S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (First Judges Case)
Issue: Can the government choose judges even when the Chief Justice disagrees?
- The dispute concerned judicial appointments, transfers and the independence of courts.
- Articles 124 and 217 required consultation with judges before appointments.
- Question: does consultation mean compulsory agreement (concurrence)?
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (First Judges Case): challenge concerning judicial appointments and transfers. Held: by majority, consultation does not mean concurrence. The executive had the final say, although consultation had to be genuine and complete. The judgment also widened access to public interest litigation and recognised the importance of government transparency. Principle: executive primacy in judicial appointments (since changed).
Later position
The appointments ruling did not remain the law. In the Second Judges Case (1993), the Supreme Court gave primacy to the judiciary and developed the collegium system.
| S.P. Gupta (First Judges Case) | Later Judges Cases (from 1993) |
|---|---|
| Executive primacy in appointments | Judicial primacy |
| Consultation must be genuine and complete, but is not concurrence | Collegium system developed |
S.P. Gupta originally favoured executive primacy; the later Judges Cases changed that position. One word, "consultation", reshaped the relationship between the government and the courts.
Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (Internet Shutdowns)
Issue: Can a government shut down the internet for an unlimited time?
Facts: During restrictions in Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, a journalist said the communications shutdown had stopped her newspaper from operating. The Court examined freedom of speech and freedom of business under Article 19.
Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India: challenge to the 2019 communications shutdown in Jammu and Kashmir. Held: speech and professional activity through the internet enjoy constitutional protection under Article 19. Principle: internet restrictions must be published, necessary, proportionate, legally justified and cannot be indefinite.
Rules laid down
- Government orders restricting these rights must be published, so that citizens can challenge them.
- An internet suspension cannot continue indefinitely.
- Each restriction must be necessary, proportionate and legally justified.
- Proportionate means no more restrictive than the legitimate aim requires.
- Emergency powers must not become tools for suppressing ordinary disagreement.
The Court did not declare access to the internet a separate fundamental right. It protected the exercise of existing constitutional freedoms through the internet.
Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India (OBC Reservation in Central Educational Institutions)
Issue: Can reservation in central universities include 27% seats for Other Backward Classes (OBCs)?
Students challenged the law providing this reservation, questioning equality, merit and the Ninety-third Constitutional Amendment, which added clause (5) to Article 15.
Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India: challenge to 27% OBC reservation in central educational institutions and to Article 15(5). Held: the reservation law was upheld, subject to exclusion of the creamy layer. The exclusion of minority educational institutions from Article 15(5) was accepted. Principle: reservation can advance real equality, but benefits must reach those for whom the scheme is intended.
- Safeguard: the creamy layer within OBCs must be excluded.
- Creamy layer means members considered sufficiently advanced under the applicable government criteria.
- The constitutional exclusion of minority educational institutions from Article 15(5) was accepted.
- Not finally settled: application of the amendment to private unaided institutions. That question was addressed later in the Pramati case.
An essential case for educational reservation and creamy layer exclusion: OBC reservation upheld, creamy layer excluded, private unaided institutions left for Pramati.
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (Article 12)
Issue: Can a government-funded research society count as the "State" under Article 12?
Facts: An employee challenged his termination by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR). The earlier position (Sabhajit Tewary) said this organisation was not State. A seven-judge bench reconsidered that view.
Test applied
- Registration as a society does not settle the matter; what matters is the real relationship with government.
- Is the organisation financially, functionally and administratively dominated by the government?
- Is that control deep and pervasive, rather than ordinary regulation?
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology: termination of a CSIR employee. Held: looking at funding, management and government supervision, there was sufficient control over the research council, so it came within Article 12. Sabhajit Tewary was overruled. Principle: the actual nature and extent of government control decide whether a body is State.
A body cannot escape constitutional responsibility merely by calling itself an independent society. The test is deep and pervasive financial, functional and administrative control.
Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka (Repugnancy under Article 254)
Issue: If a State law and a Central law both deal with buses, does the newer Central law automatically cancel the State law?
Facts: Karnataka enacted a law to acquire private contract carriages. Parliament later passed the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Private operators argued that the Central Act had made the State law invalid.
The Supreme Court examined Article 254, which deals with conflicting laws on subjects in the Concurrent List. First, the judges asked what each law was really about.
| State law | Central law |
|---|---|
| Mainly concerned acquisition of property | Mainly regulated motor vehicles |
Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka: State law acquiring private contract carriages versus the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Held: the dominant purposes of the two laws were different, and the majority found no repugnancy. The State law survived. Principle: identify the actual subjects of both laws before declaring them inconsistent.
Repugnancy means a genuine legal conflict between laws. Before declaring two laws inconsistent, identify their actual subjects and examine whether they truly contradict each other.
Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (Appointment of Election Commissioners)
Issue: Who should choose the officials responsible for conducting elections?
The Supreme Court examined appointments to the Election Commission under Article 324. Before Parliament made a specific appointment law, the Union executive effectively controlled the selection process.
Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India: challenge to executive control over Election Commission appointments. Held: free and fair elections need an independent Election Commission. The Court created an interim selection committee of the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition and the Chief Justice of India, to apply only until Parliament made a law. Principle: constitutional importance of independent and impartial elections.
| Court's interim committee | Parliament's 2023 law |
|---|---|
| Prime Minister | Prime Minister |
| Leader of Opposition | Leader of Opposition |
| Chief Justice of India | Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister (replacing the Chief Justice) |
| Temporary, until Parliament legislated | Statutory system; has faced a separate constitutional challenge |
Remember the word interim. Do not describe the temporary committee created by the Court as the permanent system.
Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Proportionality Test)
Issue: Can a private medical college refuse a common entrance examination imposed by the State?
Private institutions said that controlling admissions and fees violated their freedom to run educational institutions under Article 19.
Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh: private colleges challenged State control over admissions and fees. Held: private colleges have rights, but those rights are not unlimited because education serves a public purpose. The State may regulate admissions to protect merit and prevent unfair practices, and may review fees to prevent profiteering while allowing reasonable funds for development. Principle: the four-part proportionality test.
Four-part proportionality test
- The restriction needs a legitimate aim.
- The method must help achieve that aim (suitability).
- There should not be an equally effective, less restrictive option (necessity).
- The benefit and the harm must be balanced.
Use this case whenever a question asks whether government regulation goes too far. A restriction must serve the public without unnecessarily destroying individual freedom.
Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab (Scope of Executive Power)
Issue: Can the government start publishing school textbooks without first passing a new law?
Private publishers challenged a government policy that reduced their chances of selling approved schoolbooks, arguing that executive orders could not interfere with their freedom of business.
Rule under Articles 73 and 162
- Executive power generally extends to subjects on which the relevant legislature can make laws.
- The government does not need a new statute for every ordinary executive activity.
- However, executive action cannot violate fundamental rights or existing laws.
Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab: publishers challenged the government's textbook policy. Held: the publishers had no fundamental right to force the government to approve their books; the petition failed. The Court did not generally authorise taking away business rights without law. Principle: broad executive power, always subject to constitutional and legal limits.
Executive power generally extends to subjects on which the relevant legislature can make laws, but it cannot violate fundamental rights or existing law.
Waman Rao v. Union of India (Ninth Schedule and the Cut-off Date)
Issue: Can Parliament place any law in the Ninth Schedule and make it permanently immune from challenge?
The case arose from land ceiling laws protected through the Ninth Schedule and Article 31B. The Court linked the answer to the basic structure rule announced in Kesavananda Bharati.
| Laws placed in the Ninth Schedule before 24 April 1973 | Amendments placing laws there after 24 April 1973 |
|---|---|
| Do not face the basic structure challenge | Can be examined for damage to the basic structure |
Waman Rao v. Union of India: challenge to land ceiling laws protected by the Ninth Schedule and Article 31B. Held: 24 April 1973 is the dividing date for basic structure scrutiny of Ninth Schedule laws. The Court also upheld Article 31A and the surviving, original protection under Article 31C. Principle: Parliament can protect social reforms, including land redistribution, but cannot use amendments to destroy essential constitutional principles.
Remember the date: 24 April 1973 separates the protected past from later Ninth Schedule scrutiny.
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (Maintenance of a Divorced Muslim Woman)
Issue: Can a divorced Muslim woman claim maintenance even after her iddat period ends?
After her marriage broke down, Shah Bano sought financial support under Section 125 of the former Criminal Procedure Code. Her husband argued that Muslim personal law limited his duty to the iddat period.
Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum: maintenance claim under Section 125 of the former Criminal Procedure Code. Held: this secular maintenance remedy does not belong to only one religion; a divorced woman unable to maintain herself could claim relief under it. Payment of mehr did not automatically end the maintenance obligation. Principle: financial protection beyond religious labels.
Later developments
- Parliament passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.
- The Danial Latifi judgment interpreted that Act.
- A 2024 ruling reaffirmed the availability of the secular remedy.
- Today, the corresponding general maintenance provision is Section 144 of B.N.S.S.
Section 125 of the former Criminal Procedure Code (now Section 144 B.N.S.S.) is a secular remedy available irrespective of religion; mehr does not automatically discharge it.
D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (Re-promulgation of Ordinances)
Issue: Can a State government keep making the same temporary law again and again, without letting its legislature decide?
- The Governor may issue an ordinance under Article 213 when the legislature is not in session and urgent action is required.
- An ordinance is temporary; it must face the legislature when the session resumes.
- Research showed that Bihar had repeatedly reissued ordinances instead of passing proper Acts.
D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar: Bihar's practice of repeatedly re-promulgating ordinances. Held: re-promulgation cannot become a substitute for ordinary lawmaking; routine repetition is a fraud on the Constitution. Principle: emergency legislative power exists for exceptional situations and cannot be used to bypass elected representatives.
Re-promulgation means issuing essentially the same ordinance again. This does not mean every later ordinance is automatically invalid; genuine new circumstances must be considered.
A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla (Habeas Corpus during Emergency)
Issue: During a National Emergency, could the government imprison someone without letting a court examine the detention?
During the Emergency of 1975, detention orders were challenged through habeas corpus petitions. Habeas corpus means asking a court to examine whether detention is lawful.
A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla: habeas corpus petitions against Emergency detentions. Held: by 4:1, the Court restricted the habeas corpus remedy while the relevant enforcement rights were suspended. Justice H.R. Khanna dissented, holding that personal liberty does not exist only because the government permits it. Principle (lasting, from the dissent): constitutional protection matters most when government power is greatest.
How the ruling was undone
- The Forty-fourth Constitutional Amendment protected the enforcement of Articles 20 and 21 even during an Emergency.
- In the Puttaswamy privacy judgment, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the A.D.M. Jabalpur approach.
Never present A.D.M. Jabalpur as current law. History vindicated Justice Khanna's dissent.
Dheeraj Mor and Rejanish K.V.: Judicial Officers and Direct Recruitment as District Judges
Issue: Can serving judicial officers compete for direct appointment as District Judges under Article 233?
Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi: Held: serving judicial officers could not compete; recruitment from the Bar was separated from promotion within judicial service. Principle: the older, now overruled position.
Rejanish K.V. v. K. Deepa (9 October 2025): a Constitution Bench overruled the Dheeraj Mor restriction and permitted judicial officers to apply for direct recruitment. Principle: newer eligibility rules under Article 233, applied prospectively.
New eligibility rules
- At least 7 years of continuous experience as an advocate, a judicial officer, or both combined.
- Minimum age of 35 years when applying.
- Eligibility is examined on the application date.
- The change applies prospectively: completed selections and earlier appointments ordinarily remain undisturbed, although cases with earlier interim court orders may be treated differently.
| Dheeraj Mor | Rejanish K.V. |
|---|---|
| Older position: judicial officers barred from direct recruitment | Newer position: judicial officers may apply |
| Bar quota separate from service promotion | 7 years' combined experience; minimum age 35; prospective effect |
Dheeraj Mor states the older position; Rejanish K.V. supplies the newer eligibility rules. Always check the applicable recruitment notification too.
I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (Amendment of Fundamental Rights)
Issue: Can Parliament amend fundamental rights?
A family challenged land reform measures and the constitutional amendments protecting them.
I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab: challenge to land reform laws and protecting amendments. Held: by a narrow majority, Parliament could not amend fundamental rights under the constitutional provisions as then understood; constitutional amendments were treated as "law" for Article 13. The Court applied prospective overruling. Principle: historical bar on amending fundamental rights (later rejected).
- Prospective overruling means the new interpretation operates for the future rather than undoing earlier amendments.
- Parliament responded with the Twenty-fourth Constitutional Amendment, expressly affirming its power to amend the Constitution.
- Kesavananda Bharati (1973): a larger bench rejected the complete Golaknath prohibition and established the basic structure doctrine.
| Golaknath | Kesavananda Bharati |
|---|---|
| Parliament cannot amend fundamental rights | Parliament can amend the Constitution, including fundamental rights |
| Amendment is "law" under Article 13 | But it cannot destroy the basic structure |
For exams, distinguish the historical Golaknath rule from the rule that governs constitutional amendments after Kesavananda Bharati.
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (Section 66A, IT Act)
Issue: Could someone be arrested simply because an online post was called annoying or offensive?
Section 66A of the Information Technology Act used vague words that could cover ordinary discussion, criticism or unpopular opinions.
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India: challenge to Section 66A of the IT Act. Held: Section 66A violated freedom of speech under Article 19 and was struck down. The website blocking framework under Section 69A was upheld, subject to its safeguards, and the operation of intermediary liability under Section 79 was limited. Principle: a law controlling expression must be clear, lawful and constitutionally justified.
| Discussion | Advocacy | Incitement |
|---|---|---|
| Sharing an idea | Supporting an idea | Encouraging unlawful action |
Mere discussion or advocacy does not automatically justify criminal punishment. The government cannot criminalise speech merely because others find it irritating.
Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (Governor's Discretion)
Issue: Can a Governor change the date of an Assembly session and direct legislators to remove the Speaker?
In Arunachal Pradesh, the Governor advanced an Assembly session during a crisis and influenced its agenda.
Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker: Governor advanced the Arunachal Pradesh Assembly session and influenced its agenda. Held: the Governor ordinarily acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers; Articles 163 and 174 do not create unlimited personal discretion. The disputed actions were set aside and the earlier constitutional position restored. Also held: a Speaker facing a pending removal notice should not decide disqualification petitions. Principle: constitutional offices carry duties, not unlimited personal authority.
| Issue 1: Governor | Issue 2: Speaker |
|---|---|
| Cannot take over the role of government; acts on aid and advice | Speaker facing removal notice should not decide disqualification petitions; this rule was later referred to a larger bench for reconsideration |
Treat these as two separate issues. Questions about the Speaker's powers must be read with later judicial developments.
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (Mandal Case)
Issue: Why does India have a creamy layer rule and a general 50% ceiling for many reservations?
The government introduced 27% reservation in Central services for Other Backward Classes.
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (Mandal case): challenge to 27% OBC reservation in Central services. Held: a nine-judge bench upheld the policy but said the creamy layer should be excluded. Caste can help identify social backwardness, but the law must examine actual circumstances. A general 50% ceiling was maintained, allowing for exceptional situations. Reservation in promotions under Article 16(4) was rejected at that time. Principle: equality in public employment with creamy layer exclusion and a 50% ceiling.
- Creamy layer exclusion prevents advanced members from taking benefits meant for the genuinely disadvantaged.
- Later amendments and judgments changed parts of the promotion framework.
- Economic reservation developed under a separate constitutional amendment.
Indra Sawhney remains central to OBC reservation, creamy layer exclusion, the 50% ceiling and equality in public employment.
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (Anti-defection Law)
Issue: Can the Speaker decide whether legislators have defected, without any court reviewing the decision?
The Tenth Schedule was added to discourage political defections and allowed the Speaker or Chairman to decide disqualification cases. Critics argued that giving this power to a political officeholder was unfair.
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu: challenge to the Tenth Schedule. Held: the anti-defection system was upheld; the Speaker's role was treated as comparable to a tribunal. But the attempt to completely exclude judicial review was rejected. Principle: the Speaker decides first, but does not have the last word against the Constitution.
- A tribunal means a body deciding legal disputes.
- Courts can examine the final decision for constitutional errors, serious procedural violations, bad faith or unreasonable findings.
- Ordinarily, courts do not interfere before the Speaker has decided.
Judicial review remains a safeguard against misuse of the anti-defection law, but generally only after the Speaker's decision.
Joseph Shine v. Union of India (Adultery)
Issue: Was adultery once a criminal offence in India? Yes.
The former Section 497 punished a man for a relationship with a married woman without the consent of her husband. The woman herself was not punished under that provision.
Joseph Shine v. Union of India: challenge to the adultery offence. Held: the provision treated a married woman as if her choices belonged to her husband, violating equality, dignity and individual autonomy. The adultery offence and the connected procedural rule were struck down. Principle: marriage cannot turn one adult into the legal property of another.
- Autonomy means the freedom to make personal decisions.
- Adultery may still be relevant as a ground for divorce under applicable marriage laws.
What ended was criminal punishment under the old provision, not the relevance of adultery in family disputes.
M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (Reservation in Promotions)
Issue: Can the government reserve promotions for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes?
M. Nagaraj v. Union of India: challenge to amendments allowing promotion reservation and related seniority benefits. Held: the amendments were upheld, but they did not automatically create a right to reserved promotions. Government action must satisfy constitutional conditions, including inadequate representation and administrative efficiency. The Court originally also required data showing backwardness. Principle: constitutional permission to reserve does not remove the need for lawful justification.
Jarnail Singh (2018): Held: fresh data proving the backwardness of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was not required, because their constitutional identification already mattered. Inadequate representation and other limits still remained important.
| Nagaraj (original conditions) | After Jarnail Singh (2018) |
|---|---|
| Data on backwardness required | No fresh data on SC/ST backwardness required |
| Inadequate representation | Still required |
| Administrative efficiency | Still relevant |
Quoting only the original Nagaraj conditions can mislead. Promotion policies must follow the later judgments as well as the constitutional framework.
Berubari Union Presidential Reference (Cession of Territory)
Issue: Can Indian territory be transferred to another country simply by passing an ordinary law?
India and Pakistan had agreed on the division of territory. The President asked the Supreme Court how the Constitution permitted such a transfer.
Berubari Union Presidential Reference: reference on implementing an India-Pakistan agreement on territory. Held: changing boundaries within India is different from giving Indian territory to another country. Article 3 deals with forming States and altering their boundaries, but is not enough for ceding territory abroad; an amendment under Article 368 was required. Principle: territory cannot be transferred by treating Article 3 as an unlimited power.
- Ceding means legally transferring territory to another country.
- The judgment also described the Preamble as not part of the Constitution. This observation did not survive: in Kesavananda Bharati, the Court recognised the Preamble as part of the Constitution.
Remember both points: cession needs an Article 368 amendment, and the Berubari view on the Preamble was corrected in Kesavananda Bharati.
Zee Telefilms v. Union of India (Is BCCI "State"?)
Issue: Does the cricket board become the State merely because it controls cricket in India?
The dispute began after a disagreement over television broadcasting rights with the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI). The petitioners tried to enforce fundamental rights against the board through Article 32.
Zee Telefilms v. Union of India: dispute over broadcasting rights with BCCI. Held: by majority, BCCI was not State under Article 12; it was not created by statute, and government regulation did not amount to deep and pervasive control. But a High Court may issue appropriate directions under Article 226 when a body performs public duties. Principle: a public role does not automatically make a private body State, but public duties can attract accountability through other remedies.
Article 226 is wider in this respect than Article 32: it can reach bodies performing public duties even if they are not State.
Danial Latifi v. Union of India (Muslim Women Act, 1986)
Issue: Did the law passed after the Shah Bano judgment end the financial rights of divorced Muslim women?
Critics argued that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 restricted maintenance to the iddat period.
Danial Latifi v. Union of India: challenge to the 1986 Act. Held: a former husband must make a reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced woman. It must be made within the iddat period, but it can cover her needs beyond that period. This distinction saved the Act from being struck down. Principle: a time limit for making provision is not necessarily a limit on the period of support.
| Timing | Duration |
|---|---|
| Provision must be made within the iddat period | Provision can cover needs beyond the iddat period |
- If the woman cannot maintain herself, the Act contains remedies involving relatives and, where relevant, the Waqf Board.
- Later, the Supreme Court confirmed that the general secular maintenance remedy remains available too.
Distinguish timing from duration: a time limit for making provision is not necessarily a limit on the period of financial support.
P.V. Narasimha Rao and Sita Soren: Legislative Immunity and Bribery
Issue: Can a Member of Parliament escape a bribery prosecution because a vote was given inside Parliament?
P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (1998): allegations of bribes during a no-confidence vote. Held: a narrow majority read Article 105(2) as giving some members immunity connected with their votes. Principle: no longer the law.
Sita Soren v. Union of India (2024): a seven-judge bench unanimously overruled P.V. Narasimha Rao. Held: taking a bribe is a separate wrongful act and is not protected merely because it relates to a speech or vote in the legislature. Comparable protection under Article 194 also does not shield bribery. Principle: privileges protect genuine legislative work, not the sale of votes.
- Immunity means legal protection from specified proceedings.
Distinguish legislative freedom from corruption. Constitutional privileges do not create a private licence to sell votes for money.
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (Seventeenth Amendment)
Issue: Can Parliament amend the Constitution to protect land reform laws from court challenges?
The Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment widened protection for agricultural reform measures and placed laws in the Ninth Schedule. The challengers argued that Parliament could not weaken fundamental rights through its amendment power.
Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan: challenge to the Seventeenth Amendment. Held: the majority upheld the amendment, following Shankari Prasad, treating constitutional amendments differently from ordinary laws under Article 13. Justices Hidayatullah and Mudholkar expressed concern about whether there were essential features Parliament could not alter; the question was not finally settled. Principle: an important stage on the path to the basic structure doctrine.
| Stage | Position |
|---|---|
| Shankari Prasad, Sajjan Singh | Amendments treated differently from ordinary laws under Article 13; amendments upheld |
| Golaknath | Interpretation changed; fundamental rights could not be amended |
| Kesavananda Bharati | Parliament may amend but cannot damage the basic structure |
Remember Sajjan Singh as an important stage in the debate: it upheld the Seventeenth Amendment while helping open the path toward the basic structure doctrine.
Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal ("Other Authorities" in Article 12)
Issue: Must electricity boards follow fundamental rights even when they sell electricity like a business?
Employees brought a dispute involving a statutory electricity board. The Court had to interpret the words "other authorities" in Article 12, which defines State for the purposes of fundamental rights.
Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal: employee dispute against a statutory electricity board. Held: "other authorities" has a broad meaning. A statutory authority does not escape constitutional duties because its activities are commercial or involve public services; its legal powers and public character matter. A narrow reading limiting "other authorities" to bodies similar to local governments was rejected. Principle: constitutional accountability of public authorities.
- This ruling later helped shape decisions about public corporations and government-controlled organisations.
- Article 12 cases still depend on the legal position of the body and its relationship with government.
Public authorities cannot avoid equality requirements merely by operating in the marketplace.
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (Transgender Rights)
Issue: Can the law force a person to accept only male or female as their gender?
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India: Held: transgender persons have the right to their gender identity, including third gender recognition, linked to dignity, equality, freedom of expression and personal liberty under Articles 14, 15, 16, 19 and 21. The Court accepted self-identification and directed governments to address discrimination and provide measures for social inclusion. Principle: constitutional protection belongs to every person, not only those who fit traditional categories.
- Without legal recognition, people faced difficulties with identity papers, education, employment and healthcare.
- Later legislation created further rules, but the constitutional principles declared by the Court remain important.
| Gender identity | Sexual orientation |
|---|---|
| Who a person is | Whom a person is attracted to |
Gender identity and sexual orientation are not the same thing.
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (Basic Structure Doctrine)
Issue: Can Parliament change any part of the Constitution, even its most important principles?
The dispute arose against the background of land reform laws and Parliament's amendment power. Thirteen judges heard the case.
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (24 April 1973): closely divided judgment. Held: Parliament can amend the Constitution under Article 368, but cannot destroy or damage its basic structure. Principle: power to amend, but no power to destroy the essential character of the Constitution.
- Basic structure means the essential features that give the Constitution its identity.
- Examples recognised in case law: constitutional supremacy, judicial review, democracy and the rule of law.
- The Court did not provide one final, closed list.
- The principle later shaped cases on judicial independence, elections, emergency powers and the Ninth Schedule.
One date and one rule: 24 April 1973; Parliament can amend but not destroy the basic structure.
Manoj Narula v. Union of India (Ministers Facing Criminal Charges)
Issue: Can the Supreme Court stop someone from becoming a minister simply because criminal charges are pending?
The Court examined Articles 75 and 164, which deal with ministerial appointments at the Union and State levels.
Manoj Narula v. Union of India: challenge to appointment of ministers facing serious criminal allegations. Held: the Court recognised constitutional morality and clean public life but declined to create a new disqualification not written in the Constitution or applicable law; pending charges alone did not allow it to rewrite ministerial eligibility. The Prime Minister and Chief Ministers should act with constitutional responsibility when advising appointments. Principle: a legal limit combined with a strong ethical expectation.
A judge cannot automatically turn every desirable standard of public conduct into a new eligibility rule; democratic leaders must still exercise their powers in ways that maintain public trust.
Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India (Criminalisation of Politics)
Issue: Should a person facing serious criminal charges be barred from contesting elections before conviction?
The petitioners asked the Court to disqualify candidates once charges for serious offences had been framed.
Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India: Held: the Court recognised the danger of criminalisation in politics but said creating a new disqualification is primarily the task of Parliament; it could not add that rule to the Representation of the People Act. Instead, it required stronger public disclosure of criminal cases by candidates and political parties, so voters receive the information before choosing. Later orders strengthened publicity requirements. Principle: informed voting and constitutional limits on judicial power.
The case separates the need for reform from the power to make that reform. Judges can protect the voter's right to know but cannot replace every legislative decision with their own policy.
Selvi v. State of Karnataka (Narco-analysis and Lie Detector Tests)
Issue: Can police force an accused person to undergo a narco-analysis test or a lie detector test?
The Court examined narco-analysis, polygraph examinations and brain mapping.
Selvi v. State of Karnataka: Held: forcing these tests violates Article 20(3) (protection against compelled self-incrimination) and Article 21 (personal liberty and mental privacy). These techniques extract responses from the mind without free consent. Principle: the State may investigate crimes but cannot open a person's mind by force.
- Self-incrimination means being forced to provide testimony against oneself.
- These tests differ from collecting ordinary physical evidence, such as fingerprints or lawful biological samples.
- Voluntary testing is not automatically forbidden, but strict safeguards apply, including informed consent recorded before a Judicial Magistrate, with the test itself conducted by an independent agency in the presence of a lawyer.
- Even voluntary test results do not simply become admissible confessions.
Updated from the lecture: the lecture described voluntary testing as supervised by a Judicial Magistrate. The correct position is that the accused's consent is recorded before a Judicial Magistrate, while the test itself is carried out by an independent agency (such as a hospital) in the presence of a lawyer. Source: Selvi v. State of Karnataka, Supreme Court of India (Indian Kanoon).
Compelled narco-analysis, polygraph and brain mapping are unconstitutional; constitutional rights continue to operate during investigations.
Chief Election Commissioner v. Jan Chaukidar (Persons in Custody Contesting Elections)
Issue: Could a person in jail contest an election while unable to vote?
Section 62(5) of the election law restricts voting by many persons confined in prison or lawful police custody, subject to a stated exception.
Chief Election Commissioner v. Jan Chaukidar: Held: the Supreme Court linked the voting restriction to the qualifications for contesting, so certain persons in custody were prevented from standing for election. Principle: the result was effectively removed by Parliament.
- Parliament responded with the Representation of the People (Amendment and Validation) Act, 2013.
- It clarified that a person does not cease to be an elector merely because voting is restricted by custody.
- The change removed the original obstacle and was given retrospective effect.
Do not quote the original Jan Chaukidar result without the amendment. Distinguish the legal status of an elector from the ability to cast a vote while in custody.
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (Section 377)
Issue: Could two consenting adults be treated as criminals because their private relationship was between people of the same sex?
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India: challenge to the former Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code. Held: criminalising consensual sexual conduct between adults in private violated dignity, equality, privacy and personal liberty under Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21. Popular disapproval cannot decide the fundamental rights of a minority. The earlier Koushal decision was overruled to that extent. Principle: constitutional rights belong equally to minorities.
Limit of the judgment: it did not remove legal protection against sexual offences involving children or acts without consent. It concerned consenting adults in private.
Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram (Statutory Corporations as State)
Issue: Are public corporations outside the Constitution because they look like ordinary companies?
The case involved service disputes in public statutory corporations: the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, the Life Insurance Corporation and the Industrial Finance Corporation.
Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram: service disputes in ONGC, LIC and IFC. Held: these statutory bodies were State under Article 12, as they were established through law and exercised public powers. Service regulations framed under statutory authority have binding legal force, and employers could not disregard them while terminating employees. Justice Mathew developed the idea that government instrumentalities must remain constitutionally accountable. Principle: the form of the organisation does not remove constitutional safeguards.
- Instrumentality means an organisation acting as a means through which government functions are carried out.
- The judgment helped build important later Article 12 decisions.
If public power is exercised through a corporation, the form of the organisation does not automatically remove constitutional safeguards for employees and citizens.
Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka (Capitation Fee and Education)
Issue: Can a medical college demand an enormous capitation fee from a student?
Capitation fee means an extra payment demanded for admission, beyond lawful fees.
Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka: a student challenged the fee system for private medical education. Held: education is connected with human dignity and the right to life under Article 21; admission fees that effectively shut poorer students out were strongly criticised. The ruling became an important step in recognising education as a constitutional concern. Principle: link between fair educational access, dignity and constitutional equality.
- The broad approach was refined in Unni Krishnan, which focused on free education for children up to 14 years.
- Subsequently, Article 21A expressly guaranteed free and compulsory education for children aged 6 to 14.
Do not treat every observation in Mohini Jain as a complete statement of current education law.
Minerva Mills v. Union of India (Limited Amending Power)
Issue: Can Parliament amend the Constitution to remove limits on its own amendment power?
Parts of the Forty-second Constitutional Amendment tried to make constitutional amendments immune from court challenge and expand protection for laws implementing Directive Principles.
Minerva Mills v. Union of India: challenge to clauses of the Forty-second Amendment. Held: clauses damaging the basic structure were struck down. Limited amending power is itself a basic feature; Parliament cannot convert a limited power into an unlimited one. Fundamental rights and Directive Principles must be in harmony. Principle: limited amending power, judicial review, and harmony between Part III and Part IV.
| Fundamental Rights (Part III) | Directive Principles (Part IV) |
|---|---|
| Protect individual liberty | Guide the State toward social justice |
Neither Part should be used to destroy the other. The Constitution seeks both freedom and social progress.
Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (Constitutional Heads)
Issue: Does the President or Governor personally run the government?
The dispute concerned judicial officers and executive authority. A seven-judge bench considered the constitutional role of the President and Governors.
Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab: Held: the President and Governors are ordinarily constitutional heads who act on the aid and advice of their Councils of Ministers. Formal powers may be written in their name, but elected ministers exercise political responsibility. There are exceptions where discretion is permitted. The Court also considered the High Court's constitutional control over the subordinate judiciary. Principle: real executive responsibility lies with ministers answerable to the legislature.
- Discretion means lawful freedom to decide without following ordinary ministerial advice in a specifically recognised situation.
The President and Governors are not independent executives like an elected presidential head.
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (Right to Privacy)
Issue: Is privacy a fundamental right when the Constitution does not use that word?
The dispute emerged during litigation over the Aadhaar identity scheme.
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India: Held: a nine-judge bench unanimously held that privacy is protected under the Constitution, particularly Article 21 and other fundamental rights. Older decisions denying constitutional privacy were rejected to that extent, and the A.D.M. Jabalpur approach was condemned. Principle: privacy is a fundamental right, but not unlimited.
- Privacy includes control over personal information, intimate choices, and personal physical and mental space.
- Government interference needs legal authority, a legitimate purpose and proper safeguards, including proportionality.
- Proportionality means the State must not restrict a right more than is justified.
This judgment settled the existence of the right to privacy. Separate judgments later decided specific questions about Aadhaar and data collection.
Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India (Dissolution of Bihar Assembly)
Issue: Can a Governor recommend dissolving an Assembly simply because no government has yet been formed?
After a hung Assembly election in Bihar, instead of allowing the Assembly to explore government formation, the authorities relied on concerns about defections and possible horse-trading, and the Assembly was dissolved.
Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India: Held: the dissolution under Article 356 was unconstitutional because the power had been misused. A Governor cannot replace proven constitutional failure with speculation about what politicians might do. Courts can examine the material behind an Article 356 proclamation. However, the Assembly was not restored because of the circumstances then existing, including the election process. Principle: constitutional power needs genuine reasons, not political assumptions.
Remember both the principle (unlawful dissolution condemned) and the remedy (practical relief was limited; no restoration).
Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (Article 239AA)
Issue: Who has real executive power in Delhi, its elected government or the Lieutenant Governor?
Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi v. Union of India: Constitution Bench under Article 239AA. Held: Delhi has a special constitutional arrangement. Its elected Council of Ministers ordinarily governs matters within subjects permitted to the Legislative Assembly. The Lieutenant Governor is not meant to act as an automatic rival government, and differences of opinion cannot be used to obstruct every ordinary decision. But Delhi is not a full State; public order, police and land are reserved for the Union framework. Principle: constitutional cooperation and representative government within Delhi's special status.
- Later legislation and judgments addressed particular disputes about services and administrative control.
Neither the elected government nor the Lieutenant Governor can ignore the specific division of powers written into the Constitution.
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (Preventive Detention and Article 21)
Issue: Does following a written legal procedure always make detention constitutional?
Preventive detention means holding a person to prevent anticipated harmful acts, rather than punishing a completed offence.
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras: Gopalan challenged his detention under a preventive detention law soon after the Constitution came into force. Held: the Court took a narrow approach to Article 21, treating "procedure established by law" largely as properly enacted legal procedure, and viewed fundamental rights as separate compartments. Principle: historical starting point, not the modern rule.
| A.K. Gopalan | Maneka Gandhi (1978) |
|---|---|
| Procedure means properly enacted legal procedure | Procedure must be fair, just and reasonable |
| Fundamental rights in separate compartments | Articles 14, 19 and 21 read together |
The modern understanding gives stronger protection against arbitrary State action and unfair procedures.
Common Cause v. Union of India (Passive Euthanasia and Living Wills)
Issue: Can a seriously ill person legally refuse life-sustaining treatment?
| Active euthanasia | Passive euthanasia |
|---|---|
| Deliberately causing death | Withholding or withdrawing futile treatment, letting the illness take its course |
| Not authorised | Recognised under strict safeguards |
Common Cause v. Union of India: right to die with dignity. Held: passive euthanasia and advance medical directives (living wills) were recognised under strict safeguards, linked to dignity and personal autonomy under Article 21. No unrestricted right to have someone end a human life was created. Principle: protecting dignity in serious illness differs from authorising the deliberate administration of a lethal substance.
- An advance directive records the wishes of a competent person about future medical care if they later cannot decide.
- Medical and legal safeguards are essential.
- The Supreme Court later simplified some procedures in 2023.
Protecting human dignity during serious illness (passive euthanasia, living wills) is different from authorising the deliberate administration of a lethal substance (active euthanasia).
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (Thirty-ninth Amendment)
Issue: Can Parliament change election rules to protect a disputed election of the Prime Minister?
After Indira Gandhi's election was challenged, during the Emergency period, Parliament passed the Thirty-ninth Constitutional Amendment, attempting to place certain high-level election disputes beyond ordinary judicial scrutiny.
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain: Held: examined under the basic structure doctrine, free and fair elections and essential constitutional limits could not be removed by such an amendment. The provision giving exceptional protection to specified election disputes was struck down. Principle: even the highest elected office cannot gain unlimited protection by changing the Constitution for a pending dispute.
The case applied the basic structure doctrine beyond land reform and ordinary fundamental rights: elections must remain subject to constitutional standards.
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (National Anthem)
Issue: Must every student sing the National Anthem when it is played at school?
Facts: Three children who were Jehovah's Witnesses respectfully stood when the National Anthem was sung but declined to sing because of sincere religious beliefs. They were expelled from school.
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala: Held: the expulsion violated Article 19 (freedom of expression) and Article 25 (freedom of conscience and religion). The children had not interrupted the anthem or shown disrespect; respectful silence differs from deliberate insult. Principle: constitutional freedom can include the freedom not to say particular words.
- Freedom of conscience means the right to hold sincere personal beliefs.
Facts precisely: the students stood respectfully; they did not sing; their peaceful refusal was protected. Patriotism cannot be measured only by forced speech.
M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (Excessive Reservation)
Issue: Could a State reserve 68% of seats in professional colleges?
The government divided certain backward classes into categories and reserved a large majority of seats. Students challenged the order under Article 15(4), which permits special measures for socially and educationally backward classes and certain protected groups.
M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore: Held: the 68% reservation was excessive and could not stand. Identifying backwardness requires careful consideration of social and educational conditions. Reservation should ordinarily remain below 50%. Principle: positive measures must still respect equality and lawful limits.
An early stage in reservation law; the later framework developed through cases such as Indra Sawhney and constitutional amendments.
Shayara Bano v. Union of India (Instant Triple Talaq)
Issue: Could a Muslim husband instantly end a marriage by saying talaq three times in one sitting?
Shayara Bano v. Union of India: challenge to talaq-e-biddat (instant triple talaq). Held: a five-judge bench, by 3:2, held the practice could not continue as legally valid. Principle: constitutional examination of personal-law practices on equality and dignity.
| Opinion | Reasoning |
|---|---|
| Two judges (majority) | Practice manifestly arbitrary under Article 14 |
| Third judge (majority) | Practice lacked support in essential Islamic legal sources |
| Two judges | Dissented |
- Manifestly arbitrary means plainly unreasonable in a way the Constitution cannot accept.
- Parliament later enacted the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, creating specific statutory consequences.
The judgment concerned instant, irrevocable triple talaq only; it did not abolish every lawful method of divorce under Muslim law.
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar (Speedy Trial)
Issue: Can an undertrial prisoner remain in jail for years without a speedy trial simply because they are poor?
Reports described prisoners who had spent longer in custody awaiting trial than the possible punishment for their alleged offences.
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar: Held: speedy trial is part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. The Court stressed free legal assistance for those who cannot afford lawyers and directed attention to release and fair treatment of undertrial prisoners trapped by poverty. Principle: a fair system protects personal freedom, legal representation and timely proceedings.
A landmark in public interest litigation and access to justice: the State cannot keep someone waiting indefinitely for trial and call the delay justice.
M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu (Child Labour)
Issue: Can children be employed in dangerous industries merely because their families need money?
The case concerned child labour in hazardous work, including match and fireworks production around Sivakasi. The Court looked at Article 24, which restricts employment of children below 14 in factories, mines and hazardous employment, and the State's duties toward children under the Directive Principles.
M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu: Held: the Court directed stronger enforcement and rehabilitation measures, required specified compensation from employers for illegally employed children with the money directed toward their welfare, and stressed education and support for affected families. Poverty is not a justification for exposing children to danger. Principle: employers cannot evade responsibility by pointing to the family's economic difficulties.
- Later legislation changed and expanded the statutory rules on child labour.
Child development and access to education deserve strong legal protection; poverty of the family does not justify exposing children to hazardous work.
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (Sabarimala)
Issue: Can women of a particular age group be barred from entering a public temple?
The Sabarimala temple practice excluded women roughly between 10 and 50 years old.
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2018): Held: a five-judge bench ruled 4:1 against the exclusion, emphasising women's right to worship and finding the rule inconsistent with constitutional and statutory protections. Justice Indu Malhotra dissented, warning about judicial interference with religious practice. Principle: equality and worship rights must be balanced with religious freedom.
- Review petitions followed, and larger questions about religious freedom and constitutional rights were referred for further consideration.
- The original judgment was not automatically stayed merely because review proceedings continued.
Remember the constitutional tension: equality and individual worship rights must be considered alongside the protection of religious freedom, examining both the claimed religious practice and the rights of those excluded.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (Fair, Just and Reasonable Procedure)
Issue: Can the government take away a passport without a fair chance to challenge the decision?
The government impounded Maneka Gandhi's passport under the Passport Act and initially withheld its reasons.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India: Held: a procedure restricting personal liberty must be fair, just and reasonable, not arbitrary or oppressive. Articles 14, 19 and 21 must be read together. Procedural fairness, including an appropriate opportunity to be heard, was strengthened. Principle: a written law does not automatically make every government action fair.
- The link between Articles 14, 19 and 21 is often called the golden triangle of fundamental rights.
- The case moved constitutional law away from the narrower A.K. Gopalan approach.
When liberty is restricted, both the law and its application must respect constitutional standards.
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (Article 356)
Issue: Can the Central Government dismiss a State government just because it dislikes the ruling party?
Article 356 permits central rule in defined constitutional circumstances.
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India: Held: a nine-judge bench held that Article 356 proclamations can be judicially reviewed. A Governor's political opinion is not enough; majority support is ordinarily to be tested on the Assembly floor. Unconstitutional use can lead to meaningful relief, including restoration in appropriate cases. Federalism and secularism received strong protection. Principle: constitutional breakdown must be supported by relevant material, open to judicial scrutiny.
- Federalism means sharing government power between the Union and the States.
Floor test, judicial review of proclamations, possible restoration: political uncertainty does not give the Centre unlimited power to dissolve elected State governments.
I. R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu: Limits of the Ninth Schedule
Question: Can Parliament protect a law forever simply by placing it in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution?
- Article 31B was intended to protect certain laws from challenges based on fundamental rights.
- The Supreme Court explained that this shield is not unlimited.
- Amendments placing laws in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 can be tested against the basic structure of the Constitution.
- The Court examined whether such protection damages essential constitutional rights and principles, including equality and judicial review.
- The judges built on the earlier Waman Rao ruling, which had used the same dividing date.
Judicial review means the power of courts to examine whether government action follows the Constitution.
I. R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu: the question was whether placing a law in the Ninth Schedule under Article 31B makes it immune from challenge. Held: amendments placing laws in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973 can be tested against the basic structure, including equality and judicial review. Principle: the Ninth Schedule offers special protection, but it is not a hiding place for constitutional destruction.
Parliament cannot use an amendment to make the basic structure of the Constitution meaningless.
PUCL v. Union of India: Telephone Tapping and Privacy
Question: Can the government secretly listen to telephone calls whenever it wants?
- The Supreme Court considered Section 5(2) of the former Indian Telegraph Act.
- Interception requires the conditions laid down in law, including a public emergency or public safety, and the specified statutory grounds.
- Phone tapping affects privacy under Article 21 and can also affect freedom of expression under Article 19.
- The Court laid down procedural safeguards, including proper authorisation and review, to prevent arbitrary surveillance.
- These directions influenced later privacy safeguards and legal rules.
Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India: examined telephone tapping under Section 5(2) of the former Indian Telegraph Act. Held: interception requires the conditions laid down in law (a public emergency or public safety and the specified statutory grounds), and procedural safeguards of proper authorisation and review must be followed. Principle: phone tapping affects privacy under Article 21 and can also affect freedom of expression under Article 19, so surveillance cannot be arbitrary.
The government cannot justify every secret interception merely by saying it would be useful. The legal conditions must exist, and safeguards must be followed. This case protected communications privacy many years before the nine-judge Puttaswamy ruling formally recognised privacy as a fundamental right.
Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal: Obscenity and Context
Question: Does every photograph containing nudity become legally obscene?
- The Supreme Court rejected the old approach of judging isolated parts of material through the strict Hicklin test.
- It applied the contemporary community standards approach and examined the publication in context.
Context means looking at the full situation and purpose, not one detail alone.
Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal: a photograph showed tennis star Boris Becker posing with a woman as part of a message against racism; a complaint claimed publishing the image was obscene. Held: the anti-racism message mattered, and the material was not obscene merely because it showed nudity; the criminal proceedings were quashed. Principle: obscenity is judged by contemporary community standards, looking at the publication as a whole and in context, not by the Hicklin test.
| Hicklin test (rejected) | Contemporary community standards (applied) |
|---|---|
| Judges isolated parts of the material | Examines the complete publication in context |
| Strict, old approach | Considers meaning, purpose and present-day standards |
Freedom of expression requires courts to consider the complete publication, its meaning and present-day standards. An image cannot be condemned simply because someone finds part of it uncomfortable.
Anant Kumar Naik v. State of Andhra Pradesh: Blood Tests and Self-Incrimination
Question: Can an accused person refuse lawful blood and semen tests by invoking the right to remain silent?
- The case was decided by the High Court.
- The accused challenged an order requiring physical samples during an investigation.
- He relied on Article 20(3), which protects against being compelled to testify against oneself.
- The Court drew a distinction between testimonial evidence and physical evidence.
| Testimonial evidence | Physical evidence |
|---|---|
| Communicating personal knowledge, such as through forced answers | Physical material, such as a blood sample |
| Protected by Article 20(3) | Not a compelled spoken confession; not barred by Article 20(3) |
Anant Kumar Naik v. State of Andhra Pradesh: the accused challenged an order requiring blood and semen samples, relying on Article 20(3). Held: the medical examination was not prohibited by Article 20(3); the Court considered the relevant powers under the then Criminal Procedure Code. Principle: physical evidence and forced testimony are different legal questions.
The corresponding modern framework includes Section 51 of B.N.S.S.
This case did not authorise torture or unrestricted testing. Collection must still follow lawful procedures and constitutional safeguards.
G.V.K. Industries v. Income Tax Officer: Extra-Territorial Laws under Article 245
Question: Can the Indian Parliament make laws about events that happen outside India?
- The question was examined under Article 245.
- The constitutional issue concerned the power of Parliament to make laws with effects beyond Indian territory.
- The Supreme Court explained that Parliament may legislate about overseas matters when there is a real connection to India.
- It does not have unlimited authority to legislate for entirely foreign matters having no such connection.
- The Court decided the constitutional principles separately from the remaining tax dispute, which was considered later.
A real connection is often described as a nexus.
G.V.K. Industries v. Income Tax Officer: the dispute began with a payment by an Indian company to a foreign adviser for help arranging finance for an Indian project. Held: Parliament may make laws on overseas matters that have a real connection (nexus) with India, but not on entirely foreign matters with no such connection. Principle: Article 245 permits extra-territorial effect only for matters meaningfully connected with India.
Article 245 does not ban laws with effects outside India. But the power of Parliament must be exercised for matters meaningfully connected with India and its constitutional interests.
Raja Ram Pal v. Honourable Speaker, Lok Sabha: Parliamentary Privilege and Judicial Review
Question: Can Parliament expel its own members for accepting money to ask questions, and can a court examine that expulsion?
- The case arose after the cash-for-questions sting operation.
- Several legislators were accused of accepting money for parliamentary questions and were expelled.
- They argued that parliamentary proceedings were protected from judicial interference.
- The Supreme Court recognised the important powers of Parliament to protect its dignity and functioning.
- But it rejected the idea that parliamentary privilege is completely beyond the Constitution.
- Courts may review exercises of privilege for serious constitutional violations or illegality.
- Courts do not simply replace the decision of Parliament with their own views about ordinary procedure.
Raja Ram Pal v. Honourable Speaker, Lok Sabha: legislators expelled after the cash-for-questions sting operation challenged their expulsion. Held: parliamentary privilege is not beyond the Constitution, and its exercise is open to judicial review for serious constitutional violations or illegality; the expulsions were upheld. Principle: Parliament may maintain its integrity, but judicial review remains available where constitutional limits are crossed.
Parliament needs authority to maintain integrity within its chambers, but no constitutional institution has unlimited power. The Constitution protects institutions while also holding them accountable.
