice is part of it. The order was not formally quashed, because the Attorney General assured the Court that she would be heard.

Key point

Natural justice means basic fairness in decision-making, especially the right to be heard before an adverse decision. After Maneka Gandhi, the gap between "procedure established by law" and "due process" became very small.

PointA.K. Gopalan (1950)Maneka Gandhi (1978)
Procedure established by lawAny procedure laid down by a valid statuteMust be right, just and fair, with a fair hearing
Relation between rightsSeparate codes; detention tested only under Articles 21 and 22Articles 14, 19 and 21 must be satisfied together

The Emergency: A.D.M. Jabalpur and Its Correction

During the Emergency, the President suspended the right to move courts to enforce Article 21.

Case

A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976): Held (five judges, four to one): during the suspension, no detenu could challenge his detention, even if it was illegal or malicious. Justice H.R. Khanna, dissenting alone, held that the State has no power to deprive any person of life or liberty without the authority of law, even during an emergency.

The correction came in two steps. The Forty-fourth Amendment amended Article 359 so that the enforcement of Articles 20 and 21 can never be suspended. In 2017, the privacy judgment held the majority view in A.D.M. Jabalpur seriously flawed and overruled it.

Life with Dignity

After Maneka Gandhi, "life" means the right to live with human dignity, not mere animal existence.

Case

Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981): Held: the right includes the bare necessities of life, such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter.

Case

Olga Tellis: Held: the right to livelihood is part of the right to life, so pavement dwellers could not be evicted without notice and a hearing.

Other rights recognised: speedy trial, free legal aid, emergency medical treatment, a clean environment and, in 2024, freedom from the adverse effects of climate change.

Right to die with dignity

Case

Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996): Constitution Bench. Held: the right to life does not include a right to kill oneself, but includes dignity in the process of dying.

Case

Common Cause v. Union of India (9 March 2018): Constitution Bench. Held: the right to die with dignity is part of Article 21. Passive euthanasia and advance directives (living wills) were allowed. Active euthanasia, such as a lethal injection, remains unlawful.

Key point

Passive euthanasia means withdrawing or withholding life support from a patient with no hope of recovery.

In January 2023 the Court simplified the procedure for living wills.

Case

Harish Rana case (11 March 2026): Harish Rana had been in a permanent vegetative state for more than thirteen years. Held: for the first time, the Court allowed life-sustaining treatment, including artificial nutrition, to be withdrawn in an individual case.

Right to Privacy

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy, a retired judge of the Karnataka High Court, challenged the Aadhaar scheme, which collects residents' fingerprints and iris scans to give them a unique identity number. The government denied any fundamental right to privacy, relying on two judgments of larger benches:

  • M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra: eight judges rejected a privacy argument against search and seizure.
  • Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh: six judges said privacy was not a guaranteed right, while striking down night visits by the police to a suspect's home.
Case

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (24 August 2017): nine judges, unanimous. Held: privacy is a fundamental right, intrinsic to life and personal liberty under Article 21, and also flowing from other freedoms in Part III. M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh were overruled to that extent. There were six opinions: Justice D.Y. Chandrachud wrote for himself, Chief Justice J.S. Khehar, Justice R.K. Agrawal and Justice S. Abdul Nazeer; the other five judges wrote separately.

Privacy protects:

  • the body, for example against forced medical procedures;
  • information, meaning control over personal data; and
  • decisions, the freedom to make intimate choices about family, marriage, sexuality and way of life.

It is not surrendered merely because a person is in a public place.

Test for restrictions

Privacy is not absolute. The plurality laid down three requirements:

  1. Legality: there must be a law.
  2. Legitimate aim.
  3. Proportionality: the means must be rationally connected to the aim and must not go further than necessary.
Key point

Justice S.K. Kaul added procedural safeguards against abuse. The test of legality, legitimate aim and proportionality now governs every privacy case.

Case

Aadhaar judgment (26 September 2018): applying the test, five judges upheld the Aadhaar Act for welfare benefits and subsidies, by four to one, but struck down Section 57, which had allowed private companies to demand Aadhaar details. Justice Chandrachud dissented, holding among other things that the Act could not validly have been passed as a Money Bill, a procedure that limits the role of the Rajya Sabha.

Autonomy, Sexuality and Personal Relationships

With privacy and dignity as fundamental rights, a person's most intimate choices about body, sexuality and relationships are protected.

Case

National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014): Held: transgender persons have the right to self-identify their gender.

A 2026 amendment to the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 replaced self-identification with certification through a medical board; a challenge is pending in the Supreme Court.

Section 377 of the IPC punished carnal intercourse against the order of nature and was used against consensual sex between adults of the same sex.

Case

Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation (2013): Held: the Supreme Court upheld Section 377, reversing the Delhi High Court, saying only a minuscule fraction of the population was affected.

Case

Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (6 September 2018): Navtej Singh Johar, a dancer, and others challenged the section again. Held (Constitution Bench, unanimous, four opinions): Section 377 is unconstitutional in so far as it criminalised consensual sexual conduct between adults; Suresh Kumar Koushal overruled. Justice Chandrachud also held that discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation is discrimination on the ground of sex under Article 15.

Key point

Reasons in Navtej, in four steps:

  1. Sexual orientation is a core part of identity; punishing it violates dignity, autonomy and privacy under Article 21.
  2. The section was manifestly arbitrary under Article 14.
  3. Fundamental rights do not depend on majority approval, so the small size of a minority is no reason to deny it rights.
  4. Constitutional morality, meaning the values of the Constitution, prevails over the popular morality of the time.

The section still applied to non-consensual acts and to acts with minors and animals. The B.N.S., which replaced the IPC from 1 July 2024, has no corresponding provision.

Joseph Shine v. Union of India

Section 497 of the IPC made adultery an offence, but only a man could be punished, for sex with another man's wife without that man's consent. The wife could not be punished even as an abettor, and if the husband consented, there was no offence at all.

Case

Joseph Shine v. Union of India (27 September 2018): the same five judges, unanimous. Held: Section 497 struck down because it was (i) manifestly arbitrary under Article 14; (ii) based on the stereotype that the wife is the husband's property, violating Article 15; and (iii) a denial of the wife's dignity and sexual autonomy under Article 21.

Adultery can still be a ground for divorce, but it is no longer a crime, and the B.N.S. does not make it one. In January 2023, the Court clarified that the judgment does not stop the armed forces from taking disciplinary action for such conduct.

Supriyo alias Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India

Case

Supriyo alias Supriya Chakraborty v. Union of India (17 October 2023): same-sex couples asked the Court to read the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in a gender-neutral way so that they could marry. Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud. Held unanimously: (1) there is no unqualified fundamental right to marry; (2) the Court cannot strike down the Special Marriage Act or read words into it, because that would be legislating, which is for Parliament; (3) transgender persons in heterosexual relationships can already marry under the existing laws. On two points the bench split three to two (table below). The Union assured the Court that a committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary would examine benefits for queer couples. Review petitions were dismissed on 9 January 2025.

IssueMajority (Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, Justice Hima Kohli, Justice P.S. Narasimha)Minority (Chief Justice Chandrachud, Justice S.K. Kaul)
Legal recognition of the unionNo enforceable rightRight to enter into a union recognised
Adoption rules barring unmarried (including queer) couples from adopting jointlyUpheldWould have struck down
Case

Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. (2018): the Kerala High Court had annulled the marriage of an adult woman, Hadiya, who had converted to Islam and married a man of her choice. Held: the annulment was set aside. Principle: the right to marry a person of one's choice is part of Article 21.

Live-in Relationships

A live-in relationship between two consenting adults is not an offence and is protected as part of their liberty.

Case

S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal (2010): Held: criminal complaints against an actress who had spoken in favour of live-in relationships were quashed.

A woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage can claim protection under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Case

D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010): Held: for such a relationship, the couple must (i) hold themselves out to society as akin to spouses; (ii) be of legal age; (iii) be otherwise qualified to marry; and (iv) have lived together voluntarily for a significant period.

In Uttarakhand, the Uniform Civil Code, in force since 27 January 2025, requires live-in couples to register. Supporters say this protects women and children; critics say it intrudes on privacy. Challenges have been filed in the Uttarakhand High Court.

Marital rape exception

The IPC said that sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, if she was not under fifteen, is not rape; the B.N.S. keeps the exception but raises the age to eighteen.

Note

Updated from the lecture: the lecture said the IPC and the B.N.S. both set the age at eighteen. The correct position is that the IPC exception, as enacted, covered wives not under fifteen (which is why it had to be read down to eighteen in Independent Thought), while Exception 2 to Section 63 of the B.N.S. itself says eighteen. Source: Section 375, Indian Penal Code (Indian Kanoon) and B.N.S., Section 63 (Ministry of Home Affairs).

Case

Independent Thought v. Union of India (2017): Held: the exception was read down for wives below eighteen. For adult wives, the exception stands.

Case

RIT Foundation v. Union of India (May 2022): two judges of the Delhi High Court split. Justice Rajiv Shakdher held that the exception violates equality, dignity and bodily autonomy; Justice C. Hari Shankar upheld it and left any change to the legislature. The question is pending before the Supreme Court.

Restitution of conjugal rights

Under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a court may order a spouse who has withdrawn without reasonable excuse to return.

Case

T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah (1983): Held: the Andhra Pradesh High Court struck down Section 9 as violating privacy and dignity.

Case

Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar Chadha: decided the year after T. Sareetha. Held: the Supreme Court upheld Section 9 as a way of preserving marriage.

A fresh challenge to Section 9, relying on the privacy judgment, is pending.

Bodily autonomy and medical choices

Case

Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India (2 May 2022): Held: bodily integrity is protected by Article 21, and no one can be forced to be vaccinated. The vaccination policy itself was not unreasonable, but conditions imposed by some States barring unvaccinated people from public places and services were not proportionate in the conditions then prevailing.

New Frontiers: Data Protection

Every use of a phone or a payment app collects data about the user. After Puttaswamy, Parliament passed the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act).

Key point

The data principal is the person whose data is processed. The data fiduciary is the entity that decides why and how it is processed.

  • As a rule, data may be processed only with free, specific and informed consent, or for certain legitimate uses listed in the Act.
  • The data principal has rights to information, correction, erasure and grievance redressal.
  • A Data Protection Board can impose heavy penalties.
  • The rules were notified in November 2025 and are coming into force in phases.
Critics' concernGovernment's answer
The Central Government may exempt any instrumentality of the State on grounds such as security and public order, which could permit surveillance without the Puttaswamy safeguards.The exemptions are limited to specified grounds.
The Act amended the Right to Information Act to exempt all personal information from disclosure, weakening transparency.Personal data deserves protection.

Mass Surveillance and Facial Recognition

Case

People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (December 1996): Held: telephone tapping seriously invades privacy. Safeguards: an order only by a senior official such as the Home Secretary, on the grounds in the Telegraph Act, for a limited period, subject to review by a committee. Similar powers are now in the Telecommunications Act, 2023.

In 2021, reports alleged that the Pegasus spyware had been used against journalists, activists and politicians. The government neither confirmed nor denied its use, citing national security.

Case

Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India (27 October 2021): Held: the State does not get a free pass every time national security is raised. The Court appointed a technical committee overseen by a retired judge, Justice R.V. Raveendran. In 2022 the Court was told that the committee found malware on five of the twenty-nine phones examined, could not conclude that it was Pegasus, and that the government had not cooperated.

Facial recognition technology

It identifies people by matching images of their faces, for example from street cameras, with a database.

SupportersCritics
Helps find missing children and catch criminalsCan be inaccurate; can track innocent people everywhere; not governed by any specific law

Under Puttaswamy, any such system needs a law, a legitimate aim, proportionality and safeguards. A challenge to its use by the police has been filed in the Telangana High Court.

The Right to be Forgotten

Key point

The right to be forgotten is the right to have old, irrelevant or harmful personal information removed from public view, especially online, such as an old judgment naming a person who was acquitted.

The DPDP Act gives a right to erase personal data given by consent, but there is no general statutory right to be forgotten. High Courts differ:

CourtView
Odisha High Court (2020)Recognised it as part of privacy, where intimate images of a woman had been posted online
Delhi High CourtInterim relief to persons acquitted in criminal cases
Kerala High Court, Division Bench (2022)Open justice prevails; the right cannot remove names from court judgments

The Supreme Court is examining the question and has stayed a Madras High Court order directing a legal database to remove an acquitted person's name from a judgment.

Rights of Animals

Article 48A asks the State to safeguard forests and wildlife. Article 51A(g) makes it a duty of every citizen to have compassion for living creatures.

Case

Animal Welfare Board of India v. A. Nagaraja (May 2014): Held: jallikattu, the bull-taming sport of Tamil Nadu, and bullock-cart races were banned as violating the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960. The Act was read in the light of five freedoms for animals, such as freedom from hunger, pain and fear; every species has a right to life and security, subject to the law of the land.

Case

Constitution Bench on the State amendments (18 May 2023): Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Karnataka had amended the Act to allow these sports with safeguards. Held (judgment by Justice Aniruddha Bose): the amendments were upheld. The Court declined to bring bulls within Article 21, calling that judicial adventurism, and left the matter to the legislature.

Key point

Animals are protected by statute and by duties, but they do not hold fundamental rights.

Right against Exploitation: Article 23

  • Article 23(1) prohibits traffic in human beings, begar and other similar forms of forced labour, and makes any breach an offence.
  • Article 23(2) allows the State to impose compulsory service for public purposes, such as military service, but without discrimination on grounds only of religion, race, caste or class.
Key point

Begar is an old practice of forcing people, usually of the lowest castes, to work without any payment. Bonded labour is a system in which a person is forced to work for a creditor, often for years, to repay a loan or advance, for little or no wage.

Case

People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (18 September 1982): after investigating construction work for the Asian Games in Delhi (1982), this civil liberties organisation wrote to Justice P.N. Bhagwati: workers were paid below the minimum wage, middlemen took part of their wages, and children below fourteen were employed. The letter was treated as a writ petition. Held (Justice Bhagwati): (1) forced labour is not limited to physical force or legal compulsion; when hunger and poverty drive a person to work for less than the minimum wage, it is forced labour, because he has no real choice; (2) Articles 17, 23 and 24 can be enforced against private persons such as contractors, and the State must ensure their observance; (3) construction work is hazardous employment, so children below fourteen cannot be employed in it under Article 24, even though the child labour law did not then list it.

Case

Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (December 1983): the organisation, working to free bonded labourers, wrote to Justice Bhagwati that many labourers in stone quarries in Faridabad district, Haryana, lived as bonded labourers in inhuman conditions. The letter was treated as a writ petition and commissioners were sent to the quarries. Held: (1) the right to live with dignity under Article 21, read with the directive principles, protects workers from such exploitation; (2) the State must identify, release and rehabilitate bonded labourers under the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976; (3) a labourer shown to be providing forced labour is presumed to be a bonded labourer unless the employer proves otherwise; (4) a letter from a social organisation for poor workers who cannot approach the court themselves is maintainable under Article 32.

Case

Association of Medical Super Speciality Aspirants and Residents v. Union of India (19 August 2019): doctors challenged conditions requiring those who studied postgraduate or super-speciality courses in government colleges to serve the State for some years or pay a large sum. Held: the compulsory service bonds were upheld and were not forced labour, because Article 23(2) itself allows compulsory service for public purposes, the State needs doctors where they are scarce, and the doctors accepted the condition when they took their seats.

Child Labour: Article 24

No child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine, or engaged in any other hazardous employment.

Case

M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (10 December 1996): children in the match and fireworks factories of Sivakasi. Held: offending employers must pay compensation of Rs. 20,000 for each child into a Child Labour Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund.

Since a 2016 amendment, the Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 forbids employing children below fourteen in any occupation, except helping a family enterprise after school hours and working as an artist in audio-visual entertainment, with safeguards. Adolescents between fourteen and eighteen cannot be employed in hazardous occupations.

Right to Education: Article 21A

Education first appeared only among the directive principles.

Case

Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (1992): Held: the right to education flows from the right to life, and capitation fees violated it.

Case

Unni Krishnan J.P. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (4 February 1993): Constitution Bench, narrowing Mohini Jain. Held: every child has a fundamental right to free education until fourteen; beyond that, the right depends on the economic capacity of the State.

The Eighty-sixth Amendment (2002) inserted Article 21A:

The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine.

It also added a duty on parents and guardians to provide such opportunities. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 gives effect to Article 21A; both came into force on 1 April 2010. The Act requires private unaided schools to admit children from weaker sections and disadvantaged groups, to the extent of at least 25 per cent of their entry class.

Note

Updated from the lecture: the lecture said private unaided schools must admit such children up to 25 per cent of the entry class. The correct position is that Section 12(1)(c) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 requires admission to the extent of at least 25 per cent of the strength of class I (or pre-school), so 25 per cent is a minimum, not a ceiling. Source: Section 12, Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (Indian Kanoon).

Case

Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India (2012): Held: the 25 per cent requirement was upheld, except for unaided minority schools.

Key point

Article 21 began as a narrow guarantee against executive action without law. Today it protects dignity, privacy, autonomy and fair procedure.

Freedom of Religion: The Design of Articles 25 to 28

India is home to almost every major religion of the world. The framers had to protect religious freedom fully, and yet allow the State to reform social practices, such as untouchability and discrimination against women, that had been justified in the name of religion. Articles 25 to 28 are their answer: they protect faith, and also limit faith when it collides with other rights.

Article 25: freedom of conscience and religion

Article 25(1): subject to public order, morality and health, and to the other provisions of Part III, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.

  • Freedom of conscience: the inner freedom to believe, or not to believe.
  • Profess: to declare one's faith openly.
  • Practise: to perform its rituals and observances.
  • Propagate: to spread it by explaining its tenets to others.

The right is subject to public order, morality and health, and to the other fundamental rights. Article 25(2) keeps two powers with the State:

  1. to regulate or restrict any economic, financial, political or other secular activity associated with religious practice; and
  2. to make laws for social welfare and reform, and to throw open Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. For this purpose, Hindus include Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists.

An Explanation says that wearing and carrying the kirpan is part of the profession of the Sikh religion.

Articles 26, 27 and 28

  • Article 26: every religious denomination has the right to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes, to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, and to own, acquire and administer property in accordance with law.
  • Article 27: no person can be compelled to pay taxes whose proceeds are specifically used to promote a particular religion.
  • Article 28: no religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of State funds. In institutions recognised or aided by the State, no person can be made to attend religious instruction or worship without his consent, or the consent of the guardian if he is a minor.

The Essential Religious Practices Test

Almost everything a believer does may be connected with his religion. If all of it were protected, the State could reform nothing. So the courts developed a test to decide which practices are protected.

Key point

Essential religious practices test: only practices that are essential and integral to a religion receive the protection of Articles 25 and 26.

Case

The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954): the case in which the test began. Held: religion is not limited to belief; it includes rituals, observances, ceremonies and modes of worship. Principle: what is essential to a religion is to be decided with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself.

In later cases, the courts began to decide the question for themselves:

Case

Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali (1961): Held: even practices religious in character may not be protected if they are merely superstitious beliefs that have grown up around the religion.

Case

M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India (1994): Held: offering prayers in a mosque is not an essential practice of Islam, because namaz can be offered anywhere.

Case

Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta (2004): Held: performing the tandava dance in public processions was not an essential practice of the Ananda Margi faith.

Criticism of the test

The test asks secular judges to decide what is truly essential to a faith, which is really a theological question. Some judges have suggested a different approach:

Essential religious practices testAlternative approach
Is the practice essential and integral to the religion?Is the practice consistent with dignity, equality and the other fundamental rights?

This debate lies at the heart of the reference now before a nine-judge bench (see the Sabarimala review below).

Shayara Bano v. Union of India: Instant Triple Talaq

Case

Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017): Shayara Bano was divorced by her husband through talaq-e-biddat, or instant triple talaq, under which a Muslim husband could end the marriage at once by pronouncing talaq three times in one sitting, without any attempt at reconciliation. She challenged it in the Supreme Court; the Union of India supported her, and the All India Muslim Personal Law Board defended the practice. Held: on 22 August 2017, a five-judge bench set aside talaq-e-biddat by 3:2. Principle: the majority rested on two different lines of reasoning (see table).

JudgesReasoning
Justice R.F. Nariman and Justice U.U. Lalit (majority)The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 recognised and enforced triple talaq, so it was a law in force under Article 13. Because it allowed a marriage to be broken capriciously, without any attempt at reconciliation, it was manifestly arbitrary and violated Article 14.
Justice Kurian Joseph (majority, different route)Triple talaq is against the basic tenets of the Quran, and what is bad in theology cannot be good in law. So it was not an essential practice protected by Article 25.
Chief Justice J.S. Khehar and Justice S. Abdul Nazeer (dissent)Triple talaq was part of Muslim personal law, protected by Article 25, and only Parliament could change it. They restrained husbands from using it for six months and urged Parliament to legislate.
Key point

Learn the two majority routes separately: manifest arbitrariness under Article 14 (Nariman and Lalit JJ) and "not an essential practice" under Article 25 (Kurian Joseph J).

Parliament later passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019. It declares instant triple talaq void and illegal, and makes it an offence punishable with up to three years' imprisonment.

The Hijab Case

The essential practices test was tested again in Karnataka. In February 2022, the State government issued an order under which students had to wear the uniform prescribed by their colleges. Several colleges barred Muslim girls who wore the hijab, a headscarf, from classes.

Case

Resham v. State of Karnataka (2022): on 15 March 2022, a full bench of the Karnataka High Court upheld the order. Held: wearing the hijab is not an essential religious practice in Islam, and prescribing a school uniform is a reasonable restriction.

Case

Aishat Shifa v. State of Karnataka (2022): the appeal, decided in October 2022 by two judges of the Supreme Court who disagreed. Held: split verdict; the matter was referred to the Chief Justice for a larger bench. It has not yet been decided, so the High Court's ruling continues to operate for now.

Justice Hemant GuptaJustice Sudhanshu Dhulia
Dismissed the appeals. The State may prescribe a uniform to promote equality and secular education.Allowed the appeals. The essential religious practices question was unnecessary; the real questions were choice and conscience, and whether stopping girls from studying because of a headscarf was reasonable.

Managing Religious Institutions: Article 26

Key point

Religious denomination (Shirur Mutt case): a collection of individuals with a common faith and organisation, called by a distinctive name.

The right of a denomination to manage its affairs in matters of religion cannot be taken away. But the administration of its property can be regulated by law.

Example

The State can appoint officers to audit a temple's accounts, but it cannot decide which rituals the priests must perform.

The Sabarimala case

This case brings Articles 14, 15, 17, 25 and 26 together.

Case

Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018): the Sabarimala temple in Kerala is dedicated to Lord Ayyappa, worshipped there as a celibate deity. By long-standing custom, women between the ages of 10 and 50 were not allowed to enter, and Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules, 1965 gave legal backing to this exclusion. The Indian Young Lawyers Association challenged it. Held: on 28 September 2018, a five-judge bench struck down the Rule by 4:1.

Judge(s)View
Chief Justice Dipak Misra (for himself and Justice A.M. Khanwilkar)The devotees of Ayyappa are not a separate religious denomination, so Article 26 did not apply. Excluding women was not an essential practice, and the Rule violated the right of women to worship under Article 25.
Justice R.F. NarimanAgreed.
Justice D.Y. ChandrachudThe exclusion rested on notions of purity and pollution, and was a form of untouchability. The essential practices test must be applied in the light of constitutional morality.
Justice Indu Malhotra (dissent)In matters of deep religious faith, courts should not impose their own notions of rationality. The worshippers of Ayyappa at Sabarimala have the character of a denomination, and a petition by persons who were not devotees should not decide such a question.
Key point

Constitutional morality means the Constitution's values of dignity, equality and liberty.

Case

Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Association (2019): on 14 November 2019, a bench hearing the review petitions decided, by 3:2, to refer larger questions on religious freedom to a larger bench. Principle: until the larger bench decides, the 2018 judgment stands.

The questions referred include the scope of Articles 25 and 26, the meaning of morality in them, how far courts may examine whether a practice is essential, and whether outsiders can challenge a denomination's practices through public interest litigation. A bench of nine judges heard these questions in 2026 and has reserved its judgment.

The Waqf Amendment Act, 2025

Key point

Waqf: a permanent dedication of property by a Muslim for religious or charitable purposes.

The State's power to regulate the property of religious bodies is being tested again. In 2025, Parliament passed the Waqf Amendment Act, which made major changes to the management of waqf property. Among other things, it allowed non-Muslims to be members of waqf boards, and allowed a government officer to decide whether property claimed as waqf is really government land.

PetitionersGovernment
The Act violated the rights of a religious denomination under Article 26.The Act only regulated the secular administration of property.

On 15 September 2025, the Supreme Court refused to stay the whole Act, but stayed a few provisions for the time being, including the power of the government officer to decide questions of title, and a condition that only a person practising Islam for at least five years could create a waqf. It also limited the number of non-Muslim members on the boards. The final decision is awaited.

Apostasy and Conversion

Key point

Apostasy means giving up one's religion. Conversion means changing from one religion to another. Freedom of conscience clearly includes the freedom to change one's own faith.

The question is whether the right to propagate includes a right to convert others.

Case

Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1977): decided on 17 January 1977; laws of Madhya Pradesh and Odisha punishing conversion by force, fraud or inducement were challenged. Held: to propagate means to spread one's religion by explaining its tenets; it does not include a right to convert another person, because that would impinge on the equal freedom of conscience of the other person. The laws were upheld. Principle: forcible conversion could disturb public order, a ground on which Article 25 may be restricted.

Many States have since passed similar laws, often called freedom of religion laws, and the newer ones go further. Many require notice to the District Magistrate before a conversion, and some allow a marriage performed only for the purpose of conversion to be declared void.

Supporters sayCritics say
These laws protect vulnerable people from fraud and pressure.They intrude into private choices of faith and marriage, and place the burden of proof on the accused.

In August 2021, the Gujarat High Court stayed some provisions of that State's amendment as they applied to marriages freely entered into by adults of different faiths. Challenges to several State laws are pending in the Supreme Court. Two points are settled:

Case

Hadiya case: Held: an adult may choose a faith and a partner.

Case

Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India (1995): Held: a Hindu husband who converts to Islam only to marry again, without dissolving his first marriage, commits bigamy. Principle: conversion only to escape the law does not work.

An Experiment with Secularism

The word secular was added to the Preamble by the Forty-second Amendment in 1976. But the idea was present from the start, in Articles 14, 15, 16 and 25 to 28.

ModelMeaning of secularism
United StatesOften described as a wall of separation between church and State.
FranceKeeping religion out of public life altogether.
IndiaNo wall. The State may engage with religion: to reform it, to regulate its secular activities, and even to fund institutions run by religious groups. It may not prefer one religion over another, or discriminate on the ground of religion.
Key point

Principled distance (the scholars' term for Indian secularism): the State keeps a distance from all religions, but may intervene when equality or dignity requires it.

Case

S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994): decided on 11 March 1994 by a nine-judge bench. Held: secularism is part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

Case

The Ayodhya judgment (2019): delivered on 9 November 2019; the Court spoke of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991, which freezes the religious character of places of worship as it existed on 15 August 1947. The Court said that the Act protects the secular features of the Constitution.

Challenges to the Places of Worship Act are now pending. In December 2024, the Supreme Court directed courts not to register new suits of this kind until it decides.

Case

Dr. Balram Singh v. Union of India (2024): Held: in November 2024, the Court dismissed a challenge to the words socialist and secular in the Preamble.

Is Indian secularism working?

  • Some scholars argue that the constitutional design shows a bias towards the majority religion, for example in grouping Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists with Hindus for some purposes, and in the directive on cattle slaughter.
  • Others argue that the State has too readily accommodated conservative leaders of minority religions, at the cost of women's rights within those communities.
  • Some feminist scholars argue that religion and nationalism have been used to shape the law on women's lives.
Key point

Know the criticisms, but also the binding position: secularism is a basic feature, and it requires the State to treat all religions with equal respect.

Constitutional values also live outside courtrooms, in films, songs and stories. Indian cinema has long shaped how the nation imagines its many communities, and film makers such as Shyam Benegal have reflected on this. But popular culture is also a site of conflict: films and books are often attacked for hurting religious sentiments. The Court has repeatedly protected artistic expression against such pressure.

Case

S. Rangarajan: Held: the State cannot suppress a film because a group threatens violence. Principle: the State must protect free expression, not surrender to those who threaten it.

So secularism in popular culture means that the State must protect the freedom of every creator, whatever his religion, from the veto of an angry crowd.

Constitutional Protection for the Minorities: Articles 29 and 30

Freedom of religion protects every believer as an individual; Articles 29 and 30 protect minority communities as groups. In a democracy, the majority decides through elections. But a permanent minority, religious or linguistic, may never become the majority. If the majority could shape all schools and colleges in its own image, a minority's language, script and culture could slowly disappear. So Articles 29 and 30 give minorities two protections: one for their culture and one for their educational institutions.

Article 29

  • Article 29(1): any section of the citizens residing in India, having a distinct language, script or culture of its own, shall have the right to conserve the same.
  • Article 29(2): no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State, or receiving aid out of State funds, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.
Key point

The right under Article 29(1) belongs to any section of citizens, not only to minorities.

Article 30

  • Article 30(1), the heart of minority protection: all minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
  • Article 30(1A), added by the Forty-fourth Amendment: if the State acquires the property of such an institution, the amount fixed must not restrict or abrogate this right.
  • Article 30(2): the State, in granting aid, shall not discriminate against an institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority.

Who is a minority

The Constitution does not define the word minority. Minority status under Article 30 is decided with reference to the State: both religious and linguistic minorities are identified State by State, and this does not change when the law in question is made by Parliament. The Kerala Education Bill case said that, for a State law, the minority is judged against the population of that State, and eleven judges settled the State as the unit in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, decided on 31 October 2002.

Note

Updated from the lecture: the lecture said that for a central law minority status is judged against the country as a whole, and that eleven judges confirmed this in T.M.A. Pai. The correct position is that T.M.A. Pai made the State the unit for both religious and linguistic minorities, and held that the meaning of minority for Article 30 does not change depending on who is legislating. Source: T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (Indian Kanoon).

Example

A community that is a majority in India may be a minority in one State. Hindus are a minority in Punjab and Mizoram, and in the Union Territory of Lakshadweep.

Note

Updated from the lecture: the lecture listed Lakshadweep as a State. The correct position is that Lakshadweep is a Union Territory under the First Schedule to the Constitution, not a State. Source: Constitution of India, First Schedule (Legislative Department).

For central welfare schemes, the Central Government notifies national minorities under the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992. In 1993 it notified five communities: Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists and Parsis. On 27 January 2014, it added Jains as the sixth.

In Re Kerala Education Bill

Case

In Re Kerala Education Bill (1958): the foundation of minority rights in Indian law. In 1957, the new government of Kerala passed the Kerala Education Bill to regulate aided private schools closely: the State would control the appointment of teachers through a list prepared by the Public Service Commission, pay their salaries directly, and could even take over the management of a school in some situations. Many of these schools were run by Christian and Muslim communities. Before signing, the President asked the Supreme Court for its opinion under Article 143. Held: on 22 May 1958, a seven-judge bench, in an opinion written by Chief Justice S.R. Das, held some clauses valid, but a few, as applied to minority schools, went beyond regulation and destroyed the right to administer.

The four principles laid down, which still guide this area:

  1. Minority status is decided with reference to the State as a whole.
  2. A minority institution does not lose its protection because it admits a few students from other communities.
  3. There is no fundamental right to receive State aid or recognition. But the State cannot impose conditions for aid or recognition that would destroy the minority character of the institution, or force it to surrender its right to administer.
  4. The State may impose reasonable regulations to maintain educational standards and excellence, such as rules on qualifications of teachers and on health and hygiene.
Key point

The right to administer is not a right to maladminister.

The Right to Establish and Administer

Later case law has worked out the line between permitted regulation and forbidden control.

Case

Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay (1962): decided in August 1962. The government ordered minority teacher-training colleges to reserve most of their seats for its own nominees, on pain of losing aid and recognition. Held: the order was struck down. Principle: the right to administer includes the right to choose whom to admit.

Case

Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society v. State of Gujarat (1974): a nine-judge bench. Held: regulations are valid only if they are reasonable, and serve the excellence of education, without taking over the management.

Case

T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002): eleven judges. Held: a clear distinction exists between aided and unaided minority institutions (see table).

Unaided minority institutionAided minority institution
Takes no government money, so enjoys the widest autonomy.Uses public money, so can be regulated more.
May admit students and appoint teachers of its choice, and fix its own fees, subject only to a ban on profiteering and capitation fees.May be required to admit a reasonable proportion of students from outside the minority community, because Article 29(2) applies to aided institutions.
Case

P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005): decided on 12 August 2005 by seven judges. Held: the State cannot impose its reservation policy, or its own quota of seats, on unaided institutions, whether minority or not.

Governance and reservation in minority institutions

Parliament responded to P.A. Inamdar with the Ninety-third Amendment, which added Article 15(5). It allows reservation in admissions to private educational institutions, aided or unaided, but expressly excludes minority institutions under Article 30. So a minority institution cannot be compelled to follow the State's reservation policy.

Case

Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust v. Union of India (2014): a Constitution Bench. Held: Article 15(5) is valid. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, including its rule that private schools must admit 25 per cent of students from weaker sections, does not apply to minority schools, aided or unaided.

In September 2025, a bench of two judges doubted whether minority schools should be exempted from the whole Act, rather than only from the 25 per cent rule, and referred the question to a larger bench. Until that bench decides, Pramati remains the law.

A minority institution may prefer students of its own community:

Case

St. Stephen's College v. University of Delhi (1992): Held: an aided minority college may reserve up to about half its seats for students of its own community. Later, T.M.A. Pai held that this proportion is not a fixed rule and depends on the needs of the State and the type of institution.

But the institution must still meet the standards set by law for teachers, courses and examinations, and must treat its teachers fairly. Regulations that protect teachers from arbitrary dismissal are valid, because good administration requires them.

The Minority Status of Aligarh Muslim University

The roots of Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) lie in the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, founded at Aligarh in 1875 by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan to promote modern education among Muslims. In 1920, the Central Legislature passed the Aligarh Muslim University Act, which dissolved the college and incorporated the University.

Case

S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India (1967): decided on 20 October 1967 by a Constitution Bench. Held: AMU was not a minority institution, because it had been established by an Act of the Central Legislature, not by the Muslim community, so it could not claim Article 30.

Parliament responded with an amendment in 1981, which described the University as established by the Muslims of India. In 2005, the Allahabad High Court struck down that part of the amendment, along with a policy reserving half the postgraduate medical seats for Muslim students. Appeals went to the Supreme Court.

Case

Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal (2024): decided on 8 November 2024 by seven judges. Held: by 4:3, Azeez Basha was overruled. Chief Justice D.Y. Chandrachud wrote the majority judgment; Justice Surya Kant, Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma dissented.

The majority held three things:

  1. An institution does not lose its minority character merely because it was incorporated by a statute. The real question is who established it.
  2. To answer that, the court must look at the genesis of the institution. Whose idea was it? Who collected the funds and gave the land? Was it established mainly for the benefit of the minority community?
  3. The administration need not be entirely in the hands of the minority, but its set-up should affirm the minority character.

The majority did not itself decide whether AMU is a minority institution. It left that question to a regular bench, to decide by applying these tests. That decision is still awaited.

Constitutional Remedies: Articles 32 and 226

A right that cannot be enforced is only a promise on paper. So the framers made the remedy itself a fundamental right.

  • Article 32(1) guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the fundamental rights.
  • Article 32(2) empowers the Supreme Court to issue directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari.
  • Article 32(4): the right shall not be suspended except as provided by the Constitution, which means only during an emergency under Article 359.

In the Constituent Assembly, on 9 December 1948, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar called Article 32 the very soul and the very heart of the Constitution.

Case

Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras (1950): Held: the Supreme Court is the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights, and cannot refuse to entertain a petition seeking their protection.

Article 226 compared

Article 226 gives every High Court the power to issue writs throughout its territory, to any person or authority, including a government, for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose.

PointArticle 32Article 226
PurposeOnly to enforce fundamental rights.Also ordinary legal rights, because of the words "for any other purpose"; so its scope is wider.
NatureItself a fundamental right.A constitutional power; the High Court has discretion to refuse relief, for example where an adequate alternative remedy exists.
TerritoryAcross India.Within the High Court's territory, or where the cause of action arises.
Case

Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998): Held: the alternative remedy rule is not absolute. A High Court may still entertain a writ petition (1) where a fundamental right is to be enforced; (2) where the principles of natural justice have been violated; or (3) where the order is wholly without jurisdiction, or the validity of a law is challenged.

In practice, the Supreme Court often asks petitioners to approach the High Court first.

Case

L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997): decided on 18 March 1997 by seven judges. Held: the power of judicial review under Articles 226 and 32 is part of the basic structure, and cannot be taken away even by a constitutional amendment.

Case

Daryao v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1961): Held: once a High Court dismisses a writ petition on the merits, the same claim cannot be brought afresh under Article 32. The remedy is an appeal.

The Five Writs and Public Law Compensation

The five writs came to India from English law.

Habeas corpus

Habeas corpus means "you may have the body". It is issued to a person or authority who has detained someone, to produce the detained person before the court and justify the detention. If the detention is unlawful, the court orders release. It is the most important protection of personal liberty. Any person may seek it on behalf of the detenu, and the rules on standing are relaxed.

Case

Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling (1973): Held: physical production of the detenu is not essential; the court can decide the legality of the detention without it.

Mandamus

Mandamus means "we command". It is issued to a public authority, commanding it to perform a public duty that the law requires it to perform. It does not lie to enforce a purely private duty or a private contract, or against the President or a Governor for the exercise of their official powers.

Example

A municipality refuses a building permit to Farhan although he meets every legal condition. A High Court may issue mandamus.

Certiorari and prohibition

Certiorari means "to be certified". It is issued by a higher court to a lower court, tribunal or authority, to send up the record of a case and quash its decision. It lies where the lower body:

  • acted without jurisdiction, or exceeded its jurisdiction;
  • violated natural justice; or
  • made an error of law apparent on the face of the record.

Prohibition is its twin. It is issued to stop a lower court or tribunal from proceeding with a case that is beyond its jurisdiction.

ProhibitionCertiorari
Issued while the proceedings are still pending, to prevent the excess.Issued after the decision, to quash it.
Key point

The difference between prohibition and certiorari lies in timing.

Quo warranto

Quo warranto means "by what authority". It asks a person holding a public office created by law to show by what authority he holds it. If he is not legally qualified, or was not validly appointed, the court removes him.

Case

University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao (1963): decided in August 1963. Held: the writ tests whether the holder has a legal right to the office.

Example

Aadil is appointed registrar of a university without the qualification the statute requires. Any member of the public may seek quo warranto against him.

Compensation as a public law remedy

Beyond these writs, the Court has developed a public law remedy of compensation.

Case

Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar (1983): a man had remained in jail for more than fourteen years after he was acquitted. Held: the Court ordered the State to pay him compensation under Article 32.

Case

Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa (1993): a death in police custody. Held: this compensation is a liability of the State in public law, for violating fundamental rights. Principle: the State cannot plead sovereign immunity.

Public Interest Litigation

Key point

Locus standi means standing to sue. Traditionally, only a person whose own right was violated could approach a court.

Bonded labourers, undertrial prisoners and pavement dwellers are often too poor or too unaware to go to court. So from the late 1970s, the Supreme Court relaxed this rule and created public interest litigation (PIL).

Case

Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1979): newspaper reports revealed that thousands of undertrial prisoners in Bihar had spent more time in jail than the maximum sentence for their alleged offences. An advocate, Kapila Hingorani, filed a petition. Held: the Court ordered their release and recognised the right to a speedy trial.

Case

S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981): decided on 30 December 1981; Justice P.N. Bhagwati explained the principle. Principle: where a legal wrong is done to a person or class of persons who, because of poverty, helplessness or disability, cannot approach the court, any member of the public acting in good faith may approach the court for them.

Epistolary jurisdiction

Key point

Epistolary jurisdiction: the court's willingness to treat a letter as a writ petition. The word epistle means a letter.

Case

Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1980): Sunil Batra, a prisoner in Tihar jail, wrote to Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer that a warder had brutally assaulted another prisoner. Held: the Court treated the letter as a petition and gave directions against torture in prisons.

The letters in the Asiad workers case and the Bandhua Mukti Morcha case were treated the same way.

Achievements and criticism

PIL has achieved a great deal for prisoners, workers, children and the environment. But it has also been criticised:

  • Some scholars argue that courts, freed from ordinary procedure, have sometimes made sweeping orders without hearing those affected. They point to the demolition of slum settlements along the Yamuna in Delhi in 2004, which followed litigation in the High Court: a remedy designed for the poor was used against the poor.
  • The Supreme Court itself has warned against PILs filed for publicity or private gain.

PIL remains a powerful tool, but one to be used with care.

Directive Principles of State Policy

Part IV contains the Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP). The idea came from the Irish Constitution. They are goals that the State must pursue in governing the country, for example: adequate means of livelihood for all; distributing the material resources of the community to serve the common good; preventing the concentration of wealth; equal pay for equal work; free legal aid; protection of the environment; and separation of the judiciary from the executive.

Article 37: the directives shall not be enforceable by any court, but they are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country, and it shall be the duty of the State to apply them in making laws.

Key point

A citizen cannot file a writ petition to compel the State to pass a law under a directive principle. But the directives guide the State, and guide the courts in interpreting the Constitution.

Rights and directives: the relationship

The relationship between the enforceable rights and the unenforceable directives has changed over time.

Case

State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951): Held: the directive principles must conform to the fundamental rights, and run subsidiary to them.

In the Kerala Education Bill case (1958), the Court adopted the doctrine of harmonious construction: courts should try to give effect to both, as far as possible. Parliament then tried to give the directives priority through Article 31C, and the Forty-second Amendment extended that protection to all the directives.

Case

Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980): Held: the extension of Article 31C to all the directives was struck down. Principle: the Constitution rests on a balance between Part III and Part IV, and this harmony is itself a basic feature. Rights are the means and directives are the goals; neither can be sacrificed for the other.

Since then, the Court has used the directives to give content to fundamental rights, as Article 21 absorbed the directives on education, health and livelihood. In the Property Owners Association case, it read Article 39(b) more narrowly than before.

The Uniform Civil Code: Article 44

Article 44 says that the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.

Key point

Uniform civil code: one set of laws on marriage, divorce, inheritance, adoption and succession for all citizens, whatever their religion. Today these matters are largely governed by the personal law of each community.

The Supreme Court has more than once urged the State to act:

Case

Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985): the Court regretted that Article 44 had remained a dead letter.

Case

Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India (1995): the Court again called for a common code.

Case

Jose Paulo Coutinho v. Maria Luiza Valentina Pereira (2019): the Court described Goa, which has long had a common civil law, as a shining example.

Supporters of a uniform civil codeCritics
It would promote equality, especially gender equality, and national integration.It could erode the cultural autonomy of religious minorities and tribal communities; reform should come gradually and from within communities.

Uttarakhand became the first State to bring a uniform civil code into force, from 27 January 2025; it does not apply to the Scheduled Tribes. In March 2026, Gujarat became the second State to pass such a law.

Cow protection and Article 48

Article 48 asks the State to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines, and to take steps to preserve and improve breeds and prohibit the slaughter of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle. When the Constituent Assembly debated it on 24 November 1948, some members wanted cow protection to be a fundamental right. It was finally placed among the directive principles, in the language of agriculture.

Case

Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar (1958): decided on 23 April 1958. Held: a total ban on the slaughter of cows and calves was upheld. But a total ban on slaughtering bulls, bullocks and she-buffaloes, even after they had ceased to be useful, was not a reasonable restriction on the butchers' freedom of trade.

Case

State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat (2005): decided on 26 October 2005 by seven judges. Held: by 6:1, a Gujarat law banning the slaughter of cow progeny of all ages was upheld, and Hanif Quareshi was overruled to that extent. Chief Justice R.C. Lahoti relied on Articles 48 and 48A, and on the duty of compassion for living creatures. Justice A.K. Mathur dissented.

Key point

Today, the directives are used not to defeat fundamental rights, but to judge whether a restriction on them is reasonable.

Fundamental Duties

The original Constitution had no list of duties. The Forty-second Amendment in 1976, following the Swaran Singh Committee, added Part IVA, with ten fundamental duties of every citizen in Article 51A. The Eighty-sixth Amendment in 2002 added an eleventh. The duties include:

  • respecting the Constitution, the national flag and the national anthem;
  • upholding the sovereignty and integrity of India;
  • renouncing practices derogatory to the dignity of women;
  • protecting the environment;
  • developing the scientific temper; and
  • for parents and guardians, providing opportunities for education to children between six and fourteen.

The duties are not directly enforceable: no writ lies to compel a citizen to perform them. But courts use them in two ways:

  1. to help interpret laws and fundamental rights; and
  2. to help decide whether a restriction on a right is reasonable, as in the cattle slaughter case.
Case

AIIMS Students' Union v. AIIMS (2001): Held: although the duties are not enforceable by writ, they are not to be ignored, and are as important as the rights.

Case

Bijoe Emmanuel: Held: standing respectfully during the national anthem was enough to show respect. Principle: the duty to respect the anthem did not create a duty to sing it.

Connecting the Whole Course: A Problem

Example

A State law allows the police to install facial recognition cameras on every street and keep the data for ever. Prince is wrongly identified and arrested at a protest.

  1. The police are the State under Article 12, and the law is law under Article 13.
  2. His privacy under Article 21 is affected, so the law must pass the test in Puttaswamy.
  3. His freedoms of speech and assembly are chilled, so the restriction must fall within Article 19(2) and 19(3), and be reasonable.
  4. He must be given the grounds of his arrest in writing under Article 22.
  5. If the system targets people of one community, Articles 14 and 15 are engaged.
  6. He can seek habeas corpus and compensation under Article 226 or 32.

Quick revision

  • Religious freedom protects faith, but only its essential core, and always subject to public order, morality, health and other rights.
  • Secularism means equal respect for all faiths, not hostility to faith.
  • Minority status is decided State by State.
  • A minority has the right to establish and administer its own institutions; the State may regulate them only to maintain standards, not to take away their character.
  • In every problem, first ask whether the wrongdoer is the State, and which right is affected.
  • Always name the Article, and support it with the leading case.
  • Whenever two concepts look similar, such as reasonable classification and arbitrariness, or preventive and punitive detention, write their differences clearly, with an example.

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