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Indian Contract Act: Complete Notes

Contract Law I runs from the first question, what a contract is, to the newest one, how contracts are made on the internet. Contracts are made every day: buying a cup of tea, booking a cab or renting a room. Connecting every rule to such everyday transactions is the easiest way to understand and re…

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Contract Law I runs from the first question, what a contract is, to the newest one, how contracts are made on the internet. Contracts are made every day: buying a cup of tea, booking a cab or renting a room. Connecting every rule to such everyday transactions is the easiest way to understand and remember it. For each important case, the principle matters most, because that is what is applied in examination answers.

Meaning of Contract

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Not every promise is a contract.

Example

Prince promises a friend to take him to a movie on Sunday, and forgets. The friend cannot go to court. But if Prince promises to sell his motorcycle to Farhan for ₹50,000, Farhan agrees and pays an advance, and Prince then refuses to hand it over, Farhan can go to court. Both were promises; only the second is enforceable by law.

The law of contract tells us which promises the law will enforce, and what happens when they are broken.

Section 2(h)

The Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines a contract in Section 2(h): an agreement enforceable by law is a contract. So there must be (1) an agreement, and (2) it must be enforceable by law.

Key point

Agreement + Enforceability = Contract (Section 2(h)).

Definitions by jurists

  • Sir Frederick Pollock: every agreement and promise enforceable at law is a contract.
  • Anson: a legally binding agreement between two or more parties, by which rights are acquired by one or more of them to acts or forbearances on the part of the others. Forbearance means holding back from doing something.

Nature of Contract

  1. Private law made by the parties. The legislature does not tell Prince at what price to sell his motorcycle. The parties decide their own rights and duties, and the law stands behind them.
  2. Right in personam. A contract creates rights against a particular person. Farhan can demand the motorcycle only from Prince, not from the whole world.
  3. Every contract is an agreement, but every agreement is not a contract. Social promises, many family arrangements and illegal deals are agreements the law does not enforce. As Salmond put it, the law of contract is not the whole law of agreements, nor the whole law of obligations. Some obligations, like the duty not to injure others, come from other branches such as the law of torts.
  4. Foundation of commercial life. Sale of goods, partnership, companies, banking and insurance all rest on the general principles of contract.

Historical Background

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Roman and English law

In early societies a promise was mostly a moral or religious matter. Roman law, for a long time, enforced only certain types of agreements, usually those made in a proper form, for example by speaking fixed words. A bare promise without such form was a naked pact, and the Roman maxim said that no action arises from a naked pact.

  • English courts at first enforced only a few claims, like a claim for a fixed debt or a promise under seal.
  • From the sixteenth century they enforced ordinary promises, but only if something was given in return: the doctrine of consideration.
  • In the nineteenth century freedom of contract peaked; people were seen as free and equal individuals who could make any bargain they liked.
  • In the twentieth century the law recognised that bargaining power is often unequal and began protecting weaker parties, for example through consumer protection laws.

The Indian story

Before 1872 there was no single contract law for the whole country.

  • In the presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, English law was largely applied.
  • The Act of Settlement, 1781 provided that in matters of contract, Hindus would be governed by Hindu law and Muslims by Muslim law; where only one party was a Hindu or a Muslim, the law and usage of the defendant applied.
  • Outside the presidency towns, courts often decided by justice, equity and good conscience, which in practice frequently meant English law.

To end the confusion, an Indian Law Commission sitting in England prepared a draft. The Indian Contract Act was passed on 25 April 1872 and came into force on 1 September 1872. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, then Law Member of the Governor General's Council, supervised its final revision and added the definitions in Section 2. The Act originally covered sale of goods and partnership too; those chapters were replaced by the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 and the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.

Key point

The preamble says the Act defines and amends certain parts of the law relating to contracts. It is not an exhaustive code; where it is silent, courts may apply justice, equity and good conscience.

Sir Henry Maine: from status to contract

Sir Henry Maine, the British legal historian, published Ancient Law in 1861 and served in India as Law Member of the Governor General's Council from 1862 to 1869.

The movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status to contract.
  • Status is a position in society fixed by birth: family, caste, gender or class. In ancient societies rights and duties were decided mostly by status; in ancient Rome, a son under his father's power could not own property of his own.
  • Contract means obligations a person chooses by his own free will.

Progressive societies moved from birth deciding a person's duties to his own agreement deciding them. Hitherto means "until now": Maine described history up to his own time and did not promise the movement would continue forever. He contrasted progressive societies with stationary societies, which changed very little.

Example

In an old village system, occupation was often decided by family. Today Farhan can become a software engineer, sign an employment contract with any company and change jobs by giving notice. His duties come from his contract, not his birth.

Maine's second idea: the positive duty resulting from one man's reliance on the word of another is among the slowest conquests of advancing civilization. Society took very long to accept that relying on another's word creates a legal duty to keep it; early law punished physical wrongs like theft and assault long before it enforced mere promises. A mature law of contract is a sign of an advanced civilization.

Modern law has, in some ways, moved back towards status: a consumer, worker, tenant or minor gets special protection because of his or her position, whatever the contract says.

Key point

Exam tip: Maine's first statement is historically true, but modern welfare laws have added a layer of protective status on top of contract.

Key Definitions Under Section 2

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  • Clause (a), Proposal: when one person signifies to another his willingness to do or to abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a proposal. It is the Indian word for the English offer. Prince saying to Farhan, "I will sell you my phone for ₹10,000, do you agree?" is a proposal.
  • Clause (b), Acceptance: when the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent to it, the proposal is accepted. A proposal, when accepted, becomes a promise.
  • Clause (c): the person making the proposal is the promisor; the person accepting it is the promisee.
  • Clause (d), Consideration: in simple words, something of value given in return for a promise, at the desire of the promisor. The ₹10,000 is consideration for the promise to give the phone; the phone is consideration for the promise to pay.
  • Clause (e), Agreement: every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each other.
  • Clause (f), Reciprocal promises: promises which form the consideration, or part of the consideration, for each other.
  • Clause (g), Void agreement: an agreement not enforceable by law; it has no legal effect at all.
  • Clause (h), Contract: an agreement enforceable by law.
  • Clause (i), Voidable contract: an agreement enforceable by law at the option of one or more of the parties, but not at the option of the other or others. It is valid until the party with the choice cancels it. If Prince forces Farhan to sign by threatening him, Farhan may cancel it or keep it.
  • Clause (j), Void contract: a contract which ceases to be enforceable by law becomes void when it ceases to be enforceable. It was valid when made but became void later, e.g. because performance became impossible.
Key point

Proposal + Acceptance = Promise. A promise, or a set of promises forming the consideration for each other = Agreement. Agreement + Enforceability = Contract.

Void, voidable and valid compared

ConceptProvisionPosition
Void agreementSection 2(g)Dead from birth.
Void contractSection 2(j)Born alive but died later.
Voidable contractSection 2(i)Alive, but one party holds the power to end it.
Valid contractSection 2(h)Fully alive and binding on both sides.

Essential Elements of a Contract

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Section 10: all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not expressly declared by this Act to be void. It also keeps alive any law requiring a contract to be in writing, or in the presence of witnesses, or relating to registration of documents.

The essential elements:

  1. An agreement (proposal and acceptance).
  2. Intention to create legal relations.
  3. Competent parties.
  4. Free consent.
  5. Lawful consideration and lawful object.
  6. Not expressly declared void by the Act.
  7. Certainty of terms.
  8. Possibility of performance.
  9. Writing or registration where a law requires it.

This list is also the map of the subject: the elements are followed by how contracts end and the remedies, relations resembling contracts, and electronic contracts.

Key point

Exam tip: in a problem question, walk through these elements one by one.

Agreement: Proposal and Its Essentials

Sections 3 to 9 deal with formation of agreement: one person proposes, the other accepts, and their minds meet on the same terms. From Section 2(a), the essentials of a valid proposal are:

  1. Willingness to do or to abstain. An offer to sell a phone is willingness to do; a promise not to file a suit is willingness to abstain.
  2. With a view to obtaining assent. A mere statement of intention is not a proposal. "I am thinking of selling my car next year" only shares a plan.
  3. Definite terms, or terms capable of being made definite. Vague terms give a court nothing to enforce.
  4. Communication. A proposal is complete only when it comes to the knowledge of the person to whom it is made.
  5. Express or implied (Section 9). A promise is express when made in words, and implied when made otherwise than in words. A bus standing at a stop with its door open is an implied proposal to carry passengers at the fixed fare; boarding it is implied acceptance.
  6. Specific or general. A specific proposal is made to a particular person, who alone can accept. A general proposal is made to the public, like a reward notice, and anyone who fulfils its conditions can accept.
  7. Silence cannot be prescribed as acceptance (Felthouse v. Bindley, below).
Case

Taylor v. Portington: Taylor offered to let his house, promising thorough repair if needed. Mrs Portington's agent replied that she would take it for three years at £85 a year if it was put into thorough repair and the drawing rooms were handsomely decorated according to the present style. Taylor agreed to "the terms you mention". After a dispute about repairs, she refused the lease and Taylor sued for specific performance. The trial judge ordered a lease, but the appeal court reversed. Held: "thorough repair" and "handsome decoration in the present style" were too uncertain to enforce. Principle: proposal and acceptance must be certain enough for a court to know exactly what was promised. This links with Section 29.

Three special situations

  • Counter proposal: a reply that changes the terms. It is a new proposal that rejects the original. If Prince offers his car for ₹5 lakh and Farhan offers ₹4 lakh, and Prince refuses, Farhan cannot go back and accept at ₹5 lakh; the first offer is dead.
  • Cross proposals: two people make identical proposals to each other, each unaware of the other's. The accepted view is that there is no contract yet, since neither is an acceptance of the other.
  • Standing offer: an offer open for a period, to be accepted again and again, e.g. a supplier's offer to supply bricks to a government department as and when orders are placed during one year. Each order is an acceptance creating a separate contract, so the supplier may withdraw for the future but must supply orders already placed.

Offer and Invitation to Offer

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OfferInvitation to offer
A final expression of willingness to be bound.Only an invitation to others to make offers; the inviter does not intend to be bound the moment someone says yes.

Common invitations to offer

  • Goods displayed with a price tag. When Prince takes the phone to the counter, he makes the offer and the shopkeeper accepts there. If the display were an offer, the shopkeeper might be bound to sell the same phone to ten people; he must remain free to choose.
  • Price lists, catalogues, menu cards and most newspaper advertisements for sale of goods.
  • Auctions: the call for bids is an invitation, each bid is an offer, and the fall of the hammer is acceptance; a bidder can withdraw before the hammer falls.
  • Tenders: a government notice inviting tenders is an invitation; the contractor's tender is the offer, which the department may accept or reject.
Case

Harvey v. Facey (Privy Council, from Jamaica): Harvey telegraphed Facey, who was travelling on a train, about Bumper Hall Pen, a property: "Will you sell us Bumper Hall Pen? Telegraph lowest cash price." Facey replied, "Lowest price for Bumper Hall Pen, £900." Harvey telegraphed that he agreed to buy at £900; Facey never replied. Held: no contract. Facey answered only the second of two questions; stating the lowest price was information, not an offer to sell. Harvey's last telegram was itself an offer, never accepted. Principle: a mere quotation of price in reply to an enquiry is not an offer. So if Farhan asks Prince the lowest price of his bike and Prince says ₹40,000, Farhan cannot simply "accept" and claim a contract.

Case

Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company: the most famous case on general offers. The company sold a carbolic smoke ball which, it claimed, would prevent influenza. Its advertisement promised £100 to anyone who caught influenza after using its smoke ball three times daily for two weeks as directed, adding that £1,000 was deposited with the Alliance Bank to show sincerity. Mrs Carlill used it as directed for several weeks and still caught influenza; she claimed the £100 and the company refused. The company argued the advertisement was a mere puff (exaggerated sales talk), that an offer cannot be made to the whole world, and that she never communicated acceptance. Held (Court of Appeal): every argument rejected. The deposit showed serious intention to be bound; an offer can be made to the world at large and becomes a contract with anyone who performs its conditions, without separate notice of acceptance. Principle: an advertisement can be an offer if it shows a clear intention to be bound, and a general offer is accepted by performing its conditions, as Section 8 provides.

Example

A coaching institute advertises a full fee refund to any student who attends every class and still fails. A student who does exactly that can claim the refund.

Case

Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Dutt (Allahabad High Court): Gauri Dutt sent Lalman, an employee of his firm, to Haridwar to search for his runaway nephew. After Lalman left, Gauri Dutt issued handbills offering ₹501 to whoever found the boy. Lalman traced him at Rishikesh and was given a small gift of money. About six months later, after dismissal from service, he sued for the reward. Held: claim dismissed. There can be no acceptance without knowledge of the offer, because acceptance means assent; on the facts the court relied mainly on Lalman already being under a duty, as a servant, to search for the boy, a duty arising before the reward was announced. Principle (for which the case is cited): knowledge of the offer is essential for acceptance. So if Prince helps the police catch a thief and only later learns of a reward, he cannot claim it as a matter of contract.

Standard Form Contracts

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A standard form contract is a printed or pre-drafted contract prepared by one party, usually a large company, and offered on a take it or leave it basis: insurance policies, bank loan forms, airline tickets, online terms and conditions. They save time and cost, since a company dealing with lakhs of customers cannot negotiate with each. But the weaker party has no real choice: he cannot bargain, often does not read the terms, and unfair clauses can hide in small print, such as a clause excluding liability even for negligence.

  1. Reasonable notice: terms must be brought to the other party's reasonable notice at or before the time of contract. A term printed on a receipt handed over after the contract may not bind.
  2. Contra proferentem: an ambiguous term is read against the party who drafted it.
  3. Public policy (Section 23): an unfair and unreasonable term in a contract between parties of grossly unequal bargaining power may be struck down.
  4. Consumer Protection Act, 2019: Section 2(46) defines an unfair contract, and the State and National Consumer Commissions may declare unfair terms null and void. A gym may thus be unable to rely on small print that fees will never be refunded, even if it shuts down for good.
Case

Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. Brojo Nath Ganguly (Supreme Court): a rule allowed a government company to terminate a permanent employee simply by giving three months' notice. Held: struck down as opposed to public policy under Section 23. Principle: unfair terms imposed through grossly unequal bargaining power can be invalidated.

Acceptance and Its Essentials

Under Section 2(b), acceptance means signifying assent to a proposal. A valid acceptance must be:

  1. Absolute and unqualified (Section 7). A new condition makes it a counter proposal.
  2. In a usual and reasonable manner, unless the proposal prescribes the manner. If the proposal prescribes a manner and acceptance is made in some other manner, the proposer may, within a reasonable time after the acceptance is communicated to him, insist on the prescribed manner; if he does not, he is taken to have accepted the acceptance.
  3. Communicated to the proposer by the acceptor or someone authorised by him. A mental decision is not enough.
  4. Made by the person to whom the proposal was made.
  5. Given while the proposal is alive, before it lapses or is revoked.
  6. Possibly by conduct (Section 8): by performing the conditions of a proposal, or accepting any consideration offered with it.
  7. Not mere silence, as a rule.
Case

Felthouse v. Bindley: Paul Felthouse, negotiating to buy a horse from his nephew John, wrote offering to split the difference: "If I hear no more about him, I consider the horse mine at £30 15s." John never replied, but told the auctioneer Bindley to keep the horse out of his farm stock sale; Bindley sold it by mistake. The uncle sued the auctioneer. Held: no contract. The nephew's decision stayed in his own mind and was never communicated, and the uncle could not impose a contract by declaring silence to be acceptance. Principle: silence does not amount to acceptance. So if a magazine company tells Prince it will treat him as a subscriber unless he replies within ten days, his silence does not bind him.

Case

Thawardas Pherumal v. Union of India (Supreme Court; mainly on arbitration): a contractor's tender to supply bricks to a government department had been accepted. He then wrote to the engineer asking that rations be supplied to his workers, a new term, and without waiting for a reply signed the formal contract, which omitted it. An arbitrator treated the new term as accepted. Held: an error of law. A suggestion made after acceptance is a fresh proposal needing its own acceptance; no one is bound by a one-sided offer never accepted, particularly where the contract is to be reduced to writing. The suggestion had simply been dropped. Principle: one party cannot add terms to a concluded contract on his own.

Communication and Revocation

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A proposal, an acceptance and a revocation take effect only when communicated. Section 3: communication may be made by any act or omission of the party by which he intends to communicate it, or which has the effect of communicating it.

Section 4: when communication is complete

Communication ofComplete as againstWhen
ProposalThe person to whom it is madeWhen it comes to his knowledge.
AcceptanceThe proposerWhen put in a course of transmission to him, so as to be out of the acceptor's power.
AcceptanceThe acceptorWhen it comes to the proposer's knowledge.
RevocationThe person who makes itWhen put in a course of transmission.
RevocationThe person to whom it is madeWhen it comes to his knowledge.
Example

Prince in Delhi writes to Farhan in Mumbai offering his car. The proposal is complete when Farhan reads the letter. Farhan posts acceptance on Monday; it reaches Prince on Thursday. Prince is bound from Monday and can no longer revoke; Farhan is bound only from Thursday, and until then can revoke his acceptance by a faster message reaching Prince before, or at the same time as, the letter.

Instantaneous communication

Case

Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. Girdharilal Parshottamdas and Company (Supreme Court): Girdharilal Parshottamdas and Company, a firm in Ahmedabad, offered on the telephone to buy cotton seed cake from a firm in Khamgaon owned by the Kedia family, which accepted on the telephone, speaking from Khamgaon. When the goods were not supplied, the Ahmedabad firm sued for damages in a court at Ahmedabad; the defendants said the contract was made at Khamgaon, where acceptance was spoken. Question: is a telephone acceptance complete where spoken or where heard? Held (majority, Justice Shah): where it is heard by the proposer. The postal rule in Section 4 is an exception for the convenience of communication by post; on the telephone the parties are, in a sense, in each other's presence, and the drafters did not foresee the telephone. So the contract was made at Ahmedabad, and the court there had jurisdiction. Dissent (Justice Hidayatullah): Section 4 covers the telephone too, so acceptance was complete against the proposer when spoken at Khamgaon. Principle: in instantaneous communication, the contract is made where the acceptance is received.

Key point

The Bhagwandas Kedia rule is very important for online contracts.

Section 5: time for revocation

  • A proposal may be revoked any time before communication of its acceptance is complete as against the proposer, not afterwards.
  • An acceptance may be revoked any time before its communication is complete as against the acceptor, not afterwards.

In the postal example, Prince could revoke only if his revocation reached Farhan before Farhan posted his acceptance on Monday; Farhan could revoke his acceptance until Thursday.

Section 6: how a proposal is revoked

  1. By the proposer communicating notice of revocation.
  2. By lapse of the prescribed time for acceptance or, if none, a reasonable time. (An offer "open till Friday" lapses if Farhan replies on Saturday.)
  3. By the acceptor's failure to fulfil a condition precedent to acceptance.
  4. By the death or insanity of the proposer, if it comes to the acceptor's knowledge before acceptance.
Key point

A bare promise to keep an offer open does not bind. But if the proposer receives consideration for keeping it open, that is a separate contract, an option. If Farhan pays Prince a small sum to keep the car available for a week, Prince cannot withdraw within that week.

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (31:13)

The Act does not mention this element expressly, but Indian courts have accepted it from English law, and it fits Section 2(h), which speaks of agreements enforceable by law. The law enforces only agreements the parties intended to have legal consequences.

Type of agreementPresumption
Social and domestic (husband and wife, friends)No intention to create legal relations.
CommercialIntention to create legal relations.

Both presumptions can be rebutted by evidence.

Case

Balfour v. Balfour: Mr Balfour, a senior irrigation official in the government of Ceylon, came to England on leave with his wife. Returning to Ceylon, he left her in England on medical advice and promised her £30 a month. They later separated, he stopped paying, and she sued. Held (Court of Appeal): not a contract; arrangements between husband and wife in the ordinary course of married life are not intended to be legally binding. Lord Justice Atkin: each house is a domain into which the king's writ does not seek to run. Principle: the law does not enter the home to enforce every family promise.

Case

Rose and Frank Company v. J. R. Crompton and Brothers (commercial presumption rebutted): English paper manufacturers made the American firm Rose and Frank their sole selling agent in the United States and Canada. The document said it was not a formal or legal agreement, would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the law courts, and was only a record of intention to which the parties honourably pledged themselves. The manufacturers ended the arrangement and refused to supply goods already ordered. Held: the arrangement itself was not binding, legal relations having been clearly excluded; but the House of Lords held that individual orders already placed and accepted were separate, enforceable contracts of sale. Principle: even in business, parties can exclude legal consequences by clear words.

Case

Global Asset Capital v. Aabar Block (recent English case): a debtor, Mr Maud, sent a letter marked "without prejudice and subject to contract" offering €250 million for claims that Aabar, an Abu Dhabi investment company, held against him. He claimed Aabar's chief executive accepted on a telephone call, if the offer was resent in binding form with proof of funds. But in that call Mr Maud himself asked what was needed to progress the deal, and three days later sent a fresh offer on different terms, which Aabar rejected. Held (Court of Appeal): no contract. Whether a contract is concluded is judged objectively on the whole course of dealings, including communications after the alleged acceptance; and "subject to contract" shows no intention to be bound until a formal contract is made, a label removable only by clear words or conduct. Principle: an offer made "subject to contract" does not bind until the formal contract is made.

Example

Prince writes to Farhan, "I agree to buy your flat for ₹50 lakh, subject to contract." Neither is bound until the formal agreement is signed.

Capacity to Contract

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Section 10: what agreements are contracts

Under Section 10, all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not expressly declared by the Act to be void. This topic deals with the words "parties competent to contract".

The law cares about capacity because some people, due to age or mental condition, cannot properly judge their own interests. The law protects them, even if that sometimes causes loss to the other party.

Section 11: who is competent to contract

Every person is competent to contract who:

  1. is of the age of majority according to the law to which he is subject;
  2. is of sound mind; and
  3. is not disqualified from contracting by any law to which he is subject.
Key point

Section 11 creates three disabilities: minority, unsoundness of mind and disqualification by law.

Minors

Age of majority

Under the Majority Act, 1875, a person domiciled in India attains majority on completing 18 years. Earlier, a minor under a court-appointed guardian attained majority only at 21. That rule was removed in 1999, but several older cases turned on it.

Effect of a minor's agreement: void or voidable?

The Act only says that a minor is not competent. Courts long differed on whether his agreement was void or merely voidable, until the Privy Council settled the question.

Case

Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose: Dharmodas Ghose, a minor, mortgaged his houses to a moneylender, Brahmo Dutt, for 20,000 rupees (the amount actually advanced was disputed). The moneylender's attorney, Kedar Nath, handled the transaction. Before signing, the minor's mother, his High Court-appointed guardian, sent Kedar Nath a written notice through her attorney that Dharmodas was under 21 and anyone lending to him did so at his own risk. The loan was still made, and the minor signed a declaration that he had come of age. He sued, through his mother, to have the mortgage declared void. The moneylender died during the appeal; his executors, including Mohori Bibee, carried it on.

Issues: void or voidable; estoppel by the false declaration; repayment of the money.

Held: (1) a minor is not competent under Section 11, so his agreement is void from the beginning, not voidable; (2) no estoppel, because the false statement was made to a person who already knew the truth through his attorney and was not misled; (3) Sections 64 and 65 could not be used, as both presuppose an agreement between competent parties; (4) return of money under the Specific Relief Act was discretionary, and was rightly refused since the money was advanced with full knowledge of the minority.

Principle: a minor's agreement is void ab initio (void from the very beginning).

Example

If a sixteen-year-old signs an agreement to buy a car on instalments, the seller cannot enforce it.

Main rules about minors' agreements

  1. Void: a minor's agreement cannot be enforced against the minor, and as a rule not by him either.
  2. No ratification: a minor cannot ratify the agreement on attaining majority, because a void agreement has nothing to approve. A promise made after majority to repay a loan taken during minority is void for want of consideration; the parties must make a fresh contract with fresh consideration.
  3. No estoppel: a minor who lies about his age is not bound because of that lie. The law of contract protects him from his own immaturity, and estoppel, now in Section 121 of the B.S.A., cannot make a void agreement valid. He may, however, be made to restore what he obtained by his fraud.
  4. No disguised tort claim: a minor cannot be made liable in tort where the tort claim is really a disguised way of enforcing the void contract.
  5. Promisee or beneficiary: a minor can be a promisee or beneficiary. A minor who has fully performed his side, for example by advancing money on a mortgage, can enforce the mortgage.
  6. Agent and partner: under Section 184, a minor may act as an agent so as to bind his principal to third persons, but he is not personally responsible to the principal. Under Section 30 of the Indian Partnership Act, a minor cannot become a partner, but may be admitted to the benefits of a partnership with the consent of all partners.
  7. Guardian's contracts: a minor cannot sue on a contract of service made for him by his guardian, because his own promise to serve cannot be consideration. A guardian may, however, bind the minor's property by a contract within his powers and for the minor's benefit.
  8. Necessaries: very important, the minor's property is liable for necessaries supplied to him under Section 68.
Case

Jennings v. Rundall: the plaintiff let a mare to a minor to be ridden moderately for a short journey. The minor rode it too hard and too far, injuring it. The owner sued in tort, not on the contract. Held: for the minor; a plaintiff cannot convert an action founded on contract into a tort to make a minor liable. Indian courts quote Lord Kenyon in this case as saying that the protection of infancy is a shield, and not a sword. Principle: a claim founded on a contract cannot be dressed up as a tort to make a minor liable. But a minor remains liable for an independent tort, like assault, which has nothing to do with any contract.

Case

Raj Rani v. Prem Adib: Raj Rani, a minor, was engaged through her father by film producer Prem Adib to act for one year for 9,500 rupees. The producer soon gave her role to another artist and terminated the contract. She sued for damages through her father. Held (Bombay High Court): she could not sue. It was not her contract, as a minor cannot appoint an agent and she was incompetent under Section 11. Her void promise to act could not be consideration for the producer's promise, so the agreement failed for want of consideration. Even if the father's promise was the consideration, damages would be his, not hers. The court refused to follow the English case Roberts v. Gray.

Restitution Against Minors and the Specific Relief Act

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Suppose a minor lies about his age, takes money or property, and then pleads that the agreement is void. Should he keep the benefit? Section 65 cannot help the other party because, as Mohori Bibee held, it presupposes competent parties. The courts turned to equity and the Specific Relief Act, and were divided.

Minor as plaintiff

Case

Jagarnath Singh v. Lalta Prasad: two minors, falsely stating they were adults, joined their guardian in selling a share of land, then sued to set aside the sale and recover the land. The trial court returned the land on condition that they refunded the money received. Held (Allahabad High Court): both judges agreed the sale was void and the minors were not estopped, and that the minors, as plaintiffs, could be made to restore what they received, though they differed on how much and on the legal basis. Principle: a minor who comes to court as plaintiff can be made to restore what he received. He who seeks equity must do equity.

Minor as defendant: two conflicting Full Benches

Case

Khan Gul v. Lakha Singh: Khan Gul, a minor, sold land for 17,500 rupees, stating he was 19. He received the price, partly in cash and partly by promissory note, but refused to hand over the land. The buyers sued for possession or, alternatively, return of their money. Held (Full Bench, Lahore High Court, Chief Justice Shadi Lal): no estoppel, and the sale could not be enforced; but in equity a minor who obtained a benefit by falsely representing his age may be required to restore it, whether plaintiff or defendant. The Chief Justice called the plaintiff/defendant difference a mere accident and said minority is a shield, not a sword. One judge dissented on this point.

Case

Ajudhia Prasad v. Chandan Lal: two minor brothers mortgaged property, their minority being fraudulently concealed. The lenders sued on the mortgage. Held (Full Bench, Allahabad High Court, unanimously): no money decree. Section 65 did not apply; Specific Relief Act relief was available only when the minor was plaintiff; a money decree against a minor defendant would enforce the void agreement in another form. The court specifically disagreed with Khan Gul. At most, specific property still traceable in the minor's hands could be ordered back.

PointKhan Gul v. Lakha Singh (Lahore FB)Ajudhia Prasad v. Chandan Lal (Allahabad FB)
Restitution against minor defendantYes; benefit restored whether plaintiff or defendantNo money decree; relief only when minor is plaintiff
ReasoningPlaintiff/defendant distinction a mere accidentMoney decree would enforce the void agreement in another form
ExtentBenefit obtained by false representationOnly specific property still traceable

Section 33, Specific Relief Act, 1963

The conflict is now largely resolved by Section 33:

  • Sub-section (1): when a court cancels an instrument, it may require the party who gets relief to restore any benefit received and pay such compensation as justice requires. So a minor plaintiff can be put on terms.
  • Sub-section (2)(b): where a defendant successfully resists a suit on the ground that the agreement is void because he was not competent under Section 11, and he received any benefit from the other party, the court may require him to restore it, to the extent that he or his estate has benefited.

The Law Commission had preferred the view in Khan Gul, and this provision largely follows it.

Key point

Restitution can now be ordered against a minor whether plaintiff or defendant. As defendant he returns only the benefit, and only to the extent he actually benefited. He is never made liable on the contract itself.

Example

A seventeen-year-old lies about his age and takes a loan of one lakh rupees. If he still has the money, the court may order its return. If he spent it on a holiday, the court cannot make him repay it from future earnings as if it were a loan.

Necessaries Supplied to a Minor (Section 68)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (46:36)

If a person incapable of entering into a contract, or anyone whom he is legally bound to support, is supplied by another person with necessaries suited to his condition in life, the supplier is entitled to be reimbursed from the property of the incapable person.

  • Applies to minors and persons of unsound mind.
  • Covers supplies to dependants he is legally bound to support, like his wife or child.
  • Goods must be necessaries suited to his condition in life.
  • Reimbursement only from his property; he is not personally liable.
  • Rationale: otherwise no one would supply food, clothes or medicine to a minor who needs them.

What are necessaries?

Not only things needed to stay alive, but things suited to the minor's station in life, like clothes, lodging, education and medical treatment. Luxuries are not necessaries, and even useful things are not necessaries if the minor already has enough of them.

Case

Nash v. Inman: a tailor supplied clothes worth over 120 pounds, including eleven fancy waistcoats, to Inman, a minor student at Cambridge University. The father proved his son already had plenty of suitable clothes. Held (Court of Appeal): the tailor could not recover. Principle: the supplier must prove the goods were suitable both to the minor's condition in life and to his actual requirements at the time of sale and delivery. The minor's liability arises from the fact of supply, not from agreement, the same idea that places Section 68 among quasi contracts.

Case

Chapple v. Cooper: a young minor widow arranged the funeral of her husband, who left no property; the undertaker sued her. Held: liable, as a decent burial of her husband was a necessary for her. Baron Alderson explained that necessaries are things without which a person cannot reasonably exist, such as food, clothing, lodging, instruction in a trade or learning, and the help and attendance of others, the particular articles varying with the person's condition in life. Under Section 68 too, supplies to those the minor must support are covered, but recovery is only from the minor's property, never from the minor personally.

Case

Roberts v. Gray: John Roberts, a famous professional billiards player, agreed with Gray, a young minor player, to go on a long world tour playing matches together. Roberts spent time and money on arrangements, but Gray backed out. Held (English Court of Appeal): Gray liable in damages; the contract as a whole was for his benefit, giving him training and experience in his profession, so it was treated like a contract for necessaries.

PointEnglish law (Roberts v. Gray)Indian law (Raj Rani; Section 68)
Executory contract for the minor's benefitEnforceable, like a contract for necessariesVoid
LiabilityMinor personally liable in damagesOnly for necessaries actually supplied, and only against the minor's property

Persons of Unsound Mind (Section 12)

A person is of sound mind for the purpose of making a contract if, at the time he makes it, he is capable of understanding it and of forming a rational judgment as to its effect upon his interests.

Key point

Two tests: capacity to understand the contract, and to form a rational judgment about its effect on his interests. Both apply at the time the contract is made.

Usual conditionOccasional conditionRule
Unsound mindSound mindMay contract when of sound mind
Sound mindUnsound mindMay not contract when of unsound mind

Illustrations: a patient in a mental hospital who is at intervals of sound mind may contract during those intervals. A sane man delirious from fever, or so drunk that he cannot understand the terms or judge their effect, cannot contract while that condition lasts.

Example

Prince is so drunk at a party that he cannot understand anything, and Farhan gets him to sign an agreement to sell his car cheaply. The agreement is void.

Burden of proof: the person alleging unsoundness must prove it. But if a person is usually of unsound mind, whoever relies on the contract must prove it was made in a lucid interval.

Persons Disqualified by Law

The Act does not list them, so other laws must be consulted:

  1. Alien enemy: a citizen of a country at war with India, or anyone living and doing business there, cannot contract with Indians during the war without the permission of the Central Government.
  2. Foreign sovereigns and ambassadors: can contract, but generally cannot be sued in Indian courts without the consent of the Central Government (Section 86, Code of Civil Procedure).
  3. Insolvent: cannot deal with property vested in the official receiver until discharged.
  4. Companies and statutory corporations: can act only within the powers given by their constitution or statute. A contract beyond those powers is ultra vires (beyond the powers) and void.

Capacity of a State to contract

Case

The Law Debenture Trust Corporation v. Ukraine: in December 2013 Ukraine issued notes worth 3 billion US dollars under English law, all bought by Russia. Ukraine did not repay on maturity in 2015, and the trustee sued in England. Ukraine pleaded lack of capacity (the borrowing exceeded limits in its own budget law), lack of authority of its Finance Minister, and duress from Russia. Held (English courts up to the UK Supreme Court): a recognised State has full capacity to contract; limits in its internal law affect at most the authority of its officials. The Finance Minister had ostensible authority, authority which Ukraine's own conduct led others to believe he had. On duress, the Supreme Court held in 2023 that economic pressure was not enough, but alleged threats of force could amount to duress, so that narrow issue was sent for trial. Principle: distinguish capacity (legal ability to contract at all) from authority (an agent's power to act for someone else).

Key point

An agreement with a minor or a person of unsound mind is void, and the other party cannot enforce it even if he acted honestly. The law protects the incapable person and leaves it to the other party to check whom he is dealing with.

Consideration: Meaning and Definition

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (53:51)

The law does not enforce a bare promise, where one person gives everything and gets nothing; it enforces a bargain. Consideration is the price for which the promise is bought, in Latin quid pro quo ("something for something").

Key point

Section 2(d): When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise.

  • Three time periods: "has done" (past), "does" (present), "promises to do" (future).
  • Two kinds of conduct: doing and abstaining, so consideration may be positive or negative.
Example

Farhan promises to pay Prince 5,000 rupees if Prince does not file a suit against him. Giving up the right to sue is good consideration.

Section 2(f): promises which form the consideration, or part of it, for each other are reciprocal promises, like the promise to deliver goods and the promise to pay for them.

Essentials of Consideration

1. At the desire of the promisor

An act done at the desire of a third person, or done voluntarily, is not consideration.

Case

Durga Prasad v. Baldeo: the plaintiff, at the Collector's request, built a market with shops in Etawah at his own expense. Traders occupying the shops later promised in writing to pay him a commission on goods sold through them, but did not pay. Held (Allahabad High Court): no consideration. The market was built at the desire of the Collector, not the defendants; the plaintiff acted to please the Collector and the defendants were not in his mind. The second exception in Section 25 did not help either, as nothing was done voluntarily for the defendants.

2. May move from the promisee or any other person

This is a special feature of Indian law.

Case

Venkata Chinnaya Rao v. Venkataramaya Garu: a woman made a registered gift of land to her daughter, requiring her to continue an annuity of 653 rupees a year that the mother paid to her own brothers. The same day the daughter promised the uncles in writing to pay it, but later refused, arguing no consideration moved from the uncles. Held (Madras High Court): under Section 2(d), consideration may be given by the promisee or any other person; the mother's gift was consideration for the daughter's promise, and gift and promise formed one transaction. The uncles could enforce it.

3. May be past, present or future

English law generally says past consideration is no consideration. The Indian Act, by the words "has done or abstained from doing", accepts past consideration, provided the past act was done at the desire of the promisor.

Example

Prince repaired Farhan's roof at Farhan's request last month; today Farhan promises to pay for it. The past repair is good consideration.

4. Must be real and have some value in the eye of the law

It must not be illusory or impossible.

Case

White v. Bluett: Bluett owed his father money on a promissory note and kept complaining that his father had given more property to his siblings. The father promised to release the debt if he stopped complaining. After the father's death, his executor, White, sued on the note. Held: stopping complaints was no consideration, as Bluett had no legal right to complain; the release was without consideration and Bluett had to pay.

Example

A promise by Farhan to pay his sister 1,000 rupees if she stops sulking is not an enforceable contract.

Case

Collins v. Godefroy: Collins was served a subpoena (a court order) to appear as a witness in Godefroy's case. He attended for six days but was never called, then sued Godefroy for six guineas for loss of time on a promise to pay him. Held: he could not recover, being already under a legal duty to attend.

Example

A police officer promised money merely for doing his normal duty gets no enforceable right.

6. The promisee's act can itself be consideration

This is the case in a unilateral contract, as in Carlill.

Case

Errington v. Errington: a father bought a house for his son and daughter-in-law, paying part of the price and taking a mortgage loan for the rest, telling them the house would be theirs if they paid the instalments until the loan was repaid. They paid regularly. The father died leaving the house to his widow; the son went to live with his mother, but the daughter-in-law stayed and kept paying. The widow sued for possession. Held (Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Denning giving the leading judgment): she could stay. The promise was a unilateral contract, the payments were the consideration, and it could not be revoked once performance had begun, so long as they continued. Principle (English law): once performance of the requested act has begun, the promisor cannot revoke at will.

Adequacy of Consideration

Consideration need not equal the promise in value. Explanation 2 to Section 25: an agreement to which the promisor's consent is freely given is not void merely because the consideration is inadequate, but inadequacy may be taken into account in deciding whether consent was freely given.

Example

From the illustrations: a man freely agrees to sell a horse worth 1,000 rupees for 10 rupees; it is a contract. If he says his consent was not free, the very low price is a fact the court should consider.

Only the parties can judge a thing's value to them. Farhan may sell his old guitar to a friend for 100 rupees because he wants it to go to a good home. But a shockingly low price makes the court look closely for coercion, undue influence or fraud.

Exceptions to Consideration (Section 25)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:00:50)

An agreement without consideration is void, except in three cases.

Exception 1: Natural love and affection

All these conditions must be met: the agreement is (1) in writing, (2) registered under the law for registration of documents, (3) made on account of natural love and affection, (4) between parties in a near relation to each other.

Example

A father who, out of natural love and affection, promises his son 1,000 rupees in a written and registered document is bound.

Case

Rajlukhy Dabee v. Bhootnath Mookerjee: a husband executed a registered written agreement promising his wife a monthly allowance so she could live separately; the document recited disagreement between them and a likelihood of quarrels. Held (Calcutta High Court): not enforceable. No consideration moved from the wife, and though the parties were near relatives and the document was written and registered, it was not made on account of natural love and affection; it spoke of quarrels, not affection. Principle: a near relationship does not by itself prove love and affection.

Case

Bhiwa v. Shivaram: one brother had sued the other for a share in property and lost, and they had long been on bad terms. The winning brother later signed a registered written agreement promising the other half of that property, to bring about a reconciliation. The lower courts held it void for want of consideration. Held (Bombay High Court): enforced under the first exception, as a promise made out of natural love and affection between brothers.

These two cases are learnt as a pair:

PointRajlukhy DabeeBhiwa v. Shivaram
What the document showedOnly quarrelsA wish to be reconciled
ResultNot enforceableEnforced

Exception 2: Compensation for past voluntary services

A promise to compensate, wholly or in part, a person who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor, or something the promisor was legally compellable to do.

Example

Farhan finds Prince's purse and returns it; Prince then promises him 50 rupees. That is a contract.

Past consideration (Section 2(d))Second exception (Section 25)
Past act done at the desire of the promisorPast act done voluntarily, not at the promisor's desire; the later promise still binds

Exception 3: Promise to pay a time-barred debt

A written promise, signed by the debtor or his authorised agent, to pay wholly or in part a debt barred by the law of limitation.

Example

Farhan owes Prince 1,000 rupees, now time-barred. A written promise signed by Farhan to pay 500 rupees on account of it is a contract.

Other cases where consideration is not needed

  • Explanation 1 to Section 25: the section does not affect the validity of a gift actually made.
  • Section 185: no consideration is needed to create an agency.
  • Section 63: a promisee may accept less than what is due in full satisfaction, without fresh consideration. If Prince accepts 2,000 rupees in full settlement of a 5,000 rupee debt, the whole debt is discharged, unlike the traditional English rule.

Charitable Subscriptions

Whether a promise to donate money for a public cause is enforceable depends on whether the promisee did something on the faith of the promise, at the implied desire of the subscriber.

Case

Kedarnath Bhattacharji v. Gorie Mahomed: a town hall was to be built in Howrah if enough money was raised by public subscription. The defendant subscribed 100 rupees. On the faith of the subscriptions, the Municipal Commissioners, including the plaintiff, contracted with a builder, and the plans and cost grew with the subscriptions. The defendant did not pay. Held (Calcutta High Court): liable. The subscribers knew the Commissioners would incur liability to the builder on the faith of their promises; in effect each said, "in consideration of your contracting to build the hall, I will contribute my amount". Incurring that liability, at the subscriber's implied desire, was good consideration.

Case

Doraiswami Iyer v. Arunachala Ayyar: temple trustees had already contracted for repairs; later, needing more money, they opened a subscription list, and the defendant wrote down 125 rupees but did not pay. Held (Madras High Court): not enforceable. The trustees had done nothing at the subscriber's desire, since the repair contract preceded the subscription. It was a bare promise.

Key point

A favourite exam comparison. In Kedarnath the promisee incurred a liability on the faith of the promise, so it was enforced. In Doraiswami the promisee did nothing on the faith of the promise, so it was not.

Unlawful Consideration and Its Effect

  • Section 23: an agreement whose consideration or object is unlawful is void.
  • Section 24: if the consideration or object is unlawful even in part, the whole agreement is void.
  • Generally, a court will not help either party recover money paid under an agreement both knew was illegal.
Example

Farhan promises to pay Prince 50,000 rupees for beating up a rival. The agreement is void.

These rules are studied in detail later, with unlawful agreements.

Doctrine of Privity of Contract

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:06:44)

Privity means the relationship between the parties to a contract. Only a party to a contract can sue on it; a stranger cannot enforce it, even if it was made for his benefit.

Case

Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company v. Selfridge and Company: Dunlop sold tyres to Dew and Company on condition that Dew would not sell below Dunlop's list prices and would take a similar promise from its buyers. Selfridge bought from Dew, promising Dew to pay Dunlop five pounds for every tyre sold below list price. Selfridge undersold, and Dunlop sued. Held (House of Lords): Dunlop could not sue. Lord Haldane's two principles: only a party to a contract can sue on it; and a person enforcing a simple contract must have given consideration for it. Dunlop was not a party to the Dew–Selfridge contract and had given Selfridge nothing.

Case

Tweddle v. Atkinson: after William Tweddle married William Guy's daughter, the two fathers agreed in writing with each other to pay money to the young husband, stating he could sue for it. Guy died without paying; the husband sued Guy's executor, Atkinson. Held: he could not sue, not being a party and no consideration having moved from him. Principle: the foundation of the English rule that consideration must move from the promisee.

Case

M. C. Chacko v. State Bank of Travancore: Held (Supreme Court): privity is part of Indian law; a stranger to a contract cannot sue on it, even though consideration may come from a third person. Indian courts, however, recognise several exceptions.

Exceptions to privity

  1. Trust or charge: a third person in whose favour a contract creates a trust or charge on property can enforce it as beneficiary.
  2. Family arrangements and marriage settlements: a family member for whose marriage expenses or maintenance a family settlement or partition provides can enforce it.
  3. Acknowledgment or estoppel: if Farhan gives Prince money to pay a shopkeeper, and Prince tells the shopkeeper he holds it for him, the shopkeeper can sue Prince.
  4. Agency: a principal can sue and be sued on contracts made through his agent.
  5. Assignment: contractual rights, like the right to receive money, can be transferred, and the assignee can enforce them.
  6. Covenants running with the land.
Case

Smith and Snipes Hall Farm v. River Douglas Catchment Board: the Catchment Board agreed with several landowners, including Ellen Smith, to widen, repair and maintain for all time the banks of a brook; the landowners contributed to the cost. Ellen Smith sold her land to a buyer, also named Smith, who let it to Snipes Hall Farm. The work was badly done, the banks burst and the land flooded. Held (Court of Appeal): the buyer and his tenant could sue though neither was a party, because the promise related to the land and, under the English Law of Property Act, such a covenant is deemed made with later owners and those deriving title from them. Lord Justice Denning also attacked the privity rule itself, but that reasoning was later rejected by the House of Lords.

In India, a related idea appears in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act: certain contractual obligations attached to land can be enforced against a later owner who takes the land with notice of them, or without paying for it.

In England, the strict rule was reformed by the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act, 1999, which lets a third party enforce a term that expressly gives him that right, or that purports to benefit him, unless the parties intended otherwise. India has no such general statute.

Privity of Contract and Privity of Consideration

  • Privity of contract: only a party to the contract can sue.
  • Privity of consideration: only a person who gave consideration can sue.
RuleEnglish common lawIndian law
Privity of contractRequiredRequired
Privity of considerationRequired (Tweddle v. Atkinson)Not required (Venkata Chinnaya Rao), as Section 2(d) says "the promisee or any other person"
Key point

In India, a stranger to consideration can sue, but a stranger to the contract cannot. If the promise was made to you, you can sue on it, even if someone else paid for it.

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:11:51)

Section 10 requires an agreement to be made by the free consent of the parties. Two questions arise: what is consent, and when is consent free?

Two or more persons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense (consensus ad idem). It is not enough that both say yes; they must say yes to the same thing, understood in the same way.

Case

Raffles v. Wichelhaus: Raffles agreed to sell Wichelhaus 125 bales of Surat cotton, to arrive by the ship Peerless from Bombay. Two ships called Peerless sailed from Bombay, one in October and one in December. The buyers meant the October ship; the seller offered cotton from the December ship, which the buyers refused. Held: judgment for the buyers. Principle: when the parties understand the same words in different senses, there is no real agreement and no binding contract.

Example

Prince agrees to sell Farhan his Swift car, meaning his old white one, while Farhan thinks he is buying the new red one. There is no consensus.

Consent is free when it is not caused by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake, subject to Sections 20, 21 and 22. Consent is "so caused" when it would not have been given but for the existence of such factor. This is the "but for" test: would the person have agreed but for the pressure or deception? (See Smith v. Chadwick under fraud.)

Key point

No consent vs. consent not free. With no consent at all (Raffles v. Wichelhaus) there is no agreement. With consent that is not free, the contract usually exists but is voidable by the party whose consent was not free, except for a mutual mistake of fact, which makes the agreement void.

Coercion (Section 15)

Coercion is:

  • committing, or threatening to commit, any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code; or
  • unlawfully detaining, or threatening to detain, any property,

to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement. By the Explanation, it is immaterial whether the Indian Penal Code is in force in the place where the coercion is employed.

The Indian Penal Code has been replaced by the B.N.S., 2023, from 1 July 2024. Under the General Clauses Act and a government notification of 2024, references to the old Code in other laws are read as references to the B.N.S. Section 15 therefore now effectively speaks of acts forbidden by the B.N.S.

Features

  • It may be directed against any person: a threat to harm Farhan's child is coercion against Farhan.
  • It may come from anyone, even a stranger to the contract.
  • A threat to file a genuine civil suit is not coercion, because filing a suit is lawful.
Case

Chikkam Ammiraju v. Chikkam Seshamma: Seshamma's husband threatened to commit suicide unless she and her son signed a release deed giving up their rights in certain lands in favour of his younger brothers, one of whom was Ammiraju. They signed, and later sued to set the release aside. Held: the Madras High Court, by two to one, held that a threat of suicide is a threat to commit an act forbidden by the Penal Code. Chief Justice Wallis reasoned that since the Code punished both abetment of and attempt to commit suicide, suicide was a forbidden act, even though one who succeeds is beyond punishment. The release was obtained by coercion and was voidable. The dissenting judge read Section 15 strictly. Principle: a threat of suicide can be coercion, and coercion can come from a non-party.

Modern position: the B.N.S. has no general offence of attempting suicide, except an attempt made to compel or restrain a public servant from doing his official duty (Section 226). Abetment of suicide is still an offence. Part of the reasoning has therefore weakened and its effect on the case is not yet settled; it is an open question, though the case remains the leading authority.

Case

Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti: a wealthy man died leaving a widow of about thirteen. While his body lay in the house, persons including relatives of a boy, Alwar, would not allow it to be removed for cremation until she adopted Alwar and signed an adoption deed. She did so. The boy later sued to claim the property as her adopted son. Held: the Madras High Court held the adoption not binding. Obstructing the removal of a corpse to force adoption was an unlawful act within Section 15 or Section 16, and but for it there would have been no adoption. A required adoption ceremony had also not been performed. Principle: consent extracted by such pressure at a moment of grief is not free consent.

Case

Muthiah Chetti v. Karuppan Chetti: Muthiah, agent of a banking firm managing its shops in Singapore, refused to hand over account books, documents and cash to the new agent unless the firm executed a release deed freeing him from all claims. Fearing heavy loss from the stoppage of business, the firm signed. Held: the Madras High Court held that withholding the firm's property was coercion by unlawful detention of property under Section 15, so the release was voidable. But the firm lost, because it had later affirmed the release through its counsel's statement in a Singapore court. Principle: detaining property to force an agreement is coercion, but a voidable contract, once affirmed, can no longer be set aside.

Case

Askari Mirza v. Bibi Jai Kishori (Judicial Commissioner's Court of Awadh): a minor who had borrowed on mortgages agreed to a compromise, then claimed he agreed only because he was threatened with prosecution for cheating by lying about his age. Held: a threat to prosecute is not in itself an act forbidden by the Penal Code; it is coercion only if it is a threat to bring a false charge. As the lower court had not decided whether the charge was true, the case was remanded for a fresh trial.

An agreement to drop a criminal prosecution in return for money may itself be void under Section 23.

Effect (Section 19): when consent is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused.

Undue Influence (Section 16)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:19:19)

Coercion is pressure by threat; undue influence is pressure through a relationship.

Key point

Section 16(1): a contract is induced by undue influence where the relations between the parties are such that one of them is in a position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other.

Both elements are needed; a relationship alone is not enough. A father who buys his son's land at a fair price, with the son's free agreement, does not use undue influence.

Presumed domination: Section 16(2)

A person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another where he:

  • holds a real or apparent authority over the other (e.g. parent, employer);
  • stands in a fiduciary relation (trust and confidence) to the other (e.g. doctor and patient, lawyer and client, spiritual guru and disciple); or
  • contracts with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by age, illness, or mental or bodily distress.

Burden of proof: Section 16(3)

Where a person in a position to dominate the will of another contracts with him, and the transaction appears, on its face or on the evidence, to be unconscionable (grossly unfair), the dominating party must prove that the contract was not induced by undue influence. A related rule, now in Section 114 of the B.S.A., requires a person in a position of active confidence to prove the good faith of a transaction with the person who trusted him.

Illustrations

  • A father misusing his influence to obtain from his son, just come of age, a bond for more than is due: undue influence.
  • A medical attendant obtaining an unreasonable fee from an old and sick patient: undue influence.
  • A debtor already indebted to his village moneylender takes a fresh loan on apparently unconscionable terms: the moneylender must disprove undue influence.
  • A banker lending at an unusually high rate when money is scarce in the market: ordinary business, not undue influence.
Case

Wajid Khan v. Raja Ewaz Ali Khan (Privy Council): an elderly widow of about sixty-five, with little education, relied completely on her managing agent, Dalmir Khan, as her only adviser. By deed she gave him management of twenty-nine villages for ever, in the name of maintaining her and her husband's tombs. The tombs needed only a small part of the income, leaving the agent a large surplus, and he gave nothing in return. She revoked the deed; the agent's son sued for the villages. Held: claim dismissed. A person in a position of confidence receiving such a benefit must prove that the transaction was honest and that the lady had independent advice, or at least a real opportunity of knowing exactly what she was doing. This was not shown, and the facts showed active undue influence. The deed predated the Contract Act, so general principles of equity, now reflected in Section 16, were applied.

Pardanashin women

Courts specially protect a pardanashin woman, one who lives in complete seclusion behind the veil. The Supreme Court has held that whoever relies on a transaction with such a woman must prove that she executed it after clearly understanding its nature, so that it was her mental act and not merely her physical act.

Case

Sheikh Ismail v. Amir Bibi: the lady had appeared before the Registrar to register documents, given evidence as a witness in court, and managed her tenants and collected rent. Held: the Bombay High Court held she was not a pardanashin woman, since the protection applies only to women in complete seclusion, not to those who deal with the outside world. Only the ordinary rules of Section 16 applied.

Case

Rani Annapurni Nachiar v. Swaminatha Chettiar: a widow who had received no maintenance for ten years after her husband's death borrowed 1,500 rupees from a moneylender to fund her efforts to establish her right to maintenance, at 100 per cent interest a year, secured on her future maintenance. Held: the Madras High Court held that urgent need alone is not enough, but the relations between the parties include the circumstances of the deal; the lender was in a position to dominate the will of a poor widow in desperate need. The bargain was unconscionable, so under Section 16(3) the lender had to prove absence of undue influence, and failed. The court did not wipe out the debt but allowed recovery with interest reduced to 24 per cent a year. Principle: a court may reopen an unconscionable bargain and, under Section 19A, give relief on just terms instead of cancelling the contract.

Effect (Section 19A): a contract induced by undue influence is voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused. It may be set aside absolutely or, if that party has received any benefit under it, on such terms and conditions as the court thinks just.

Coercion and undue influence compared

BasisCoercionUndue influence
NaturePressure by threat or a forbidden act, often a crimeMental pressure; misuse of trust or authority; not a crime
RelationshipNone neededArises from a relationship in which one can dominate the other
Who exercises itAnyone, even a stranger, against anyoneThe dominating party to the contract
EffectVoidable (Section 19)Voidable; court may set aside on just terms (Section 19A)

Fraud (Section 17)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:26:11)

Fraud means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to the contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:

  1. the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true;
  2. the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact;
  3. a promise made without any intention of performing it;
  4. any other act fitted to deceive;
  5. any act or omission which the law specially declares to be fraudulent.

The key idea in fraud is dishonesty.

Example

Prince sells his car to Farhan saying it has never been in an accident, knowing it was badly damaged in a crash: fraud. If Prince paints over the rust so Farhan cannot see it: active concealment.

Silence (Explanation to Section 17)

Mere silence as to facts likely to affect a person's willingness to contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances make it the duty of the silent person to speak, or the silence is in itself equivalent to speech.

Example

A seller auctions a horse he knows to be unsound and says nothing: not fraud. If the buyer is his own daughter just come of age, the relationship creates a duty to speak. If the buyer says, "If you do not deny it, I shall assume the horse is sound," and the seller stays silent, his silence is equivalent to speech.

Case

Derry v. Peek (House of Lords): a tramway company could use steam power only with the Board of Trade's consent. Its directors' prospectus said the company had the right to use steam power, honestly believing consent would be a formality. Consent was refused and the company was wound up. Peek, who bought shares on the prospectus, sued for fraud. Held: the directors were not liable because they honestly believed the statement. Lord Herschell: fraud is proved when a false representation is made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. Principle: a false statement honestly believed is not fraud, even if the belief was careless. In India such an honest but unfounded statement would be misrepresentation under Section 18.

Case

Peek v. Gurney (House of Lords): the bill brokers Overend, Gurney and Company had huge bad debts. The partners formed a new company to take over the business; its prospectus presented the business as flourishing while concealing a deed making the new company carry the old firm's bad debts. The company collapsed. Peek, who bought shares later in the market, not from the company, sued the directors. Held: (1) mere non-disclosure is not fraud, but a literally true statement made misleading by what it omits, a half-truth, can be, and this prospectus was misleading; (2) Peek still lost, because a prospectus is addressed only to those invited to apply for shares from the company, and once shares are allotted its purpose is exhausted, so a later market buyer cannot sue on it. Principle: silence is not fraud, but a misleading half-truth is, and the deception must be aimed at the claimant.

Case

Smith v. Chadwick (House of Lords): a prospectus described an ironworks' output impressively, stating that the value of the turnover or output was over one million pounds a year. Smith bought shares, the company failed, and he sued for fraud. Held: he must prove he was actually deceived and induced by the statement. The statement was ambiguous (actual or possible output), and Smith could not show he understood it in the false sense and relied on it. A false statement naming a Member of Parliament as director did not help, as he had never heard of that man. His claim failed. Principle: a false statement makes a contract voidable only if it actually caused the consent, as the Explanation to Section 19 provides.

Effect of fraud (Section 19)

  • The contract is voidable at the option of the deceived party.
  • He may instead insist on performance and on being put in the position he would have been in had the representations been true.
  • He may also claim damages in the tort of deceit.

Exception: if consent was caused by misrepresentation or fraudulent silence, the contract is not voidable if the party had the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence. This does not protect active fraud: a deliberate liar cannot say the victim should have checked.

Misrepresentation (Section 18)

Misrepresentation is a false statement made innocently, without intention to deceive. Its three forms are:

  1. positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that which is not true, though he believes it to be true;
  2. any breach of duty which, without intent to deceive, gains an advantage to the person committing it by misleading another to his prejudice;
  3. causing, however innocently, a party to an agreement to make a mistake as to the substance of the thing which is its subject.
Example

Prince tells Farhan his car gives twenty kilometres per litre because a friend said so, without checking; it actually gives twelve. That is misrepresentation, and Farhan can cancel the contract.

Fraud and misrepresentation compared

BasisFraudMisrepresentation
IntentionIntends to deceiveHonestly believes the statement
RemedyVoidable; also damages in tortVoidable; main remedy is rescission
Ordinary diligence exceptionNot available to one guilty of active fraudAvailable
CrimeMay also be a crimeNot a crime

Mistake of Fact and Law

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:32:55)

Mutual mistake of fact (Section 20)

Where both parties are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, the agreement is void.

Example

A cargo supposed to be on its way from England to Bombay had already been lost before the bargain, unknown to both: the agreement is void. So too a sale of a horse which, unknown to both, was already dead.

Explanation: an erroneous opinion as to the value of the thing is not a mistake of fact. If both think a painting is worth ten thousand rupees and it is worth one lakh, the contract stands.

Mistake of law (Section 21)

A contract is not voidable for a mistake as to any law in force in India, since everyone is presumed to know the law of the land. A mistake as to a law not in force in India has the same effect as a mistake of fact. Illustration: a contract made on the mistaken belief that a debt is barred by the Indian law of limitation is not voidable.

Unilateral mistake (Section 22)

A contract is not voidable merely because one party was under a mistake as to a matter of fact. If Prince buys a phone thinking it has a better camera than it does, without any misrepresentation by the seller, he is bound. But a mistake as to the identity of the other party, where identity is vital, can prevent a contract altogether.

Case

Cundy v. Lindsay (House of Lords): a rogue, Blenkarn, hired a room on Wood Street, London, where a respectable firm, Blenkiron and Son, also did business. He ordered handkerchiefs from Lindsay, a linen manufacturer, by letters signed to look like "Blenkiron and Company". Lindsay sent the goods to that name at the rogue's address. Blenkarn never paid and sold them to Cundy, an innocent buyer. Held: there was no contract between Lindsay and Blenkarn at all, since Lindsay intended to deal only with the respectable firm and never thought of Blenkarn. Blenkarn got no title and could pass none; Cundy had to pay Lindsay.

Case

Phillips v. Brooks: North entered Phillips's jewellery shop, chose pearls and a ring, and wrote a cheque saying "I am Sir George Bullough", giving an address. Phillips checked a directory, found Sir George lived there, and let him take the ring. North pawned it with Brooks, a good-faith pawnbroker; the cheque bounced. Held: Phillips contracted to sell to the person in his shop, whoever he was; his mistake was as to creditworthiness, not identity. The contract was only voidable for fraud, and as Brooks took the ring in good faith before Phillips avoided the contract, Brooks kept it.

BasisCundy v. LindsayPhillips v. Brooks
DealingBy letters; seller intended to deal only with a particular existing firmFace to face; seller presumed to intend to deal with the person in front of him
ContractVoidVoidable
Innocent third partyGets nothingProtected if he buys before the contract is avoided
Key point

Mistake summarised: a mutual mistake of an essential fact makes the agreement void; a mistake of Indian law does not affect the contract; a mistake of foreign law is treated as a mistake of fact; a unilateral mistake of fact generally does not affect the contract, except in special cases like mistaken identity where identity is vital.

Effect of the Vitiating Factors

  • Coercion, fraud and misrepresentation: contract voidable (Section 19).
  • Undue influence: voidable, with power to impose just terms (Section 19A).
  • Mutual mistake of an essential fact: agreement void (Section 20).
  • No consensus at all, as in Raffles v. Wichelhaus: no agreement.

A voidable contract is valid until avoided; the innocent party may affirm or rescind it. On rescission, Section 64 requires him to restore any benefit received, and under Section 66 rescission is communicated like a proposal. The right to rescind is lost if he affirms the contract after knowing the truth or being free of the pressure (Muthiah Chetti), if he delays unreasonably, or if an innocent third party acquires rights first (Phillips v. Brooks).

Example

Prince forces Farhan at knife point to agree to sell his bike: coercion. Prince, as Farhan's spiritual guru, misuses that influence: undue influence. Prince lies about the market price of bikes: fraud. Prince honestly states a wrong price his information does not support: misrepresentation. In all four, the contract is voidable. If both believed the bike existed when it had been destroyed the night before, the agreement is void for mutual mistake.

Unlawful Object and Consideration

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:38:50)

Freedom of contract is not unlimited. Contracts cannot be used to commit crimes, cheat others or harm the public, so the law limits this freedom, mainly in Sections 23 to 30. Contingent contracts follow in Sections 31 to 36.

Section 23

The consideration or object of an agreement is lawful unless it:

  1. is forbidden by law;
  2. is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law;
  3. is fraudulent;
  4. involves or implies injury to the person or property of another; or
  5. is regarded by the court as immoral or opposed to public policy.

Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. Consideration is what each party gives in return; object is the purpose of the agreement. If Prince lends money to Farhan so that Farhan can buy smuggled goods, the money is lawful consideration but the object is unlawful, so the agreement is void.

The heads explained

  • Forbidden by law: e.g. an agreement to sell liquor where the law prohibits it.
  • Defeating the provisions of law: not directly forbidden, but designed to get around a law, e.g. a debtor handing his property to a friend so creditors cannot reach it.
  • Fraudulent: e.g. an agreement to cheat a third person.
  • Injury to person or property: e.g. an agreement to beat up a rival or damage his crops.
  • Immoral: confined by courts mainly to sexual immorality; an agreement to let a house knowing it will be used for prostitution is void, and the landlord cannot sue for rent.
  • Opposed to public policy: harmful to the interest of the public at large. Illustrations to Section 23: paying money to obtain a job in the public service, and agreeing to drop a prosecution for robbery in return for the value of the stolen goods. Both are void.

Section 24: unlawful in part

If any part of a single consideration for one or more objects, or any one or part of any one of several considerations for a single object, is unlawful, the agreement is void. If Prince agrees, for one single salary, to manage Farhan's business comprising a legal and an illegal trade, the whole agreement is void, as the parts cannot be separated.

Case

Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya (Supreme Court, Justice Subba Rao): the leading case on public policy. Gherulal and Mahadeodas formed a partnership, sharing profit and loss equally, to enter into forward contracts for wheat with two firms in Hapur. These were wagers, as only price differences were to be paid. Mahadeodas paid the whole loss and sued for Gherulal's half. Gherulal argued that the partnership was unlawful under Section 23 because its object was wagering. Held: Gherulal was liable. (1) Section 30 makes wagers void but not forbidden by law, so a collateral agreement like this partnership is not unlawful, except in the former State of Bombay, where a special law also voided collateral agreements. (2) Public policy should be applied only in clear cases of harm to the public; its heads are settled and, though not closed, courts should be very slow to invent new ones. (3) Wagers are not against public policy in India, and "immoral" in Section 23 refers mainly to sexual immorality. Principle: a void agreement is not the same as an illegal agreement, and public policy must be applied with great caution.

Void Agreements

Besides agreements with unlawful object or consideration and agreements without consideration under Section 25 (void except in its three cases), the Act expressly declares the following agreements void.

Restraint of marriage (Section 26)

Every agreement in restraint of the marriage of any person other than a minor is void. Marriage is a basic personal freedom that no one may buy away. An agreement restraining a minor's marriage is not void under this section, which fits the policy against child marriage.

Case

Lowe v. Peers: Peers promised Mrs Lowe by sealed document that he would marry no one but her, and would pay her one thousand pounds if he married anyone else. He married another woman. The jury awarded her the money, but the court set the judgment aside. Held: this was not a promise to marry her, since she was not bound to marry him, but simply a promise not to marry anyone else, which is void as in restraint of marriage. She got nothing.

Case

Rao Rani v. Gulab Rani: two widows of the same man compromised a property dispute: each would hold half, but a widow who remarried would forfeit her share to the other. Gulab Rani remarried and sued for her share, calling the forfeiture clause void under Section 26. Held: the Allahabad High Court ruled against her. The family settlement did not restrain remarriage; it only attached a consequence, loss of a share, if she chose to remarry. The court doubted whether Section 26 covers partial or indirect restraints at all. Principle: merely attaching a property consequence to remarriage is not, by itself, a restraint of marriage.

Restraint of trade (Section 27)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:42:48)

Every agreement by which anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind is, to that extent, void. Reasons: every person has a right to earn a living, and the public benefits from competition. "To that extent" means only the restraining part is void; the rest may survive.

Exception: sale of goodwill

A seller of the goodwill (reputation and customers) of a business may agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within specified local limits, so long as the buyer, or anyone deriving title to the goodwill from him, carries on a like business there, provided the limits appear to the court reasonable having regard to the nature of the business.

Example

Prince sells his famous sweet shop in a market to Farhan and promises not to open another sweet shop in that market area. The promise is valid; otherwise Prince could take back all the customers the next day.

Case

Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company (House of Lords): Nordenfelt, a famous gun and ammunition maker, sold his business with goodwill for a very large price, and later promised not, for twenty-five years, to make guns or ammunition anywhere in the world, nor engage in any business competing with the company. He broke the promise. Held: the worldwide restraint on making guns and ammunition was valid, since the customers were a few governments across the world, and the restraint was reasonable between the parties and did not harm the public. The wider promise not to engage in any competing business was too wide and was cut out. Principle (English test): a restraint is valid if reasonable in the interests of the parties and of the public.

Case

Madhub Chunder v. Rajcoomar Doss (Calcutta High Court): the plaintiff sold copper utensils in a locality of Calcutta. Rival traders there promised to repay advances he had paid to his workmen if he closed his business. He closed his shop; they did not pay; he sued for 900 rupees. Held: the agreement was void under Section 27. Chief Justice Couch said the section is not limited to total restraints but applies equally to partial restraints limited to a place, otherwise the goodwill exception would be unnecessary; the court had nothing to do with the policy of the law. As the plaintiff's promise to stop trading was void, the defendants' promise had no valid consideration. Principle: in India every restraint of trade, total or partial, reasonable or unreasonable, is void unless within the statutory exception.

Case

S. B. Fraser and Company v. Bombay Ice Manufacturing Company (Bombay High Court): four Bombay ice manufacturers formed a pool, agreeing a minimum selling price, sharing production and profits in fixed proportions, and using a common fund. Fraser broke away and sold below the agreed price, and pleaded Sections 27 and 23 when sued. Held: defence rejected. Though the object was to limit competition and keep up prices, the members were not restrained from trading; they had only agreed how to carry on their trade. Principle: Section 27 strikes at agreements that stop a person from trading, not those that merely regulate how parties trade. Today such price fixing between competitors may be forbidden by the Competition Act.

English law (Nordenfelt)Indian law (Section 27, Madhub Chunder)
Restraint valid if reasonable in the interests of the parties and of the publicEvery restraint, total or partial, reasonable or unreasonable, is void, except sale of goodwill

Indian position summarised

  • Any restraint, total or partial, on lawful trade, profession or business is void, except sale of goodwill.
  • A restraint operating during the term of a contract (e.g. not working for a competitor while employed) is generally valid.
  • A restraint operating after the contract ends (e.g. never working for a rival after leaving) is void.
  • An agreement to keep trade secrets confidential is valid, as it does not stop anyone working.
Example

Prince, a software engineer, promises not to join any rival company for two years after resigning: unenforceable. His promise not to disclose his employer's source code: enforceable.

Void to that extent are agreements which:

  • restrict a party absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals;
  • limit the time within which he may enforce his rights; or
  • (after a 1997 amendment) extinguish the rights of, or discharge from liability, any party on the expiry of a specified period, so as to restrict enforcement of rights.

Access to justice is a public right, and limitation is fixed by law, not private agreement. A clause that Prince will never go to court, or that any claim must be filed within one month when the law allows three years, is void.

Exceptions

  • Agreements to refer future or existing disputes to arbitration are valid; arbitration only provides a different forum.
  • Under an amendment in force from 2013, a bank or financial institution may provide in a guarantee that rights will be extinguished on expiry of a specified period, not less than one year from the specified event.
  • Choosing one of several courts already having jurisdiction is valid, but parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that has none.

Uncertain agreements (Section 29)

Agreements whose meaning is not certain, or capable of being made certain, are void; a court cannot enforce a promise it cannot identify.

Example

An agreement to sell a hundred tons of oil, with nothing to show what kind, is void; but if the seller deals only in coconut oil, it means coconut oil and is valid. A sale at a price to be fixed by a named third person is valid, as the price can be made certain. A sale of a white horse for five hundred rupees or one thousand rupees is void, as nothing shows which price is payable.

Case

Guthing v. Lynn: a buyer bought a horse for a fixed price, promising to pay five pounds more, or buy another horse, if it proved lucky. Held: the court called the extra promise much too loose and vague to be considered in a court of law, a mere honorary understanding. The sale was valid, but the "lucky" promise was unenforceable. Principle: a promise too vague to be given a definite meaning is not enforceable.

Wagering Agreements (Section 30)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:53:06)

Agreements by way of wager are void. No suit lies to recover anything alleged to be won on a wager, or entrusted to anyone to abide the result of any game or uncertain event on which a wager is made.

Key point

Wager (Justice Hawkins, trial court, Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Company): the Act does not define a wager. In substance, it is a contract in which two persons, holding opposite views about an uncertain future event, agree that, depending on its outcome, one shall win from the other a sum of money or other stake, neither having any other interest in the contract than the stake he will win or lose.

Essentials

  1. A promise to pay money or money's worth depending on an uncertain event.
  2. Each party stands to win or lose.
  3. Neither controls the event.
  4. Neither has any real interest in the event other than the stake.

If Prince and Farhan bet one thousand rupees on whether it will rain tomorrow, that is a void wager.

Transactions that are not wagers

  • Horse race prizes: Section 30 does not render unlawful a subscription or contribution, or agreement to subscribe or contribute, towards a prize of five hundred rupees or more for the winner of a horse race.
  • Games of skill: the Supreme Court has held that competitions in which success depends substantially on skill are not gambling.
  • Insurance: the insured has an insurable interest and suffers real loss if the event happens; insurance is a contract of indemnity, not a wager.
  • Commercial contracts to buy or sell goods or shares at a future date, unless both parties intend never to deliver but only to settle price differences.

Effect: a wager is void but, in most of India, not illegal. As Gherulal Parakh held, collateral transactions, like a partnership to carry on such dealings or a loan to pay off a lost bet, are not necessarily affected.

Wagering agreementContingent contract
A kind of contingent agreementNot always a wager
Each party may win or lose; no interest in the event except the stakeA party has a real interest in the event (e.g. insurance)
VoidValid

Contingent Contracts (Sections 31 to 36)

Key point

Section 31: a contingent contract is a contract to do or not to do something if some event, collateral to such contract, does or does not happen. "Collateral" means the event is not the performance itself but something outside it.

Illustration: a contract to pay a person ten thousand rupees if his house is burnt. Insurance and guarantees are common examples.

Rules of enforcement

  • Section 32 (event happening): cannot be enforced until the uncertain future event has happened; if the event becomes impossible, the contract becomes void. If Prince promises Farhan fifty thousand rupees if Farhan marries Zoya, and Zoya dies unmarried, the contract becomes void.
  • Section 33 (event not happening): enforceable when the happening of the event becomes impossible, and not before; e.g. a promise to pay if a ship does not return becomes enforceable when the ship sinks.
  • Section 34 (future conduct of a living person): the event is considered impossible when that person does anything making it impossible that he should so act within any definite time, or otherwise than under further contingencies. If Prince agrees to pay Farhan if Farhan marries Zoya, and Zoya marries someone else, the marriage is now considered impossible, although her husband may die and she may later marry Farhan.
  • Section 35 (fixed time): a contract contingent on an event happening within a fixed time becomes void if it does not happen within that time or becomes impossible before it expires. A contract contingent on an event not happening within a fixed time may be enforced when the time expires without the event, or earlier if it becomes certain it will not happen.
  • Section 36 (impossible events): contingent agreements dependent on an impossible event are void, whether or not the impossibility is known to the parties, e.g. a promise to pay if two straight lines should enclose a space.

Cases

Case

Frost v. Knight: a promise to marry after the death of the promisor's father was a contingent contract. Held: it could be broken in advance, even before the contingency happened.

Case

Pym v. Campbell: the defendants agreed to buy a share in Pym's invented machine only if two engineers they chose approved it. One approved; the other could not be found. To save another meeting, they signed a written agreement on the oral understanding that it would not take effect unless the second engineer approved. He did not, and Pym sued on the writing. Held: the defendants could prove the oral understanding and were not liable. Evidence to vary a written agreement is barred, but evidence that there never was a binding agreement is allowed. Principle: parties may make the very existence of a contract depend on a condition precedent. The same rule now appears in the third proviso to Section 95 of the B.S.A.

Case

Brown v. Knowsley Borough Council (English Employment Appeal Tribunal): Mrs Brown, a temporary college lecturer, was appointed only so long as sufficient funds were provided for the courses, mainly by the Manpower Services Commission, a government training agency. When the funds stopped, her employment ended and she claimed dismissal. Held: she was not dismissed; her contract ended automatically on a future event, the ending of funding, not by any act of her employer.

Key point

Pym v. Campbell vs. Brown v. Knowsley: in Pym, the event was a condition that had to happen before the contract came into force; in Brown, the event was a condition that brought an existing contract to an end.

Discharge of Contract

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:00:19)

Discharge means that the contract comes to an end and the parties are freed from their obligations under it.

Key point

Modes of discharge: (1) performance, (2) agreement, (3) lapse of time, (4) operation of law, (5) impossibility, (6) breach.

Discharge by Performance

Performance is the most natural mode of discharge: when Prince delivers the phone and Farhan pays the price, the contract is discharged.

Section 37

  • The parties must perform, or offer to perform, their promises, unless performance is dispensed with or excused by law.
  • Promises bind the representatives of a promisor who dies before performance, unless a contrary intention appears.
Example

If Prince dies after agreeing to sell his car, his heirs must complete the sale. If Prince was a singer who agreed to sing at a wedding, his heirs cannot be asked to sing, because the promise was personal.

Tender: attempted performance (Section 38)

Performance may be actual or attempted. Attempted performance, an offer to perform, is called a tender. If a proper tender is refused, the promisor is not responsible for non-performance and does not lose his rights under the contract. A valid tender must:

  • be unconditional;
  • be made at the proper time and place;
  • give the promisee a reasonable opportunity to see that the promisor is able and willing to do the whole of what he promised;
  • where goods are offered, give the promisee a fair chance to check them.
Example

Prince brings 100 bags of rice to Farhan's godown on the agreed day, during business hours, and Farhan refuses them. Prince has made a valid tender and can sue for breach.

Other provisions on performance

  • Sections 40 to 50: who must perform; time and place of performance.
  • Sections 51 to 58: reciprocal promises.
  • Section 55: time as the essence of the contract.
Time is of the essenceTime is not of the essence
Failure to perform in time makes the contract voidable at the option of the promisee.The contract does not become voidable, but the promisee can claim compensation for the delay.
A promisee who accepts late performance cannot claim compensation for the delay unless he gives notice of his claim at the time of accepting.—
Case

Bhudar Chandra Goswami v. Betts: Betts hired an elephant from Goswami for Rs. 700 for an operation to capture wild elephants, to be delivered on 1 October. Goswami obtained an extension to 6 October but offered the elephant only on 11 October; Betts refused it and sued. Held (Calcutta High Court, Justice Ashutosh Mukherjee): time was of the essence. Parties do not fix a date in a business contract unless it matters, and Goswami's own request for an extension showed the date was important. Betts could reject the late delivery and claim damages under Section 73, but only for losses actually proved. Principle: whether time is essential depends on the intention of the parties, gathered from the terms and their conduct.

Appropriation of Payments and Clayton's Rule

Where a debtor owes several separate debts to the same creditor and pays an amount that does not clear all of them:

SectionSituationRule
59Debtor expressly or impliedly indicates the debtPayment must be applied to that debt.
60Debtor gives no indicationCreditor may apply it to any lawful debt due to him, even one barred by limitation.
61Neither party appropriatesApplied to debts in order of time; if the debts are of equal standing, proportionately. This reflects Clayton's Rule.
Case

Devaynes v. Noble (Clayton's Case): Devaynes, a partner in a London bank, died; the surviving partners carried on the bank, which failed the next year. Clayton, a current-account customer, was owed about 1,700 pounds at Devaynes' death. His later withdrawals exceeded that old balance, though later deposits kept the account in credit. He tried to make Devaynes' estate liable for the old balance. Held (Sir William Grant, Master of the Rolls): in a running account, the sum first paid in is the sum first drawn out. The old balance had been used up by withdrawals after the death; what remained came from later deposits, for which only the surviving partners were liable. Principle: "first in, first out" (Clayton's Rule) is only a presumption, applied where neither party has appropriated the payment.

Section 62: if the parties agree to substitute a new contract, or to rescind or alter it, the original contract need not be performed.

ModeMeaningExample
NovationSubstituting a new contract for the old one, between the same or different parties. The new contract must itself be valid.Farhan owes Prince Rs. 50,000; all three agree that Aadil will pay Prince instead, and Farhan is released.
RescissionCancelling the contract by mutual agreement.Both agree to cancel the sale of a flat and the advance is returned.
AlterationChanging the terms by consent.Delivery date moved from May to June.

Section 63: a promisee may dispense with or remit performance wholly or in part, extend the time, or accept any other satisfaction he thinks fit.

Key point

A creditor who accepts Rs. 2,000 in full satisfaction of a debt of Rs. 5,000 discharges the whole debt. This is remission, or accord and satisfaction, and in India it needs no fresh consideration.

Discharge by Lapse of Time and by Operation of Law

Lapse of time: under Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit for compensation for breach of contract must generally be filed within three years of the breach. After that the remedy is barred, but strictly the debt is not extinguished; that is why a written and signed promise to pay a time-barred debt is valid under Section 25.

Operation of law (without any act of the parties):

  • death of a party, where the contract is personal;
  • insolvency;
  • merger of a lower right into a higher one, as when a tenant buys the house he rented;
  • unauthorised material alteration of a written contract;
  • rights and liabilities becoming vested in the same person.

Discharge by Impossibility: Doctrine of Frustration (Section 56)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:07:37)

Paragraph of Section 56Rule
First: initial impossibilityAn agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void (e.g. to discover treasure by magic).
Second: supervening impossibility (frustration)A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful.
Third: compensationA promisor who knew, or with reasonable diligence might have known, and the promisee did not know, that the act was impossible or unlawful must compensate the promisee for loss caused by non-performance.
Example

Illustrations to Section 56: (a) two persons contract to marry and one goes mad before the marriage: the contract becomes void; (b) a person contracts to take in cargo at a foreign port and his Government declares war against that country: void when war is declared; (c) a performer engaged at a theatre for six months is too ill to act on several occasions: the contract to act on those occasions becomes void; (d) a man contracts to marry a woman knowing he is already married and that his law forbids polygamy: he must compensate her.

Rationale: parties contract on the basis that certain things will continue, such as the subject matter or a performer's health. When an unexpected event destroys that basis, holding them to the literal terms would be unjust.

Classic English cases

Case

Taylor v. Caldwell: Caldwell agreed to give Taylor the use of the Surrey Gardens and Music Hall for four days of concerts at 100 pounds a day. Before the first concert the hall was destroyed by fire without anyone's fault, and Taylor sued for wasted expenses. Held: the contract was discharged and neither party was liable. Justice Blackburn: where performance depends on the continued existence of a particular thing, there is an implied condition that the parties are excused if it perishes without the fault of either. Principle: destruction of the subject matter frustrates the contract (e.g. a wedding hall burning down a week before the wedding).

Case

Krell v. Henry: Henry hired Krell's flat in Pall Mall, London, for the daytime of 26 and 27 June 1902 to watch the coronation procession of King Edward VII. The letters did not mention the procession, but both understood it was the purpose. Rent was 75 pounds, 25 paid in advance. The King fell ill, the procession was cancelled, Henry refused the balance and Krell sued. Held (Court of Appeal): the contract was frustrated; the procession was its foundation, and its cancellation defeated the object even though the flat could still be occupied. Principle: a contract is frustrated when an event both parties regarded as its very foundation fails to take place.

Case

Robinson v. Davison: the defendant's wife, a pianist, was too ill to play at a concert on the agreed day, and the organiser sued. Held: a contract for personal services carries an implied condition that the performer remains well enough to perform. Her illness excused her, so no damages were payable for the failure to perform, though the organiser recovered a small sum because she had given notice late.

The leading Indian case

Case

Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur and Co.: the company was developing land near the Dhakuria lakes in Calcutta into a housing colony, promising roads and drains, with no date fixed for the roads. A buyer agreed to buy a plot in 1940, paying Rs. 101 as earnest money; the plaintiff later took his place. During the Second World War the land was requisitioned in stages for military purposes. The company cancelled the contract, offering to refund the earnest money or to convey the plot at once with roads to be built after the war. The plaintiff sued for a declaration that the contract subsisted; the Calcutta High Court held it frustrated. Held (Supreme Court, Justice B.K. Mukherjea, reversing): the contract was not frustrated and the company had to perform it.

Principles laid down in Satyabrata Ghose:

  1. "Impossible" in Section 56 does not mean physical or literal impossibility. Performance that is impracticable and useless from the point of view of the object and purpose of the parties is impossible within the section.
  2. In India the doctrine of frustration falls within Section 56, which is exhaustive; English cases are only persuasive.
  3. Where the contract itself, expressly or impliedly, provides for discharge on some event, the matter falls under Section 32, not Section 56.
  4. On the facts, the requisition was temporary, no time limit was fixed for the roads, and the war was already on when the contract was made, so the contract was not frustrated.
Case

F.A. Tamplin Steamship Co. v. Anglo-Mexican Petroleum Products Co.: a tanker was chartered for five years (December 1912 to December 1917). In 1915, during the First World War, the Government requisitioned it as a troopship. The owners, since the Government paid much more than the charter hire, argued frustration; the charterers were willing to keep paying. Held (House of Lords, 3:2): not frustrated. Nearly three years remained and the interruption might end before then. Principle: parties take the risk of such interruptions; a contract is discharged only if the interruption goes to the root of the whole contract. Cited by the Supreme Court in Satyabrata Ghose.

Case

British Movietone News v. London and District Cinemas: during the Second World War a newsreel company agreed to supply newsreels to a cinema, terminable by notice. Because a wartime order rationed film, a supplementary agreement kept the contract in force until that order was cancelled. After the war the order continued for different peacetime reasons, and the cinema gave notice, arguing these conditions were never contemplated. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Denning held that a court may qualify the literal words of a contract to do what is just when circumstances change unexpectedly. Held (House of Lords, rejecting this): Viscount Simon said an unanticipated turn of events, such as a wholly abnormal rise or fall in prices, a sudden fall in the value of currency or an unexpected obstacle to performance, does not in itself affect the bargain. Whether the contract still applies is a question of interpretation, not of what the judge thinks fair. The contract continued. The Supreme Court of India has approved this view.

Key point

What does not frustrate a contract: mere commercial hardship or a rise in costs; a temporary difficulty that does not destroy the object; self-induced frustration (the party's own act or choice); an event the parties foresaw and provided for; failure of one of several purposes where the main purpose can still be achieved.

Effect of frustration: the contract becomes void from the moment of the frustrating event. Under Section 65, any person who has received any advantage under it must restore it or pay compensation, so an advance paid under a frustrated contract can generally be recovered.

Force Majeure and the Modern Cases

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:16:19)

Force Majeure (French: "superior force"). Many contracts contain a Force Majeure clause listing events such as war, flood, epidemic or government action, and stating what happens if such an event prevents performance.

Case

Energy Watchdog v. CERC (Central Electricity Regulatory Commission): power companies, including Adani Power and a Tata Power company, agreed to supply electricity to State distribution companies at fixed tariffs for many years from plants designed to run on Indonesian coal. In 2010 Indonesia required its coal to be sold at international market prices, and costs shot up. The companies sought relief under the Force Majeure clause, frustration, or a higher tariff. Held (Supreme Court, Justice Nariman): Force Majeure and frustration rejected. Where a contract has a Force Majeure clause, the matter is governed by Section 32 as a contingent contract; Section 56 applies to events outside the terms of the contract. The clause here excluded changes in fuel cost. A rise in price, however steep, does not frustrate a contract, especially where coal could be bought elsewhere at higher cost. But a 2013 change in Indian coal policy was a change in law under the contracts, and the matter was remitted to the Commission for relief on that. Principle: commercial hardship is not frustration; a Force Majeure clause is applied according to its own terms.

COVID-19 lockdown cases (2020)

Case

Halliburton Offshore Services v. Vedanta Ltd.: Halliburton's contract to develop oil fields for Vedanta in Rajasthan had a final deadline of 31 March 2020. It claimed Force Majeure and asked the Delhi High Court to stop encashment of its bank guarantees; a short stay was first granted. On 29 May 2020 Justice Prathiba M. Singh vacated it. Held: the pandemic can be a Force Majeure event, but the question is whether it caused the non-performance. Halliburton had been in breach since September 2019, and a pandemic cannot excuse non-performance of a contract whose deadlines fell long before it. Principle: Force Majeure needs a causal link between the event and the failure.

Case

Standard Retail v. G.S. Global Corporation: Indian buyers of steel from Korean sellers, paying by letters of credit, asked the Bombay High Court after the lockdown to stop the banks from paying, claiming frustration. Held: refused. A letter of credit is an independent obligation of the bank; the Force Majeure clause protected only the sellers; the goods had been shipped, steel was declared an essential service, and the lockdown was temporary, so the buyers remained bound to pay.

Case

Ramanand v. Dr. Girish Soni: tenants of a Khan Market (Delhi) shop who had lost an eviction case were allowed to stay pending their challenge only on paying Rs. 3.5 lakh a month, and sought suspension during the lockdown. Held (Delhi High Court, Justice Prathiba M. Singh): if a lease has a Force Majeure clause, its terms govern under Section 32. Section 56 does not apply to leases, because a lease is a completed transfer of an interest in property, not merely a promise to be performed in future. A tenant can avoid a lease under Section 108(B)(e) of the Transfer of Property Act only if the property is destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit; temporary non-use in a lockdown is not enough. Suspension refused, though some extra time to pay was given.

Case

Indrajit Power v. Union of India: a coal-mine allottee had missed its development milestones since 2018. When the Government moved to encash part of its performance bank guarantee, it pleaded the lockdown as Force Majeure. Held (Delhi High Court): petition dismissed; the default began long before the lockdown, and an unconditional bank guarantee can be restrained only for fraud or irretrievable injustice.

Key point

Lessons from the lockdown cases: Force Majeure or frustration excuses only a failure actually caused by the event; it does not excuse an earlier breach; a Force Majeure clause protects only the party it names; a temporary disruption does not end a long-term obligation.

Discharge by Breach

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Breach is failure to perform a contractual obligation. A serious breach going to the root of the contract allows the other party to treat himself as discharged; any breach allows him to claim damages.

  • Actual breach: on the due date or during performance (goods not delivered on the agreed day, or half delivered and the rest refused).
  • Anticipatory breach: before the due date, when a party declares he will not perform or disables himself from performing.

Section 39: when a party has refused to perform, or disabled himself from performing, his promise in its entirety, the promisee may put an end to the contract, unless he has signified, by words or conduct, his acquiescence in its continuance. The innocent party may accept the repudiation and sue at once, or keep the contract alive and wait.

Case

Hochster v. De La Tour: in April, De La Tour engaged Hochster as a courier for a European tour from 1 June at 10 pounds a month; in May he wrote that he no longer needed him. Hochster sued before 1 June. Held: he could. Principle: on renunciation before the time for performance, the other party may treat it as a breach and sue immediately, and is free to look for other work and reduce his loss.

Case

Frost v. Knight: the defendant promised to marry the plaintiff after his father's death, but broke off the engagement while the father was alive; she sued at once. Held: she need not wait for the father's death; the declaration was an anticipatory breach. Principle: this was a contingent contract, so even a contingent promise can be broken in advance.

Case

Avery v. Bowden: Bowden chartered Avery's ship to load cargo at Odessa (Russia), with 45 days for loading. Bowden's agent told the captain he had no cargo and advised him to leave; the captain refused and stayed. Before the 45 days expired the Crimean War broke out, making loading at an enemy port illegal. The shipowner's suit failed. Held: as the refusal was not accepted, the contract remained alive and was then discharged by the war, a supervening illegality, without breach by Bowden. Principle: a party who does not accept an anticipatory breach keeps the contract alive for both sides and takes the risk of later events.

Actual breachAnticipatory breach
When performance is due or under way.Before the date of performance.
The innocent party can sue only after it happens.He may sue at once if he accepts the repudiation; if he waits, he risks losing his claim through a later event (Avery v. Bowden).
FrustrationBreach
Neither party at fault.One party at fault.
No damages payable; benefits restored under Section 65.The party at fault must pay damages.

Remedies for Breach of Contract

A right without a remedy is of little use. The main remedies are: suit for damages, quantum meruit, restitution, specific performance, injunction and rescission. Damages are governed by Sections 73 to 75 of the Contract Act; specific performance, injunction and rescission mainly by the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Suit for Damages

Damages means money paid as compensation for loss caused by the breach.

Section 73

The party who suffers by the breach is entitled to compensation from the party who broke the contract for loss or damage which (a) naturally arose in the usual course of things from the breach, or (b) the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from it. No compensation is given for remote and indirect loss.

Key point

Damages compensate; they do not punish. The aim is to put the innocent party, as far as money can, where he would have been had the contract been performed.

Duty to mitigate (Explanation to Section 73): in estimating the loss, the means which existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by non-performance must be taken into account.

Example

A supplier fails to deliver cement to Farhan, and cement is easily available at a slightly higher price. Farhan must buy it there; he can claim the extra price, but not the huge loss of stopping construction for months.

Remoteness of damages

Case

Hadley v. Baxendale: the crankshaft of Hadley's mill at Gloucester broke and had to be sent to engineers at Greenwich as a pattern for a new one. The carriers (Baxendale was a partner) negligently delayed delivery by several days, and the mill stood idle longer. Hadley claimed lost profits. Held: lost profits not recoverable; new trial ordered. A mill owner might in the usual course have a spare shaft, so stoppage was not a natural result of the delay; and the carriers, as the court saw it, knew only that a broken shaft was being sent, not that the mill would stand idle until it arrived. Principle: Baron Alderson's two-part rule, both parts adopted in Section 73: damages cover (1) loss arising naturally, in the usual course of things, from the breach; and (2) loss both parties may reasonably be supposed to have contemplated, when contracting, as the probable result of breach.

Example

Prince sends a laptop by courier without saying anything special. The courier is not liable for a big deal Prince loses because of a one-day delay.

Case

Simpson v. London and North Western Railway Co.: Simpson, a cattle-food maker, won customers by exhibiting samples at cattle shows. At a show where the railway kept an agent, his samples were handed over for carriage to another show at Newcastle, the consignment note reading "must be at Newcastle on Monday certain"; the exhibition was not expressly mentioned. The goods arrived after the show. Held: the railway was liable for lost profits, as it could reasonably infer the purpose from collection at one show ground for delivery to another by a fixed day. Principle: special circumstances may be known by clear inference, not only by express notice.

Types of damages

TypeMeaning
Ordinary / generalLosses arising naturally, e.g. difference between contract price and market price when a seller fails to deliver.
SpecialLosses from special circumstances; recoverable only if those circumstances were known (Simpson).
NominalA token sum where a right is violated but no real loss is proved.
Exemplary / punitiveMeant to punish; generally not given for breach of contract.
LiquidatedFixed in advance by the contract itself.

Liquidated damages and penalty: Section 74

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:31:16)

Where a contract names a sum payable on breach, or contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of breach is entitled to reasonable compensation not exceeding the sum named or the penalty stipulated, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved.

English lawIndian law
Liquidated damages (a genuine pre-estimate of loss) are enforced; a penalty (meant to frighten the other party) is not.Section 74 cuts across this distinction (Fateh Chand, Supreme Court): in both cases only reasonable compensation is awarded, with the named sum as the upper limit.

In Kailash Nath Associates, the Supreme Court held that where loss can be proved it must be proved; the named sum is awarded as such only where it is a genuine pre-estimate and the loss is difficult to prove.

Example

A builder must pay Rs. 1 lakh for each day of delay, but the real loss is Rs. 10,000 a day. The court awards only reasonable compensation.

Case

Adarsh Food Products v. State of Himachal Pradesh: a State corporation's tender for supply of pulses required earnest money of Rs. 25 lakh, forfeitable if a bidder withdrew. The company, the lowest bidder, withdrew before acceptance, citing a sudden market change, and sought a refund. Held (Himachal Pradesh High Court): forfeiture upheld. No contract had been concluded, and forfeiture of earnest money under tender conditions is not governed by Section 74; such conditions ensure only serious bids are made. Principle: Section 74 applies to sums named in a contract, not to forfeiture under tender or auction terms before a contract is made.

Ascertainment of damages

  • Goods: usually the difference between contract price and market price on the date of breach.
  • Loss of profits: must be proved with reasonable certainty; no damages on speculation.
Case

Kanchan Udyog Ltd. v. United Spirits Ltd.: Kanchan Udyog set up a plant to bottle soft drinks under the respondent's brands (now part of United Spirits). The respondent terminated the agreement; Kanchan Udyog continued briefly with another supplier's concentrate, then closed and sued for lost profits and the cost of the plant. Held (Supreme Court): both claims refused. Expected profits were speculative, and its own letter had forecast losses for several years; the losses came mainly from weak finances and poor brand acceptance, not the breach alone; it had not mitigated its loss. A claimant cannot recover both expectation loss (expected profits) and reliance loss (money spent relying on the contract); he must choose, and even reliance damages cannot put him in a better position than performance would have. Principle: the claimant must prove his loss, show the breach caused it, and take reasonable steps to reduce it.

Section 75: a person who rightfully rescinds a contract is entitled to compensation for damage sustained through its non-fulfilment, so ending the contract for the other side's breach does not cost him his damages.

The Doctrine of Quantum Meruit

Quantum meruit (Latin: "as much as he has earned") allows reasonable payment for work done or goods supplied where the claimant cannot sue on the contract itself. It applies when:

  • one party has partly performed and the other breaks the contract and prevents completion;
  • work is done under a contract later found to be void;
  • a divisible part of a contract is completed;
  • work is done at request with no price fixed.
Case

Prickett v. Badger: Badger engaged Prickett, an estate agent, on commission to find a buyer for land at a stated price. Prickett found one, but the sale failed because Badger had no real interest in the land and its actual owner refused to sell. Held: when the principal, for whatever reason, declines to sell after the agent has found a buyer at the agreed price, the law implies a promise to pay reasonable remuneration. Principle: an agent prevented from completing by the other side can recover on quantum meruit.

But a party who himself fails to complete an entire contract cannot claim.

Case

Cutter v. Powell: Cutter agreed to serve as second mate on a voyage from Jamaica to Liverpool for 30 guineas, well above usual wages, provided he proceeded, continued and did his duty for the whole voyage. He died about seven weeks into a voyage of about ten weeks; his widow sued for proportionate wages. Held: nothing recoverable. The contract was entire, so complete performance was a condition of payment. Later English law softened this harsh rule, e.g. through the doctrine of substantial performance.

Prickett v. BadgerCutter v. Powell
Claimant prevented from completing by the other side.The contract itself made full performance the condition of payment.
Reasonable pay recoverable.Nothing payable.
Case

Indu Mehta v. State of Uttar Pradesh: an advocate was asked by the District Magistrate to work as Assistant District Government Counsel at Kanpur Dehat, pending State approval. She worked for over two years and was paid at that post's rate. The Government then cancelled her appointment as illegal (only the State could make it), demanded refund of the extra fees and withheld later bills to recover them. Held (Allahabad High Court): recovery quashed. Even if the appointment was void, she was entitled to payment for work done, on quantum meruit and under Section 65. Section 70 applied, since her work was lawful, not meant to be free, and the State enjoyed its benefit. The State had paid voluntarily, not by mistake or coercion, so Section 72 gave it no right of recovery. Principle: a party who accepts work under an invalid arrangement must pay a reasonable price for it.

The Doctrine of Restitution

Restitution means restoring to a person what belongs to him so that the other party is not unjustly enriched. It arises mainly when a contract fails, is rescinded or is found void.

  • Section 64: a party rescinding a voidable contract must restore the benefit received.
  • Section 65: a person who received an advantage under an agreement discovered to be void, or a contract that becomes void, must restore it or make compensation.
  • Sections 68 to 72 apply the same idea where there is no contract at all.
  • The Specific Relief Act lets a court rescinding a contract or cancelling an instrument require the successful party to restore what he received.
Quantum meruitRestitution
A claim for reasonable payment for work done or goods supplied.The wider idea of giving back any benefit received, so no one is unjustly enriched.
Often a way of achieving restitution where the benefit is work, which cannot be physically returned, so its value is paid.—
Example

Farhan pays a Rs. 50,000 advance for a car and the contract becomes void: returning the advance is restitution. Prince has done half a painting job under a contract that becomes void: paying the reasonable value of his work is quantum meruit.

Suit for Specific Performance

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:37:43)

Specific performance is a court order directing the party in breach to actually perform, e.g. directing Prince to execute the sale deed of the flat he agreed to sell to Farhan. Under the original Specific Relief Act it was discretionary, granted mainly where damages were inadequate. The Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, in force from 1 October 2018, changed this.

  • Section 10: specific performance shall be enforced by the court, subject to Section 11(2), Section 14 and Section 16. It is now the normal rule; the old general discretion is gone.
  • Annamalai v. Vasanthi (2025): the Supreme Court held these changes are not retrospective and do not apply to suits or transactions that arose before the amendment.
  • Section 9: the defendant may raise any defence available under the law of contract.

Section 14: contracts not specifically enforceable

  1. where a party has obtained substituted performance under Section 20;
  2. a contract involving a continuous duty the court cannot supervise;
  3. a contract so dependent on the personal qualifications of the parties that the court cannot enforce its material terms;
  4. a contract in its nature determinable (which a party can end at will).

Section 16: personal bars

Relief cannot be given to a person who has obtained substituted performance; who has become incapable of performing or has violated an essential term; or who fails to prove that he has performed, or has always been ready and willing to perform, the essential terms on his part.

  • Section 20: on breach, the innocent party may, after at least 30 days' written notice, get the contract performed through a third party or his own agency and recover the costs from the party in breach; he then cannot also claim specific performance.
  • Sections 20A to 20C: special rules for infrastructure projects and special courts; suits under the Act to be decided within 12 months from service of summons, extendable by up to six months.
  • Section 21: compensation may be claimed in addition to specific performance; if specific performance is refused but breach is proved, compensation is awarded.
  • Section 22: reliefs such as possession, partition or refund of earnest money must be specifically claimed.
  • Section 23: a sum named for breach does not bar specific performance if meant only to secure performance.
  • Section 24: if a suit for specific performance is dismissed, the plaintiff cannot later sue for compensation for the same breach.
Case

C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy: Murthy sold a Bengaluru plot to his creditors, who the same day agreed to sell it back to him. Years later he sued for specific performance. Held (Supreme Court): refused. Under Section 16(c) the plaintiff must prove readiness and willingness continuously from the date of the contract up to the decree. He need not produce the cash but must show he had the means to pay. The plaintiff admitted he had no income or property, and his conduct showed no real readiness, so relief was refused even though the agreement was proved. Principle: readiness and willingness is a condition the plaintiff must prove.

Case

A.G. Venkatanarasaiah v. Smt. Vijayalakshmi (Madras High Court): not a contract case, but it shows the idea behind specific relief. A woman obtained a partition decree for delivery of a particular jewel belonging to her; the person bound to deliver it offered its money value instead. Held: he had no such option. Principle: a decree for a specific movable must be obeyed by delivering the thing itself; for an article of special or sentimental value, money is no substitute.

DamagesSpecific performance
Money remedy compensating for loss.Order to do what was promised.
Suits cases where money can make good the loss (ordinary goods).Sought mostly for unique subject matter (land, a rare painting). Since 2018 the normal rule, but refused in cases listed in the Act; the plaintiff must prove readiness and willingness.

Suit for Injunction

Under the Specific Relief Act, an injunction is a court order directing a person to do, or more often not to do, a particular act.

SectionProvision
37Temporary injunction: lasts until a specified time or further order; may be granted at any stage of a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure. Perpetual injunction: granted only by the final decree after a hearing on merits; permanently restrains the defendant.
38Perpetual injunction to prevent breach of an obligation existing in favour of the plaintiff.
39Mandatory injunction: compels the defendant to do certain acts to prevent a breach, e.g. remove a wall built in breach of an agreement.
40Damages in addition to, or in substitution for, an injunction.

Section 41: injunction refused

  • to prevent breach of a contract which would not be specifically enforced;
  • to prevent an alleged nuisance unless it is reasonably clear that it will be a nuisance;
  • where equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding;
  • where the plaintiff's conduct disentitles him to the court's help;
  • where the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter;
  • since 2018, where it would impede or delay an infrastructure project.

Section 42: negative agreements

Where a contract contains an affirmative promise together with a negative promise, the court may enforce the negative promise by injunction even though it cannot compel performance of the affirmative one, provided the plaintiff has performed his own part.

Case

Warner Brothers v. Nelson: actress Bette Davis (sued under her married name Nelson) agreed to act exclusively for Warner Brothers and not for anyone else during the contract, but left America and agreed to act for another producer in England. Held: the court would not order her to act for Warner, since a contract for personal services cannot be specifically enforced, but it enforced her negative promise by an injunction restraining her from acting in films or on stage for anyone else, limited to three years and to the court's jurisdiction. She was not forced to work for Warner, as she could earn her living in other ways. Principle: Indian law applies the same idea through Section 42, and a negative promise operating only during the contract is not void as a restraint of trade.

Case

Nagar Parishad, Ratnagiri v. Gangaram Narayan Ambekar: villagers sought a permanent injunction against the municipal council's solid waste disposal project on land given by the State, fearing pollution of a river and a dam supplying the town. The lower appellate court granted it. Held (Supreme Court): set aside. Substantial environmental questions belong to the National Green Tribunal, not civil courts. A quia timet injunction (to prevent a feared future harm) needs proof of a strong probability of imminent and serious harm, which was not shown; and Section 41 barred relief, as nuisance was not reasonably clear and an equally efficacious remedy existed. Principle: such an injunction is not granted on mere apprehension.

Case

Nair Service Society v. Rev. Father K.C. Alexander: Father Alexander had long possessed some government land in Kerala; the Society forcibly took it and argued he had no title, as it belonged to the Government. Held (Supreme Court): a person in settled possession can recover from a trespasser without proving title; possession is good title against all but the true owner, and a trespasser cannot rely on a third person's title. The summary suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act must be filed within six months of dispossession, but an ordinary suit based on prior possession remains available after that. The same principle underlies injunctions protecting settled possession.

Case

Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin: a person not in possession sued only for a declaration of ownership of land at Agra. Held (Supreme Court): the suit should have been dismissed for that reason alone. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act lets a court, in its discretion, declare a person's legal character or right to property, but its proviso bars a bare declaration where the plaintiff could seek further relief, such as possession, and omitted to do so. Principle: claim every relief that flows from the right sought to be declared.

Suit for Rescission

Rescission means cancelling a contract so that the parties are put back in their original position.

Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act: any person interested in a contract may sue for rescission where the contract is voidable or terminable by the plaintiff, or where it is unlawful for causes not apparent on its face and the defendant is more to blame. The court may refuse rescission where:

  • the plaintiff has ratified the contract;
  • changed circumstances make it impossible to restore the parties substantially to their original position;
  • third parties have acquired rights in good faith, without notice and for value.

Section 31: a written instrument that is void or voidable may be cancelled if leaving it outstanding may cause serious injury.

Case

Deccan Paper Mills v. Regency Mahavir Properties: Deccan Paper Mills sued to have a development agreement and related documents declared void and cancelled as obtained by fraud; the other side sought arbitration. Held (Supreme Court): a suit for cancellation under Section 31 is an action in personam, binding only the parties and not the whole world, so the dispute is arbitrable. Allegations of fraud between the parties, without public overtones, are also arbitrable.

Case

South East Asia Marine Engineering and Constructions v. Oil India: a contractor drilling wells for Oil India claimed extra payment when diesel prices rose, relying on a change-in-law clause. The arbitral tribunal allowed it; the High Court set the award aside and the Supreme Court agreed. Held: it was a fixed-rate contract, the contractor bore fuel costs, and a price rise was not a change in law; a prudent bidder prices such risks into his bid. Principle: as in Energy Watchdog, compensation follows the risks the contract allocates, and a court will not rewrite the bargain because performance has become costlier.

Quasi Contracts

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:50:28)

Meaning of quasi contract

Quasi means "as if" or "almost". A quasi contract is not a real contract, because there is no agreement between the parties. But the law imposes an obligation on one person to pay or return something to another, as if there were a contract. The Act deals with these situations in Sections 68 to 72, under the heading "Of certain relations resembling those created by contract".

Example

A delivery boy leaves groceries meant for a neighbour at Neha's house by mistake. Neha never agreed to buy them, but if she uses them, knowing they were not meant to be free, the law will make her pay. There is no contract, but there is an obligation that resembles one.

Doctrine of unjust enrichment

No person should be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. Lord Mansfield, the English judge, explained in the eighteenth century that where a person has received money which in justice and equity belongs to another, the law implies a duty to pay it back. A quasi contract rests on three ideas:

  1. the defendant has received a benefit;
  2. at the expense of the plaintiff; and
  3. it would be unjust for him to keep it.

Section 73 adds that a person injured by the failure to discharge an obligation resembling those created by contract is entitled to the same compensation as if there had been a contract and it had been broken.

Key point

A contract rests on the agreement of the parties; a quasi contract rests on an obligation imposed by law. But both give a right against a particular person.

Types of quasi contracts

The Act recognises five types:

  1. Supply of necessaries to a person incapable of contracting (Section 68)
  2. Payment by an interested person (Section 69)
  3. Liability to pay for a non-gratuitous act (Section 70)
  4. Responsibility of the finder of goods (Section 71)
  5. Money paid or thing delivered under mistake or coercion (Section 72)

1. Supply of necessaries (Section 68)

The supplier is reimbursed from the property of the incapable person, but that person is not personally liable.

2. Payment by an interested person (Section 69)

A person who is interested in the payment of money which another is bound by law to pay, and who therefore pays it, is entitled to be reimbursed by the other.

Example

Illustration: A tenant holds land in Bengal on lease from a zamindar. The zamindar falls into arrears of revenue payable to the Government, and his land is advertised for sale, which would annul the lease. The tenant pays the Government the sum due; the zamindar must make good the amount to the tenant.

Likewise, if Farhan, a tenant, pays the municipal tax that his landlord was bound to pay, to prevent the building from being attached, he can recover it from the landlord.

Case

Govindram Gordhandas Seksaria v. State of Gondal: The Maharaja of Gondal held all the debentures on two mills in Bombay, and the debenture trustees were in possession of the mills for some years. He then agreed to sell the mills to Seksaria, who agreed to resell them to a company. The Bombay Municipality claimed arrears of property tax for earlier years, a charge on the mills, and threatened to enforce them. Neither the Maharaja (bound by his contract of sale to clear these taxes) nor the trustees paid, so the company paid and sued to recover. Issue: was the company, having no proprietary interest when it paid, "interested" under Section 69? The Bombay High Court said no and dismissed the suit. Held (Privy Council, reversing): a person may be interested without any proprietary interest; a buyer facing the forced sale of property he has contracted to buy is interested. Principle: "bound by law to pay" covers any legally enforceable obligation, including one arising from a contract, not only a statutory duty.

3. Liability to pay for a non-gratuitous act (Section 70)

Where a person lawfully does anything for another, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and the other enjoys the benefit, the latter must make compensation or restore the thing. Three conditions:

  1. the act must be lawful;
  2. it must not be intended to be free of charge; and
  3. the other person must enjoy the benefit.
Example

Illustrations: A tradesman leaves goods at a house by mistake; if the owner treats them as his own, he must pay for them. But a person who saves his neighbour's property from fire, intending to act gratuitously, gets nothing.

Case

State of West Bengal v. B. K. Mondal and Sons (leading case on Section 70): Contractors, at the request of local government officers, built a road, a guard room, an office, a kitchen and storage sheds for the government of Bengal. The government used them but refused to pay, as no contract had been made in the form required for government contracts (now Article 299 of the Constitution). Held (Supreme Court): the State was liable. The contract was unenforceable, but Section 70 does not enforce that contract; it rests on the State having voluntarily accepted and enjoyed work it was free to refuse. All three conditions were met. Principle: the State is bound by Section 70 like a private person, and a prior request is not necessary.

Case

Damodar Mudaliar v. Secretary of State for India: An irrigation tank watered several villages, some of the Government and some of zamindars. The Government carried out repairs necessary to preserve the tank; the zamindars knew, did not object, and benefited. The Government sued them for a proportionate share of the cost. Held (Madras High Court): they were liable under Section 70, even without contract or request. Principle: Section 70 lays down a wider rule than English law, but it does not reward officious interference.

4. Responsibility of the finder of goods (Section 71)

A person who finds goods belonging to another and takes them into his custody has the same responsibility as a bailee (a person to whom goods are entrusted). He must take as much care of them as a person of ordinary prudence would take of his own goods, try to find the owner, and return them.

Rights of the finder:

  • Section 168: he cannot sue for his voluntary trouble and expenses, but may keep the goods until compensated, and may sue for any specific reward offered by the owner.
  • Section 169: if the owner cannot be found or refuses to pay the lawful charges, he may sell the goods, but only if they are in danger of perishing or of losing most of their value, or if the lawful charges amount to two-thirds of their value.
Example

If Prince finds a gold chain on the road, he must keep it safely and try to find the owner, and he can claim any reward announced for it.

5. Money paid or thing delivered under mistake or coercion (Section 72)

The person who receives money or a thing by mistake or under coercion must repay or return it.

Example

Illustrations: Two persons jointly owe 100 rupees to a creditor. One pays; the other, not knowing this, pays again. The creditor must repay the second payment. And if a railway company refuses to deliver goods unless an illegal charge is paid, the consignee can recover the excess.

  • Mistake includes mistake of law: the Supreme Court has held that "mistake" in Section 72 covers mistake of law as well as fact. But for tax refunds, the Court later held that the claimant must generally follow the refund procedure in the tax law and show that he has not passed the burden of the tax on to his customers; otherwise the refund would itself be an unjust enrichment.
  • Coercion in its ordinary sense: "coercion" in Section 72 is not limited to the narrow definition in Section 15. An illegal demand by an authority that compels a payment is enough.
Key point

All five types share one idea: the law will not allow a person to keep a benefit that, in justice, belongs to someone else.

E-Contracts

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (2:59:29)

Meaning of an e-contract

An e-contract (electronic contract) is a contract formed through electronic means, such as e-mail, a website, a mobile application, or the exchange of data between computers. Buying clothes, booking tickets, ordering food and signing business deals online are all contracts.

Key point

An e-contract is not a new kind of contract with new rules; it is an ordinary contract made in a new way. All the essentials apply fully: offer and acceptance, free consent, competent parties, lawful consideration and lawful object. The Information Technology Act, 2000 only adds rules about electronic records, signatures, and the time and place of communication.

Definitions under the IT Act

  • Electronic record: data, a record, or an image or sound, stored, received or sent in electronic form.
  • Originator: the person who sends or generates an electronic message.
  • Addressee: the person whom the originator intends to receive it.
  • Intermediary: one, like an internet service provider or online marketplace, who only receives, stores or transmits records on behalf of others; neither originator nor addressee.
  • Electronic signature: authentication of an electronic record by an electronic technique recognised by the Act, including a digital signature.

Formation of an e-contract

Example

Prince sees a phone listed on a shopping website for 20,000 rupees. Like a shop window, the listing is generally an invitation to offer. When Prince clicks "buy now" and pays, he makes the offer; when the seller confirms the order, it accepts, and the contract is formed.

Contracts can also be formed by an exchange of e-mails. The absence of a signed paper document does not prevent a binding contract if the essential terms have been agreed.

Time and place: Section 13 of the IT Act

Besides Section 4 of the Contract Act, Section 13 of the IT Act applies. Unless the parties agree otherwise:

  • Despatch: when the record enters a computer resource outside the control of the originator.
  • Receipt where a resource is designated (for example, a particular e-mail address): when the record enters it; if the record is sent to some other resource of the addressee, when he retrieves it.
  • Receipt (no resource designated): when the record enters any computer resource of the addressee.
  • Place: despatched where the originator has his place of business, and received where the addressee has his place of business, wherever the computer may be.

Importance and challenges

ImportanceChallenges
Speed: a deal is concluded in seconds across the worldHard to verify the identity and age of the other party; a minor may easily click "I agree"
Low costJurisdiction is difficult when the parties are in different places
Make e-commerce possible, bringing goods and services to small townsRisks of hacking and fraud
Automatic record of the transaction; kept business alive during the coronavirus pandemicConsumers accept long terms without reading them

The Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020 give some protection: e-commerce platforms must have a grievance officer, and a consumer's consent to a purchase must be recorded through an explicit and affirmative action, not a pre-ticked box.

Section 10A of the IT Act

Inserted by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008, in force from 27 October 2009, under the title "Validity of contracts formed through electronic means":

Where, in a contract formation, the communication of proposals, the acceptance of proposals, the revocation of proposals and acceptances, as the case may be, are expressed in electronic form or by means of an electronic record, such contract shall not be deemed to be unenforceable solely on the ground that such electronic form or means was used for that purpose.

Key point

A court cannot refuse to enforce a contract merely because it was made electronically. But Section 10A does not make an e-contract valid if it lacks free consent, consideration, capacity or a lawful object; those requirements still come from the Contract Act.

E-contracts and traditional contracts compared

PointTraditional contractE-contract
FormationOffer and acceptanceOffer and acceptance communicated electronically, often by a click
Time and placeSection 4, Contract ActSection 4, plus specific rules in Section 13 of the IT Act
SignatureHandwrittenElectronic signatures, recognised by Section 5 of the IT Act (many contracts need no signature at all)
Evidence—Section 63 of the B.S.A., which replaced Section 65B of the old Evidence Act from 1 July 2024; generally requires a certificate
Bargaining position—Mostly standard form contracts drafted by the company, so the protections for standard form contracts matter greatly

Scope: under Section 1(4) and the First Schedule, the IT Act does not apply to certain documents. After an amendment in 2022, these are negotiable instruments (other than cheques and certain notes and bills involving regulated financial institutions), powers of attorney (with a similar exception), trusts and wills. The entry for contracts for the sale of immovable property was removed in 2022; a sale of land must still be registered under the Registration Act.

Click-Wrap, Browse-Wrap and Case Law

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (3:06:09)

Kinds of online standard terms

  • Click-wrap: the user must click a button like "I agree", after being shown the terms, before he can proceed (creating an account, installing an app, buying a ticket online). Because the user takes a positive step to show assent, the terms are generally enforceable, like a signed printed form, even if unread, so long as he had a fair opportunity to read them.
  • Browse-wrap: the terms are available through a link, usually at the bottom of a website, saying that by using the site the user agrees to them. They are harder to enforce, as the user may never have seen them; courts generally enforce them only where the user had actual or reasonable notice and his conduct shows assent.
  • Shrink-wrap: software comes in a packet with the terms inside, and opening or using it is treated as acceptance.
PointClick-wrapBrowse-wrap
AssentExpress, by a clickImplied from mere use
TermsShown before the user proceedsSit behind a link
EnforceabilityGenerally enforceableBinds only with reasonable notice
Example

When Prince ticks a box saying "I have read and agree to the terms" before paying for a flight, he is bound. But if a website only says, in small letters at the bottom, that using the site means accepting its terms, a court will ask whether Prince ever had a reasonable chance to notice them.

Case law

Case

Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. Girdharilal Parshottamdas and Co.: An offer from Ahmedabad was accepted by telephone from Khamgaon. Held: when acceptance is communicated instantaneously, as by telephone, the contract is complete where the acceptance is received by the proposer. Principle: courts have applied the same reasoning to internet transactions.

Case

Trimex International v. Vedanta Aluminium: Trimex, a Dubai trading company, e-mailed Vedanta an offer to supply bauxite in two or five shipments, with all essential terms including an arbitration clause. Vedanta first confirmed five shipments but asked for a new termination clause (a conditional reply, not an acceptance); shortly after it e-mailed "we confirm the deal for five shipments". A formal contract was drafted but never signed, and Vedanta argued no contract was concluded. Held (Supreme Court): a binding contract, including the arbitration clause, was concluded through the e-mails. The final e-mail was an absolute acceptance under Section 7, complete as against Vedanta under Section 4 when it came to Trimex's knowledge. The plan to sign a formal document later did not matter, as the parties had not agreed to be bound only on signing. Principle: an exchange of e-mails can create a complete, binding contract. These 2007 e-mails came before Section 10A, so the Contract Act alone was enough.

Case

World Wrestling Entertainment v. Reshma Collection: WWE, an American company, sued Mumbai traders in the Delhi High Court for selling fake goods bearing its trademarks. Under the trademark and copyright laws a plaintiff can sue where it carries on business; WWE had no office in Delhi but sold goods to Delhi customers through its website. Held (Division Bench): the website is only an invitation to offer, like a menu card. The Delhi customer offers by placing an order; WWE accepts by confirming the order and accepting payment, and that acceptance reaches the customer instantly in Delhi. Applying the telephone-case rule, the contract is concluded in Delhi, so WWE carried on business there to that extent and could sue there. Principle: the ordinary rules of offer and acceptance apply online, and an online contract is concluded where the acceptance is received.

Case

InterGlobe Aviation v. N. Satchidanand: InterGlobe runs IndiGo. A passenger on a Delhi–Hyderabad flight, delayed for many hours by fog, claimed compensation before a Permanent Lok Adalat in Hyderabad. The airline relied on its conditions of carriage, which gave jurisdiction only to Delhi courts and excluded liability for delays beyond its control. Held (Supreme Court): (1) the conditions bound the passenger even if he never read them, as the ticket incorporated them by reference and they were available on the website and at airline counters, which was sufficient notice; (2) the exclusive jurisdiction clause, drafted to apply wherever the cause of action arose, was invalid, because parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that has none, and a Permanent Lok Adalat is not a court anyway. On the merits the airline won, as the fog was beyond its control. Principle: standard terms incorporated by reference bind a person who had reasonable notice of them, the same test applied to click-wrap and browse-wrap terms.

Quick revision

  • A quasi contract rests on an obligation imposed by law, not on agreement; its basis is unjust enrichment. The five types are in Sections 68 to 72, and Section 73 gives the same compensation as for breach of contract.
  • Section 70 needs a lawful act, not intended to be gratuitous, the benefit of which is enjoyed by the other (State of West Bengal v. B. K. Mondal and Sons).
  • An e-contract is an ordinary contract made electronically; Section 10A of the IT Act only removes the objection that electronic form was used, and Section 13 fixes the time and place of despatch and receipt.
  • Click-wrap terms are generally enforceable; browse-wrap terms bind only with reasonable notice. An online contract is concluded where the acceptance is received.
  • Contract Law I runs from the meaning of contract and Henry Maine's idea of "status to contract" to contracts made online.
  • In every problem, walk through the essentials of a valid contract one by one.
  • Always name the section and support it with the leading case.
  • Whenever two concepts look similar, such as void and voidable, or damages and specific performance, write their differences clearly, with an example.

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