Media Law: 30 Important Case Laws

Express Newspapers Private Limited v. Union of India (1958)

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This case tests whether a law protecting journalists can also limit press freedom. Can a newspaper refuse to follow a law that protects its own journalists? If paying proper wages becomes expensive, does that alone make the labour law unconstitutional?

Facts

• In 1955, Parliament passed the Working Journalists Act to improve the pay and service conditions of journalists.
• Under the Act, a Wage Board fixed wage scales for working journalists.
• Newspaper companies (owners) challenged both the Act and the decision of the Wage Board.

Issue

Whether a law regulating the wages and service conditions of working journalists violates freedom of the press under Article 19(1)(a), merely because compliance imposes a financial burden on newspapers.

Arguments

The newspaper owners argued that the heavy financial burden would force some newspapers to close or cut their circulation, and so the law restricted the freedom of the press.

Judgment (held)

The Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice N. H. Bhagwati, decided in 1958, rejected the attack on the Act.

• The press is not immune from the ordinary forms of taxation, or from the general laws on industrial relations.
• Such a law can be struck down under Article 19(1)(a) only if its direct or inevitable consequence is to take away or abridge the freedom of speech.
• Here, the Act aimed to improve the conditions of journalists, and any harm to the press was remote and uncertain. So the Act was valid.
• Exception: one provision on gratuity was struck down as an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on business.
• Wage Board decision set aside: the Board had ignored the capacity of the newspaper industry to pay, which was an essential condition for fixing wages, so its decision went beyond the Act itself.

Principle / ratio

The two rights must be kept separate. Publishing news is protected expression. Running a newspaper also involves business decisions, wages and employment. The court had to ask about the direct effect of the law, not simply whether complying with it costs money.

Article 19(1)(a)	Article 19(1)(g)
Protects speech and expression (publishing news).	Concerns the right to carry on business (wages, employment, business decisions).
Restrictions only on the grounds in Article 19(2).	Subject to its own restrictions.

Constitutional framework

• The Constitution gives citizens freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).
• Freedom of the press is part of that right even though the provision does not use the word "press".
• Article 19(2) allows restrictions only for specified reasons, such as public order, defamation and decency.
• A court must therefore identify the particular right affected and the legal reason offered for restricting it.
• A restriction does not become valid merely because the State says it is for the public good.
• Equally, press freedom does not cancel all general laws that apply to newspaper businesses.

Significance

Press freedom protects a newspaper against censorship, not against every ordinary employment duty. A lawyer must identify the specific provision, its purpose and its real effect.

Exam points

Sakal Papers Private Limited v. Union of India (1961)

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Can the government decide how many pages a newspaper may sell for a given price? It looks like a business rule, but it may decide how much information the public receives. This case explains why newspaper prices and page limits can affect free speech.

Facts

• The Newspaper Price and Page Act of 1956, and an order of 1960 made under it, fixed the maximum number of pages a newspaper could publish according to the price it charged.
• A newspaper that wanted more pages had to charge a higher price.
• The aim was to stop big newspapers from using low prices and many pages to kill small ones.
• The company that published Sakal, a Marathi newspaper from Pune, its two shareholders, and two of its readers challenged the law.

Issue

Whether a law linking the price of a newspaper to the number of pages it may print violates freedom of the press under Article 19(1)(a), and whether it can be justified as regulation of the business side of a newspaper.

Arguments

The government's stated aim was to protect smaller newspapers from unfair competition.

Judgment (held)

The Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice J. R. Mudholkar, decided in 1961, struck down both the Act and the order.

• Freedom of the press includes the right to publish and to circulate. This covers not only what a newspaper says but also the volume of its circulation.
• A newspaper forced to raise its price or cut its pages will lose readers or content, so the law was aimed directly at circulation.
• The State cannot curtail freedom of speech in order to regulate the business side of a newspaper.
• Restrictions on business are allowed under Article 19(6), but speech can be restricted only on the grounds in Article 19(2). Preventing unfair competition is not one of them.

Principle / ratio

Page limits influence expression directly. A publisher who cannot add pages must remove reporting, reduce advertising or change the selling price. A higher price may reduce readership. This is why the Court looked at the effect on both publication and circulation. Freedom of the press is not confined to the ink on a page; it also protects the ability of the page to reach readers.

Article 19(6)	Article 19(2)
Permits restrictions on business.	Permits restrictions on speech only on specified grounds.
Covers the business side of a newspaper, but cannot be used to curtail speech.	Preventing unfair competition is not one of the grounds.

Significance

The government's aim of protecting smaller newspapers from unfair competition may sound fair. But a restriction on expression cannot be justified merely by referring to economic policy. Article 19(2) contains specific grounds for restricting speech. The public-policy aim and the constitutional power are different questions.

Exam points

Bennett Coleman and Company v. Union of India (1972)

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If paper is scarce, can the State limit the number of pages in a newspaper and stop new editions? This is not just a question about a physical commodity; it is a question about the reach of ideas. This is the landmark case on the effect test.

Facts

• Newsprint, the special paper on which newspapers are printed, was then scarce and largely imported, so its import was controlled.
• The Newsprint Policy for 1972–73 did more than share out newsprint:
  • it fixed a ceiling of ten pages for newspapers;
  • it barred a group owning two or more newspapers from starting a new paper or a new edition, even within its own quota;
  • it did not allow such a group to shift newsprint between its own papers or editions.
• Bennett Coleman, the publisher of The Times of India, and other newspaper companies and their shareholders challenged the policy.

Issues

• Whether newsprint controls can restrict the growth of newspapers.
• Whether the petitions by companies and their shareholders were maintainable under Article 19.

Arguments

The government argued that the policy only regulated the import of a commodity, and did not touch speech at all.

Judgment (held)

In 1972, the Supreme Court rejected the government's argument by a majority, in a judgment written by Justice A. N. Ray.

• What matters is not the object of the law or the form of the action, but its direct effect on the fundamental right.
• Here, the direct effect was to control the growth and circulation of newspapers. A limit on pages is a limit on what a newspaper can say.
• The page ceiling, the ban on new papers and editions, and the ban on shifting newsprint were struck down.
• The government could still fix quotas, because newsprint was scarce, but it could not use the quota to control the size and growth of newspapers.
• Shareholders do not lose their fundamental rights by forming a company, so the petitions were maintainable. The company was not a citizen for Article 19, but the individual shareholders had constitutional rights.

Dissent

Justice K. K. Mathew dissented. In his view, the policy was a fair way of sharing a scarce resource among big and small papers. It might reduce the quantity of speech, but it did not abridge the freedom of speech.

Principle / ratio

The Court separated allocation from suppression. The State could distribute scarce imported newsprint through quotas. But the quota policy could not be used to freeze the growth of newspapers. A ceiling on pages meant a ceiling on information. The majority looked at the direct result for readers and publishers. Calling the rule an import policy did not settle the constitutional question.

Permitted (allocation)	Struck down (suppression)
Fixing quotas of scarce imported newsprint.	Ten-page ceiling on newspapers.
	Ban on a group starting a new paper or new edition within its own quota.
	Ban on shifting newsprint between a group's own papers or editions.

Significance

The decision teaches a powerful test: see what the measure does to free expression. Its title and stated economic purpose cannot hide its actual impact on the press.

Exam points

Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra (1964)

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Can a bookseller face punishment for selling a novel that contains sexual descriptions? Does the Constitution protect every kind of writing simply because it appears in a book? This was an early major Supreme Court decision on the criminal law of obscenity and shows how Indian courts once tested whether a book was obscene.

Facts

• Ranjit Udeshi was one of four partners of the Happy Book Stall in Mumbai.
• In 1959, the partners were found keeping for sale an unexpurgated copy of Lady Chatterley's Lover, a novel by D. H. Lawrence.
• They were convicted under Section 292 (Indian Penal Code), and each partner was fined 20 rupees.
• The High Court upheld the conviction, and the case reached the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether Section 292 is a valid restriction on freedom of speech under Article 19.
• Whether the bookseller's knowledge of the obscenity is an ingredient of the offence.
• What test determines obscenity, and whether the novel was obscene.

Judgment (held)

The Constitution Bench, in a judgment by Justice Hidayatullah, decided in 1964, held:

1. Validity: Section 292 is a valid reasonable restriction in the interest of decency and morality.
2. Knowledge: the bookseller's knowledge of the obscenity is not an ingredient of the offence. Lack of knowledge may reduce the punishment, but it is not a defence.
3. Test: the Hicklin test, as followed in India, is the right test, and it does not violate Article 19.

The Court added important qualifications:

• Treating sex and nudity in art and literature is not by itself evidence of obscenity. As Justice Hidayatullah put it, there is no need to make the angels and saints of Michelangelo wear breeches before they can be viewed.
• The work must be seen as a whole, but the obscene passages must also be judged separately.
• Where art and obscenity are mixed, the art must so preponderate as to throw the obscenity into a shadow, or the obscenity must be so trivial that it can be overlooked.

Applying this, the Court found the passages in the novel obscene, with no preponderating social gain, and dismissed the appeal.

Principle / ratio

The historical test in this case was associated with Hicklin. That older approach asked whether some material could corrupt susceptible readers. But the Court also discussed the whole work and its value as literature. The issue was not whether sex could ever appear in art; it was the legal meaning of obscenity and the limits placed by Article 19(2) on freedom of expression.

Significance

This decision is important historically, but its Hicklin test is not the present Indian test. The Supreme Court later adopted contemporary community standards in Aveek Sarkar.

Point	Ranjit D. Udeshi (1964)	Later position
Test of obscenity	Hicklin test (whether material could corrupt susceptible readers)	Contemporary community standards (Aveek Sarkar)
Provision	Section 292, Indian Penal Code	Section 294, B.N.S. (corresponding present provision)

Exam points

K. A. Abbas v. Union of India (1970)

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Why may the State examine a film before the audience sees it, even though it cannot normally demand advance approval of a newspaper article? This case explains why films may be certified before public exhibition.

Facts

• The writer and filmmaker K. A. Abbas made a documentary called A Tale of Four Cities.
• It showed the contrast between the lives of the rich and the poor in four big cities, and included shots of the red-light area of Mumbai.
• He asked for a U certificate, which allows unrestricted viewing. The Board gave only an Adult certificate.
• The Central Government offered a U certificate only if certain cuts were made.
• Abbas challenged the whole system of film censorship.

Issues

• Whether censorship of films before their exhibition (pre-censorship) is valid.
• What standards censors must follow.

Judgment (held)

During the hearing, the government agreed to give a U certificate without the cuts. But in 1970, a Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice Hidayatullah decided the larger questions:

1. Pre-censorship is valid. A motion picture combines sight and sound, it has instant appeal, and it can stir emotions more deeply than any other form of art. So films can be treated differently from books.
2. Standards must be clear and must leave a vast area for creative art. The Court warned that standards must not fall to a level where the protection of the least capable and the most depraved decides what the morally healthy cannot see or read.
3. Guidelines should also stress the importance of art.

Principle / ratio

A film communicates through movement, words, music and pictures together. The Court accepted that this may justify a separate certification system. But it did not give censors unlimited power:

• the law must be clear enough to guide decision makers;
• artists must retain a wide area of creative freedom;
• a censor cannot apply only the feelings of the most easily shocked viewer.

Constitutional framework for film

• Film law involves both constitutional freedom and certification under the Cinematograph Act.
• Article 19(1)(a) protects expression, while Article 19(2) permits certain reasonable restrictions.
• Certification is a lawful system for classifying public exhibition, but it cannot be a licence for unlimited personal censorship.
• A viewer has a right to disagree with a film. That disagreement does not by itself establish a legal ground for stopping everyone else from seeing it.
• The legal test requires attention to content, context, the power of the authority and the purpose of any proposed restriction.

Significance

The case allows film certification in principle, but also insists that artistic freedom must survive that system. Both parts are necessary for an accurate answer.

Exam points

Samaresh Bose v. Amal Mitra (1985)

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Are rude words the same as legally obscene words? A reader might dislike a novel intensely, but can that dislike become a criminal conviction? This case explains why offensive writing is not always legally obscene.

Facts

• Samaresh Bose, a well-known Bengali writer, wrote a novel called Prajapati.
• It was published in the autumn festival number of Desh, a leading Bengali journal.
• Amal Mitra, a young advocate, complained that the novel was obscene.
• The trial court convicted the author and the publisher, fined each of them 201 rupees, and ordered the pages to be destroyed.
• The Calcutta High Court upheld the conviction.

Issue

Whether a novel containing slang and frank descriptions is obscene, and how a judge should approach such a work.

Judgment (held)

In 1985, the Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice A. N. Sen, acquitted both the author and the publisher.

1. How a judge should approach a work

1. The judge should first place himself in the position of the author, and try to understand what the author wants to convey and whether the work has literary or artistic value.
2. Then he should place himself in the position of readers of every age group into whose hands the book is likely to fall, and ask what influence it may have on them.

2. Vulgarity distinguished from obscenity

A vulgar writing is not necessarily obscene. The novel had slang and frank descriptions, but it depicted the dark side of society, and it was not obscene.

Vulgarity	Obscenity
Arouses disgust, revulsion or boredom.	Has the tendency to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such influences.
Does not deprave or corrupt.	Legally punishable obscenity.
A matter of bad taste.	A legal idea requiring examination of tendency and setting.

Principle / ratio

The key distinction is between bad taste and legally punishable obscenity. A work may feel vulgar because of its language, yet the law requires a further examination of its tendency and the setting in which those words appear. Judges must understand what the author is communicating. They cannot decide the case after collecting only the most uncomfortable sentences.

Constitutional framework for obscenity

• Indian law balances free expression under Article 19(1)(a) with the ground of decency or morality in Article 19(2).
• Obscenity is a legal idea, not simply a word for something a person dislikes.
• The work should be assessed in its proper setting.
• A judge must distinguish nudity, vulgarity, artistic expression and material meeting the statutory test.
• Courts have developed their approach over time. This matters greatly when a judgment is old: an earlier test may be useful to understand history without being the final test for a problem arising under present law.

Significance

Under the old Indian Penal Code, Section 292 dealt with obscene publications. The present corresponding provision is Section 294 of B.N.S. Later decisions developed the test further, but this case remains especially useful for distinguishing vulgarity from obscenity.

Exam points

Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon (1996)

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Should a film showing terrible violence against a woman be banned for showing that violence? The answer depends on why the scene appears and what the film is communicating. This is the famous Bandit Queen case.

Facts

• The film told the true story of Phoolan Devi, who was married off as a child, repeatedly abused and raped, and paraded naked in a village, and who later took revenge as a dacoit.
• The Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) gave it an Adult certificate with several cuts. On appeal, the appellate tribunal relaxed some of those cuts.
• Om Pal Singh Hoon, who said he belonged to the Gujjar community, challenged the certificate in the Delhi High Court.
• The High Court quashed the certificate.

Issue

Whether a film showing cruelty, nudity and sexual violence may still be certified because of its important social message.

Arguments

Om Pal Singh Hoon argued that the film:

• was obscene;
• insulted womanhood;
• showed his community in a depraved light, because a rapist in the film was named Babu Gujjar.

Judgment (held)

In 1996, the Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice S. P. Bharucha, restored the Adult certificate.

• The scene of Phoolan Devi being paraded naked was not meant to arouse lust. It was meant to create sympathy for the victim and disgust for the perpetrators.
• The swear words were words heard in every village and town.
• Test for a serious film: first recognise its message, and then ask of each scene, does it advance the message? If it does, leave it alone, with only the caution of an Adult certificate.
• As the Court put it, a film that illustrates the consequences of a social evil must necessarily show that social evil.

Principle / ratio

Nudity or violence in a film must be judged in the context of the whole film and its message. A film that shows an evil in order to condemn it is not obscene. A disturbing scene that makes a viewer feel sympathy for a victim and disgust towards the offenders is different from a scene designed to excite sexual desire. The Court looked at the whole film and the relationship between each scene and the serious message. Context changed the legal meaning of the images.

Significance

The case arose under the Cinematograph Act and the constitutional limit of decency or morality in Article 19(2). Showing a social evil to condemn it is not the same as promoting it; artistic context can be legally decisive.

Exam points

Director General, Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan (2006)

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Can a public television broadcaster refuse a certified documentary just because its subject is uncomfortable? This case explains how a public broadcaster must assess a serious documentary.

Facts

• Anand Patwardhan made Father, Son and Holy War, a documentary on communal violence, masculinity and the oppression of women.
• It won two National Awards in 1995.
• The Board had given its first part a U certificate and its second part an Adult certificate.
• Doordarshan, the public broadcaster, refused to telecast it.
• The Bombay High Court directed Doordarshan to show the film.

Issue

Whether a public broadcaster can refuse to telecast a certified documentary just because its subject is uncomfortable, and how such a documentary must be assessed.

Judgment (held)

In 2006, the Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice A. R. Lakshmanan, dismissed Doordarshan's appeal.

• The Court discussed the American three-part test and the Indian cases.
• The message of a film cannot be judged by viewing some portions in isolation; it must be viewed as a whole.
• The scenes of violence and social injustice were meant to show that such evils are evil.
• Judged in its entirety, the film was not vulgar or obscene.
• Doordarshan was directed to telecast it within eight weeks.

Principle / ratio

1. A documentary must be judged as a whole. A troubling picture may have a serious social purpose.
2. A public broadcaster does not have complete freedom to act as though it were an ordinary private owner. Its decisions must be compatible with constitutional standards. If it rejects serious public-interest content, it needs legally sound reasons.

The relevant framework includes freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a) and reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2). The fact that a film has a certificate is important, but does not replace every separate issue a broadcaster must consider. The important limit is that the broadcaster cannot reject a film arbitrarily or on a legally mistaken claim of obscenity.

Significance

The Court protected the value of showing harsh facts for a serious purpose. A free society should not hide a problem merely because honest pictures of it are painful.

Exam points

Ajay Goswami v. Union of India (2006)

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How can newspapers protect children without forcing every adult to read only material suitable for children? This case explains the balance between protecting children and protecting adult readers.

Facts

Ajay Goswami filed a petition in the Supreme Court complaining that leading newspapers carried semi-nude pictures and sexual content that children could easily see. He wanted the Court to order controls to protect minors.

Issue

Whether the Court should order controls on newspapers to shield minors from semi-nude pictures and sexual content.

Judgment (held)

In 2006, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

• The test of obscenity is the view of an ordinary person of common sense and prudence, not of a hypersensitive person.
• Nudity alone does not make material obscene.
• Most importantly, in shielding minors, the adult population cannot be restricted to reading and seeing only what is fit for children.
• Remedies already exist, such as the Norms of the Press Council and the criminal law.
• The petitioner had not shown any need to curtail the freedom of the press.

Principle / ratio

The Court recognised the importance of protecting minors. But the existence of children in the audience does not allow the State to erase every image or article that an adult may lawfully read. The Court considered existing criminal law and press norms, and rejected an approach that would make the most sensitive reader the standard for all readers.

The constitutional balance is between Article 19(1)(a) and the legitimate concern for children under Article 21 and relevant laws. The old Penal Code Section 292 and press regulation were discussed. The Court did not declare that newspapers are free to print obscene material. It held that the petitioner had not shown grounds for the broad controls he requested.

Question	Can it support a conviction?
Is somebody shocked or offended?	No. An individual feeling cannot become an automatic criminal test.
Are the exact requirements of the criminal provision proved?	Yes. Only this question can support a conviction.

The surrounding story, the likely audience and the reason the material appears may change its legal meaning.

Significance

The decision does not remove laws that protect children from genuinely obscene material. It requires the court to choose a legally justified response instead of an unnecessary blanket ban. It reminds journalists to practise care and reminds courts to avoid unnecessary blanket restrictions. Protecting children and protecting free speech are both serious goals.

Exam points

S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal (2010)

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Decided by the Supreme Court in 2010. The case explains why an unpopular personal opinion is not automatically a crime.

Issue

If a famous person expresses an unpopular opinion about relationships, may strangers file criminal cases just because they feel offended?

Facts

• In 2005, the magazine India Today published a survey on the sexual habits of people in big cities.
• The actress Khushboo gave her personal opinion: society should accept pre-marital relationships; educated men should not insist on their wives being virgins; and girls should protect themselves from pregnancy and disease.
• A Tamil daily then reported further remarks, which she denied making, and there were protests.
• As many as 23 criminal complaints were filed against her, mostly in Tamil Nadu, for defamation and indecent representation of women, among other offences.

Judgment (held)

In 2010, the Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice B. S. Chauhan, quashed all the complaints.

• The complainants were not persons aggrieved, because her remarks were not aimed at any individual or identifiable group.
• There was nothing obscene or defamatory in expressing a view on social morality.
• Notions of social morality are inherently subjective, and criminal law cannot be used to unduly interfere with personal autonomy.
• In the Court's words, morality and criminality are not co-extensive.
• If people disagree with an opinion, they should answer it with speech, not with criminal cases.

Principle / ratio

The judgment separates personal moral disagreement from criminal liability.

• A public statement may be debated, criticised or rejected, but prosecution requires the ingredients of an actual offence.
• For criminal defamation, the complainant must usually be a person who is legally aggrieved.
• A general opinion not aimed at an identifiable person or group does not become defamation merely because many disagree with it.
• Courts cannot replace the elements of an offence with a personal belief about how people should behave, even when a public statement causes strong disagreement.

Exam points

• The prosecution involved provisions of the old Indian Penal Code and the Indecent Representation of Women law. Historical charges should be described as they were filed, rather than replacing them with new Code numbers.
• The Court did not announce that every statement about sex is protected. It decided that these complaints, on these facts, could not continue.
• Offence and disagreement belong mainly to public debate. Criminal law needs proof of a defined wrong, not just a loud reaction.

Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal (2014)

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Decided by the Supreme Court in 2014. It replaced the older Hicklin approach with the contemporary community standards test. This is the case that finally buried the Hicklin test in India.

Issue

Can one photograph be called obscene simply because it contains nudity, or must the court examine its message and the standards of the society viewing it?

Facts

• A German magazine, Stern, published a photograph of the tennis star Boris Becker posing nude with his dark-skinned fiancée, Barbara Feltus. The photograph was taken by her father.
• It was meant to protest against racism and to show that love triumphs over hatred.
• In May 1993, the Indian magazine Sports World and the Bengali newspaper Anandabazar Patrika reproduced the photograph.
• A lawyer filed a complaint for obscenity against the editor and the publisher, and also sought action under the Indecent Representation of Women Act.
• The High Court refused to quash the case.

Judgment (held)

In 2014, the Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice K. S. Radhakrishnan, quashed the proceedings.

• The Hicklin test is no longer the correct test. The correct test is the contemporary community standards test.
• Only material that tends to excite lustful thoughts can be held obscene, judged from the point of view of an average person, applying contemporary community standards.
• A picture of a nude or semi-nude woman is not obscene by itself.
• The photograph had to be seen in its context, with the message it conveyed (a protest against racism). So it was not obscene.

Principle / ratio

Old Hicklin approach	Contemporary community standards approach
Asks how a highly vulnerable person might react	Asks how an ordinary (average) person would view it
Looks at an isolated picture	Looks at the work in its full setting and context
Earlier approach, reflected in the reasoning of Ranjit Udeshi	Standards of the present time ("contemporary")

This case is central because the Supreme Court moved away from the old Hicklin test. "Contemporary" means standards of the present time. The work must be seen from the perspective of an ordinary person and in its full setting. The general obscenity framework (Article 19(1)(a) balanced with decency or morality under Article 19(2)) applies here as well.

Significance

• The underlying historical offence arose under Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code. The current comparable provision is Section 294 of B.N.S.
• The decision does not say that pornography can never be restricted. It changes how allegedly obscene work is assessed.
• Its legal significance includes moving beyond the earlier reasoning of Ranjit Udeshi on the Hicklin approach.

Apurva Arora v. Government of NCT of Delhi (2024)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (40:11)

Decided by the Supreme Court in 2024. It explains the difference between abusive language and legal obscenity online.

Issue

May people be prosecuted for a web series merely because its dialogue uses crude or insulting words? The law asks a narrower question than whether viewers find the language polite.

Facts

• College Romance was a web series streamed on YouTube. One episode used a lot of crude language, including words for sexual organs and acts.
• On a complaint, the police were directed to register a case under Sections 67 and 67A of the Information Technology Act.
• The Delhi High Court refused to quash it, holding that the language was obscene when judged by the standard of a common person.

Judgment (held)

In March 2024, the Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice P. S. Narasimha, quashed the case.

• The High Court had asked the wrong question. The question is not whether the language is civil or decent, but whether it is obscene.
• Vulgarity and profanity are not obscenities by themselves.
• A person may find expletive-filled language distasteful, uncivil and improper, but obscenity relates to material that arouses sexual and lustful thoughts.
• The series, a comedy about college life, had to be seen as a whole.
• The standard is that of an ordinary adult, not of impressionable minds or children.

Principle / ratio

Provision of the Information Technology Act	What it concerns
Section 67	Obscene material in electronic form
Section 67A	Material containing sexually explicit acts or conduct in electronic form

• These are separate legal requirements. The fact that a script contains profanity does not automatically satisfy either section.
• Profanity means rude or abusive language.
• The court must connect the alleged content to the actual words of the offence.
• The general obscenity framework (Article 19(1)(a) balanced with decency or morality under Article 19(2), assessing the work in its proper setting) applies here as well.

Significance

• The Court quashed the proceedings rather than merely reducing the punishment. A complaint must disclose the ingredients of the offence.
• The judgment does not mean that all online content is protected, or that Sections 67 and 67A are invalid. The sections remain; they simply cannot be stretched to cover conduct their words do not criminalise.
• Lasting lesson: speech may be rude without being legally obscene. Criminal labels must fit the statutory definition, not public annoyance.

R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994)

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Decided by the Supreme Court in 1994. It explains the boundary between privacy, public records and press freedom. The judgment is often called the Auto Shankar case.

Issue

Can a magazine publish a prisoner's life story when it names officials, and can officials stop the publication before anyone reads it?

Facts

• A Tamil weekly called Nakkheeran said it planned to publish the autobiography of a prisoner known as Auto Shankar.
• The proposed account claimed links between him and officials.
• Prison authorities disputed whether the prisoner had written or authorised it, and sent a warning to the magazine.

Judgment (held)

The Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice B. P. Jeevan Reddy, held:

• Citizens have a right to privacy. Publishing details of a person's private life without consent may be actionable, unless the matter is based on public records, such as court records.
• For public officials, the Court discussed a higher standard for damages claims about their official conduct. A public official cannot claim damages for a publication about his official conduct, even if it is untrue, unless he proves that it was made with reckless disregard for the truth.
• It is enough for the publisher to show that he acted after a reasonable verification of the facts.
• The Court did not decide the disputed authorship.
• The magazine could publish material drawn from public records without prior permission, while remaining responsible under the law for going beyond those records.
• Officials could not impose a prior ban.

Principle / ratio

Privacy and press freedom protect different interests, and both goals have value:

Privacy	Press freedom / journalism
Protects a personal space for choices and information	Protects the public's access to relevant facts
Protection against unwanted publication of one's private life	Serious public interest in the conduct of officials who hold power
Private material	Information drawn from public records

The Court also considered the higher burden a public official faces when suing over reporting about official conduct. Courts distinguish public records from rumours.

• A reporter should ask whether publication contributes to a real public question, whether it reveals an unnecessary intimate detail, and whether the information has been checked.
• The fact that someone is well known does not remove every personal right.
• The fact that a person is private does not automatically erase legitimate reporting about a matter of public concern.

Exam points

• The judgment is not a general permission to invent charges against officials, nor a rule that every private fact appearing online may be copied without risk.
• Liability depends on the nature of the material, public records and the level of care taken.
• Later constitutional privacy law, including the nine-judge decision in Puttaswamy, strengthens the wider privacy framework.
• Enduring contribution: the line between public accountability and unnecessary invasion of private life. Press freedom is strongest when it informs citizens, not when it exposes secrets for entertainment.

Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (48:00)

Decided by the Supreme Court in 2016. It considers whether criminal defamation is consistent with free speech.

Issue

Can insulting or damaging words be punished as a crime when the Constitution also protects free speech? This is a difficult conflict between expression and reputation.

Facts and arguments

• Many argued that sending a person to jail for words is a colonial relic that chills free speech, and that civil remedies are enough.
• Several political leaders, including Subramanian Swamy, who were facing criminal defamation complaints, challenged the provisions in the Supreme Court.

Judgment (held)

In 2016, the Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice Dipak Misra, upheld Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code and the related procedure.

• Reputation is an inseparable part of the right to life and dignity under Article 21.
• The word "defamation" in Article 19(2) includes criminal defamation, not only the civil wrong.
• Free speech does not include a right to damage another person's reputation, so the two rights must be balanced. As the Court put it, the reputation of one cannot be allowed to be crucified at the altar of the other's right of free speech.
• The Court also relied on the value of fraternity in the Preamble.
• The magistrate carries a heavy burden to scrutinise a private complaint with care before summoning anyone, so that the process does not become a tool of harassment.

Principle / ratio

Criminal defamation therefore remained constitutionally valid. The Court examined the constitutional values:

Provision	Value protected
Article 19(1)(a)	Protects speech
Article 19(2)	Expressly allows reasonable restrictions concerning defamation
Article 21	Protects dignity and reputation as part of the right to life

The Court concluded that criminal defamation, with its statutory safeguards, is constitutionally permissible.

Exam points

• At the time of the judgment, the offence appeared in Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code.
• The present criminal defamation provision is Section 356 of B.N.S. Procedure for complaints is addressed in Section 222 of B.N.S.S. These current references are not the provisions the Court was reviewing in 2016.
• B.N.S. now contains the offence, but a complaint must still meet its legal requirements. A person cannot be convicted merely because someone objects to criticism.
• The case does not ban criticism of public officials or replace the legal exceptions. It says that reputation is also a constitutional value and that complaints require careful judicial scrutiny.

Crop Care Federation of India v. Rajasthan Patrika (2009)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (51:47)

Decided by the Delhi High Court in 2009. It explains when an industry association cannot claim to have been defamed.

Issue

Can a trade association sue a newspaper because articles criticise an entire industry, even when the articles do not name that association?

Facts

• A federation of pesticide manufacturers, with 84 members, sued the Hindi newspaper Rajasthan Patrika over a series of articles published in February 2004.
• The articles described the harmful effects of pesticides on plants, animals and people.
• They did not name the federation or any of its members.
• The federation filed its suit in Delhi, although the articles were published in Rajasthan.

Judgment (held)

In 2009, Justice S. Ravindra Bhat of the Delhi High Court rejected the suit under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure because it disclosed no cause of action.

1. The articles referred to pesticide makers as a whole class, not to the plaintiff. A trade body cannot sue for a general criticism of an entire industry.
2. The suit had all the ingredients of a SLAPP suit, meant to censor, intimidate and silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defence. Whether pesticides harm life is a matter for public debate, which cannot be stifled by intimidatory litigation.
3. Even civil injunctions and claims for damages can chill the freedom of the press.

Principle / ratio

• To establish defamation, the challenged statement normally must be shown to refer to the plaintiff.
• That does not always require mentioning a person by name. But the reader must reasonably identify the person or a definite, identifiable group.
• A broad discussion about problems with an industry is different from accusing a named firm of wrongdoing.

Responsible journalism

A careful journalist should preserve the source material, check serious allegations, fairly describe uncertainty and seek the other side's response where practicable. These steps do not guarantee victory in a lawsuit, but they help show how the report was prepared. A court, in turn, must distinguish an honestly examined public question from a statement presented as fact without support. Defamation law is not a simple rule that every negative story must be removed.

Exam points

• The decision comes from the Delhi High Court and should not be described as a Supreme Court ruling.
• Twofold lesson: a plaintiff must be identifiable, and courts should not allow expensive litigation to become a tool for silencing debate that serves the public.

National Stock Exchange of India v. Moneywise Media (2015)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (55:42)

Decided by the Bombay High Court in 2015. It examines a request to silence reporting about a stock exchange. The dispute concerned reporting by the online magazine Moneylife.

Issue

When journalists investigate a powerful financial institution, should an allegation alone be enough to stop their report before a trial?

Facts

• In June 2015, Moneylife, an online financial magazine, published an article by its editors Sucheta Dalal and Debashis Basu.
• Relying on an anonymous whistleblower's letter sent to the market regulator, the article alleged that the National Stock Exchange had allowed some traders unfair advantages in high-speed trading, through the placement of their servers next to the exchange's systems.
• The Exchange sued for defamation and asked for an injunction.

Judgment (held)

In September 2015, Justice G. S. Patel of the Bombay High Court refused the injunction and found no prima facie case at all.

• The suit looked like an attempt at deflection and evasion; he called it a gross abuse of the process of the court.
• Courts, he said, are not playgrounds for imagined slights by those who command considerable resources.
• He ordered the Exchange to pay costs of 1.5 lakh rupees to each journalist.
• He also ordered it to pay 47 lakh rupees as exemplary costs to two hospitals, for the free treatment of poor patients.

Principle / ratio

• An injunction is a court order requiring a person to do something or stop doing it.
• An interim injunction operates before the final decision.
• Because stopping a news report before trial can seriously affect public debate, courts must examine the evidence with care.
• A powerful claimant does not receive an injunction merely because an investigation is embarrassing.
• The defamation framework (Article 19(1)(a), Article 19(2) and Article 21 weighed together) and the responsible-journalism steps noted under Crop Care apply here as well.

Exam points

• The ruling was given by the Bombay High Court, not by the Supreme Court.
• It is often discussed in lessons on SLAPP litigation because the court criticised the use of a powerful plaintiff's resources against journalists and imposed substantial costs.
• It does not mean a stock exchange or large company can never sue for defamation. Genuine false and harmful allegations can still be challenged under the law.
• Legal process should protect rights, not punish the act of asking difficult public questions.

Bloomberg Television Production Services India v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises (2024)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (59:34)

Decided by the Supreme Court in 2024. It explains why courts must be extremely careful before stopping a news report.

Issue

Can a court order journalists to remove a report before hearing them, simply because a company calls the report defamatory?

Facts

• A trial court in Delhi ordered Bloomberg to take down an article about the media company Zee, without hearing Bloomberg.
• The High Court declined to set aside that direction.

Judgment (held)

In March 2024, the Supreme Court, in a judgment by Chief Justice D. Y. Chandrachud, set aside the order.

• The usual test for interim injunctions (a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable harm) must not be applied mechanically in defamation cases against the media.
• An injunction against a publication, especially without hearing the other side, should not be granted unless the content is shown to be malicious or palpably false.
• It should be granted only in exceptional cases, where the defence is bound to fail at trial.
• A pre-trial injunction often acts as a "death sentence" for the material.
• The Court expressly recognised SLAPP suits, where powerful entities use prolonged litigation to keep the public from learning about matters of public interest.

Principle / ratio

The ordinary interim-injunction test includes:

1. a preliminary (prima facie) case;
2. balance of convenience; and
3. risk of harm that money cannot properly repair (irreparable harm).

In a media-defamation case, these words cannot be repeated as an empty formula. A judge must explain the reasons and consider the right to free speech against the right to reputation and privacy. The same defamation framework applies: neither the press nor a powerful claimant should automatically win, and care is needed before stopping a publication while the full trial is pending.

Exam points

• The Supreme Court discussed the Bonnard standard, a principle requiring special caution before restraining publication in a defamation dispute.
• The Court also noted the danger of SLAPP suits.
• It set aside the orders in this case but did not finally decide that every claim in the news article was true. This distinction between removing an interim restraint and finally deciding defamation is essential.
• Freedom of the press must be considered at the first court hearing, not only after a long trial is over.

Sahara India Real Estate Corporation v. Securities and Exchange Board of India (2012)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:03:19)

Decided by the Supreme Court in 2012. It explains when a court may briefly postpone reporting to protect a fair trial.

Issue

When a case is still being heard, how can the law protect a fair trial without making the media silent about every court proceeding?

Facts

• During a dispute in the Supreme Court about refunds to investors, the lawyer for Sahara sent a confidential proposal to the lawyer for the market regulator.
• Before the next hearing, a television channel broadcast its details.
• Sahara then asked the Court to frame guidelines for media reporting of pending cases.

Judgment (held)

In 2012, a Constitution Bench led by Chief Justice S. H. Kapadia refused to frame general guidelines, but developed the idea of postponement orders.

• A court may order the media to temporarily postpone reporting on a pending case, but only when there is a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the fairness of the trial or to the proper administration of justice.
• Such an order must be necessary and proportionate.
• It must be for a limited period, and must not alter the content of the report.
• It is allowed only when other measures, like changing the venue or postponing the trial, cannot prevent the risk.
• The Court called this a neutralising device, not a punishment, and held that such orders are reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2).
• Any accused or aggrieved person who genuinely fears that a publication will harm his right to a fair trial can approach the High Court or the Supreme Court for such an order.

Principle / ratio

Open justice means the public should ordinarily know what courts are doing; it is the normal starting point. Public reporting of court proceedings helps people see justice being done, while courts must at the same time protect fair hearings. But an exceptional publication may create a real and substantial danger to a fair hearing. Article 21 concerns fair procedure, while Article 19(1)(a) protects reporting. An order affecting publication must rest on a real legal need, not on the simple fact that a party feels uncomfortable. The court should consider:

• how serious the risk is;
• whether less restrictive methods are possible; and
• how long any restriction would last.

Exam points

• The Court linked the issue to freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a), the constitutional grounds in Article 19(2) and the right to a fair trial.
• The lesson is balance, not silence. Court reporting remains important, while a narrow temporary delay may protect justice in a truly exceptional case.

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:06:57)

Decided by the Supreme Court in 2015. It protects lawful online speech from a vague criminal provision.

Issue

Can a person be arrested for sending an online message that somebody finds annoying or offensive?

Judgment (held)

The law must not be vague or overbroad. The Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act.

• The section punished sending online messages that were grossly offensive or menacing, or were sent to cause annoyance or inconvenience.
• These words were so vague that they caught innocent speech too, and so had a chilling effect, that is, they frightened people into silence.
• Mere discussion, and even advocacy of an unpopular cause, is protected. Only when speech reaches the level of incitement can it be restricted.

Principle / ratio

• Vagueness: Section 66A used words such as "annoyance" and "inconvenience". Those expressions were too uncertain; a person could not know clearly what speech was criminal.
• Chilling effect: a vague law causes people to avoid lawful opinions because they fear prosecution.
• The Constitution protects the freedom to express ideas through modern technology as well as through newspapers and books.
• Applying a legal rule online still requires the words of the relevant statute to be satisfied. A person's dislike of an online message is not enough by itself.
• Restrictions must have a lawful basis and fit the constitutional grounds.
• Internet communication affects how people learn, work and take part in public affairs, so it is important to study both freedom and the limited situations in which the State may lawfully interfere.

Stage of speech	Legal position
Discussion	Protected, even when the opinion is unpopular
Advocacy	Protected, even of an unpopular cause
Incitement	A more serious stage, where expression urges unlawful action in a legally relevant way; may be restricted

Significance

• The Court struck down Section 66A only. It did not strike down every provision of the Information Technology Act or give unlimited protection to online threats, fraud or criminal conduct.
• Where another valid law actually applies, speech may still attract liability.
• A court cannot expand a criminal section just because new technology makes speech travel faster. Clear legal limits protect users and also help authorities enforce valid laws fairly.

Exam points

• Separate the facts from the rule. The facts explain why Shreya Singhal v. Union of India reached the court; the rule is the court's reason for its decision.
• A good answer first states the correct legal question, then explains what the judges decided, and finally applies that principle to new facts. A different situation may have a different result, so never use one judgment as a universal answer to every dispute.
• Essential for answers on digital speech: a criminal law must be clear, properly limited and connected to a constitutional ground.

Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:10:38)

Facts

The case concerned the internet shutdown in Jammu and Kashmir. The Court examined the constitutional limits on internet shutdown orders.

Issues

• What happens to newspapers, businesses and ordinary people when the internet is shut down?
• Is a long shutdown lawful just because the government invokes security?

The test of proportionality

Courts apply the test of proportionality. The State must show four things:

1. Legitimate aim: the restriction must pursue a legitimate aim.
2. Suitability: it must be a suitable way to achieve that aim.
3. Necessity: there must be no less restrictive but equally effective alternative.
4. Balancing: the harm to the right must not be greater than the benefit gained.

Judgment (held)

• An indefinite suspension of the internet is not permissible (it was impermissible under the rules then applicable).
• Suspension orders must be published (made available) and periodically reviewed.
• The Court considered proportionality and judicial review of such orders.
• The Court did not itself order immediate restoration of all internet services.

Principle / ratio

The Supreme Court distinguished the protected use of the internet from a separate standalone constitutional right to internet access. Freedom of speech and the freedom to carry on trade through the internet receive constitutional protection. Orders restricting these activities must meet legal requirements and may be tested by courts.

The Constitution protects the freedom to express ideas through modern technology as well as through newspapers and books. However:

• Applying a legal rule online still requires the words of the relevant statute to be satisfied.
• A person's dislike of an online message is not enough by itself.
• Restrictions must have a lawful basis and fit the constitutional grounds.
• Internet communication affects how people learn, work and take part in public affairs, so both the freedom and the limited situations in which the State may lawfully interfere must be studied.

When the State relies on security, the power is not free from checks. Officials must:

• show a lawful basis;
• explain why the step is necessary; and
• choose a duration and scope that can be justified.

Method for online-speech cases

1. Do not begin with the emotional reaction to a message; begin with the legal provision.
2. Identify the conduct the section actually prohibits.
3. Connect it to the constitutional rights and any relevant restriction.

A court cannot expand a criminal section just because new technology makes speech travel faster. Clear legal limits protect users and also help authorities enforce valid laws fairly.

Exam points

• Rules on telecom suspension have changed since the judgment; do not present the procedures from 2020 as if every detail remains unchanged.
• Separate the facts from the rule. The facts explain why the case reached the court; the rule is the court's reason for its decision.
• A good answer first states the correct legal question, then explains what the judges decided, and finally applies that principle to new facts. A different situation may have a different result, so never use one judgment as a universal answer to every dispute.

Significance

Freedom on the internet matters because digital publication is now part of everyday speech. Security concerns may matter, but they do not end constitutional examination.

S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:14:21)

Issues

• What should the police do if a group threatens violence over a certified film: protect the cinema hall, or stop the film?
• Can threats of protest automatically stop a certified film?

Facts

• The Tamil film Ore Oru Gramathile criticised the policy of caste-based reservation.
• After review, the Board gave it a U certificate.
• Some people argued that it portrayed reservation in a biased way, hurt caste sentiments and would cause law and order problems in Tamil Nadu.
• The Madras High Court revoked the certificate.

Judgment (held)

In 1989 the Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice K. Jagannatha Shetty, restored the certificate. The Court said:

• A film cannot be suppressed merely because some people may react violently.
• The danger must not be remote, conjectural or far-fetched.
• The film itself must be as closely linked to the danger as a spark in a powder keg.
• Freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on account of threats of demonstrations, processions or violence. That would amount to negation of the rule of law and a surrender to blackmail and intimidation.
• It is the duty of the State to protect freedom of expression; the State cannot plead its inability to handle a hostile audience.

Principle / ratio: the heckler's veto

Article 19(2) allows restriction for public order, but the danger must be closely connected with the expression. A remote guess or far-fetched worry is not enough.

Film law framework

Film law involves both constitutional freedom and certification under the Cinematograph Act.

• Article 19(1)(a) protects expression, while Article 19(2) permits certain reasonable restrictions.
• Certification is a lawful system for classifying public exhibition, but it cannot be a licence for unlimited personal censorship.
• A viewer has a right to disagree with a film. That disagreement does not by itself establish a legal ground for stopping everyone else from seeing it.
• The legal test requires attention to content, context, the power of the authority and the purpose of any proposed restriction.

Answering a film-censorship problem

1. Identify whether the film has been certified.
2. Identify who is trying to interfere: the certification authority, a State official, a police officer or a private group. Each actor has different legal powers.
3. Ask for the actual constitutional ground and evidence of harm.
4. Ask whether a narrower legal step could deal with the concern.

This method prevents a vague answer based only on public sentiment. It applies equally to the later film cases below.

Exam points

• In the actual decision, the Supreme Court restored the certificate after the High Court had revoked it.
• The Court was not deciding which side of the reservation debate was politically correct.

Significance

The rule remains vital whenever books, speeches or films cause controversy: threats from opponents do not automatically cancel constitutional rights.

Prakash Jha Productions v. Union of India (2011)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:18:09)

Issue

Can a State government stop a film after the national film-certification authority (the Board) has approved it?

Facts

• The film Aarakshan, which means reservation, was certified by the Board.
• Around its release in 2011, the governments of Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Andhra Pradesh suspended its screening, fearing trouble.
• Punjab and Andhra Pradesh withdrew their orders once the producers went to court.
• Uttar Pradesh defended its order, relying on a high-level committee that had watched the film and suggested deleting some portions.

Judgment (held)

• In August 2011, a Bench of the Supreme Court led by Justice Mukundakam Sharma quashed the order of Uttar Pradesh.
• The State's committee had tried to sit over the decision of the Board and demand cuts. That is a power of pre-censorship which the State simply does not have.
• Once the expert Board has cleared a film, the State cannot prohibit its screening on the ground of a possible law and order problem.
• It is for the State to maintain law and order effectively.

Principle / ratio

Film certification is the responsibility of the body given that role by law. A State government has public-order duties, but it cannot automatically create its own second censorship system. A minister or local committee cannot simply demand new cuts because the certified film may trigger disagreement. The legal power, the stated danger and the available remedies must all be examined.

Exam points

• Apply the film law framework and the four-step answer method set out under S. Rangarajan: certification status, the actor interfering, the constitutional ground and evidence of harm, and any narrower legal step.
• Remember that two States withdrew their orders; only Uttar Pradesh's order was quashed by the Court.

Significance

A certified film cannot be treated as illegal merely because officials fear criticism or protest. Lawful powers have boundaries.

Phantom Films v. Central Board of Film Certification (2016)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:21:49)

Issue

Can a film be forced to remove the name of a State simply because it shows a serious social problem in that State? How must film certification respect creative freedom?

Facts

• The film Udta Punjab showed the problem of drug addiction among the youth of Punjab.
• The producers asked for an Adult certificate.
• The Revising Committee demanded thirteen cuts, including:
  • removing the names of Punjab and its towns;
  • references to elections and politicians;
  • close shots of drug injections; and
  • many abusive words.

Judgment (held)

• In June 2016, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, in a judgment by Justice S. C. Dharmadhikari, set aside all the cuts except one: a scene of a character urinating in front of a crowd. It also required a change in the disclaimer.
• The central theme of the film was the menace of drugs; a few shots of injections do not glamorise drug use.
• Stray lines do not insult the whole State of Punjab.
• None can dictate to a creative person how he should make his film, and the Board must certify films according to law, not demand unnecessary cuts.
• The Court directed an Adult certificate within 48 hours.

Principle / ratio

Certification exists to apply legal standards, not to make every film flattering. A difficult subject such as drug addiction may be socially valuable. The Board still has a role, but reasons for cuts must be supported by the law and must relate to the entire film rather than an official preference.

Exam points

• The dispute arose under the Cinematograph Act and certification guidelines as they stood at the time; do not assume every old procedural step remains unchanged under later amendments.
• Apply the film law framework and the four-step answer method set out under S. Rangarajan.

Significance

A practical lesson for filmmakers: controversial social reality may be shown, but certification authorities must exercise their powers lawfully and with care.

Viacom 18 Media v. Union of India (2018)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:25:31)

Issue

Can angry protests, and State bans based on them, stop a film that already has a lawful certificate?

Facts

• The film Padmaavat by Sanjay Leela Bhansali faced violent protests from groups who claimed that it distorted history and insulted the queen Padmavati.
• The Board certified the film after changes, including a new title.
• Even so, several State governments, including Gujarat and Rajasthan, issued notifications banning its exhibition.

Judgment (held)

• In January 2018, a Bench led by Chief Justice Dipak Misra stayed the bans and restrained other States from issuing similar orders.
• Once the Board has issued a certificate, there is a presumption that it has considered all the guidelines, including public order.
• It is the duty of the State to maintain law and order, not to stop a lawfully certified film.

Principle / ratio

A certification process evaluates a film under the standards fixed by law. Once a certificate is issued, public authorities must respect that decision unless they use a lawful power for proper reasons. The State also has a duty to protect people and property against threats. The presence of loud protesters is not, by itself, a reason to surrender the rights of every viewer.

Authorities cannot set aside lawful exhibition merely by invoking a fear of protest, without satisfying constitutional and statutory conditions.

Exam points

• The order was an interim order stopping State bans, not a final ruling on the film's historical accuracy. The legal dispute was about the State's power to prevent exhibition.
• The decision did not decide the historical truth of every scene in the film.
• A certificate does not make a producer immune from all laws.
• Apply the film law framework and the four-step answer method set out under S. Rangarajan.

Indibily Creative Private Limited v. Government of West Bengal (2019)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:29:10)

Issue

If the State does not officially ban a film but police pressure causes cinemas to stop showing it, can that informal pressure violate constitutional rights?

Facts

• The Bengali political satire Bhobishyoter Bhoot, directed by Anik Dutta, received a U/A certificate.
• A few days before its release in Kolkata in February 2019, a senior police officer wrote to the producers demanding a special screening, saying that the film might hurt public sentiments.
• The day after its release, the film was pulled out of almost all theatres, though no law authorised this.

Judgment (held)

• In April 2019, the Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice D. Y. Chandrachud, held that the State had used its police to stop a certified film. This was an unlawful and unconstitutional restraint.
• The Court stressed the positive duty of the State to protect free speech, and quoted the question asked in Rangarajan: what good is the protection of freedom of expression if the State does not take care to protect it?
• The State was ordered to pay Rs. 20 lakh as compensation to the producers, and Rs. 1 lakh as costs.

Principle / ratio

A State may have to pay compensation when it unlawfully blocks a film. The case draws an important distinction between lawful regulation and an unofficial restraint. An authority may claim that it never signed a formal prohibition; yet if police pressure effectively prevents screenings, the result may still violate freedom of expression. Courts examine the real effect of official conduct, not only written orders.

Lawful regulatory restriction	Unofficial restraint
Made under a statute after proper review	No law authorises it (here, police pressure that pulled a certified film from theatres)
A formal prohibition or written order	The authority may claim it never signed a formal prohibition; pressure may be communicated through a phone call rather than a formal notification

Exam points

• The Supreme Court recognised the State's positive obligation to protect a certified film and ordered compensation and costs.
• The name appears with different spellings in some reports, but the Supreme Court judgment is titled Indibily Creative Private Limited v. Government of West Bengal.
• Do not confuse this case with a lawful regulatory restriction made under a statute after proper review.
• Apply the film law framework and the four-step answer method set out under S. Rangarajan.

Significance

The lesson goes beyond cinema. An informal official threat can silence speech just as effectively as a written ban, and courts can look at that reality.

Tata Press Limited v. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited (1995)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:32:58)

Issue

Are advertisements only business messages, or do they also give citizens information protected by free speech?

Facts

• Tata Press published Tata Press Yellow Pages, a buyer's guide made up of advertisements by businessmen, traders and professionals.
• Mahanagar Telephone Nigam, the public telephone company, sued to stop it.
• It argued that under the Indian Telegraph Act and its rules, only it could publish a telephone directory.

Judgment (held)

• In 1995, the Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice Kuldip Singh, held that commercial speech is part of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).
• Advertisements give the public information about goods and services, and the public has a right to receive that information. In a free economy this information is vital for making choices.
• The Court agreed with an earlier ruling that the Hamdard Dawakhana case had been stated too broadly. Hamdard only dealt with advertisements of prohibited drugs, which were against public interest.
• Commercial speech which is deceptive, unfair, misleading or untruthful can be regulated or prohibited.
• On the facts, the Yellow Pages was a buyer's guide, not a telephone directory, so Tata Press could publish it, as long as it did not copy the white pages listing only names and numbers.

Principle / ratio

An advertisement may tell people which services exist, what they cost and how to contact the seller. The public can use such information to make choices. The Supreme Court therefore recognised commercial speech under Article 19(1)(a). But a claim being commercial does not give it freedom to deceive; false and misleading advertisements may still be controlled by valid laws.

Advertising and free speech

Advertisements are messages that seek to influence consumer choices.

• Some give useful facts about prices, quality and availability.
• Others may mislead, especially when they promise cures or safety without support.

Commercial speech can therefore raise freedom-of-expression questions alongside public-health and consumer-protection questions. The answer depends on the nature of the advertisement and the valid law that controls it. A seller cannot use the word freedom as an excuse for false promises; officials also cannot assume that every genuine advertisement has no speech value.

Exam points

• The Court distinguished its older decision concerning objectionable drug advertisements (Hamdard Dawakhana).
• The Yellow Pages had a different purpose from a plain telephone-number directory.
• The judgment does not mean a seller has an absolute right to copy protected information or publish harmful medical claims. Advertisements remain subject to consumer-protection, competition and other applicable laws.
• The judgment does not create a right to publish fake promises. Consumers need reliable information, and dishonest commercial claims can still be controlled.

Significance

Advertising can inform as well as persuade. The Constitution protects truthful commercial information, while allowing lawful control of deception.

Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India (1959)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:36:39)

Issues

• Can the government stop an advertisement claiming that a medicine can cure serious diseases?
• Does calling the message an advertisement make every claim constitutionally protected?

Facts

• The case concerned the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954.
• The Act restricted advertising of certain medicines and claims to cure named diseases.
• The petitioners challenged the law under the Constitution.

Judgment (held)

• In 1959, the Supreme Court treated this type of medical advertising mainly as trade, not protected discussion of ideas.
• The Court upheld the core restrictions but did not uphold the whole Act.
• Section 3(d): part of it allowed officials to add further diseases to the banned list without clear standards. The Court struck down those words.
• Section 8: it gave broad seizure powers without proper safeguards. The Court struck it down.
• These invalid provisions were separable, so the rest of the Act could still operate.

Principle / ratio: severability

The rule of severability means a court can remove an unlawful part of a statute when the remaining part can still work. Here, the judges did not cancel every restriction on drug advertisements. They removed particular powers that went too far and left the rest of the law standing.

Applying advertising law

Look at what the message promises and what an ordinary customer may understand. Ask:

1. Is it a verifiable factual claim, a clearly expressed opinion or a promise about health?
2. Is the statement accurate?
3. Does a law prohibit this category of claim?

These questions are more helpful than assuming that every sales message is either completely free or completely outside freedom of speech.

Hamdard Dawakhana and Tata Press compared

Point	Hamdard Dawakhana (1959)	Tata Press (1995)
Subject	Advertisements of prohibited drugs and claims to cure named diseases	Yellow Pages, a buyer's guide of advertisements
View of advertising	Treated mainly as trade, not protected discussion of ideas	Commercial speech is part of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a)
Later position	Its broad statement about commercial advertisements was later limited by Tata Press; it only dealt with advertisements against public interest	Truthful commercial information is protected; deceptive, unfair, misleading or untruthful commercial speech may be regulated or prohibited

Exam points

• The case was decided in December 1959, even though it is often cited from a 1960 law report.
• Do not teach Hamdard as though all advertisements lack constitutional protection under current law.
• Equally, do not assume that the later Tata Press case makes misleading cure claims lawful.

Significance

The key is the distinction between useful commercial information and prohibited or deceptive medical claims. Both the historical ruling and the later development matter.

Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Manubhai D. Shah (1992)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:40:23)

Issue

If a government-owned institution publishes an article defending itself, can it refuse the affected critic a fair opportunity to reply?

Facts

• A consumer researcher had criticised the premiums charged by the Life Insurance Corporation.
• The Corporation published a counter article in its own magazine.
• It refused to publish his reply.

Judgment (held)

• The Corporation, being the State, could not act so unfairly.
• The refusal violated Articles 14 and 19(1)(a).
• In a connected case, the Court also held that Doordarshan could not refuse to telecast an award-winning documentary called Beyond Genocide about the Bhopal gas disaster without a valid legal reason.

Principle / ratio

Fairness can require a right of reply. Article 14 deals with equality and non-arbitrary State action; Article 19 protects expression. Where an organisation is treated as the State under constitutional law, its editorial choices may be tested against those duties. In the connected broadcasting dispute involving the Bhopal gas tragedy documentary, the Court also addressed unfair exclusion by a public broadcaster.

Press freedom under Article 19

• The Constitution gives citizens freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a).
• Freedom of the press is part of that right even though the provision does not use the word press.
• Article 19(2) allows restrictions only for specified reasons, such as public order, defamation and decency.
• A court must therefore identify the particular right affected and the legal reason offered for restricting it.
• A restriction does not become valid merely because the State says it is for the public good.
• Equally, press freedom does not cancel all general laws that apply to newspaper businesses.

Reading a press-freedom case: four questions

1. What was the actual government measure?
2. How did it affect the newspaper and its readers?
3. Which constitutional right was affected?
4. What legal reason could justify that effect?

These questions stop the State's stated purpose from being mixed up with what happens in real life, and make the analysis of a problem question clear and orderly.

Exam points

• Separate the facts from the rule: the facts explain why the case reached the court; the rule is the court's reason for its decision.
• State the correct legal question, explain what the judges decided, then apply the principle to new facts. Never use one judgment as a universal answer to every dispute.

Significance

Free expression can involve access as well as publication, especially when a public institution controls the channel for public debate.

Justice K. S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:44:20)

Issues

• Does a person lose control over private life simply by living in a digital world?
• Can the Constitution protect personal choices, information and dignity?

Judgment (held)

• A nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that privacy is a fundamental right.
• Privacy is connected to the dignity, liberty and autonomy of a person. Autonomy means the ability to make important choices about one's own life.
• The Court located privacy in the constitutional protection of life and personal liberty and in other freedoms.
• It did not say that privacy always defeats every other right.
• The case changed the legal history of privacy by rejecting earlier broad statements that denied constitutional protection for privacy.
• Privacy may be restricted only under constitutionally justified conditions, including lawful purpose and proportionality.

Principle for the media: public interest v. what interests the public

Public interest	What merely interests the public
The corruption of a minister	His daughter's wedding menu (only gossip)
Scrutiny of a public figure's public role	Every private corner of a public figure's life
Information relevant to official accountability	Curiosity or sensationalism; details that may attract clicks

Balancing privacy and journalism

Privacy protects a personal space for choices and information. Journalism protects the public's access to relevant facts. Both goals have value. A reporter should ask:

• whether publication contributes to a real public question;
• whether it reveals an unnecessary intimate detail; and
• whether the information has been checked.

Courts also distinguish public records from rumours. The fact that someone is well known does not remove every personal right. The fact that a person is private does not automatically erase legitimate reporting about a matter of public concern.

The test of necessity: a report may be more interesting with a person's private details, but that is not the same as needing them to explain wrongdoing. Ask whether the same public message can be given without exposing a child, a victim or an unrelated family member. This practical test separates a public-interest reason from curiosity or sensationalism.

Exam points

• The judgment did not decide every possible conflict between media reporting and private life. Later cases and specific legislation may determine the result in a particular dispute.
• Separate the facts from the rule, state the legal question, explain the decision and apply it to new facts; never use one judgment as a universal answer.

Significance

A person remains a rights-holder even when personal information is easy to obtain. Public curiosity is not automatically public interest.

Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal (1995)

▶ Watch this part of the lecture (1:48:09)

Issues

• Who owns the airwaves? Does the government own every television signal simply because radio frequencies are limited?
• The Court had to consider the organiser's right to communicate, the viewers' right to receive information, and the government's control over broadcasting frequencies.

Facts

• The Cricket Association of Bengal wanted to arrange television coverage of cricket matches, including the Hero Cup.
• A dispute arose about who could produce and send the television signal and whether Doordarshan could insist on controlling the broadcast.
• The case reached the Supreme Court in 1995.

Judgment (held)

• Airwaves, meaning the radio frequencies used for broadcasting, are public property. Their use must serve the public interest.
• A State monopoly cannot be treated as an automatic answer to every broadcasting request.
• The Court called for (directed the development of) an independent public authority to regulate airwaves, so the resource could be managed for the public good.
• Article 19(1)(a) protects both giving and receiving information.
• Because the cricket matches had already been broadcast under the High Court order, the Supreme Court did not need to decide whether that particular broadcasting order was correct. It directed the High Court to decide how advertising revenue should be shared between the Cricket Association and Doordarshan.

Principle / ratio

The Constitution protects the freedom to share and receive information. Broadcasting is different from printing because signals use limited technical resources. That gives a reason for regulation, but not for treating the airwaves as the personal voice of the party in government. A public resource should be managed according to law for a public purpose. The audience's interest matters alongside the producer's and the broadcaster's interests. Proper technical control and constitutional freedom can exist together.

Analysing a broadcasting restriction

• Ask who benefits when a broadcast resource is controlled: is it serving citizens as viewers and speakers, or only the institution holding the licence?
• Ask whether the restriction is technical and lawful, or whether it suppresses particular opinions. A technical allocation rule and viewpoint censorship are not the same.
• A sound answer connects the public-resource principle to the need for fair access and independent regulation.

Exam points

• The Supreme Court did not decide whether the particular High Court broadcasting order was correct, since the matches had already been broadcast; it sent the advertising revenue question back to the High Court.
• The wider rule was clearly settled: airwaves are public property, and broadcasting must be regulated for the public interest.
• Technology and later regulatory law have changed, but the constitutional value remains important.

Significance

Broadcasting freedom belongs not only to the channel owner, but also to the public seeking ideas and information.